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THE AFFAIRS OF DAURA

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M. G. Smith

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Preface

This monograph is the first of a series that seeks to report and analyze the political histories of selected Muslim states or emirates located in the central Sudan. Of the states to be studied, Daura, Katsina, Kano, and Sokoto are in Northern Nigeria; and Maradi, which lies in Niger, adjoins Katsina. In successive volumes of this series I shall describe the organizations and relate the histories of these states for the period between 1800 and 1955. With one exception each of the states forms the subject of a separate volume, but one volume will combine accounts of the two Katsinas, the Fulani conquest state at Katsina and the Hausa successor state at Maradi, since they had common historical foundations and were intimately associated throughout the nineteenth century as enemies. It is therefore appropriate to discuss the institutions and development of the two Katsinas before and under European colonialism together.

I was led to undertake the inquiries on which these accounts are based by the results of an earlier study of the political institutions and development of the Hausa-Fulani emirate of Zaria (Zazzau), located in Northern Nigeria due south of Kano. Like Daura, Katsina, and Kano, the Hausa state of Zaria paid tribute to the Kanuri kingdom of Bornu until 1804. At that date the northeastern half of Sokoto Province was occupied by the independent Hausa state of Gobir, which had recently repudiated Bornu's suzerainty after conquering and incorporating the chiefdom of Zamfara in east and south-central Sokoto. Between 1804 and 1810 the Hausa governments of Zazzau, Daura, Katsina, Kano, and Gobir were challenged, defeated, and overthrown by a general revolt of pastoral and settled Fulani led by the Torodbe (Fulani) Muslim reformer, Shehu Usman dan Fodio (Othman ibn Fudi), who declared a jihad, or holy war, in February 1804 against the chiefs of Gobir, their congeners, and allies. By hard fighting the Shehu's community *(jema'a)* overran the Hausa states and expelled the dynasties and senior officials that had hitherto ruled them. At Zaria the defeated chief and officials withdrew southward toward Abuja, where they eventually estab-

lished a successor state within the limits of their old territory. At Katsina the chiefs and officials were forced to withdraw to Zinder, north of Kano, a Kanuri state which was also tributary to Bornu. Some years later these Katsina Hausa reestablished themselves at Maradi in the northeastern perimeter of their ancient chiefdom, following a revolt by the local pagans against Fulani rule. In like fashion, the Hausa chiefs of Gobir were driven northward, where they subsequently established a successor state at Tsibiri, five miles west of Maradi; and the expelled Hausa rulers of Daura established successor states at Zango, Magaria, and Baure, as related below. Of these defeated Hausa dynasties, only the chiefs of Kano failed to establish a successor state. In 1959, while at Maradi, I had the privilege of meeting the Hausa Pretender, Sarkin Kano Abubakar, whose ancestors had settled there under the protection of the Hausa chiefs of Katsina (Maradi).

As a result of the establishment of these successor states by Hausa dynasties after the Fulani conquest, we can compare their political institutions and developments with those of the Fulani regimes that replaced them. By thus comparing the Hausa successor states with their Fulani equivalents, we can determine with fair certainty the prejihadic constitutions of these Hausa states and so identify prejihadic Hausa institutions in the Fulani regimes. On this basis we can undertake detailed reconstructions of all of these governments and so equip ourselves to collect and sift the data we need to trace their historical development. With these materials, it is then possible to examine successive forms of each regime at appropriate intervals during the hundred and fifty years that followed the Shehu's jihad. To complement such institutional comparisons, we may then analyze the historical sequences through which these structures developed and were transformed both before and under European colonial rule.

The states selected for comparative study are all contiguous and shared the common experiences of jihad and colonialism. They also shared the same religious tradition, belonged to the same cultural bloc, and have the same major ethnic components, Fulani and Hausa. Comparative analysis of their political institutions and development over a hundred and fifty years should accordingly reveal any regularities in the processes of political change to which they were exposed and should thus enable us to see whether, at least in Muslim states of this cultural zone, such processes may not be subject to certain structural conditions which effectively determine the order by which they must proceed if they are to modify the governmental system.

This general hypothesis was the major conclusion of my analysis of the political history and institutions of the Fulani conquest state of Zaria,[1] a study that was made possible by the publication of a detailed account of the Hausa successor state of (Zazzau at) Abuja by two scholarly members of the Abuja dynasty.[2] By comparing institutions of the Abuja government with those of the Fulani emirate at Zaria, it was easy to identify Hausa elements that the Fulani retained at Zaria after the conquest and to specify their modifications. Developments at Zaria could then be studied in their historical context.

In seeking to test and develop or replace the methods and conclusions of this early study of political change by application to these new bodies of data, I have tried to adapt this general procedure to the differing circumstances of each case. For example, in the absence of a detailed account of the political institutions of the prejihadic Hausa state of Katsina, such as the Abuja princes provided for Zaria, I visited its successor state at Maradi to gather these data. Likewise, in the absence of a successor state derived from Kano, I first made a tentative reconstruction of the prejihadic Hausa regime on information supplied by the Kutumbawa Hausa of Kano city, who trace descent from its prejihadic rulers, and then reexamined the celebrated Kano Chronicle and other texts on prejihadic Kano to determine the accuracy and adequacy of my account. In studying the development of the imperial Fulani state of Sokoto, I compiled data on the Hausa governments of Gobir, Zamfara, and Kebbi from various sources, since the Fulani of Sokoto borrowed various institutions from these regimes at different times. My accounts of Kano and Sokoto accordingly treat the political history and ethnography of the Hausa regimes as preliminaries to the detailed description and analysis of developments in the Fulani regimes that replaced them in much the same way that the account of Zaria treated the reconstruction of the Hausa state as an essential first step to the study of its development. However, in the Katsina study I attempt to present parallel and related accounts of the political organizations and changes of the Fulani emirate and the Hausa successor state, partly because their histories were so intricately intertwined and mutually illuminating, partly because these regimes diverged as they developed, and primarily because their sustained comparative analysis provides an excellent unanticipated test of the methods and hypotheses under study.

At Daura historical cirumstances dictated a different adaptation of the general procedure illustrated above. To appreciate the reasons for this adaptation, a skeleton history of Daura after the jihad is necessary. Following their expulsion by the Fulani, the Hausa rulers of Daura wandered for several years before settling at Yekuwa. There the defeated Sarkin (Chief of) Daura Abdu died, and his nephew Lukudi succeeded. Shortly after Lukudi's succession, the dynasty split first into two, and later three, segments as new chiefdoms were established further east, first at Dan Mairam then at Magaria and Baure. Thus weakened, the three successor states of Hausa Daura fell prey to the expanding Kanuri state of Zinder (Damagaram) due north, which later abolished the Hausa chiefdom at Magaria and incorporated its territory. Thereafter, until the French and British arrived, there were three Daura states, the Fulani emirate centered in the old capital city of that name, the senior Hausa successor state with its capital at Zango, and its junior rival, Baure, further east. When the British pacified the region, they abolished the chiefdom of Baure and incorporated it in Zango, whose chief was then restored to his ancestral city to administer the reunited residues of the traditional Daura state, following the expropriation and abolition of the Fulani dynasty and emirate. In consequence, Daura is unique among the Fulani and Hausa states that changed hands during the jihad. It is the only example of a

Hausa restoration within the territories overrun by the Shehu's followers; and it is also the only case in which a Fulani emirate has been totally abolished. As a result of these events, however, I was unable to gather as much detail on the political ethnographies and histories of the Fulani emirate and the Hausa chiefdom of Baure as on the Zango state, whose organization was preserved, although transformed, by its ruler's restoration to Daura.

In accommodating to the situation produced by these historical events, the following case study virtually reverses the procedure followed elsewhere, for at Daura I could study the institutions and history of the prejihadic regime *in situ* to identify postjihadic changes by investigating those of the successor state at Zango before the Hausa returned and recovered their lost city. I could also compare these Hausa institutions with accounts of the Fulani regime, whose history I could not recover. To gather comparable data on Baure and the Fulani emirate, I had to rely primarily on surviving officials of those states, supplemented by data from the Zango community, since I could find virtually nothing of value about them in the regional literature, Arabic manuscripts, or administrative records. Accordingly, the study of Daura that follows concentrates on the Hausa regime that was displaced by the jihad, reconstituted at Zango, and restored to Daura by the British in 1906. The account of this Hausa state is supplemented by summary descriptions of the chiefdoms of Baure and Fulani Daura, which the British abolished in 1906. No attempt was made to study Magaria, although French officials later resurrected the chiefdom under its old Hausa dynasty, primarily because Baure supplied so large a proportion of the Magaria officialdom when that state was reconstituted that contemporary Magaria seemed more liable to represent a Baure successor state modified by French colonial policies and regulations than its original. By comparing the political institutions of Baure and Fulani Daura with each other and with those of Zango, I could check many details of the prejihadic Hausa regime supplied by members of the translated Zango community. Being unable to recover political histories of Baure and Fulani Daura in sufficient detail, I have been obliged to restrict my analysis of the detailed processes of political change within these states to the experiences of the Zango community before and after its restoration. While I regret my failure to recover equivalent data on Baure and Fulani Daura, the following account of the political organization and vicissitudes of the Zango community presents so many unique features and developments that its intrinsic interest and theoretical significance amply justify its place in this series.

Daura was the first of the emirates selected for study which I visited in 1958-1959. By then the political history of Zaria which generated the ideas and impetus for these inquiries had been completed. Having already studied the history of one Fulani emirate in detail, I thought it advisable, before proceeding to study others, to attempt a similar study of Daura, where the prejihadic Hausa dynasty and officials had been restored by British action. Later, when I had the chance to analyze my data and prepare these monographs, it was also appropriate to begin work with Daura for several reasons.

First, as a Hausa state under Kanuri influence, it has the fewest historical and cultural links with the Fulani emirates of Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto. Thus, by analyzing its institutions and history, I could sharpen my perceptions of the features that distinguished the Fulani and Hausa regimes. Moreover, as the processes of preparation and writing would inevitably test the quality and sufficiency of my data, and as Daura was the first of the emirates to be studied in 1958-1959, it seemed appropriate to undertake its description first in order to see how far my field methods had succeeded in furnishing the ethnographic and historical data required for the analysis of political change. Finally, since this account of Daura is based almost entirely on oral data collected in the field, its preparation provided another searching test of the utility of such data for a study of political change similar to the initial inquiry at Zaria.

The paucity and marginal relevance of available documents obliged me to base the study of Daura almost entirely on oral information. As field inquiries progressed from Daura, to Katsina and Maradi, to Kano, and so finally to Sokoto, the volume, relevance, and quality of textual materials, both contemporary and retrospective, increased steadily. However, lacking such resources at Daura, I had to rely there on oral information collected and cross-checked in systematic interviews with several elderly savants recruited from each of the states whose institutions and history I sought to record. Thus the account of Daura best illustrates the values and limitations of oral data for studies of political organization and change in these centralized Sudanic states. As an account of the field methods employed in these inquiries has been published elsewhere,[3] it is only necessary to illustrate their application to the peculiar problems presented by Daura's turbulent historical experience in the appropriate place.

Most of my basic data were collected in a series of daily interviews with the ex-Waziri Alhassan, the ex-Galadima Salihu, the Sarkin Fada Adamu of Daura, and Alhaji Adamu; but I also had several discussions with the then Emir Abdurrahman, the Limamin Daura Malam Ishaka, the Madawaki Malam Buhari, the Galadima (1958) Malam Ahmadu, and others. Shortly after leaving Daura, I prepared a brief outline of its ancient political organization in Hausa for the late Emir Abdurrahman; and when the ethnographic and historical chapters of this text were drafted, a copy was sent to the ex-Waziri Alhassan at Daura as I had promised for him and his colleagues to correct as they thought necessary. The then assistant manager of primary schools at Daura, Alhaji Dauda Daura, who is fluent in English, translated the text for them into Hausa. He completed his reading of the text before the former Waziri Alhassan died at the end of January 1967. At my request, Alhaji Dauda then handed the text to Professor Neil Skinner of the University of Wisconsin at Kano in July 1967 and sent a list of proposed corrections. All but one or two of these suggestions referred to the misspelling of the names of individuals and places. Thus encouraged, I revised the text for publication and drafted its concluding chapters.

For the opportunity to undertake the field inquiries on which the follow-

ing monographs are based, I am indebted to the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research for a fellowship and to the University College of the West Indies for granting leave. The preparation of the following monographs was made possible by two generous awards, G8-605 in 1965 and GS-2175 in 1968-1969, from the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. Together these awards enabled me to devote twenty undistracted months to the analysis of my data and the preparation of the documentary accounts of the five states I had studied. The University of California, Los Angeles, kindly approved two requests for leave for this program, which Professors Clement W. Meighan and Walter Goldschmidt of the Department of Anthropology submitted on my behalf. Without this generous support from the National Science Foundation and the University of California, I cannot imagine how it would have been possible to prepare these monographs for publication.

No analysis of the institutions or development of any of these states was attempted until documentary accounts of all five had been drafted. Each text was then carefully checked and revised in London before its materials were analyzed. My wife, Mary F. Smith, typed both drafts of the present text and most of the others. My son, David Smith, prepared the maps and diagrams for this monograph. I am grateful to the editorial staff of the University of California Press, and especially to Susan Crow, for the forbearance and skill with which the manuscript was translated into its present form.

At Daura I gathered the following data from the late Emir Alhaji Abdurrahman, C.B.E. (1911-1968); the Limamin Juma'a Malam Ishaka; Alhaji Adamu of the Hausa dynasty; the ex-Waziri Alhassan and the Madawaki Malam Buhari, both of whom were brothers of the emir; the former Galadima Salihu and his successor, the Galadima (1958) Malam Ahmadu, then district head of Mai Aduwa; the Sarkin Fada Adamu of Daura; the Sarkin Fada Dendi of Baure; the Sarkin Fada Zakari, also of Baure; the former Magajin Gari Na'inkali of Fulani Daura; and Malam Abdu dan Abdu Birgi. The Limam Malam Ishaka and Alhaji Adamu kindly dictated Hausa translations of local king lists and historical notes from Arabic texts in their possession on various occasions. The ex-Waziri Alhassan likewise dictated a Hausa translation of the *Kitāb al-farq* by the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, thereby introducing me to the Shehu's extant writings on the political and religious conditions of the Hausa states at which he directed the jihad. My debt to these elders for the care and interest with which they discussed the political organization and history of these states and for the readiness with which they undertook to investigate details outside their previous knowledge will be apparent in the chapters that follow, though poorly repaid by the text. I am also particularly obliged to Alhaji Dauda Daura, the former assistant manager of schools, for translating the text into Hausa so that my former colleagues at Daura could hear the fruits of their work and indicate the corrections they thought appropriate; and finally to Malam Mahmud Tukur, director of the Institute of Administration at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria;

and the Ministry of Information, North Central State, Nigeria, for the excellent photographs that illustrate the book. In acknowledgment of all the help that I received from the rulers and elders of Daura, I include at his request the official program of the installation in January 1969 of the Emir Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar, O.B.E., who succeeded his grandfather, Abdurrahman, eleven years after this volume ends.

NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

On grounds of economy and convenience I have used ordinary letters instead of the symbols frequently used to represent implosive b's, d's, and k's when Hausa is written in the roman script. This practice can be defended on the ground that those familiar with Hausa speech will immediately recognize the implosive consonants, while others unacquainted with the Hausa language will not find such directions useful.

Unfortunately, Western authors have not yet agreed on a standardized spelling of many Hausa terms, especially the names of places and people. Consequently, quotations from differing authors often present divergent spellings of certain names. Thus confused, I have frequently used variant spellings for the same term at different points in the preparation of the present text; and while, thanks to meticulous editing by Susan Crow, most or all of these inconsistencies in the spelling of names have been eliminated from the text, some divergences remain for the place names and personal names on the maps and in the genealogies. As these divergent spellings are in my view equally correct and the divergences themselves are of no great significance, I have preferred to let the genealogies and maps stand uncorrected rather than to further hold up the publication of this volume.

University College, London — M. G. Smith

1
Introduction

AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The structure of this book can be justified only by reference to my purposes in writing it. Accordingly, before outlining the structure, it is necessary to detail the aims of the work.

This volume initiates a series of studies that has three distinct but related objectives. First, these monographs endeavor to describe traditional forms of government in selected Muslim emirates of the central Sudan and to trace their development by relating their histories over the past two hundred years, giving special attention to the period from the eve of the Fulani jihad of Shehu Usman dan Fodio in 1804 until about 1950 to 1960, the closing decades of European colonization. The states with whose political ethnographies and histories the series deals are Daura, Katsina, Maradi, Kano, and Sokoto. Of these we have useful historical materials for Kano from the late fourteenth century forward; for Katsina, Maradi, and Gobir, the Hausa chiefdom that Sokoto displaced, historical data before the mid-eighteenth century are sketchy and unequal; and Sokoto itself, the imperial Fulani state, was only founded between 1808 and 1812. For Daura, which is currently the only Hausa state in this list, reliable historical information is only available from the closing decades of the eighteenth century forward. For all or most of these states our studies terminate in the 1950s, and for Daura the narrative ceases at 1958.

A primary objective of this monograph and its successors is thus to place on permanent record as detailed a political ethnography and history of each of these states as is necessary to appreciate their structure and understand their development. For the most part these accounts are based on oral data related by knowledgeable elders, sifted and collated by the writer, and corrected or supplemented by information from a variety of documentary sources. It is hoped that besides thus preserving reasonably complete accounts of these polities and their histories for future generations of Africans,

Africanists, and the wider public, these monographs may also prove of interest and value to students of political science, Islam, comparative history, sociology, and anthropology, as well as those particularly concerned with West African peoples. More immediately, the research on which these monographs are based attempted to document and reconstruct the political institutions and development of a sufficiently large and varied collection of Hausa-Fulani states to illustrate fairly some part of the variety of their political organizations and experience during the past two centuries. Such comparative materials should enable us to distinguish continuities of Hausa-Fulani political organization from variations that reflect local exigencies or the influences of specific historical situations and factors. They may also perhaps indicate the criteria that differentiate the norm and the variants and thus enable us to investigate their relations, to assess their several implications, and so open up new fields for further study. Substantially, then, these monographs are designed as a modest contribution to the history and ethnography of Northern Nigeria and the African interior. In formulating the field inquiry on which they are based, my major substantive interest was to recover and record as fully as I could all the structurally relevant details of political ethnography and history that are probably already for the most part lost with the passing of the last generation of elders who were familiar with these precolonial regimes and their histories.

In 1950 I had collected similar data in the Hausa-Fulani emirate of Zazzau (Zaria) due south of Kano, in a pioneer inquiry.[1] Accordingly, a second major objective of the research undertaken in 1958-1959, on which the present monographs are based, was to test, refine, and develop the methods for integrated field study and analysis of oral and written history in these Muslim emirates which were first employed at Zaria in 1950.[2] In the process I hoped to demonstrate the utility and fruitfulness of these methods and to supplement and improve them. An essential methodological objective was to develop criteria to determine and assess the objective validity and adequacy of the information obtained from oral and written sources. I was naturally encouraged to learn that the field methods employed in the study of Zaria had been developed and used independently by Malams Hassan and Shu'aibu, the coauthors of the ethnography of the successor state[3] founded by the Hausa rulers of Zaria after they had been expelled by Fulani in 1806-1807. Identical or very similar methods were employed even earlier at Kano by another promising local scholar who wrote a brief historical account of that emirate during the late 1930s. Thus in publishing the results of these later inquiries, I hope to show that systematic field studies of the histories and organization of certain types of centralized states may yield data of equally high validity and significance which cannot otherwise be obtained. Naturally, to reduce the errors and omissions to which historical and ethnographic accounts based wholly or primarily on oral data are prone, it is essential to develop a systematic and comprehensive program of inquiry that deploys a sufficiently varied array of appropriate internal and external

checks to assure adequate coverage of the relevant phenomena and ready detection of inconsistent and unverifiable information. It is thus essential to collate the data collected from oral and other field inquiries with such information on the political organization and history of these states as may be gathered from contemporary or later written sources, including, besides local chronicles and Arabic texts, the observations of explorers, administrators, scholars, and official records of the colonial regime. But since conventional histories and discursive observations alike commonly omit much information that is essential for an adequate understanding or structural analysis of consecutive political changes in exotic regimes over sufficiently long spans of time, scholars who wish to study these processes in such units must normally gather the data they need by their own research in the library or field; and since such studies are essential to develop or test any general propositions about political change, social scientists interested in these aspects of social organization will inevitably have to undertake historical studies for these ends. In doing so, unlike most historians, sociologists and anthropologists with structural interests will seek to collect and order information relevant to their analytic and theoretical concerns. The ethnographic and historical accounts without which these analyses cannot proceed are thus from this perspective indispensable as means rather than ends in themselves. In historical perspective, on the other hand, such accounts are the primary ends and objects of inquiry. However, insofar as such accounts are comprehensive and accurate, they have value independent of the theoretical inquiry that called them forth; and this is particularly evident in studies of the precolonial organization and history of exotic societies whose institutions and identities have been subject under colonial rule to secular processes of social and cultural erosion. In preliterate societies of this category, the social scientist who seeks to study the precolonial organization can hardly avoid a heavy dependence on oral data and field observations. For such scholars, the present series of monographs, which illustrate the rewards and limitations of such inquiries, may thus possess a special significance, independent of the data they present and the theoretical problems to which they are addressed.

As a third objective, these monographs seek to advance our analytic understanding of the conditions and structures of the processes of political change by presenting independent and comparative analyses of these developments in selected Muslim states of the central Sudan between 1800 and 1950. Initially, I set out to see whether the political histories of these states would confirm or contradict three generalizations that derive from my early analysis of the history of Zazzau (Zaria). These generalizations were then stated as follows:

1. "Resistance to changes in the form of a system varies directly with their significance for the persistence of the system in its current form." This formula may be rephrased to read "Specifically administrative changes in a system of government evoke less resistance than do specifically political changes."[4]

2. "Resistance to changes in the content of a system varies according to their significance for the maintenance of the current structure." This formula has been rephrased to read "Attempts to change the form of a system by changing its content are self-defeating."[5]

3. "Given stability in its context, the structure of a governmental system changes as a function of the political action it generates internally." This formula has been rephrased as follows: "The rate and type of change in the governmental system corresponds to the type and intensity of the pressure which its operation focuses on the revision of the formal categories on which its structure is based."[6]

As the present inquiry was undertaken in order to test these generalizations, together with the analytic conceptions and method that produced them, I must first try to confirm or disconfirm these invariant relations by analyzing the political histories of each state independently in a separate monograph and then undertake their comparative analysis in a final volume. In the course of these investigations, frequent references to critical passages in the monograph on Zazzau are unavoidable, in order to summarize its essential argument for the reader's benefit as well as to criticize or modify the details thereof. The skeletal discussion of concepts that follows is thus primarily intended to acquaint the reader with the analytic scheme and method that guided my study *Government in Zazzau* and that also informs these monographs.

Besides its commitment to test the generalizations cited above, however, the present volume, like its successors, will also try to develop and extend our understanding of political change by formulating and applying other concepts and methods besides those employed in the analysis of developments at Zaria. By far the most important alternative scheme for these analyses of political organization and change derives from the concept and theory of corporations as the perduring units and framework of societal regulation or government. From this theory, "it follows that differing combinations of these corporate forms underlie the observable differences of order and process in political organization. This is the broad hypothesis to which the comparative structural study of political systems leads. It is eminently suited to verification or disproof."[7] Since corporation theory ensures a far broader and richer analysis of political organization and change than the rather abstract and formal analysis offered in *Government in Zazzau,* I shall apply this second framework throughout the following series. Moreover, as I can fairly assume that its central conceptions are unfamiliar to most readers, I shall summarize and illustrate them sufficiently in this initial volume to relieve those that follow of need for repetition on that score. To this end, I include a bald summary outline of corporation theory in this chapter and emphasize the varied forms and bases of corporations. However, as this summary should enable readers to appreciate the significance of corporate organization in the following account of Daura's polity and history, I defer further elaboration of these concepts until the data have been presented and the scheme can be used to analyze them.

Reanalysis of the historical data in terms of corporation theory raises the further problem of the congruence of these concepts, conclusions, and methods with the formal analysis that precedes it. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to reanalyze the historical data a third time in order to investigate the fit between the two modes of analysis already applied to it and to try to advance their separate insights by combining them. Fortunately, as the data are first presented fully in the body of the text and then recapitulated in chapter 8, when testing the conclusions of the study of Zaria, it is possible to review them briefly in these reanalyses. Nonetheless, these historical data are examined three times in all, first in chapter 8, then in the corporate analysis in chapter 9, and lastly in chapter 10, when I try to determine whether the two preceding analyses are consistent and may be combined to yield further insights.

In presenting the data in chapters 2 through 7, however, these alternative conceptual schemes and analytic issues are rarely, if ever, referred to. Social scientists may therefore wonder why the field materials are presented thus without reference to, or integration in, the categories of the various analytic schemes that are subsequently applied to them. Indeed, some social scientists may even regard the documentary chapters as mere field notes or raw data, even though they represent the synthetic products of a careful and lengthy process of collation of all the oral, documentary, and field information at my disposal. To those who find my attempt to insulate the data from the conceptual frameworks employed to analyze them awkward and unsatisfactory, I can only plead a field historian's obligation to record and report as directly and fully as he can all the information on the political organization and history of Daura at his command, without risking their distortion or elision by recasting the data in his own analytic categories. It is especially important to observe this rule in the present case, particularly given the nature of my conceptual schemes and analytic objectives, including the need to test and develop the analysis of developments at Zaria. With such theoretical commitments, it is obligatory to present the basic data directly and without obscuring them by summary abstractions of differing types and degrees. To appreciate the need to insulate their report against any distortions or condensation that might flow from presentation in the summary categories on which the analysis rests, one has only to recall that the oral data which dominate this text are now probably irrecoverable because of the passing of the last generation of Daura Hausa to mature before European rule and that these data are equally significant, interesting, and essential for any understanding of the people's perception of their history, oral traditions, and reconstructions of the precolonial history and organization of their state. The alternative approach, which may be illustrated by Evans-Pritchard's first book on the Nuer, so tightly molds the data to illustrate the author's categories and argument that we may well wonder how much we objectively know of the Nuer themselves, rather than Evans-Pritchard's analytic model of their society.[8] However, while such heavily structured and

elliptic ethnographic reports of contemporary cultures like the Nuer or Iatmul may be corrected or supplemented by further studies of the populations concerned, with due allowance for the personal equation and for changes that have occurred during the interval, it is no longer possible to recover much of the oral data, including eyewitness reports of many events, on which this account of Daura's precolonial history and organization is based.

Thus the present work is not a conventional social anthropological monograph, despite its explicit scientific objectives. Rather it is simultaneously addressed to social scientists and to historians, and to all who are concerned with the history and ethnography of African societies. The ethnographic and historical data in chapters 2 to 7 are accordingly presented as simply and directly as possible, free of those theoretical and analytic concerns and concepts which are introduced below and elaborated in chapters 8 to 10. Those social scientists who are only interested in the theoretical and analytic aspects of this study should accordingly omit chapters 2 to 7 inclusive, while historians and others who have no interest in the theoretical chapters might well restrict their attention to the chapters just cited. Frankly, unless a writer presents the historical and ethnographic data that provide the materials of his analysis within the analytic categories themselves, there is no obvious alternative mode of presentation to that adopted here for historical data that may be irreplaceable. However, if such data are presented by means of the analytic categories, it is not clear how we may check the validity of the analysis or assure ourselves that the data we are given are all we need to know. Moreover, when a writer's analytic methods and concepts are as unfamiliar and experimental as those deployed below, it would be most unfortunate if his data were not initially presented with the minimal use of his concepts; and such procedure is especially necessary when the data are analyzed explicitly to test the conclusions of other studies based on the same concepts. For, in such a case, to order the data by the categories employed in the earlier analysis directly precludes the possibility of any independent objective test of its conclusions and conceptions alike. For these reasons, among others, I have therefore decided to present my empirical materials with minimal reference to the theoretical objectives and conceptual instruments of the analysis with which the volume concludes.

Some readers, including historians, may object that the ethnographic and historical data are presented in bald descriptive and narrative form. However, such presentation is economical and consistent with native modes of thought on these subjects. For the greater part, it is true, these descriptions and narratives given below are products of collation of the various information at my disposal and rarely represent the unedited statement of any individual or group of informants. Even so, readers are advised to distinguish clearly three kinds of statements reported below. Passages which are prefaced by such phrases as "It is said that..." or "It is related (believed, etc.) that..." report folk statements concerning the validity and historicity of which I entertain strong reservations, though I nonetheless feel obliged to

record them as folk perceptions and interpretations of historical institutions and events. Statements qualified by such terms as "perhaps" or "it seems that" are clearly hypothetical and normally indicate my inference from data on the event or situation referred to. Other statements offered without qualification, attribution, or similar preface report data that I regard as substantially valid and accurate, however incomplete. Accordingly, although the indicative mood in which these historical and ethnographic chapters are written may suggest that they possess an indefensible finality, readers should bear in mind the conditional character of these statements, the many critical passages concerning which my reservations are formally signaled, and the inevitable incompleteness of this record, as of any historical or ethnographic account. For a further note of warning on these matters, please see the last section of chapter 7, which concludes the documentary section. Naturally, unless I were convinced that the core historical and ethnographic data are both accurate and sufficient as a record of Daura, there would be little point in subjecting them to extended analyses, and none in employing them to test the generalizations on political change cited above. However, in those analyses I have avoided all data of doubtful validity as best I could, relying instead on those that merit confidence.

Finally, this volume spans the history of the Hausa community of Daura from about 1800 until 1958, when I visited the emirate and collected the data. It accordingly says nothing about developments at Daura after 1958 and relatively little about the then emerging patterns of regional politics, which affected Daura marginally, as related below, and to which Daura was a very minor and introverted party. Students of contemporary Nigerian politics may thus be disappointed at Daura's relative indifference to these national and regional developments; but I have not underplayed these aspects of the situation I observed at Daura in 1958. The involution and collective disinterest in Nigerian affairs indicated by the following account corresponds with the state of public and official opinion I observed in Daura at that time. There were many convincing reasons for such orientations which need not concern us here; but the major point is clear. In 1958 the Daura Hausa were preoccupied with two political issues of purely local relevance, namely, with local criticisms of the emir's authority and administration and with the unfolding competition for succession to the throne; but as a remote and minor Hausa state, they had remained marginal and indifferent to Nigerian political developments. Beyond the boundaries of the chiefdom, the Daura people were perhaps most sensitive to developments in the emirates of Bornu and Kano, but they scarcely perceived these in regional terms.

The decision to present the field materials as plainly as possible effectively determines the structure of this book. For, having elected to separate the presentation of field data from their analysis, I think it clearly best to defer the elaboration of these analytic conceptions and issues until the documentation is complete and analysis can proceed. Accordingly, the summary state-

ment of basic concepts that follows immediately is merely intended to orient the reader to the central problems and issues with which the volume deals. Fuller discussions of these issues and ideas are deferred until later when they are employed to analyze the data. Moreover, as the data are analyzed in two distinct conceptual schemes, there is inevitably some repetition, the more so, unfortunately, as it then becomes necessary to attempt to integrate the two successive analyses in a third that attempts to determine their congruence and possible integration. However succinctly essential elements of the data are summarized in these concluding analyses, and however unavoidable such repetitions may seem, it is still awkward to review the basic historical data thrice. However, as no similar extended demonstrations will be made in other volumes of this series, these repetitions are both necessary and unavoidable. To what degree these reanalyses involve unnecessary repetitions of preceding data, I must leave the reader to judge. The beginning of chapter 8 clearly recapitulates chapters 3 through 7; yet as it is not otherwise possible to test the final generalizations of *Government in Zazzau,* and as this recapitulation restates the Daura experience in the categories of the formal anlysis, given the initial decision to present the data free of any possible distortion by our analytic categories, this repetition is unavoidable and needs no excuse. Some readers, however, may object that in applying both the formal and corporate schema to their analysis, I have twice recapitulated the data in chapters 8 and 9 and then summarized them elliptically in chapter 10, when both frameworks are employed together to determine their concordance. Again, I can see no acceptable alternative to these repetitions, since each review attempts to determine the utility of a distinct framework for the analysis of political change at Daura, and especially to isolate invariants in this process. In conclusion, as this monograph initiates a series, it is necessary to give here a sufficiently full application of our concepts and methods to relieve the volumes that follow of the need for extended exposition.

THE ANALYTIC PROBLEM

Since the major objective of this study is to advance our understanding of the processes of political change, the ethnographic and historical materials that furnish the bulk of the volume should be evaluated for their relevance to its analytic purpose as well as for their empirical validity. Accordingly, I shall first outline the theoretical issues to which these data are harnessed before discussing their sources and the methods by which they were derived.

History and Change

Political continuity and change provide a central and abiding interest of historical studies. Historians specialize in recovering and unraveling the con-

texts, forms, and content of political arrangements and developments of the past and in reconstructing the situations, events, and sequences by which these structures were preserved or modified. Thus, when we seek information on such matters, it is normally to the writings of historians that we turn. However, to an anthropologist interested in the theoretical analysis of political change, conventional histories have two severe limitations. First, since historians prefer to base their reconstructions on textual or other contemporary remains of the past, their work is normally restricted to literate societies, and within that category, predominantly to the privileged elites of high civilizations. In consequence, historical writings offer little methodological or substantive guidance for the study of political developments in less advanced societies whose variable forms, situations, and experiences make them particularly rewarding objects of such study. Lacking confidence in the reliability of oral data for such purposes and lacking the cultural skills and field techniques required to gather and sift such data, historians have tacitly abandoned the study of the past of preliterate societies to the social and cultural anthropologist, whose training and experience specially equips him for that task.

A second important limitation of historical accounts for social scientists concerned with the theoretical analysis of political change is the general disinterest of historians in such questions and the characteristic absence of an explicit conceptual framework in their treatment of these phenomena. In consequence, historical accounts of political organization and change frequently include much information of limited analytic relevance, while they omit much that analysis requires. The social scientist who seeks analytically adequate conceptual schemes or documentation of processes of political change in the work of conventional historians faces frequent disappointment, primarily because historians do not regard these questions as their concern, but also perhaps because they are so committed by the methods and criteria of their discipline to document the particularities of the historical situations they study that they are inevitably disinclined to consider whether historical structures or processes exhibit significant general regularities.

The social scientist who seeks to study the phenomena and problems of political change is committed by his training and inquiry to adopt an opposite view. He can only proceed by asking whether we can formulate significant general statements about the conditions, sequences, content, or form of these processes, either for all types and levels of political organization and activity or for some specific categories of them. The contrasting idiographic and nomothetic orientations of historians and social scientists accordingly distinguish their approaches to this problem and their assessment, selection, and use of relevant data. The social scientist who seeks to investigate the possibility that empirical sequences of political change in selected exotic societies may exhibit regularities that illustrate the effect of necessary relations among the phenomena these processes embrace is obliged initially to formulate an adequate analytic conception of the relations and activities he

proposes to study, in terms which allow him to segregate them from other social systems and processes. He must then devise a scheme of inquiry and a set of methods that will secure the data he needs to reconstruct the systems, situations, and sequences he wishes to analyze in order to test or develop his ideas about the modes and conditions of political continuity and change. Finally, unless he can find appropriate accounts of such phenomena in the works of historians, he must first assemble these bodies of data and draft the historical accounts himself in order to proceed with the analysis. Normally the social scientist will have to do so whenever he seeks to study these dimensions of exotic societies that lack indigenous literary traditions and historical documents.

In pursuing such inquiries, the social scientist does not assume the role of an amateur historian, since historians are uninterested in his general problem, in the preliterate milieu he seeks to study, and in the oral data and research techniques that he employs. In conducting his parahistorical researches, whether in the library, archives, or field, the social scientist is merely behaving like his colleagues who are concerned with the study of contemporary situations when they seek to collect and order the data they need for the investigation of the particular conditions or hypotheses that interest them. The only novelty in these semihistorical types of social science inquiries is their attempt to recover systematic and valid data about past social conditions, structures, and situations in order to permit a retrospective study of political change; but it is obvious that no general theory of any aspect of social and cultural change can be developed or tested without systematic resort to such materials from a wide range of situations in the pasts of diverse societies. It is equally clear that systematic accounts of the political organization and development of particular societies over sufficiently long periods of time are likely to furnish appropriate bodies of data most economically.

Political Change

To investigate the possibility that the processes of political change—at least in units of a clearly defined culture-historical zone and type and over clearly delimited periods of time—may express significant regularities that manifest necessary relations, we need a clear conception of the focal idea of political change. The term *change* simultaneously denotes a process, a condition, and a state of affairs; but since we intend to examine processes and conditions of change in seeking regularities, it is clear that by change we refer to particular states of affairs. In this sense, change denotes any alteration in the state of an object or phenomenal unit. If *alteration* is understood to mean observable modification or difference in the unit under study at successive intervals of time, we may provisionally distinguish changes of location, volume, substance, and form as materially significant modalities of political change. For

example, a political unit may change its location in whole or in part, as the Hausa state of Daura was obliged by various historical forces to do on several occasions during the period under review. A political unit may also change its volume or size, with or without relocation, by the expansion or contraction of its boundaries, for instance, or by the increase or decrease of its population. If by the *substance* of a political system we mean its content, functions, or scope—that is, the material resources and type of affairs that the system embraces and regulates—it is evident that a political system may undergo changes of substance with or without corresponding changes in its location or volume. By *changes of form* in political or other systems, we refer to any alteration in the components or articulations that together constitute the system and define its specific form. It is conceivable that a political unit may preserve its form despite changes of location, volume, or substance, separately or together; conversely a political unit may experience changes of form without corresponding changes of substance, location, or volume.

Two further aspects of processes of change are their changing rates and directions. At the present stage of our inquiries, we can make no general statements of value about these topics. We must therefore postpone their discussion until we have had the opportunity to examine the data presented below.

It is evident that some of the most important problems in the study of political change center on the conditions and relations of changes in the substance and form of political units. Since changes of location and volume are only contingently related to changes of substance and form, which may develop or proceed independently, we may regard location and volume as contingent features of these units and concentrate initially on the categories of substance and form that constitute and define polities.

While analytically rewarding, the distinction between political substance and form requires clarification. Although differences between the scope or functional load of a political system—that is, the tasks, affairs, material and human resources that it regulates—and its form, perceived as a clearly defined complex of articulated units, seem reasonably clear, it is advisable to distinguish these notions further. When the relations of formal units involve activities that discharge political functions or regulate affairs, it may seem uncertain whether these relations should be treated as elements of substance or form. However, although the formal features of a system are part of its substance or scope, it is necessary and useful to distinguish these two aspects of the unit's organization by discriminating as *form* the complex of enduring and patterned relations among the structural components of the system or unit which manifest the canons and categories that define its order and regulate the institutionalized interaction of its parts. We can then reserve the notion of scope and substance for those resources and affairs that are routinely regulated and those functions that are routinely discharged through the institutionalized relations of these structural components. In effect, the

substance or scope of a political unit or system is the sum of the affairs it regulates and the material and human resources it employs in such activity, while its form consists in the distinctive articulation of perduring structural units through which these activities proceed and among which its resources are deployed. These conceptions indicate that for political units or systems to be viable, their form and substance must be congruent and integrated. Thus, changes in either dimension should be associated with changes in the other. Whether empirical materials substantiate this expectation in all cases remains to be determined.

In historical and other studies of political change, generations of scholars have traditionally sought to isolate substantive relations of particularistic or general kinds among the events or conditions of the processes selected for study; and many have tried to isolate or demonstrate relations of cause and effect between substantive features of changes in political organization. Several studies with inexplicit assumptions, procedures, or objectives have endeavored to demonstrate the precise degrees and ways in which subsequent events in a sequence of action have been determined or generated by specific antecedents, given the particular situation, personalities, resources, and constraints involved. An alternative approach to the causal analysis of historical processes favored by some scholars assumes that one particular category of factors, such as economic or racial relations, operates as an ultimate and universal determinant in all processes of political change. Neither of these causal approaches to the study of political change can be defended: the particularistic approach fails because the causal relations it asserts are neither demonstrable nor significant, being variable in their components, intensity, and effects and thus contingent and specific to each situation; the generalizing approach fails because the factor or factors invoked as the universal and ultimate determinant of political change can only be traced by speculative regression from variable proximate "causes" themselves identified by particularistic studies of the preceding type. Thus, either mode of "causal" analysis leaves unexplained and unresolved the variable effects of uniform or diverse determinants and similar or dissimilar historical situations. Other equally cogent considerations advise against yet another attempt at the causal analysis of substantive features of political change in the following studies. We shall therefore initially attempt to study these processes by examining their formal properties in the hope that we shall either detect some invariant relations among them or, alternatively, demonstrate their absence; and since we shall exclude relations of causation from the objects of our inquiry, the regularities we seek can only reflect necessary relations of a logical kind that order the elements or phases of processes of structural change and preclude the development of formal change by processes that have a different internal structure.

Since science normally seeks invariant relations in its subject matter, the goals of our inquiry are explicitly scientific. Thus the methods and data that we employ are governed by scientific canons. This means, *inter alia,* that the

invariant relations we seek should be validated by observations drawn from all levels of the system and from all sectors of the processes to which it is subject. Given the enormous variability in the sequences, forms, contexts, and processes of political change, such uniformities, if they obtain, can only express relations of logical necessity. They will thus be rather abstract and formal, whether they refer to structural or to substantive features of the units studied. We should therefore begin by distinguishing political change from other phenomena or aspects of the system under review. We should then distinguish sharply between endogenous and exogenous conditions or "causes" of change and concentrate our attention on the formal and substantive alterations that proceed within the systems under study, whether they are endogenous or exogenously induced.

Political Systems

The generic unit whose processes of structural change we seek to study is the political system, or government. This consists of all those activities and relations by which public—that is, political—affairs are regulated. Political events are the incidents through which this regulation of public affairs proceeds. The elementary components or principles of political action are authority and power. Authority is the right and/or obligation to take appropriate actions in certain situations subject to conditions and procedures accepted as legitimate; power is the capacity for effective action despite material and social obstructions, including legitimate rules. Though power consists in unequal distributions of individual or collective capacities to secure support and compliance within particular frameworks of rules and precedents, its bases, modes, and applications are not fully circumscribed or predetermined by these restraining rules. In consequence, these norms retain their legitimacy despite the distribution and redistribution of power within them until they are superseded by others of the same general kind.

Political relations in the strict sense are relations that mediate and express distributions of power to influence or regulate the public affairs of a social unit. Administrative relations express and mediate the forms and operation of public authority through procedures and units accepted as legitimate. It should be emphasized that these notions of authority and power, administration and politics, are analytic instruments. In empirical contexts, administrative and political capacities are frequently vested in the same social units. Nonetheless, by these criteria we can conceptually distinguish an administrative system constituted by relations of public authority and a political system composed of relations and conditions of public power. Together these relations of authority and power, administration and politics, constitute the system of government that regulates the public affairs of those discrete social units whose boundaries they serve to delimit. Thus, systems of public regulation combine relatively stable organizations of public authority with labile

distributions of public power. Differences among political systems or governments accordingly reduce to differences in the formal organizations and functional scopes of their public authority; their distributions, bases, and modes of public power; and the conditions that underlie these combinations.

The social unit to which a political system relates is generally described as a polity. In its narrower meaning the term also denotes the political system or government as a discrete, continuous system of regulatory activities. As a formally distinctive system of governmental activities and relations, the polity is coextensive with the society it incorporates and delimits. Accordingly, societies owe their boundaries and order to the structures and processes that distinguish their governmental systems. Such processes and structures are closely identified, political processes being the adaptive, articulative operations of political structures.[9]

Corporations

The structural units of a political system are those that serve to regulate the collective affairs of its members. Such units are always corporations, of which there are several varieties, the *corporate group* being perhaps the most widespread and familiar. Despite important differences in their bases, scale, organization, and other attributes, corporate groups share certain common features, being presumptively perpetual aggregates with unique identities, determinate boundaries and memberships, and the autonomy, organization, and procedure necessary to regulate their exclusive common affairs. Some corporate groups contain other collegial or conciliar corporations which are constituted as presumptively perpetual decision-making bodies staffed by a minority of the members of the corporate group such colleges regulate. As governmentally specialized corporations, such *colleges* are thus distinct from the corporate groups of which they are part and whose affairs they regulate. Yet another class of *corporations aggregate* lacks the comprehensive organization and effective procedures required for the regulation of collective affairs and accordingly lacks the autonomy to regulate them. These imperfect corporations must therefore have a categorical form and limited capacities for positive collective action. Despite their presumptive perpetuity, determinate boundaries and memberships, and unique identities, they are constituted as categories by their lack of the organization, procedures, and autonomy necessary to regulate the affairs of their collective memberships exclusively. Such *corporate categories* are accordingly often subject to external regulation by others, being structurally incapable of common action to protect their members' interests.

Offices are *corporations sole* that possess the four formal and four operational features which distinguish perfect corporations, such as groups and colleges, and endow them with the structural capacities for continous regulatory action. Characteristically, like the college, the office is attached to, and

embedded in, some corporate group of which it is the regulatory organ; and often a single corporate group or public is simultaneously regulated by one or more offices and colleges which maintain an appropriate division of labor and authority among themselves. Lacking offices, colleges, or equivalent coordinative agencies, corporate categories thereby lack the organization requisite for positive collective action. Occasionally one of these categories may be mobilized and coordinated by a charismatic leadership which temporarily or permanently reconstitutes it as a corporate group and directs its collective action. More rarely the category may constitute itself as a group by establishing a college and devising procedures to regulate its affairs.

Charismatic leadership represents one type of *commission,* an imperfect form of corporation sole, of which magisterial, military, ecclesiastical, and bureaucratic commissions, organized into presumptively perpetual structures that contain ranked series of indefinite numbers of identical substitutable units, illustrate another variety. Unlike such serially organized commissions, the charismatic leadership is a unique self-authenticating organ of collective regulation, which accordingly lacks the prescribed procedures, organization, or spheres of action that characterize all units of public authority that derive their legitimacy from traditional or legal rules, norms, and precedents. In contrast a charismatic commission mobilizes its own public and establishes its own authority, procedures, and regulatory structures. Yet another type of unique discontinuous commission, which is commonly found in centralized polities, is the statutory commission created by presidential or parliamentary action to discharge specific tasks, whether investigatory or administrative. Although normally endowed with a wide discretion to pursue its purpose, such statutory commissions cease to exist on completing the tasks for which they were created. There is thus no presumption of perpetuity for either of these three kinds of commission.

These different types of corporations and quasi-corporations—groups, colleges, categories, offices, and commissions—provide the structural units and regulatory agencies of all political systems. A political system accordingly represents a specific and articulated complex of corporations of differing type and base whose institutionalized relations provide its articulation. Since colleges, groups, offices, and commissions each regulate particular sets of public affairs, although the basis on which they claim such competence differs, all are in differing degrees and ways units of public authority. In consequence they all provide focuses for the concentration and distribution of public power and often compete with one another to defend or expand their regulatory competence. Thus corporations together constitute the political system, whose boundaries and formal features they also define by their type, bases, and articulations, while delimiting its substance, content, or scope as the sum of the affairs that they severally regulate for the members of the polity they constitute. In addition, since corporations are either organs or objects of public authority that concentrate distributions of public power within, around, and among themselves, they simultaneously embrace the

administrative and political sectors of the governmental system of the society they organize and delimit. Thus the particulars of its corporate organization define the structure and substance of the political and administrative sectors of the governmental system. Accordingly, changes in the scope or form of the system should be reflected in the articulations, bases, or types of the various corporations that together constitute it.

In synchronic accounts of political organizations, it is accordingly sufficient to specify the variety and articulation of corporate forms through which the public affairs of a given social unit are regulated; but in diachronic studies of political change, we are equally concerned with the persistence and the modification of these corporations, with their articulations and their regulatory capacities. Changes in the type, bases, or relations of corporations that constitute a governmental system indicate changes in its form. Changes in the regulatory scope of its articulated corporate structure illustrate alterations in the substance or content of the governmental system. Thus, to determine whether changes of political substance vary with changes of political form or vice versa, we should examine the bases, type, and articulations of the corporate units that together constitute the system to determine whether there has been any objective alteration in either of these features.

It is evident that regulatory resources and responsibilities may be transferred among the corporate units of a common political system without any substantial change in the scope or substance of the system as such. It is also probable that some regulatory functions and resources may be transferred between corporations without accompanying changes in their form. But if such resources and regulatory functions were formerly institutional features of either of these corporations, it seems unlikely that such transfer could proceed without accompanying changes in their articulation. Whether such formal changes invariably accompany transfers of function and resource remains to be determined.

In the preceding outline, three formal elements of corporate organization have been distinguished, namely, their bases, articulations, and types. The *basis* of a corporation indicates the set of principles on which the unit is incorporated; and these denote the criteria by which its members are recruited and differentiated from others. All corporations are based on some specific principles that regulate the recruitment of their members and order their differentiation. Thus corporate groups or categories may be based on descent, ethnicity, ritual and belief, locality, sex, age, occupation, property, jural status, or on association for various purposes. Offices and commissions may be based on precedent, law, tradition, descent, extraordinary individual capacities, creation by collective action, or the fiat of some superior authority.

Corporations differ in *form* or *type* by reference to two kinds of criteria. First, corporations aggregate, such as corporate groups, categories, and colleges, are units with several members, whereas corporations sole, such as

offices and commissions, are distinguished by having only one incumbent at a time. Second, those corporations that possess the four functional or operational attributes of organization, procedures, autonomy, and exclusive corporate affairs, together with the formal attributes of presumptive perpetuity, closure, determinate memberships, and unique identity, are *perfect* in the sense that they are routinely capable of positive collective action. Other corporations, such as categories and commissions, which lack one or more of these formal or functional attributes, are *imperfect* in the sense that they are not routinely capable of such action. Thus corporate categories are by their constitution incapacitated for inclusive positive action, while commissions, although active regulatory agencies, lack the presumption of perpetuity. Some commissions also lack unique identities, while others possess them. Thus commissions and corporate categories are both imperfect, though in different ways.

The third formal feature that defines corporations is their *articulation.* Corporations articulate with one another in various ways. Corporate groups may contain one or more corporate categories, while corporate categories may equally well contain a plurality of corporate groups. Offices and commissions are always embedded in corporations aggregate, but whereas the office, like the college, is always situated in some corporate group, commissions may occur in groups or categories. The ways in which corporations articulate with one another accordingly will either express certain requisites or implications of their bases and forms. For example, offices filled by collective election and colleges filled by the principled recruitment of select minorities from the publics they regulate alike presuppose broader corporations aggregate to which they are attached. Thus changes in the articulations of corporate units may be either preceded or followed by changes in the forms or bases of either unit.[10]

Formal Analysis of Political Change

My early analysis of the political organization of the Fulani emirate of Zaria rested on those distinctions between power and authority, politics and administration, set out above. In that study I first attempted to show how successive phases of the government of Zaria under Hausa, Fulani, and British exhibited distinct structures of political and administrative relations. Then, having indicated these differences, I reexamined the history of Zaria to seek the particular events, conditions, or processes with which these political developments and changes were linked. To facilitate analysis, I compared and reduced the initial and terminal forms of the government at Zaria to a series of seven categories, which simultaneously indicated the basic features shared by these regimes and the different ways in which these forms were articulated in either system. Since I was seeking invariant relations in the processes of political change at Zaria, the seven formal categories that

defined and distinguished these systems were ordered according to their relations of logical priority as follows:

1. Status differentiation.
2. Offices differentiated as perpetual statuses.
3. Differentiation of office by status conditions of eligibility.
4. Kingship as the most senior office.
5. Rank organization of offices.
6. Role differentiation of offices.
7. Organization of offices with similar status qualifications in exclusive promotional series.[11]

The order of logical priority in which these seven formal categories were arranged simultaneously indicates the logically necessary order of their succession, since we cannot formulate successive concepts in the series without assuming their antecedents. With these concepts I developed a model which was equally appropriate to describe all the governmental systems recorded at Zaria; and by ordering the central elements of this model in their relations of logical priority, I created an instrument which could show whether the processes by which these successive governments had developed and been transformed exhibited any invariant structural relations. For reasons already cited, it seems evident that any invariant relations that might regulate such processes will be ordered by logical necessity rather than by causal relations, as is commonly conceived. Accordingly, having ordered the elements of the political model in their relations of logical priority, I reexamined the record of political change at Zaria to see whether I could find any incidents or processes of change in its political structure that did not in all their particulars exactly replicate the logically prescribed order of change in these formal categories. This analysis rested on the argument that by virtue of its logical structure,

> revision and redefinition of a system of categories arranged in an order of logical priority can only proceed by a sequence which repeats the order of logical relations holding among the categories themselves. Moreover, revision of any single category in such a system presupposes certain changes in the content of the categories which precede it. In consequence, the order in which categories change will be identical with that in which the system as a whole undergoes revision.[12]

Having found that all instances of structural change in the successive political systems of Zaria illustrated the logically necessary relations that ordered the formal elements that defined these various structures, I then attempted to determine whether these processes of political change exhibited any similarly invariant relations among their political and administrative components. The three generalizations to which this inquiry led have already been cited in this chapter as propositions to be tested in the present inquiry. Briefly, they indicate that changes in systems of government which are initiated on the basis of authority and focused on its reallocation evoke less resistance and are normally less significant for persistence of the system in its

current form than changes initiated on the basis of power and focused on its redistribution.[13] This general conclusion implies that the selection and articulation of formal categories that underlie and define the structure of a political system owe their development and persistence primarily to the exercise and pursuit of political power, the bases and distribution of which the structure attempts to prescribe. In consequence, political structures can only be modified by and through the exercise of political power and will normally change their form when their prescriptions cease to regulate its bases and distribution effectively. Finally, these generalizations suggest that the preservation or modification of the formal structure of a political system or government are often the primary objectives of political action.

Although my early analysis of government at Zaria stressed the significance of corporate units and their relations in political structures, it made no reference to commissions and corporate categories and treated councils in a casual way. The conceptual scheme for the study of corporate organization presented above was developed after I had completed the fieldwork on which this series of studies is based and after my account of government in Zaria was published. In preparation for the current analyses, I therefore elaborated a second approach to the study of political change, which is based on the conceptions of corporate organization presented above.[14] Accordingly, in the concluding chapter of this volume, which seeks to analyze the political institutions and experience of Daura over the past one hundred and fifty years, I shall apply both approaches to the local data. In addition, I shall also examine any other issues of theoretical significance that arise in the following account. Having thus indicated the objective, procedures, and central ideas of this study, we must defer their further discussion until its historical and ethnographic materials have been presented; but first it is necessary to indicate and assess the sources and the methods by which they were derived, however briefly.

FIELD PROBLEMS AND DATA

Written Sources

As mentioned in the preface, few documents, whether contemporary or retrospective, make any reference to the history or organization of Daura before or during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the few extant texts that refer to this period of Daura history say virtually nothing about the organization or development of the state. Although Arabic was written in the Ajemic script at Daura before the Fulani jihad of 1804, only two or three indigenous documents of a historical kind survive. One of these narrates the legend of Bayajidda, a prince of Baghdad,[15] who is widely regarded as the founder of the seven Hausa states. A second text, translated and published by H. R. Palmer in 1928, lists the queens and kings of Daura.[16] Since Pal-

mer's list is very like that which I recorded at Daura, I reproduce his list in Appendix A, noting divergences in the later version beside it.

Palmer's text lists seventeen Magajiyas, or queens, and forty-seven chiefs of Daura and gives the reign lengths for thirty-six of these rulers. Simple addition of these thirty-six reigns would indicate that the city-state was founded before the birth of Christ; but other evidence suggests it was probably founded between the tenth and thirteenth centuries A.D. Thus, however impressive as a title of antiquity, the Daura king list has limited value as a chronological frame. Moreover, apart from the lengths of their reigns, these lists give no information about any of the Daura chiefs who ruled between Bawo, Bayajiddas's son and successor, and the Sarkin Gwari Abdu (1798-?1825), whom the Fulani evicted. Neither text indicates the reign lengths of the six chiefs who preceded Sarkin Gwari. Nonetheless, if we exclude the legend of Bayajidda, this king list is the only local document that refers to the history of Daura before the Fulani jihad of 1804-1807.

As an account of Daura history its value is limited. The text does not mention Daura's vassalage to the Kanuri state of Bornu; says nothing of Daura's relations with Kano, Katsina, Gobir, and other nearby states and nothing about the organization of the prejihadic regime; and does not even indicate when Islam was introduced. However, the list specifies the reign lengths of all chiefs who succeeded the Sarkin Gwari Abdu after the Fulani jihad, most of whom ruled at Zango. Even so, the text omits Tafida's first reign after Dan Aro's deposition, although it correctly records his total time on the throne; thus its chronology is not a transparent guide to the chronicle that accompanies it. By failing to record Abdu's expulsion from Daura, it might even suggest that his successors remained there. The list also omits those "Daura" chiefs who ruled at Baure and Magaria after Sarkin Gwari's death.

The third local text chronicles the wanderings and misfortunes of the Sarkin Gwari Abdu and his successor Lukudi after the jihad. This has also been translated by H. R. Palmer, whose version is again very similar to that which the Limamin Daura Malam Ishi'aka dictated to me in 1958.[17] This narrative is a detailed and useful guide to the movements of the Hausa rulers after their expulsion from Daura by the Fulani in 1806-1807. It relates how the defeated Hausa split after the Sarkin Gwari's death into three warring chiefdoms, which in due course fell under the dominion of Zinder (Damagaram). Nonetheless, being designed to record for later generations the vicissitudes of the Sarkin Gwari Abdu; his heir, Lukudi; and their direct successors in the chiefdom located at Zango, this document says little about the organization of their state and even less about the chiefdoms created by their dynastic rivals. Nonetheless, the text does present a skeletal chronicle of Lukudi's community until the arrival of the British.

Two texts by the Fulani leaders of the jihad which refer obliquely to Daura are the *Kitāb al-farq* of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio,[18] which allusively describes certain administrative practices that prevailed in Hausa states during the Shehu's lifetime (1754-1817), and the *Infak'ul Maisur* of his son and suc-

cessor, Sultan Muhamman Bello,[19] which contains a brief but valuable account of the campaign that preceded the Fulani conquest of Daura. The Shehu's brother, Abdullahi dan Fodio, also mentions a controversy that arose in 1786-1787 concerning the Shehu's practice of admitting women to his public assemblies, in which the Fulani reformers were engaged at "Dawra" by a Kanuri scholar, al-Mustafā Ghuni, several years before the jihad commenced; but it is unlikely that the "Dawra" to which Abdullahi refers is the chiefdom with which we are concerned.[20] Apart from these three passages, I know of no other references to Daura before or after the jihad in the corpus of Fulani texts. If any letters from the Fulani emirs who ruled Daura during the nineteenth century are preserved at Daura or in the archives at Sokoto or Kaduna, I have not come across them.

In 1799 the explorer Hornemann was told at Murzuk that Daura and other adjacent states paid tribute to Bornu.[21] In his brief stay at Zinder during January 1851, James Richardson also recorded several observations that refer indirectly to Daura,[22] as did his companion Henry Barth, who visited Zinder in December 1852.[23] Barth's servant, Dorugu, a native of Kworgum, has left an account of his capture and enslavement by raiders from Zinder which corroborates Richardson's reports and certain oral traditions of the Daura Hausa.[24] Of writers in this century, to my knowledge only the late Sir H. Richmond Palmer has published materials on Daura history.[25] However, for the neighboring states of Maradi, Gobir, Dungas, the Sosebaki chiefdoms, and Zinder (Damagaram) in the modern Republic of Niger, M. Landeroin and J. Tilho published valuable ethnographies and historical accounts before World War I.[26] F. Edgar's collection of Hausa folk tales contains three different versions of the Bayajidda legend and a few scattered references to the Fulani emirs of Daura.[27] The unpublished *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province,* compiled by P. G. Harris in 1938-1939 refers to Daura in two places.[28]

Among unpublished administrative records on the history or institutions of the petty chiefdoms that flourished at Daura during the nineteenth century, I found a list of Fulani emirs which seems less accurate and complete than that which the Limamin Daura Malam Ishaka provided in 1958. For the twentieth century, administrative records are rather more helpful. Assessment reports compiled in 1911 and 1926-1927 furnish useful data on the local population, economy, and administrative organization. Other administrative records on Daura affairs that were available in the Provincial Office at Katsina were also consulted.

While these documents are certainly useful in tracing developments at Daura during the present century, they contain some curious gaps and shed little light on the history or organization of the state at earlier periods. Thus, apart from a few remarks on the decadence of the Daura Fulani following the death of Muhamman Mai Gurdo in 1906, the administrative records are silent on the organization and history of the Fulani state and contain no reference to the Hausa state of Baure, which the British abolished in 1906.

Likewise, I could find no official documents that illuminated the British decision to abolish the Fulani emirate and restore the Hausa chief of Zango to Daura as ruler of the reunited chiefdom, an event that occurred in 1906. Even the Colonial Reports from Northern Nigeria for 1906 and 1907 make no reference to these unique events.[29] The *Gazetteer of Kano Province* does mention the Hausa restoration at Daura and cites the decadence of the local Fulani, but it gives no further information.[30] Thus even the major developments which occurred under British rule remain undocumented in official publications and files.

I have now listed all the documents I could trace that refer to Daura history, directly or otherwise. This list indicates the dramatic inadequacy of textual sources for the reconstruction of Daura history and political organization. Except for the chronicle of the Sarkin Gwari's successors, this corpus of texts contains such substantial and critical omissions that they are virtually useless as sources for an account of the history or organization of the various Daura states. In addition, the records are partisan, since they dwell almost exclusively on the affairs of the Zango community, whose leaders were restored to Daura, and ignore the histories and organizations of the defunct Fulani and Baure states. The literary record is thus critically incomplete. It also misrepresents or obscures the particulars of many critical relations and events and omits all the data we need to understand the inner organizations and developments of these Daura states. We are thus obliged to base our reconstruction of Daura political organization and history primarily on oral information collected in the field; and to secure our reconstruction of the prejihadic Hausa state, we need to check our data from Zango against accounts of Baure and Fulani Daura.

Historical Field

The principal problems that confront us in seeking the materials we need for an adequate political history of Daura reflect the paucity of relevant texts and the disintegration and reintegration of the state in the century that followed the jihad. For an appreciation of the field problems generated by this turbulent century of defeat, fragmentation, relocation, and ultimate reunion, the following brief outline of its major events may be helpful.

In 1806-1807 the Fulani captured the capital of Daura and incorporated the adjacent territory into a new emirate under Malam Ishi'aku, a Fulani of Daura to whom the Shehu Usman had given a flag and commission to conquer and rule the state. The expelled Hausa chief, Sarkin Gwari Abdu, was forced to withdraw and wandered for several years until he died at Yekuwa. Lukudi's succession on Abdu's death stirred several princes to withdraw eastward from Yekuwa to establish a separate chiefdom. Lukudi attacked and slew their leader, Dan Shufini, but was unable to suppress the secession-

ist state. However, shortly after Dan Shufini's death, the princes split to found two separate chiefdoms under his brother Kitari and his son Tsoho. While Kitari ruled Magaria, Tsoho established his own chiefdom due south at Baure. Meanwhile Lukudi was attacked by the Kanuri of Zinder, who destroyed his capital at Yardaji and appointed another prince, Muhamman Kyenkyere, as "Chief of Daura" in his place. Tsoho of Baure attacked and slew Kyenkyere, after which the sultan of Zinder, Ibram, forced Lukudi to submit and formally appointed his son Nuhu as cochief and successor. Ibram then relocated Lukudi's community at Zango, some twelve miles east of Daura city, which remained its home until 1906. Ibram also intervened in the border dispute between Magaria and Daura and abolished the Magaria chiefdom in the reign of Kitari's son Masallaci, placing its territory under his slave general, the Kacalla, for administration. Kyenkyere's death under Magaria's abolition thus reduced the Hausa successor states of Daura from three to two, namely, Baure and Zango. For the rest of the nineteenth century these units were mutually hostile vassals of Zinder, which soon incorporated substantial portions of the prejihadic Daura territories due north and northeast of the city. By 1850 Zinder had appropriated most of the prejihadic domain of Daura, and the rest was partitioned between the petty states of Fulani Daura, Baure, and Zango. Southwest of Zango, another Fulani leader, Dan Tunku of the Yerimawa clan, had also carved out a new chiefdom at Kazaure by appropriating a considerable segment of the old Daura territory. Most of the territorial losses that Daura suffered between 1806 and 1850 have since proved permanent.

On the eve of the Fulani invasion the chiefdom probably incorporated a territory of about three thousand square miles. Since 1907, when its boundaries were stabilized, its area has been 946 square miles. In 1903, when the British arrived, these 946 square miles contained three separate chiefdoms: namely, Fulani Daura in the west, Zango in the center, and Baure in the east. In 1904 the British placed Baure under Zango as a vassal state, thus paving the way for the amalgamation that followed shortly. In 1906 the British abolished the Fulani emirate, restored the Hausa of Zango to Daura city, and reunited the territory recently divided among these three antagonistic states. Thus after a century of partition and repartition, those fragments of the ancient Daura chiefdom that had fallen to the British were reconstituted as a single unit under the ancient Hausa dynasty. By the end of 1907 the present boundaries of the Daura state were firmly established.

Clearly, while the Sarkin Gwari Abdu and his successor, Lukudi, wandered homeless, without a capital or territorial base, the polity they claimed to rule by hereditary right could have had no stable territorial organization. Perhaps the defeated Hausa state did not develop a stable territorial organization until Zango was established and its frontiers delimited under Zinder's supervision. However, during the following decades, the territorial unity and organization of this state were almost destroyed by the policies of Zinder.

This unhappy situation was only terminated by the drastic boundary demarcations and reversals with which the French and British delimited the territories of Niger and Nigeria between 1901 and 1907.

In the region of Daura, the first provisional boundary lay substantially to the north of the present international frontier; and since the British regarded the area as the territory of Daura, they placed it under the chiefs of Zango. Thus for a few years the bulk of their lost prejihadic dominions was restored to the Zango chiefs by the British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Most of the territories thus regained had been recently administered by the suzerains of Zango as portions of Damagaram (Zinder); but the area was occupied mainly by Hausa-speaking peoples whose ancestors were previously identified with the Hausa chiefdom of Daura, directly or otherwise. Thus when the first international boundary removed these districts from Zinder and released Zango from its vassalage to Zinder, the British placed them under the Hausa chief of Zango. In consequence, whereas in 1900 the chief of Zango, Tafida, controlled only about thirty-three settlements, two years later his dominions included "some 660 towns and villages."[31] Not long after, the rival chiefdom of Baure was subordinated to Zango as a vassal state; and in 1906-1907 a second Anglo-French commission traversed the region between Daura and Zinder and recommended major changes in the colonial frontiers. In consequence the chief of Zango lost most of the territory he had recently received from Zinder to the French colony of Niger, together with some part of his former chiefdom. He was partially compensated for this loss by the formal abolition of Baure and its incorporation as a district of Zango; and when the Fulani emirate of Daura was abolished a few months later, the chief of Zango was placed in charge of Daura, an appointment that reintegrated the three fragments of the old Hausa chiefdom that remained in British hands.

From this skeletal account of the changing territorial bases and boundaries of the Zango chiefdom, we can see that its territorial organization underwent a series of radical changes throughout the last century. These transformations did not cease for some years after the Hausa rulers had been restored to Daura, when the traditional arrangements by which absentee lords administered rural areas through titled intermediaries *(jekadu)* were replaced by a new organization of compact districts under resident chiefs. This reorganization initially established thirteen small districts under absentee lords who lived at the capital; but within a year or two, territorial chiefs were obliged to reside in the districts under their charge, and by 1917 the number of districts had been halved through amalgamations. This outline of its territorial history since 1804 nicely illustrates some of the substantive and methodological problems which confront us in studying the organization and development of Daura.

To prepare a detailed account of Daura history, we must nonetheless reconstruct successive phases of its territorial system by determining their boundaries and particulars so that we may identify the conditions and proc-

esses by which they changed. In precisely the same way, to reconstruct the details of its officialdom, taxation, state councils, legal and military administrations, or other political and administrative arrangements, we must carefully distinguish the successive periods and places in which these arrangements flourished and then attempt to recover the necessary details for each situation.

Such have been the vicissitudes of the chiefdom's history during the century that followed the jihad that the perpetuation of its traditional forms manifested in action, as distinct from ideals and constitutional doctrines, has inevitably been tenuous and variable. In consequence, although traditions of ancient and authoritative political procedures and forms which prevailed at Daura before the jihad are essential equally to the operation of the current polity and to our understanding of it, they do not furnish trustworthy guides to the organization and development of any of its successor states. Nonetheless, however imperfectly these doctrines describe the political arrangements of Zango and Baure, their historical relevance is evident from the attachment of the Hausa rulers to them.

The history of those members of the Hausa dynasty who settled at Zango gains a peculiar significance and pathos from its dominant motif, their desire to recover their lost city and homeland in order to reconstitute their chiefdom in its ancestral form. Throughout the last century this theme was dramatized by the Zango chiefs at the major Mohammedan festivals of Id-el-Fitr and Id-el-Kabir, which were celebrated, then as now, at special prayer grounds outside the town walls. After each of these prayer meetings, for which the adult male population assembled, the chiefs of Zango would set out on horseback toward Daura city, then occupied by the Fulani, accompanied by their senior officials, who would always persuade them that the day divinely appointed for their return had not yet come. Repeated twice annually, this political rite dramatized the theme of eventual return on which the dynasty rested the legitimacy of its regime; but this longing for restoration was not cultivated merely as a basis for dynastic legitimacy.

It is related that in 1906-1907, when the second Anglo-French boundary commission transferred the former possessions of Zinder to the French colony of Niger, French officials invited the rulers of Zango to move to Niger, offering to place them in charge of the transferred territories. When this attractive offer was rejected, it is said, the French asked the chief of Daura, Malam Musa, to send one of his sons to rule these dominions in Niger. Musa politely refused this request but despatched one of his clients, the Shentali Alhassan, who was duly placed in charge of the transferred districts, with his capital at Dawambai close by the international border across from Zango. Thus, in rejecting these successive invitations, Musa forfeited substantial resources of population and territory to preserve the possibility that his dynasty would ultimately return to Daura. Nonetheless, despite its conservative ideals, Musa's regime at Zango differed significantly from that of the prejihadic Hausa state in its organization and purposes as well as in its

location and extent. The dominating motif of restoration itself could obviously have had no place in the ideology and policies of Daura before the jihad; but thereafter it contraposed the community of Zango, which was dedicated to restoration, with that of Baure, which pursued escape from Zinder as its major goal.

Field Procedures and Problems

Having already published an account of my field methods,[32] I shall only illustrate them obliquely by discussing their application to the special problems encountered at Daura. To develop the data required to describe the regimes and histories of these Daura states, I relied primarily on systematic oral inquiries and began by discussing those material and institutional structures that had persisted. Wells, settlements, walls, town layouts, weapons, implements, insignia, official compounds, and other material remains all embody traditions of the past no less vividly than do the current political, legal, and social arrangements of the contemporary state. Further, in 1958-1959, when I visited Daura, its political organization contained much that was new. Several current political structures could be dated from 1953, when the government of the Northern Region began to prepare for Nigerian independence. Other administrative forms and practices evidently owed their introduction or character to British action during the preceding half-century; and besides their innovations, the British prohibited and significantly modified a wide range of traditional institutions. Few political procedures or structures had persisted unchanged from the precolonial regime while many had lapsed, with or without formal abolition, during the half-century of colonial rule. Administrative records contained few references to these lapsed, prohibited, or transformed institutions. Accordingly I tried to collect systematic data on all items of traditional organization which had been preserved, abolished, or modified during this century.

My inquiries differed from the simple collection of oral traditions in their systematic character and in their specific focus on the structure and development of particular institutions. For example, to study traditional modes of revenue collection and use, I compiled catalogs of different types of local revenue at differing periods, listing the officials authorized to collect them, the procedures they employed, the modes of storage and distribution of the receipts. These inquiries were supplemented by others on the location, organization, and staffing of the state treasury. Likewise, to study the organization of offices at Daura and its successor states, I compiled catalogs of each system and investigated each office separately to learn its functions, articulation with other units in the series, resources, and distribution among status categories of the wider society. If an office was said to be hereditary in some lineage, whether slave or free, genealogical data were collected to check its list of incumbents. I compiled lists of all individuals who had held

the forty senior offices in the Zango successor state and thirty offices each at Fulani Daura and the chiefdom of Baure. These inventories were checked on several occasions by consulting different informants, by genealogies, and by other means. In compiling these lists of office holders, I paid attention to the circumstances in which they were appointed, promoted, dismissed; to their lineage and social status; to the titles they had previously held; and to their relations with their predecessors. In some cases my informants could say how long the individual had held his office. Unfortunately I did not attempt to recover such information for all incumbencies in each series.

By such inquiries an effort was made to pass behind the screen of institutional descriptions that generally reveal ideal forms of action in order to recover instead the detailed composition and procedures of the officialdom; its councils; battle organization; legal, ceremonial, and fiscal arrangements; and the like. Such details were especially important in studying Zango, since the insistence on prejihadic constitutional forms was greatest there, even when it was evident that sundry particulars of the forms invoked were of recent origin. Thus at Zango, as elsewhere, there were councils for war, for routine administration, and for selection of the chief. Formal descriptions of the authority, composition, and procedures of these councils illustrated the constitutional ideals and doctrines of their authors. Such statements have a normative, static quality, perhaps because they assert the validity of ageless, inviolable procedures. However, given its situational exigencies, these constitutional doctrines were perhaps at Zango more honored in the breach than in observance, and some are clearly of recent genesis. For example, the current formula for the composition of the council that selects an emir is an evident idealization of arrangements which are said to have been followed in 1904 at the election of the Emir Musa, whose subsequent return to Daura to rule the reintegrated residue of the Hausa state strengthened his position and amply legitimates all innovations that took place in his reign. Conversely, although generalized descriptions of council compositions and procedures at Baure or Fulani Daura do not exactly correspond with the details of such organizations under successive rulers, such discrepancies do not falsify these generalizations. As indicated above, such general statements are normative and not empirical. They assert constitutional doctrines as models against which situational deviations can be noted and evaluated.

Besides systematic collection of the names, genealogies, histories, and social status of as many incumbents of all senior offices of the various states as were reliably known, I compiled detailed inventories of the roles, resources, and relations of these and other offices; of the collection, rates, forms, and employment of local taxation; of the military organization, ceremonial and judicial arrangements, state councils, and territorial administration. In studying the latter it was necessary first to determine the boundaries of chiefdoms at particular points in time and then to identify the settlements that flourished at these different periods, the offices to which they were attached as fiefs, and the identities of their individual supervisors, where

known. It was then possible to investigate the changing allocation of these fiefs as state boundaries and territorial arrangements underwent change.

Certain problems that arose in the study of these state officialdoms illustrate nicely the relationships between constitutional or structural norms and empirical practice. These problems and insights center on local classifications of office by reference to the status categories for which they were reserved, as free or slave, clerical, royal, or other, and as restricted or unrestricted to particular descent groups. The second classification crosscuts the first, since all offices are classified either as *karda* (hereditary) and thus reserved for particular lineages or as *shigege* (unrestricted by descent) and thus available for the chief to allocate at his pleasure among men of the appropriate status category. Although central to the political structure, these classifications are also idealized and normative, rather than empirical. Inventories of incumbents often indicate that particular offices were held by members of lineages and status categories that differed from those for which these units were reserved.

Such divergences between the distribution and ideal classification of offices often illustrate the adaptations of political structure to changing situations and thus reveal the tensions that historical exigencies impose on ideal constitutional forms. They also oblige us to investigate any general statement of constitutional form by compiling catalogs of all historical instances to which the statement applies. This involves a method of investigation that begins by eliciting general statements of political organization and process, which can then be tested by a sufficiently comprehensive and accurate population of cases to demonstrate how far practice confirmed these constitutional norms and to indicate, where possible, the conditions under which the norms prevailed or were overridden by political considerations. Such inquiries situate local traditions of a constitutional or a historical kind in the matrix of the developing political systems to which they belong. Thus, instead of regarding the empirical order as a simple reflex of these constitutional ideas, and instead of setting these ideas aside as misleading or irrelevant, the traditions are treated as organizing or representative elements of the complex of political relations under study. The degree to which any tradition validly describes political practice can thus be determined by empirical analysis of relevant cases; and since such procedures enable us to assess the empirical significance of constitutional traditions, we need neither discard nor employ them as the foundations for our account.

Our reconstructions and interpretations are thus syntheses of empirical data and the doctrines and historical traditions to which these data refer. To determine the validity of these empirical data, I collated and cross-checked my tabulations wherever possible. These details of territorial organization; of the classification, functions, relations, and distribution of offices and the genealogies, identities, status categories, and histories of their incumbents; of tax schedules and modes of collection; and of military, judicial, and legal organizations hardly lend themselves to symbolic presentation or narrative

statement. They must first be patiently extracted by sharply focused and systematic inquiries and then checked and cross-checked to assess their completeness and validity. Accordingly, charges leveled at historical reconstructions based on oral tradition and the rebuttals such charges elicit are equally marginal to our inquiry. If careful cross-checking confirms the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information supplied by such organizational inventories, then their usefulness in historical reconstructions depends primarily on their adequacy and time-depth.

Since historical accounts are always in some sense hypothetical, apparently inconsistent or incomplete reports should not dismay the field researcher. In an appropriate frame of reference, such inconsistent or incomplete statements may appear to be complementary and not in conflict, since no single statement or series of statements can ever provide an exact representation of the social events or forms to which they refer. In effect, all statements, whether historical or ethnographic, are in some sense partial and incomplete and may appear to be inconsistent. To assess the value of such apparently conflicting or partial statements about events in the past, the anthropologist should first exclude his own personal biases and then attempt to identify the individual biases or specialist information of his informants. By compiling a detailed index of his field notes, he can also identify, examine, and compare his conflicting data to isolate their elements and relations. Cross-references in the index will often reveal the situational or structural relations that underlie and integrate diverse or partial accounts into coherent wholes. Even then, alternative interpretations of critical data will certainly remain. The anthropologist should indicate these alternatives and adopt the one that is most consistent with his account of the historical complex or sequence to which it relates; or he may report the competing data and interpretations and suspend his judgment. He should recognize in advance the inevitable insufficiency of his knowledge of contemporary as well as historical phenomena and so preserve the validity of his account against unsound interpretations and conjectures.

Finally, it should be noted that in assessing the adequacy and intelligibility of his data, the anthropologist must employ two sets of cultural standards simultaneously—those of the people to whose culture the data relate and those of social science, which seeks to isolate significant and general relations within and among all categories of social phenomena. It is true that by seeking several accounts of identical events or institutions, the field-worker multiplies the chances that he will obtain inconsistent or incomplete representations of these events, thereby increasing his uncertainty about their particulars and significance. But such apparent ambiguities are perhaps the best index of the value of his field data. In historical or contemporary studies, where little is known, all may seem simple and sure; but as our knowledge grows, the complexity of the phenomena becomes more evident and its analysis more profound.

Kusugu well, now a Nigerian national monument



Magajin Tambari and the royal drums

Throne musicians awaiting the emir

Procession of Emir Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar, 1968

Entrance to the emir's palace

Bayajidda's sword and knife with the royal drums of his wife,
the Magajiya Daura

2
The Society and Its Context

Habitat

Daura is commonly regarded as the oldest of the Hausa states. It now lies on the northeastern limits of Hausa territory, between 12°30′ and 13°30′ north latitude and 8° and 9° east longitude. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the chiefdom was considerably larger, extending across the present international frontier to include the districts of Kworgum and Kance, from which its boundary ran southeastward below Dogo Dakara, as shown on map 1 (p. 60). The western borders of Katsina and Daura at that date corresponded closely with their present boundary. However, in 1800 Daura included most of Kazaure emirate north of Kazaure town. Its southeastern perimeters also included the territories of Magaria and Baure. Much of this region was sparsely inhabited, since population clustered where water supplies permitted continuous farming. This settlement pattern persists northward toward Zinder across the *sahil,* most of which is uninhabited waste, unfit for farming.

Contemporary Daura forms the northeastern arm of Katsina Province in the North Central State of Nigeria, an area of coarse, heavy sand drifts that overlie lateritic ironstone.[1] The land is undulating, with marshy depressions and a covering scrub broken by intermittent shade trees. Daura lies beyond the northern limits of the tsetse fly and is therefore favored by pastoralists during the rains. For domestic water the people depend on wells, since the rains fall mainly between June and September, and the emirate has no permanent rivers. Fortunately the territory is crossed by an underground stream, the Gigido, which drains eastward toward Lake Chad and breaks the surface periodically at scattered points.[2] In 1958-1959 several reaches along its course were under water.

Contemporary Daura has the desiccated appearance of the southern *sahil* except during the rains, when the grass is lush and green. There is a notable absence of thick groves of bush (*kurmi,* pl. *kurame*), and in the rainy season

much of the local marshland is waterlogged and fit only for grazing. Crops are generally grown on upland slopes with good drainage.

With an average precipitation of about twenty-six inches, which falls mainly between July and September and averages ten inches in August, the rainy season *(damina)* at Daura is followed by harvest *(kaka)*, which gives way to a cold dry spell *(rani)* from late December until the end of February, followed by a hot dry season *(bazara)*. In effect, the year divides into the long dry season from October until May and the rainy season from June till September. Despite high daily and seasonal variations in temperature, the climate is pleasant and dry for most of the year; but late rains may produce famine, as happened in 1913, 1949-1950 and perhaps 1805-1807 as well. Being dependent for their survival on subsistence cultivation during the short rainy season, the people prepare their fields in advance of the rains and devote themselves entirely to cultivation at that time. In this area, women farm actively, although men perform the heavy work. In such southern Hausa states as Zaria, which have higher rainfall and longer wet seasons, women do little farm work.

While eastern Daura consists mainly of sandstones and sedimentary clays, ill suited to agriculture because they waterlog, the west is mainly eroded crystalline schist and granitic formations, covered in places by sandy drifts.[3] The area around and south of Zango offers the best soil for grain; but how these agricultural conditions affected the distribution of population within the territory in earlier times we cannot say, principally because of developments initiated by the Fulani conquest during the last century. The distribution of Fulani cattle is roughly uniform throughout the emirate at all seasons of the year. However, the distribution of settled Fulani in the various districts differs sharply. At Sandamu, southeast of Daura town, about 60 percent of the total population are Fulani. At Baure, the proportion is much lower.

Ethnic Divisions

Of 143,000 inhabitants enumerated at Daura in 1952, approximately 48,000 were classified as Fulani, 85,000 as Hausa, and 5,750 as Kanuri (Beriberi), the third largest group.[4]

In 1920 British officials estimated the population at about forty-eight thousand persons,[5] but in 1927 a house-to-house count yielded a figure of 76,080, despite some emigration to Gumel and Kano during the interval.[6] By 1952 the population had almost doubled, and its density in relation to arable land may have stood at three hundred per square mile, the average for the emirate being then about one hundred and sixty. Three districts, Baure, Mai Aduwa, and Zango, each contained approximately one-quarter of the emirate's population, while the capital and Sandamu contained the remainder. If we exclude Mai Aduwa on the ground that it was then administered by Zinder, in 1900 the populations of Baure, Zango, and Fulani Daura probably

ranged between ten and thirteen thousand people. Most Fulani then lived at Sandamu in the Fulani emirate, but we cannot reliably estimate how the population was apportioned among ethnic stocks.

Besides Fulani and Hausa, Daura also contains Kanuri (Beriberi), Maguzawa, and Bugaje. Beriberi are Muslims whose ethnic home is Bornu, a state with which Daura has long historical associations. During the last century, however, Daura's links with Bornu were replaced by its subordination to the neighboring Kanuri state of Zinder; and it is probable that many local Beriberi descend from Zinder folk who immigrated at that time.

Bugaje, or Buzaye, who live in separate communities under their own headmen at Sharawa, Rijiyar Mata, Unguwar Yahaya near Zugai, and Tambu, a few miles west of Daura town, are Negroid serfs owned by Tuareg of Asben. These Bugaje communities are traditionally endogamous and have only recently begun to adopt the Hausa language and to intermarry with Hausa. Bugaje villages occupy discrete blocs of land, administer their internal affairs, and are visited annually after harvest by their Tuareg masters, who levy shares of grain and other crops on their people.

By providing the Tuareg of Asben with farmland for these serf settlements, the chiefs of Daura probably sought to ensure that the Tuareg would visit their city annually, bringing the salt that their people needed; but by these grants they also sought to secure useful alliances with powerful Tuareg leaders. On their journey home, the Tuareg took grain, chillies and other foods, cotton, leather, craft products, and probably some slaves.

Like Bugaje, Daura's Maguzawa occupy discrete communities scattered widely across the territory at Unguwan Limam Jatau, Kwaryar Salla, Yanduna, Gugurdulu, Zugai, Mai Aduwa, Garni, and Badaki; but although Maguzawa are native Hausa speakers who have not adopted Islam, their settlements normally differ from those of the Muslim Hausa in being dispersed.[7] Maguzawa group themselves in localized exogamous patrilineages that worship particular pagan spirits (*iskoki,* s. *iska*) in collective rites. Each lineage has its own headman who administers the group's affairs; and several of these headmen bear such titles as Sarkin Noma (Chief of Farming) or Sarkin Gabas (Chief of the East). The ritually senior headman of the Maguzawa at Daura is known as the Sarkin Lafiya (Chief of Health, Welfare) and lives at Yanduna on the Daura-Kazaure border. In precolonial days, although the Sarkin Lafiya distributed such lesser titles as Sarkin Noma to the Maguzawa headmen who solicited them, he had no territorial or other jurisdiction over any lineage except his own.

Muslim Hausa regard Maguzawa as uncouth pagans who dedicate themselves to grain farming, to the brewing and drinking of beer, and to the worship of heathen spirits and fetishes. This negative stereotype indicates the technological backwardness of Maguzawa, whose major occupation is farming and who take little interest in the market-oriented crafts that Hausa pursue; but it also contrasts the Maguzawa preference for life in isolated hamlets with the preference of Muslim Hausa for urban life.

At Daura, Maguzawa have a wide reputation as magicians, bowmen, and farmers. Their society, segmented into parallel unilineal groups, differs from that of the Muslim Hausa primarily in its political acephaly and its lack of occupational specialization, social stratification, markets, Islam, slavery, and clientage. Maguzawa participation in the market sector of the Hausa economy is therefore limited. They are also peripheral to the Hausa political system that subordinates them and requires from them military and other services as needed. During the last century most of Daura's Maguzawa maintained their allegiance to the defeated Hausa chiefs and helped them with bowmen. Presumably some loyal Maguzawa withdrew from Fulani territory for these or other reasons.

Although the census of 1952 did not enumerate the Maguzawa of Daura as a separate ethnic group, in 1958-1959 they probably accounted for one-tenth of the Hausa population. In past centuries, before conversion had reduced their numbers, they were probably a much larger fraction of the community.

After the Muslim Hausa, the Fulani are the largest ethnic segment of Daura's population. Between 1927 and 1952 their relative number apparently declined from 40 percent of the total to approximately 33 percent;[8] but whether this was due to emigration during the interval we cannot say. Neither can we now estimate the relative proportions of Fulani and Hausa in the chiefdom before the jihad of 1804-1807, though it is clear that west, central, and southwestern Daura then contained substantial numbers of Fulani.

At Daura, as elsewhere, we must distinguish the pastoral and settled Fulani. Pastoralists roam the waste with their herds in search of water and grazing,[9] while settled Fulani live in compact hamlets or towns and obtain their livelihood by sedentary occupations. The longer and more intensive their sedentarization, the less easily do settled Fulani appreciate their cousins' pastoral traditions, as their own dependence on farming, craft, and trade increases. It is among these settled Fulani that the teachings and literature of Islam have their deepest roots at Daura, as in other Hausa states. Besides *malanci* (Muslim scholarship, clerical activity), they practice embroidery, sewing, weaving, local herding, and cultivation; but they do not engage in the traditional Hausa crafts of cloth dyeing and tanning and working leather, and they regard butchers, eulogists or *griots* (H. *maroka*), drummers, blacksmiths, hunters, and builders with some aversion. Perhaps some persisting pastoral orientations in the culture of the settled Fulani have thus restricted their adaptation to the Hausa economic context.

Like Maguzawa and Bugaje, settled Fulani at Daura prefer to live in discrete communities among their own kind. Fulani traditionally formed an endogamous segment of the local population and still remain so, preferring to marry Fulani from other emirates rather than Hausa. During the last century, the Fulani language, Fulfulde, was widely used among Fulani in rural areas. Since few Hausa understand Fulfulde, Fulani spoke Hausa in dealing with non-Fulani.

Since Hausa government requires that local communities should have

their own headmen whom the chief may call to account, most Fulani settlements have local heads, the most senior of whom are generally known as the Sarkin (Chief of) Fulani of the villages or area in which they live. In the late nineteenth century the three senior Fulani headmen in the various segments of Daura were located at Gurdo, Tsatsumburum, and Sandamu. Only the last of these lived in the Fulani emirate. Hausa territorial chiefs had long employed these Fulani headmen to collect cattle tax *(jangali)* from their pastoral cousins within and beyond their village communities; and since few Hausa speak Fulfulde, these Fulani headmen mediated the relations of the pastoralists and Hausa. Moreover, being relatively learned in Arabic and Islam, the settled Fulani provided Hausa chiefs with scribes, jurists, and advisers on Islamic ritual, law, and political practice. In consequence, before the jihad Fulani held influential positions as advisers and administrators in various Hausa states.

This summary indicates how its ethnic heterogeneity affected the state of Daura. The local society still represents a collection of several closed categories of unequal size, only the largest of which is not further subdivided into a series of closed exclusive groups. Relations among the members of these different ethnic categories are characteristically fragile, restricted, external, and shallow. Differential rights of citizenship and political participation separated the Bugaje, Maguzawa, and pastoral and settled Fulani from one another and from the dominant Hausa. Where Hausa ruled, they identified the state as their collective property and vested its direction in their chiefs and officials. Under Fulani rule throughout the last century, the emirate of Daura was no less clearly a Fulani resource and organization. Bugaje and Maguzawa were equally marginal to either regime.

Islam in Traditional Daura

The Daura Hausa traditionaly identified their society and state with Islam. Their political institutions included official priesthoods, judgeships, the Muslim festivals of Id-el-Fitr and Id-el-Kabir, and Muslim law, particularly in relations of debt, inheritance, marriage, personal status, and commerce. Arabic was locally written in an Ajemic script, and Muslim Kanuri models guided the organization of trade, stratification, and government. Islamic patterns of slavery were also prominent in the traditional Daura society, even though these northern Hausa lacked easy access to sources of slaves and secured their supplies mainly from the market or from raids on caravans. Elderly Hausa say that during the late nineteenth century, slaves may have formed one-tenth of the people of Zango. They were probably less than one-fifth of the population at Daura before the jihad. Slaves were mainly employed in farming and other manual work, but they also figured prominently in the state administration.

We cannot assess exactly how the Hausa of Daura observed Islam during

the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Data presented below indicate that Islamic law was often honored locally in the breach, particularly in regard to markets and other channels of economic distribution. Other evidence suggests that similar practices prevailed in nearby Hausa states during the latter half of the eighteenth century. It was in large part against such political practices that the Shehu Usman dan Fodio directed his protest.[10] Hausa chiefs also engaged in ritual acts which Fulani reformers regarded as inconsistent with Islam and contrary to its tenets. It seems likely that the Daura chiefs at this period practiced certain syncretistic rites that combined elements of Maguzawa provenience with the standard religious and magical practices of Islam. Their peers in nearby states were also disinclined to enforce the minimal requisites of Islamic cult, such as the declaration of faith, the five daily prayers, the fast, alms, pilgrimage, or the rules regarding jihad. Certainly, until Malam Musa's accession at Zango in 1904, no Hausa chief of Daura ever held a reputation for *malanci* (Koranic learning). The established dependence of Hausa rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on Fulani and foreign clerics for guidance in the application of Muslim law and the rules of religion further indicates the relatively backward state of Islam among the Hausa elite. At Daura and Zango the offices of Iya, Dan Baroka, Sarkin Masu, Magaji Bayamadi, and Sarkin Lafiya were all identified with non-Islamic ritual attributes and functions. Being complementary to the official priesthoods and malamships, these non-Islamic offices illustrated the syncretistic character of the Hausa state. Moreover, if such syncretism prevailed in the capital, where the rulers lived and Islam was strongest, its observance among the rural population was probably ambiguous, casual, and impure. Nevertheless, since they drew their models of Islam from Bornu, Kano, and other nearby states, whose institutions differed sharply from those of adjacent pagan societies while resembling their own, the Hausa of Daura regarded themselves as Muslims despite their imperfect Islam.

To Fulani fired by the reformist ideas of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio and to many others who had suffered the oppression of Hausa rulers or their slave staffs, the self-identification of these traditional chiefs as Muslims was hollow and spurious. To the Shehu's circle, the prevailing regime in eighteenth-century Daura would probably have seemed like a parody of Islamic government and society. Other Fulani, less directly affected by these religious doctrines, were probably encouraged to take up arms against the ruling Hausa by ethnic sentiments, by hopes of plunder, or by desires to relieve themselves of political oppression. Some combination of these conditions underlay the social and cultural background of the Fulani jihad at Daura.

Economy

Although based primarily on agriculture, the mixed economy of precolonial Daura was diversified by the raising of cattle and other stock; by the gather-

ing of sylvan produce; by the exploitation of mineral resources, particularly iron; by craft production; and by long-distance caravan trade *(fatauci)*. The participation of different ethnic segments of the society in different sectors of this economy varied considerably. Maguzawa and Bugaje farmed but took little part in cattle raising and trade. However, Maguzawa mined and smelted iron ore to produce implements for farming, war, and other purposes. Fulani have always enjoyed a monopoly of cattle rearing at Daura, while Hausa, Bugaje, and Kanuri have reared horses, donkeys, and small stock. Though some Tuareg grazed their camels in the chiefdom during the dry season, the camel was mainly seen in visiting caravans.

The people of Daura depend on sorghum and millet for their basic food. Sweet potatoes were only introduced from Kano in 1895, while cassava was brought in by the British during this century as protection against famine. Other contemporary crops include sugarcane, maize, indigo, chili peppers, tobacco, groundnuts, and sesame. The Hausa of Daura are traditionally hoe farmers; however since 1930 the British have introduced cattle-drawn plows. In 1927, of 598,000 acres in the emirate, 112,000 were under cultivation, averaging about 1.46 acres per person. The emirate then contained about 2,600 horses, 33,000 sheep, and 68,000 goats.[11] By 1949 Daura had 40,000 cattle, 120,000 goats, 40,000 sheep, 10,000 donkeys, and 3,100 horses.[12] However, whereas the 1952 Nigerian census reports only 740 males engaged in craft production in the emirate, in 1927, 6,159, or 28 percent of the adult male population, were engaged in crafts or trade; and most of these were Hausa. It is unlikely that this number has declined.

Daura city stands near the southern terminus of the great trans-Saharan caravan route that runs northward from Katsina and Kano through Zinder, Tanout, and Agades to Ghat, Ghadames, and Tunis or Tripoli. In the last century major caravans normally bypassed Daura en route to Kano and Katsina. Before the jihad, when its territory straddled the southern portion of this caravan route and all caravans were obliged to pay transit tolls on their merchandise, they probably called at Daura town. Administration of markets and regulation of caravan traffic were accordingly major interests of the local state, and the caravan trade was probably critical for Daura's prosperity and growth. However, during the last century, following Daura's fragmentation and the development of a major market at Zinder, eighty miles northeast, incoming caravans tended to disperse from that city, some moving eastward to Kukawa and Bornu, some westward through Gezawa in Maradi to Katsina and the western Hausa-Fulani states, while others went southward through Tumfushi and Baure via Babura to Kano. Few caravans visited Daura during the last century, and these were probably small. Their loss of this source of revenues accelerated the impoverishment of the Fulani and Hausa regimes. Nonetheless, before the jihad there were flourishing markets at Mai Aduwa, Zango, Daura city, Kanda, and Baure; and during the last century others developed at Tumfushi, Bumbum, and Yanduna.

For currency the Daura Hausa used various media: Maria Theresa thalers,

cowries, cloths of special weave and size called *turkuda* (s. *turkudi*), and for units of larger value, cattle, slaves, and horses. Thick silver bracelets *(mundaye)* and anklets *(kwandaye),* locally manufactured by melting down imported thalers, were hoarded as wealth. Grain, cattle, robes, slaves, and small stock provided alternative forms of liquid wealth. Since land lacked commercial value and compounds were easily constructed, the major forms of capital in traditional Daura were wells, livestock, and slaves. Since chiefs regulated markets to maintain stable prices for staples, commodities were often exchanged without resorting to currency. Thus, a horse valued at 120,000 cowries might be exchanged directly for two female slaves valued at 60,000 cowries each.

Political regulation of commodity prices enabled chiefs to profit freely from market transactions by reducing the prices of articles they wished to buy while increasing the prices of those they wished to sell. Such manipulations were mainly reserved for the internal market, external trade with caravans being channeled through the Sarkin Zango, who dealt with the Bugaje, and the Sarkin Tafarki (Chief of Highways), who administered the toll on Tuareg and other caravans. The Sarkin Zango provided visiting traders with accommodation and put them in contact with the chief of the brokers (Sarkin Dillalai) and other commission agents, who undertook their purchases and disposed of their goods. In return for these services the Sarkin Zango was remunerated by gifts and commissions in cash or kind.

Before the jihad the Hausa of Daura traded southward to Kano, Nupe, and the Yoruba of Oyo, eastward to Bornu, and west to Katsina. From Bornu they received paper, swords, straw products, and other light articles carried by the Bornu merchants *(fatake).* To Nupe they took salt and other imported goods as well as local products, returning with slaves and southern articles. Situated between the major markets of Katsina and Kano, Daura was a minor market in the Saharan and trans-Sudanic caravan trade. Nonetheless this traffic was important to its economy and a source of cultural stimuli. The caravan trade flourished in the dry season between December and April, after the harvest. Its routes were policed by the chief's agents, and it was regulated by the official arrangements sketched above.

Occupation and Stratification

Muslim Hausa take pride in the variety of their occupational skills. Occupational differentiation guides their participation in the market economy through which craft services and products are transferred and subsistence goods exchanged. Whereas the typical Bamaguje (pl. Maguzawa) rarely combines craft or trade with farming, the typical Muslim Hausa is both a subsistence farmer and a part-time craftsman. When the dry season restricts farming to marshlands, Hausa men engage full-time in craft work, house repair, or trade. Since the Hausa economy is based on agricultural production

for subsistence and exchange, only the wealthy do not engage in cultivation directly. Besides officials who farmed by slave or corvée labor, this category included leading merchants *(attajirai),* who purchased their household needs in the local market, and some Koranic scholars *(malamai),* whose receipts from alms and *zakka,* the Muslim grain tithe, supplied much of the staples they needed. Excluding these prosperous persons and such ethnic groups as the Maguzawa and Bugaje, who participate marginally in Daura society, most Hausa men still combine farming with some nonagricultural activity or *sana'a* (craft or trade). A fair number practice two or more such occupations, one inherited from their fathers and grandfathers, the others chosen by themselves.

Hausa describe hereditary occupations as *karda* or *gargajiya*—that is, "inherited, ascribed"—while new occupations and the individuals that adopt them are described as *shigege* or *katsiro.* The distinction between *karda* (hereditary) and *shigege* (achieved) occupations and statuses is equally basic to Daura society and political organization. Among officials it distinguishes those whose status is inherited from others who have been appointed freely by the chief. The former, who are called *masu-sarauta na asali* (nobility by birth) or *masu-sarauta gadaje* (hereditary officials), hold their titles by right of descent and have the higher status and prestige. *Malanci,* or Koranic scholarship, is likewise conceived by Hausa as an occupation which may be inherited or adopted by individual choice; but in this case also members of descent groups which practice *malanci* rank above those individuals who have chosen this occupation for themselves.

Such social emphases on the pursuit of paternal occupations express traditional orientations that place priority on the maintenance of social stability and order. In consequence, the Muslim Hausa of Daura are stratified in a number of relatively fixed hereditary occupational classes which recruit their members by agnatic descent. Since members of adjacent or parallel classes are free to intermarry, such occupational strata should not be confused with caste. Beyond the local community, these divisions do not distinguish social groups but rank categories differentiated by their hereditary occupational statuses. The social classification also applies to free and unfree persons alike and differentiates captives from those born in slavery. Its implications for the assignment of individual status are thus conditional; and perhaps the principal significance of this ranking of occupational classes ordered by inheritance and descent is to preserve and perpetuate the traditional form of social structure, to emphasize its dominant value-orientations, and to differentiate the society of Muslim Hausa from others within or beyond its borders.

In this respect the assimilation of Hausa culture by settled Fulani is highly selective. Settled Fulani have assimilated the Hausa conception of occupational categories as hereditary strata while altering the relative placement of particular occupations within this order to reflect their ethnic preferences for

embroidery, sewing, and *malanci* and their devaluation of occupations which they deem polluting, such as dyeing, blacksmith work, tanning, and butchery. Fulani aloofness from the market is also evident in their ranking of commercial occupations. However, like their Hausa hosts, Fulani ascribe superiority to inherited *(karda)* occupations and disapprove individual changes as innovations *(katsiro)*. And since their evaluations of ranked hereditary occupations are consistent with Hausa notions, the Hausa have assimilated them.

At Daura the dynasty is regarded as a separate stratum that outranks all others. By princely practice of concubinage, the reproduction rate of this group is almost as high as its political status, thus converting it from a lineage into a social stratum. Ranking below and in places beside the dynasty are other officials *(masu-sarauta)*, most of whom are recruited by descent, although their offices vary in significance. While the officialdom includes all who hold office in the central state structure, whether slave or free, it excludes untitled staff and most of the village chiefs. Ranking below the dynasty and officialdom are the *malamai* (s. *malam*), or Islamic intelligentsia, who are internally differentiated by criteria of ethnicity, occupational inheritance, descent, hereditary title to office, residence, and Islamic learning. Next come the *attajirai*, or leading merchants, and such titled non-Islamic ritualists, herbalists, and magicians *(masu-magani)* as the Magaji Bayamadi, the Sarkin Masu, and Dan Baroka. The remaining occupational classes are ranked roughly as follows: *fatake*, who engage in long-distance trading; tailors and embroiderers, who are mainly Fulani; blacksmiths and those who work "white" metals such as silver or tin; pot-makers; commission agents; builders; weavers; dyers; tanners; leatherworkers; barber-doctors; mat weavers and other strawworkers; and finally butchers, eulogists *(maroka)*, drummers, hornblowers, and field slaves. Since most craftsmen farm, farming is omitted from this list.

Hausa employ several terms of Arabic derivation to denote social status, for example, *daraja, ladabi,* and *adabu*. These terms are commonly used to indicate the place of an individual occupation in the traditional ranking scheme; but Hausa recognize that this scheme is categorical, abstract, and static and that it is generally modified in the assignation of individual status by other factors such as age, wealth, and birth status as free man or slave, noble or commoner. Hausa accordingly employ the occupational stratification as a summary model of the principles that allocate status within their society.[13] Although provisional, this model provides an accepted guide to proper social conduct.

One notable feature of this categorical stratification is its relative indifference to strictly economic differentials. Butchers, who rank at the base of the occupational order, are often among the wealthiest commoners in a Hausa community. Such prosperity, however, cannot enhance the status of their occupation within the system. Conversely, although many malams and

princes are relatively poor, this does not diminish their social status. Since the model assumes that status and occupations are transferred by agnatic descent, it is also immune to individual changes of fortune or occupation.

Whether at some past time these occupational categories were endogamous groups or castes, we cannot say. However, this seems unlikely, since various occupational strata have long been linked by the institution of preferential marriage: for example, malams, the dynasty, officials, and merchants; weavers, embroiderers, and dyers; leatherworkers and tanners; drummers, eulogists *(maroka),* butchers, and buglers; blacksmiths, builders, woodworkers, and hunters. Such preferential marriages do not imply that the intermarrying strata hold equivalent status. For example, the occupational stratification differentiates tailors from dyers and weavers. It groups officials, malams, and wealthy merchants, who intermarry, at the top of the scale, while eulogists, drummers, and buglers, who also intermarry, rank at the bottom. Unfortunately, I failed to learn the marriage alignments of commission agents, market vendors, barber-doctors, *fatake,* and strawworkers.

Preferential marriages *(auren zumunta)* between members of different occupational groups may thus express convergent interests in production and marketing rather than status equivalence, though without excluding the latter. For example, tanners and leatherworkers share common interests in the production and sale of leather. Weavers, dyers, and tailors are similarly associated in the cloth trade, while blacksmiths supply builders, woodworkers, and hunters with tools and weapons.

Craft alliances expressed in preferential marriage may thus reflect technological or commercial conditions. Moreover, in such situations the dependence of one craft on another may also give rise to relations of patronage, so that blacksmiths may act as patrons to woodworkers; tanners, to leatherworkers; and drummers, to eulogists. In contrast, the patterns of patronage among cloth workers reverse these relations of functional dependence, since tailors or embroiderers, who are typically Fulani, normally act as patrons to weavers and dyers and often to cloth brokers as well. This situation probably illustrates the accommodations of Hausa craftsmen to Fulani views of the occupational order during the Fulani domination of western Daura from 1807-1906. Another peculiar patronage pattern links malams, who are mostly Fulani and specialize in Islamic magic, law, and ritual, with clothworkers, dyers, tailors, weavers, and commission brokers. Since malams (clerics) do not normally extend their patronage to blacksmiths, leatherworkers, woodworkers, hunters, barber-doctors and builders, these craftsmen whom the Fulani disesteem probably seek the magical and medical assistance they need from *bokaye* (pagan magicians) and non-Islamic ritualists. Between butchers and pastoral Fulani, the pattern varies. In some cases the butcher who markets Fulani cattle acts as patron, in others as client; but all pastoralists have negative attitudes toward butchers, whom they traditionally regard as slaves by status or descent.

Forms of Clientage

Clientage is another form of social relation that distinguishes Hausa society from the Maguzawa and nomadic Fulani societies with which it is linked. While settled Fulani and Hausa may engage in relations of clientage and patronage with one another, such relations do not link Hausa with the Bugaje settled among them. Instead, these Bugaje communities are affiliated to the chiefdom through special links between their Tuareg owners and the Daura chief. Thus the boundaries and ramifications of local clientage demarcate Daura as a political community.

Clientage is an institution with two major modes, which Hausa distinguish as *baranci* and *mutumci. Baranci* is the menial form of clientage in which the dependent or inferior usually lives in or beside his patron's compound and serves on his farm and in various menial tasks. In return the patron provides his client's subsistence and should ultimately set him up in an independent household with one or more wives. When destitute men seek to create relations of this kind, individuals of high status are obliged by Islamic norms of charity and Hausa notions of status and prestige to accept the services they offer. However, the relation presumes good faith and mutual confidence between patron and client. It is also asymmetrical; while exclusive for the client, who can only have one patron at a time, it allows the patron to have several clients simultaneously. Thus while *baranci* furnishes destitute men with substitute kin *(dangin zama),* it also provides men of high status with loyal dependents who may be employed on confidential errands and manual tasks. The relation of patron and client illustrates Max Weber's concept of a status-contract.[14] Though standardized in form, it is diffuse and variable in its contents and distinguishes the statuses of patron and client in complementary terms by stressing the patron's superiority in relations with his client. In return, since only free men may contract this type of clientage, the patron is obliged to treat his clients as generously and considerately as his situation permits. Except that such diffuse, asymmetrical loyalties are equally basic to both types of relation, political clientage, although described as *barantaka,* differs from *baranci* in its content and connotations.

Baranci does not enter into those forms of patronage that align the members of occupational groups linked by functional relations of production and marketing. Since most craftsmen ply their occupations at their homes, their relations with one another are less intimate and continuous than *baranci* assumes. Thus occupational alignments normally correspond to the *mutumci* mode of clientage, in which the client remains economically independent, lives in his compound, and subsists his household himself. Despite its differing content, the *mutumci* clientage that links members of different occupational strata closely resembles the political relation of *barantaka.*

Like *mutumci* relations among craftsmen, political clientage *(barantaka)* presupposes the residential separation of patron and client and often gives

rise to alliance by marriage. However, political clientage may result in the client's promotion by his patron to positions of political and administrative responsibility. *Barantaka* was the traditional means by which Hausa clients pursued political mobility and their patrons recruited able staff. Such mobility is inconsistent with the clientage relations that link members of differing occupational groups, since it would erode the symbiosis on which their alliance is based. In the Hausa scheme of social status, all relations of clientage presume differences of status and material resources between patron and client; but in *baranci* the gaps are much wider than in *mutumci.*

Position of Women

The position of women in these systems of clientage and occupational stratification is secondary and marginal. Like their kinsmen, Hausa women derive their status from their fathers, who are themselves ranked as members of particular occupational categories. However, Hausa custom and Muslim law classify women as political and legal minors, not as full citizens in their own right. Nonetheless, although transferred between households and kin groups by preferential marriage, women are free to divorce and remarry men of their own choice, who need not always belong to the appropriate occupational categories.

The role of women in Daura society was symbolized by the offices of Magajiya, Iya, Saraki, Gabsai, Yar Kuntu and Maidaki, which were reserved for female members of the dynasty. Under Fulani rule these offices were either abolished or occasionally filled by men from particular descent lines. Thus the Hausa political system provided wider opportunities for female participation than the Fulani. In Hausa constitutional theory, the Magajiya of Daura had a central place; and besides the offices held by princesses, two others were reserved for women, that of the Korama, who presided over grain sellers in the local markets, and that of the Dakama, a royal musician. While the Korama's office was unrestricted by descent and filled by a nominee of the chief butcher, who administered the city market, that of Dakama was reserved for women of a particular descent group which was permanently attached to the throne.

Despite their virtual exclusion from the political institutions which men monopolized, women maintain elaborate relations of clientage among themselves. In relations of bond-friendship between senior and junior women resident in separate homes, the latter are described as *kanwar rana* (younger sister of the day), while the former are called *uwar rana* (mother of the day). In parallel style, the patron in *mutumci* clientage relations among men is described as the *ubandaki* (father of the hut). In the asymmetrical *rana* relations of women, the *kanwar rana* typically acts as client of the *uwar rana,* who may be a woman of senior generation, aristocratic descent, or married

in purdah of varying rigidity. Women who maintain other forms of bond-friendship that express status equality and reciprocity are described as *kawaye* (s. *kawa*). While *uwar rana* and *kanwar rana* almost always belong to successive generations, *kawaye* are generally of equivalent age as well as status. Women married under differing forms of purdah may be *kawaye.* While *kawa* relations are not exclusive, and most women maintain several, the ties that link *kanwar rana* to *uwar rana* are generally exclusive and asymmetrical. Thus the *uwar rana* (senior woman) may have several *kannen rana,* while the converse is forbidden. Whereas *kawaye* exchange equivalent gifts at kinship ceremonies, the *uwar rana* rewards her client for services.[15] At Daura, where the people in any community depend on a few deep wells and fuel is in short supply, the *kanwar rana* usually runs errands and provides household supplies of water and fuel for her patron.

In traditional Daura, wife seclusion, or purdah, was only practiced by men of high rank and wealth, the *sarakuna* (chiefs or officials), *attajirai* (wealthy merchants), and senior malams. Others looked to their wives for assistance in farming and gathering tree crops, in supplying their homes with water and fuel, and in caring for the small stock that most households rear. Whether secluded or not, Hausa women also spin, weave, and process foodstuffs for sale in local markets. Some also practice medicine, spirit possession, or hairdressing, while others pursue petty trade, directly or through commission agents. The few women who remain husbandless for long periods are classified as *karuwai* (prostitutes). At Daura these unmarried women fell under the jurisdiction of Iya, the chief's younger sister, and could practice prostitution or take part in the non-Islamic cult of spirit possession, *bori.* Some women make pots for market, and all may be called on to help in preparing the clay for hut building. Under Daura customary law, women cannot own compounds, land, or other major capital assets but may inherit rights to the fruit of certain economic trees. Most women spend their incomes from craft or trade on clothing, food, and services, including magic and ritual; but some money is loaned to their husbands and kin, saved for definite goals, or expended in kinship ceremonials at marriage, birth, and naming. Thus, despite their importance in the household sector of the local economy, women are as marginal to the market as to the political and Islamic orders.

Conditions of Slavery

From the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, slavery was an important feature of Daura society. In this century it has been effectively suppressed by the British administration. While institutional traces persist, including the Bugaje slave estates *(rumada)* scattered throughout Daura, slave raiding and slave trading are things of the past. No longer can the *sara-*

kuna of Daura recruit slaves by purchase from nearby markets or by capture from passing caravans; and long ago, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, eunuchs disappeared from the local scene.

At no time in the past century is it likely that more than one-tenth of the total population of Daura were slaves, whether in the Fulani or the Hausa sectors. Two conditions explain this. First, Daura is remote from those tribal areas which supplied Kano and Zaria with most of their slaves. Second, throughout the last century the various Daura states were so weak that their rulers could rarely authorize a raid *(iznin hari)* on nearby hamlets or caravans. However, since the Fulani and Hausa chiefs of Daura and Zango could not secure foreign slaves, the rulers in both areas were tempted to enslave Muslims who lived beside or occasionally within their borders. Some instances of such conduct cited below obliquely indicate the severe slave shortages that prevailed at Zango and Fulani Daura during the last century. In contrast, at Baure the Hausa chiefs adjusted positively to this continuing shortage by increased use of corvée labor.

As elsewhere, at Daura newly acquired slaves were distinguished from those begotten in slavery on their master's estate. The latter, born into slavery and reared as Muslim Hausa, were by local custom inalienable, addressed their owners with the ordinary Hausa kinship terms, and benefited by those reciprocal solidarities of quasi-kinship from which slaves acquired by capture or purchase were excluded.

Slaves should also be differentiated by reference to the political positions of their owners. The slaves of senior officials, and especially those throne slaves who held political or administrative roles, differed from others in their jural and political capacities. These slave officials and their administrative agents enjoyed wide political immunities and privileges which set them above and apart from the normal run of free commoners. For example, at the turn of this century the Sarkin Bai (Chief of the Slaves) in Fulani Daura wielded more power than the last two Fulani emirs, whom he deposed in quick order. Exiled subsequently, this Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo sent the British officer in charge of Daura a list of the property he had left behind. This list itemized twenty slaves, twenty-three horses, thirty-five cows, thirty-seven boxes of robes, and twenty *kwandaye* (silver anklets averaging a price of 100,000 cowries each) within his estate. In addition, Sarkin Bai had four wives, various concubines, thirteen daughters, and seventeen sons. Clearly such slave officials should be distinguished from other slaves whose normal lot consisted of manual labor on their master's farm.

Under Muslim law, a free man's offspring by his female slave is free and should inherit equally with other children of the same sex. Though Maliki law prohibits marriage between the owner and his slave, it permits the concubinage of free men and slave women[16] and admits the marriage of free women to slaves but does not state clearly whether the offspring of the latter unions are slave or free.[17] Hausa practice on this point remains ambiguous. Though Hausa filiate children to their father's agnates, if the mother is free

and the father a slave, they inherit her status, despite the rule of descent. Nevertheless, at Daura, Hausa sometimes classify the child of a male slave by his free wife as a slave on the ground of his father's status, despite the rule of Muslim law that the child of a free woman is free.

At both Fulani and Hausa Daura during the last century, chiefs regularly gave their daughters in marriage to their senior official slaves. The male offspring of such unions were thus ambiguously classified as slave or free in differing contexts and for differing purposes. By virtue of agnatic descent, they were regarded as eligible for appointment to offices reserved for the slave lineages to which their fathers belonged. Accordingly, in those contexts they were frequently classified as slaves, although legally free and often cross-cousins of the chiefs who arranged their appointment. On the other hand, at Fulani Daura the office of Tarno, which was normally reserved for free men descended from a chief's daughter or daughter's daughter, was occasionally allotted to the sons of princesses by slave husbands of high rank. The offspring of these unions were accordingly classified as free or slave in different situations. A man might thus identify himself as a slave to secure a slave office reserved for his father's lineage, although his mother was free, and his full brother claimed to be free.

This ambiguity, coupled with the frequent marriages of senior throne slaves and royal women in both chiefdoms during the last century, sometimes obscures the exact status of offices which were formally reserved for particular lineages of throne slaves; but that this is not the only source of ambiguity in determining the historical status of individual offices is apparent from the following account of the linked offices of Sarkin Bai (Chief of the Slaves) and Bai Karama (the Lesser Slave). In discussing the status of the men who held these offices at Zango, the following story was cited to "prove" that both offices were hereditary slave ranks. The Bai Karama Audu, who served the Sarkin Daura Yusufu (1886-1891) at Zango had a daughter whose son seriously injured a free boy in some dispute. On learning this, Yusufu called the free boy's parents and warned them severely against retaliation, on the curious ground that they were not slaves. The implication that local custom and law took no cognizance of injuries inflicted on free men by throne slaves was confirmed and clarified in the ensuing discussion by a remark that the slave could not take such action without the chief's implied assent, an argument which ascribes responsibility to the chief for the action of his slaves. On this doctrine, if one of the chief's free agents had committed the act, the matter could be brought to law, although in practice this was rarely attempted for fear of reprisals. Unfortunately, however illuminating on other points, the story cited does not indicate the legal status of the Bai Karama at Zango during Yusufu's reign, since we cannot infer the status of Bai Karama Audu from its allusive information on the status of his daughter's son.

To determine the status of Bai Karama Audu by tracing his lineage is also fruitless, since the data are inconclusive. On one account, this lineage derived

from some Jelko immigrants who joined Lukudi or the Sarkin Gwari Abdu on their peregrinations. Some kinsfolk of these men placed themselves under the protection of the senior official malam, the Dan Sanwai, and were duly rewarded by him with subordinate offices. Lukudi or his predecessor, the Sarkin Gwari Abdu, first placed their Jelko clients in charge of the royal herd. Later their sons were given the offices of Sarkin Bai and Bai Karama, which had previously been held by a slave lineage that deserted the Hausa chiefs during their wanderings. On this account, the two offices were filled thereafter by the descendants of these free clients; but the list of men who have held these offices since the reign of Sarkin Gwari Abdu suggests a different interpretation. From Ali, who served as Sarkin Bai under Abdu, to Killo, who succeeded Umaru Fandi as Sarkin Bai at Zango under Tafida shortly before the Hausa returned to Daura, there is an unbroken line of agnatic descent which parallels that of the listed incumbents of the Bai Karama office, from Abdu's reign to Musa's. However, the first Bai Karama on this list is said to have left Daura city with Sarkin Gwari Abdu when the Fulani took the town. After Abdu's death Lukudi made appointments of Sarkin Bai and Bai Karama at Acilafiya in northeastern Kazaure; but it is said that Lukudi's officials were sons of men who had served Abdu. In consequence, we cannot say whether the men who held these positions at Zango were slaves or free. It is possible that this obscurity in the historical record reflects the ambiguous status of the lineage that held these slave titles under the traditional criteria of classification. During the eighteenth century, and by doctrine thereafter, the offices of Sarkin Bai and Bai Karama had been reserved for slaves. Thus, if these offices were held by a client patrilineage in the last century, the free status of this descent group may have been compromised and obscured by requirements of constitutional doctrine. Other instances of similar processes are mentioned below.

Throne slaves were important administrative and political agents in all Hausa and Fulani chiefdoms during the last century. However, to my knowledge, besides Fulani and Hausa Daura, only Hadeija allowed intermarriage between official slaves and the chief's kinswomen. At Zaria, Katsina, Kano, and Sokoto, the ruling Fulani refused to allow their kinswomen to marry slaves. Apparently at Daura such marriages between the dynasty and senior slave staff antedated the jihad. Thus by recognizing such marriages, the Kuninkawa Fulani who ruled western Daura after Malam Ishi'aka's death apparently adopted the practice of their Hausa predecessors.

Kinship at Daura

As remarked above, the Hausa of Daura stress agnatic descent and are organized in patrilineages of varying depth and extent. For the pagan Hausa or Maguzawa, patrilineages are also the primary units of social organization; but Maguzawa patrilineages are localized, exogamous, and differentiated

ritually by their relations with particular localities and spirits. Among Muslim Hausa and Fulani, lineages are neither exogamous nor localized, and cousin marriages are preferred. Following Islamic models, Fulani prefer to arrange marriages between brothers' children, while Muslim Hausa prefer cross-cousin marriages of either type. In both the Fulani and Hausa kinship systems, cross-cousins are joking relations whose relationship involves privileged familiarity. Accordingly, Fulani and Hausa rulers like to appoint cross-cousins to their staffs, thus converting these warm and solidary kinship relations to political use. Isolated by office, rank, and political interests from his agnates, slaves, and client officials and continuously obliged to guard against misinformation and intrigues, the Fulani or Hausa chief relies heavily on his cross-cousins for confidential information on such affairs within and beyond the palace and looks to them for frank advice on appropriate courses of action. In addition, the patterns of joking and privileged familiarity that link cross-cousins provide chiefs with appropriate opportunities for easy social relations, which they need and appreciate. With his kinsmen, with his wives, slaves, officials, and commoners, the chief should always be circumspect. Only with his cross-cousins may he freely relax; but precisely for this reason, cross-cousins appointed to office are favorably placed to mislead and betray their kinsman, the chief, if so inclined.

Among the Daura Hausa, patrilineages vary in depth and scale with their political prominence. Having the highest political status and the greatest opportunities for reproduction, the dynasty exceeds all other lineages in extent and genealogical depth; but like other descent groups, it regularly subdivides into a series of segments, each of which traces descent from some preceding chief or other important ancestor. Such segments, which are known as *dakuna* (s. *daki*—room, hut), compete with one another for the throne and senior royal titles. As one segment becomes entrenched and displaces its rivals, its expansion generates similar processes of internal segmentation that express the competing interests of rival branches emerging within it. At Daura this incipient segmentation was observable in 1958 in the political rivalries of the Magajin Gari Umaru and the Madawakin Daura Bukari, both of whom were descended from Malam Musa, the Hausa chief under whom Daura was reunited in 1906. One effect of such internal political competition within titleholding lineages, whether dynastic, free, or slave, is to restrict the depth of effective lineage segments to three or four generations, this being the approximate time span in which a segment may retain its lineage office to the exclusion of its rivals without itself undergoing segmentation.

The significance of matrilateral affiliations in the social life of Daura Hausa is considerably less than in northern Zaria, where a larger proportion of the local population, being of recent slave descent, are still affiliated to their *iyayen giji* (owners) through their slave mothers. Thus at Daura the historic shortage of slaves has contributed to the preservation of prevailing agnatic patterns of organization by reducing the incidence of such uterine

links; and although lineage receives greatest emphasis among the ruling elite and Muslim intelligentsia, urban or rural commoners share similar orientations and structures.

Among the Hausa elite of Daura, each lineage segment regards the home of the ancestor from which it derives as its senior compound *(babban gida).* This compound is normally occupied by the oldest male member of the segment, who acts as its head and represents the unit in its relations with collateral segments and also, in certain contexts, with the officialdom. When the head of a segment dies, its eldest eligible male is required to move from his compound to the *babban gida* to occupy the quarters reserved there for the lineage head, which are usually the rooms the founder of the segment occupied. Failure to fulfill this obligation may be regarded as an act of formal disassociation from the segment, presumably in order to establish another. Such fissions limit the size of lineage segments to an average complement of about twenty adult males, irrespective of their differing rates of growth. While the senior member in the *babban gida* acts as head of the segment, his collaterals and sons in other compounds are individually responsible as household heads to the political authorities for payment of tax and fines due from themselves or their dependents and for the fulfillment of labor duties or other mandatory political services. Family heads of a segment collaborate under the guidance of the head of their segment with regard to these mandatory payments, and they also discuss appointments to lineage offices at meetings in the *babban gida.* Collective interests in jointly held farms, compounds, slave settlements, and cattle are linked with common jural responsibility for kinswomen and expressed in kinship ceremonials and exchanges at Muslim festivals that reaffirm the values of lineage membership. While each household head is independently responsible for the tax, marriage expenses, farm tools and seed, subsistence, and clothing of his dependents, he can also rely on help from his agnatic kin with his personal and political debts.

To meet his expenses, the compound head controls the crops grown on two plots, one of which, the family farm, or *gandu,* is situated on slope land while the other, which stands in or near the marsh, is known as the *garka* (fenced plot). All compound members are obliged to cultivate these farms as required by the compound head. Family members are otherwise free to till smaller plots which are allocated to them by the compound head or by the head of their immediate family *(iyali),* if the compound contains two or more distinct family units. The compound head is responsible for providing his dependents with the land they need to farm. In effect, the compound operates as a joint family *(gandu)* even when it contains several families which for various purposes operate as separate economic units.

In both Fulani and Hausa Daura, political communications with junior kinsmen were channeled through the compound head, who thus became jurally responsible for the fulfillment of their political obligations. In noble families the head has custody of such heirlooms or treasures as the unit pos-

sesses, including its stocks of *mundaye* and *kwandaye,* the silver bracelets and anklets kept as liquid reserves for conversion into cash. A descent group with traditions of Muslim learning might also have a library of inherited books in the care of the lineage head at their *babban gida.* Such corporate property could not be disposed of until the segment split, when it was either partitioned by agreement (*sulhu*) or sold and the receipts distributed equally. Such sales might be carried out when the appropriate individual refused to accept headship of an existing segment by moving to its *babban gida;* but family farms are normally maintained intact only so long as some member of the paternal generation remains to supervise and administer them. Even though brothers may farm together after their father's death, they frequently subdivide his farm in advance.

On a man's death his slaves and infertile concubines were normally inherited by his children, who were grouped hut by hut *(daki-daki)* by reference to their mothers. Allocations on this basis were inevitably unequal, since wives normally had differing numbers of children. Despite Maliki law, the deceased's offspring by concubines attached to the "huts" of particular wives during his lifetime also shared unequally in the portion their *daki* received.

Hausa marriage is virilocal, and young men normally live in or near their father's compound after their first marriage. Since young men only acquire independent status as political persons after their father and his brothers have died, the relations of clientage that senior members of a lineage maintain subsume the political affiliations of their juniors. In this way clientage, like occupational status, is often quasi-hereditary, and members of different descent groups are sometimes linked to one another by relations of *bi* (following, dependence) and *shugabanci* (leadership), which are collective equivalents of individual *mutumci* (clientage). Such interlineage or intersegmental alignments were important in providing the social framework of political relations; and since political relations regulated the distribution of office and administrative responsibilities, they manifested the solidary association of leading descent groups that identified and directed the state. However, since offices differed in their rank and political significance, and since clientage linked superior and inferior, these lineage associations were frequently dissolved by the rivalry of clients for higher positions or by conflicts of interest between patrons and clients. Thus, despite its convenience as a basis for political administration and as a principle for the alignment of descent groups, political clientage tended to generate competition among clients and between senior clients and their leader, with the result that despite the formal fixity of their administrative relations, the distributions of allegiance, power, and influence among officials reflected the play of individual interests and rivalries in changing situations.

The principal differences of kinship terminology that distinguish the Hausa of Daura and Zaria may be explained by the political independence of the Daura Hausa from Fulani rule and their greater emphasis on agnatic

lineage groupings. Thus, at Zaria the mother's brother and father's sister are addressed and described by terms of Fulani derivation (*kawu* and *goggo,* respectively), whereas in Daura and northern Katsina the terms *rafa* and *baba* are in standard use. These latter are evidently the original Hausa terms, *kawu* and *goggo* having been assimilated to the Hausa kinship terminology at Zaria during its long exposure to Fulani rule. However these are not the only differences between the two systems. At Daura the mother's sister is distinguished by the separate term *inna,* while the mother goes by the same term as the father's sister. Father and father's brother are both called *baba,* which is distinguished from *baba,* mother and father's sister, by differences of tone. As at Zaria, *uwa* and *uba* for mother and father, respectively, are reserved for reference and may also be applied to the grandparents of one's parents.

Another feature that distinguishes the kinship terminologies of Daura and Zaria is the greater use and extension of age-differentiated sibling terms in the northern state. This is consistent with the prevailing emphasis in Daura on seniority by age as the criterion for succession to headship of descent groups of any order. Among the Hausa of Zaria, where patrilineal groups are restricted to the ruling aristocracy and leading Muslim intelligentsia, such age-differentiated sibling terms as *wa* (elder brother), *ya* (elder sister), *kane* (younger brother) and *kanwa* (younger sister) are generally restricted to the children of one's parents or at furthest, to the members of one's compound. At Daura, however, the Hausa extend these terms to all members of ego's generation and lineage segment. By these criteria an individual also distinguishes his senior and junior matrilateral cousins, though all are *aboken wasa* (joking relations). Such lateral extensions of age-differentiated sibling terminology ensure that there is little doubt within patrilineal segments about the relative seniority of members eligible for succession to the headship. In the absence of office, seniority by order of birth is the normal basis for lineage headship among the Hausa of Daura.[18]

Some Implications

This account of Daura society has certain political implications. First, it indicates the marked conservative orientations of the society. These are evident in the system of occupational rankings, in the prevailing emphasis on descent and clientage, in the norms of preferential marriage, and in the endogamous tendencies of its diverse ethnic groups. Economic and ecological adaptations that enjoin production for subsistence and exchange indirectly reinforced the conservative character of the local social order. As indicated above, Daura relied heavily on the trans-Sudanic and trans-Saharan system of long-distance caravan trade for the salt it needed. Given its nature, importance, and volume, this caravan traffic assumed efficient administrative and market relations for its continuity and thus enhanced the values of convervatism.

The ambiguous Islamic affiliations of rulers and populace have been indicated above. Our description also shows how the rulers of Daura were differentiated from the ruled. This is explicit in the ascriptive model of Hausa stratification, in the vertical ethnic cleavages that divided the people, in the concentration of officialdom at the capital, in the differential reproduction rates of nobles and commoners, and in the authoritarian relations that held between officials and commoners. Since ties of clientage presume inequalities of political status between the parties they link, the prevalence of such institutionalized relations within Hausa society illustrates the generic differences of status that separated rulers and commoners. A generalized allegiance *(cafka)* was also required of all adult males in Hausa states; but in practice this was expressed by participation in the ramifying network of clientage that converged toward the throne. For its persistence as an orderly arrangement of ethnic, local, and unilineal descent groups, the political community presupposed this comprehensive network of clientage relations, which its categorical scheme of social stratification generated and helped to organize. Although women did not participate directly in this masculine system, their marriages expressed and reinforced or modified these relationships at all levels of the social system and were sometimes arranged to link chiefs and their senior slaves, or patrons and clients. Just how a political community whose components were integrated through this complex of lateral and vertical allegiance reacted to defeat and conquest we shall presently see. It is necessary first, however, to describe the political institutions of Hausa Daura on the eve of the Fulani jihad as fully as our data permit, and this summary is presented in the following chapter.

3
Daura Before the Jihad

POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES

The record of Daura's history begins around 1800. For preceding centuries, besides a myth that purports to give the origin of the Daura state and of nearby Hausa chiefdoms, we have only the scantiest references. Even such significant events as the introduction of Islam, the conversion of the first Daura chief, and the subjugation of Daura to Bornu remain unrecorded. Nonetheless, I was able to recover a fairly comprehensive account of the Daura polity during the latter half of the eighteenth century by comparing the details of state organizations at Fulani Daura, Zango, and Baure during the nineteenth century and by abstracting all elements that are known to have persisted in any of these states during that time, with due allowance for their known modifications. Further information on the government of Daura during the eighteenth century was obtained from senior members of the ruling stratum, whose lineages have long been identified with the central offices of state and whose family histories together compose a large segment of the political history of Daura. The city itself, its walls, gates, wells, markets, mosques, ward divisions, and official compounds, whose allocation, both under and before the Fulani regime, are well known, furnished another body of relevant evidence; so do the court ceremonials, procedures, methods of appointment, council organization, and other political institutions that, despite many changes during the intervening years, still preserve the form and spirit of their ancient models.

Bayajidda and the Magajiya

Daura's claim to be the oldest and original Hausa state from which all other "true" Hausa states derived is enshrined in a myth, available in various written versions, which seems to date, on internal and external evidence, from

the sixteenth century or afterward. Like many historical myths, this origin tale is a compound of heterogeneous elements which evidently refer to differing time levels. Its principal versions differ mainly in their arrangements and emphases on various themes. Thus the Limamin Daura Malam Ishaka provided me with two written narratives, one of which is identical with that published by the late Sir H. R. Palmer,[1] while the second gives less attention to the foundation of the state and its early female rulers. Another version, published in 1954 by Alhaji Abubakar Imam at Gaskiya Corporation and approved as authentic by the late emir of Daura, Alhaji Abdurrahman, C.B.E., includes certain details which are missing from those already referred to.[2] In the following summary I try to include all significant elements from the various versions of this myth, which the Hausa of Daura and other states accept as authoritative.

The foundation of Daura city and state is ascribed to a queen of that name, Daura, whose ancestor Abdul Dar, the son of Najib of Canaan, had migrated southward from Tripoli into this region after failing to secure the kingship of that country. Abdul Dar's father, Najib, is said to have left Canaan and moved to Palestine and Libya, then under the rule of Egypt. From Libya, Abdul Dar moved to Tripoli to seek his fortune and eventually settled in the present territory of Daura. There he established his chiefdom and was succeeded by nine women as chiefs: Kufunu, Gufunu, Yakunu, Yakunya, Waizamu, Waiwaina, Gidirgidir, Innagari, and Daura. These women successively ruled Abdul Dar's chiefdom with the title of Magajiya (Heiress), presumably by right of matrilineal descent. Among them only Daura, the last, lacked offspring. During the early part of her reign, Daura is said to have shifted the capital of her chiefdom ten miles southeastward from Tsohon Birni (Old Town) to Daura city. The city and its territory accordingly took her name in the same way that the emirates and capitals of Zaria and Abuja are known after their founders.

According to the myth, Daura's new capital depended for its water supplies on the Kusugu well, which still furnishes its best source of water. Kusugu, now a national monument, stands just inside the eastern perimeter of the old wall of Daura town. Since its water never fails, it may stand above the underground stream Gigido, which forms part of the official regalia of the Daura chiefship.[3] In Daura's reign Kusugu was occupied by a menacing snake which denied access to the well except on Fridays, the Muslim sabbath. In different versions of the story the snake has different names—either Sarki or simply Ki, which means "refuse, reject." Daura and her subjects lived thus until their town was visited by one Bayajidda, also called Abu Yazidu, the son of Abdullahi, ruler of Baghdad. Following some strife at Baghdad with his father or with Zidawa pagans, Bayajidda set out for the west with some of his brothers and half the military force of the city. In due course he arrived at Bornu where the Mai (King), overawed by the splendor and numbers of Bayajidda's entourage, appealed to him as a fellow Muslim for military assistance against surrounding pagans. Bayajidda placed his forces at

the disposal of his host, who in return gave him his daughter, the Magira of Bornu, as wife. Having thus detached the army from Bayajidda's command, the ruler of Bornu then plotted to kill him. Bayajidda was warned by his wife, the king's daughter, and together they fled on horseback farther west. Since the Magira was already pregnant and found traveling difficult, Bayajidda left her behind at a place known as Garun ta Gabas or Biram in Hadeija, where in due course she bore a son, who later became its chief. Bayajidda himself continued westward and came to Dalla Rock in Kano, which was then occupied by pagan blacksmiths known as Abagiyawa. At his direction these blacksmiths made him a knife, following which he continued northward, arriving at Daura late one night. Entering the city, Bayajidda sought water for his horse. The old woman with whom he lodged told him that water was available only on Friday, owing to the snake in the well. Bayajidda asked the way to the well and borrowed a bucket. As he let the bucket down into the well, the snake seized it. Bayajidda then pulled the creature to the surface and cut off its head with his sword. He then drew the water he needed and returned to his lodging, taking the snake's head with him.

Next morning the townsfolk were amazed to find the body of the snake beside the well. News of the event reached Daura quickly. She at once sent her two senior eunuchs, the Galadima and Kaura, to investigate the situation. The Galadima approached no closer than necessary to see what lay beside the well. The Kaura, more courageous, went up to the beheaded snake, inspected its blood, touched it, and satisfied himself that the beast was dead. This he reported to Daura. To reward his superior courage, Daura promptly appointed the Kaura as commander in chief. She then set out to inspect the marvel herself and, seeking the man who had slain the snake, offered to give him half the town. This tempting reward evoked false claims from various ambitious men, who were quickly exposed when Daura asked them to show her the head of the snake. As none could do this, the old woman with whom Bayajidda had stayed remembered her visitor's request for water. She related the event to the queen, remarking that Bayajidda had watered his horse on returning to her home, and was immediately sent to call him. Bayajidda came, bringing the head of the snake under a cloth. Asked if he had slain the snake, Bayajidda assented; and when the snake's head was demanded, he duly uncovered it and laid it before the Magajiya. She then told him that she had promised to give half the town to the man who had killed the snake. Bayajidda replied that he would prefer to marry her rather than have half the town. Daura accepted and the two were immediately married; but apparently at first Daura refused to consummate the union, though Bayajidda lived in her home. Thereafter the people described Daura's house as "the house of the man who killed the snake" *(Gidan makashin Sarki).* According to one interpretation, this is the origin of the word *Sarki,* the Hausa term for chief.

Being herself childless, Daura gave her husband Bayajidda a Gwari slave concubine. This concubine bore a son, whom she asked to be allowed to

name. When this request was granted, she named her infant Karbogari, meaning "Town-seizer." Not long afterward Daura also became pregnant and bore a son, whom she asked Bayajidda's permission to name. This granted, she named her son Bawo, which is interpreted as the short form of Bawo-gari, meaning "Return My Town." The Daura king list credits Bayajidda with 150 years on the throne, after which Bawo ruled for 90 years, 3 months, and 7 days.

Bawo begat six sons by three wives. Of these Kazure, who succeeded him as the chief of Daura, was the eldest, followed by Kumayau, who became chief of Katsina; these sons had the same mother. So did Gunguma, who became chief of Zazzau (Zaria), and Duma, who became chief of Gobir. His sons by the third wife were Bagauda, the first chief of Kano, and Zamnakogi, who established himself at Rano. Together with Bayajidda's son by the Magira of Bornu, who ruled Biram in Hadeija, this completes the list of the seven Hausa states and indicates their kinship connections and common descent from Bayajidda. In some versions of the myth Bawo's brother, Karbogari, is also credited with seven sons, who established the chiefdoms of Zamfara, Nupe, Kebbi, Gwari (Birnin Gwari?), Yauri, Yoruba (Katanga or Old Oyo?), and Kororofa (Jukun), respectively. These seven states are referred to by Hausa as the *Banza Bakwai,* meaning "The False or Worthless Seven," in contradistinction to the *Hausa Bakwai* descended from Bayajidda and Bawo.

As related above, the tale represents a compound of several distinct elements. First, it summarizes the legendary beginnings of the local state under an early line of queens who were ultimately descended from Semitic ancestors. To this, which may be the oldest portion of the tale, has been added the later narrative of Bayajidda's movements from Baghdad to Daura, via Bornu and Kano, with the account of his marriage and accession. In all versions now current, the Bayajidda theme of snake killing dominates the story; but if the reign lengths of the later chiefs listed in the historical texts at Daura are added up, Bayajidda appears to have reigned around 20 B.C.[4] However, from the family records of the Masbarma lineage, which supplied the Magumi rulers of Bornu with viziers over several centuries, H. R. Palmer translated a tale of the arrival and flight of Abu Yezid, son of Abdullahi, the sultan of Baghdad, which is identical in its outline with the Hausa tradition of Bayajidda's visit to Bornu but gives greater detail. The Masbarma chronicle that contains this story dates Abu Yezid's arrival at Bornu in the reign of Sultan (Mai) Idris ibn Ayesha, who ruled between 1503 and 1526 immediately after Ali ibn Dunama, the Mai who built his new capital of Gasrgamo, west of Lake Chad in the present province of Bornu.[5] Before Mai Ali's reign, which Palmer dates between A.D. 1476 and 1503, there was no separate state of Bornu, since the Magumi Mais had previously lived in Kanem, east of Lake Chad. However, all versions of the Bayajidda myth stress that he visited Bornu and there lost his men after marrying the Mai's daughter. Thus it seems possible that the myth of Bayajidda derives from the events linked

with Abu Yazid, as related in the Masbarma chronicle at Bornu. This would place Bayajidda's visit to Daura between the years 1503 and 1526, by which date, on the evidence of Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, and various other Hausa states were already established.[6] Palmer suggests that the Masbarma account of Abu Yazid's visit to Bornu places these events five hundred years too late, but he does not consider the significance of this anachronism. As I have argued elsewhere,[7] the myth that the seven Hausa states derive from Bayajidda and Bawo was evidently created by Kanuri in the sixteenth century to serve two main functions. First, it grouped together these seven states as Hausa by virtue of putative common descent and distinguished them from seven others which lay beyond the contemporary limits of Bornu power. Second, it provided a quasi-historical justification for Bornu dominion over the seven states mythically descended from Bayajidda and Daura or from Bayajidda and Magira, the daughter of the Mai of Bornu. This aspect of the myth, however important to the Bornu imperial system of the sixteenth to eighteenth century, has limited relevance in an account of Daura history. But if the myth indeed asserts the Kanuri view that Daura was the origin of the seven Hausa states, the acceptance of Daura's seniority by other Hausa states such as Kano or Katsina merely indicates the extent to which the Kanuri imposed their interpretations of Hausa history on these states in the context of political and cultural domination. According to Harris, during the eighteenth century tribute from the northern Hausa states was routed through Daura to Bornu, while the southern states sent theirs through Zaria.[8]

For the ethnographer of Daura, the narrative of Bayajidda has two special interests. It points to a second eastern immigration which was followed by the immigrants' domination of the chiefdom, apparently accompanied by intermarriage and free cultural exchange. It may also provide a "historical" event that purports to explain the displacement of matrilineal by patrilineal succession to the chiefship. However, this development is very obscure; the various indigenous texts recorded in Arabic and Hausa enumerate differing numbers of Daura queens. In the popular version of the legend, Daura reigned at the time of Bayajidda's visit, married him, and later bore Bawo. This version ostensibly explains the succession of queens at Daura by Abdul Dar's lack of male issue. However, according to the list of Daura rulers reproduced in Appendix A, as in Palmer's text,[9] Daura, having founded her city, apparently died before Bayajidda's arrival after a reign of 150 years. She was succeeded by eight queens, each described as Magajiya (Heiress), beginning with Gamata and ending with Shawata, in whose reign Bayajidda appeared. Apart from their names and residence at Daura, nothing further is known of these ladies. It is extremely improbable that they all lacked male issue, and in the tale, Bayajidda has male descendants only, whether by the Magira, by Daura, or by his Gwari concubine. Thus the story might appear to represent the original institutions of matrilineal descent and female chief-

ship and their later displacement by agnatic descent and male chiefship as the effects of historical accidents, the lack of male issue of the queens and Bayajidda's lack of daughters. Nonetheless, the slaughter of the terrible snake by the noble stranger is dramatized to legitimate this adoption of agnatic descent and masculine rule.

Our reservations regarding the historicity of this myth cannot diminish its constitutional significance for the Hausa of Daura state. Whatever may have been the early history of Daura, according to popular belief the city-state was founded and ruled for a long period by a line of queens or Magajiyas, the last of whom freely decided to share her authority with the immigrant hero she married. Hitherto these queens had ruled the city through titled eunuchs, two of whom, the Kaura and the Galadima, are mentioned in the legend. This would suggest that the titles of Kaura, Galadima, and Magajiya antedate the establishment of the male chieftainship (Sarki) at Daura. However, we know that the Galadima title was introduced to Daura from Bornu, presumably after the Kanuri had imposed their dominion in the sixteenth century.

The myth provides a historical justification for the constitutional doctrine that the Magajiya could countermand the orders of the chief and might, if necessary act to depose him. On such occasions the Magajiya would act on the advice of the two senior nonroyal officials of the Daura state, the Kaura and Galadima; and only on their joint request would she take such action. Thus, in Daura constitutional doctrine perhaps the main point of the foregoing narrative is to legitimate the fundamental principle that there can never be a chief in Daura without a Magajiya. The state of Daura remains incomplete without the Magajiya. Allowing for innumerable differences of content and form, the position the Magajiya occupies at Daura is thus comparable to that of the Crown in modern Britain as regards the prime minister and the cabinet. While the Sarkin Daura exercises executive authority, in certain critical conditions his authority may be negated, and he may be removed by decision of the Magajiya (Queen Mother). In essence, then, the myth presents the state and its people as hers by original right and establishes the constitutional doctrine that the chief is merely her executive agent. Thus the tale of Bayajidda enshrines a basic constitutional principle in symbolic historical form.

Verisimilitude requires that there should be, in contemporary Daura, some symbolic representation of the existence and status of Karbogari. This element of the origin-myth was appropriately preserved in the office of Magaji Bayamadi, one of the senior official magicians. Daura savants relate that to assure the chiefship for Bawo, Karbogari was made to sit in front of Bawo, thus placing him in the role of intermediary or usher before whom people had to pass to secure an audience with the chief. To this day a woolen rug, which symbolizes the rug spread for the chief, forms part of the Magaji Bayamadi's insignia of office; and Hausa assert that the present Magaji Bayamadi is the direct descendant of Karbogari, unlikely as that may be.

Daura and Bornu

No information is available to date the introduction of Islam to Daura or the conversion of its first chief. The first ruler whose name indicates Muslim influence is Bawan Allah, the forty-fourth chief on our list. His successor, Kalifa, who probably ruled in the late eighteenth century, was succeeded by Tsoho, Jiro, and the Sarkin Gwari Abdu, whom the Fulani expelled. However, since Kano, ninety-five miles south of Daura, had adopted Islam as the state religion by the late fifteenth century, it is likely that some Daura chiefs were also nominal Muslims before or during the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, we can neither estimate the date nor the degree of Daura's Islamization on the data available.

We are similarly uninformed of the precise period and circumstances in which Bornu extended its dominion over the Daura state. Evidently this followed the westward movement of the Magumi Mais toward Muniyo and Geidam, whence they migrated to establish their new capital at Gasrgamo. According to the Kano Chronicle, Bornu established its suzerainty over Kano during the reign of Abdullahi Burja dan Kanajeji—that is, between 1438 and 1452, during the reign of the Mai Mohammed ibn Mutalla.[10] Not long afterward, as Leo Africanus relates, Mohammed Askia, the ruler of Songhai, overran Katsina and Kano and reduced them to vassalage. However, Songhai control of these Hausa states lapsed by 1520, following the revolt and secession of Kanta of Kebbi. Kanta, who had previously governed the Leka region near Gwandu for Songhai, established his empire over western Hausaland after repelling several Songhai attacks; by 1550, however, Kebbi had lost control of eastern Hausa, including Daura, to Bornu. Nonetheless, the only reference to the establishment of Kanuri domination at Daura that I have found is a remark by Barth that "it was an ancestor of Kosso of the name of Serriyo, who once conquered the strong town of Daura, the most ancient of the Hausa states."[11] The Kosso to whom Barth refers ruled the Bornu vassal state of Muniyo from Gure in 1852. No data indicate whether Serriyo's conquest of Daura resulted in or followed on its subordination to Bornu. Neither can we estimate the date of Serriyo's conquest with the information at hand. Yet despite this lack of evidence, we cannot doubt Daura's early subjugation to Bornu or the many cultural and economic benefits it derived from this association. At Daura the contemporary office of Magaji Dankakulema memorializes this bond. The Magaji Dankakulema was charged with the task of conveying Daura's annual tribute of 100 slaves to the court of the rulers of Bornu at Gasrgamo.

Under Bornu the senior officials of Daura were allowed to select, appoint, and, apparently with the Magajiya's intervention, to depose their chiefs; to levy taxes and administer justice, including capital sentences and banishment; to construct wells, walls, and fortified places; and perhaps to engage in limited warfare against their neighbors. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the efficiency and power of the Bornu regime

declined, its peripheral vassal states engaged in military adventures, including attacks on one another, with increasing impunity. At that time Katsina lay along the northwestern and Yauri along the southwestern frontiers of the Bornu empire. Besides Katsina and Gobir, Kano due south of Daura; Miria, Zinder, Dungas, and Muniyo to Daura's north and northeast; and Gumel and Massina to its south and east all paid tribute to Bornu. Besides this relation of tribute, Daura also maintained a sentimental link with the rulers of Auyo (Biram) in modern Hadeija, to whom token gifts were annually sent. Informants relate that during this period there were occasional boundary disputes and military conflicts between Daura and the Sosebaki states of Dungas and Jere. However, no records of Daura warfare comparable with those of Katsina or Kano survive.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century, after the combined forces of Gobir, Zamfara, and Katsina had overthrown the power of Kebbi, the Gobir army under its chief, Babari, conquered Zamfara, sacked its capital, and launched a heavy onslaught against Katsina. After an interval Babari's son, Bawa Jan Gwarzo, succeeded to the Gobir throne and, extending his attacks from Katsina to Bornu, advanced as far as Ajumawa near Dambarta in Kano, after formally refusing to render the customary tribute to the Mai of Bornu.[12] In response the Bornu forces marched west as far as Kalgo beyond Hadeija to meet Bawa, but no battle ensued. Thereafter Gobir ceased to pay tribute to Bornu, and some uncertainty surrounds Daura's vassalage. In 1959 the Shehu of Bornu, Alhaji Sir Umar ibn Ibrahim, informed me that to his knowledge Daura had ceased to render tribute to Bornu before the Fulani jihad of 1804. In like vein, Y. Urvoy omits Daura from the list of Bornu vassal states at the end of the eighteenth century, although in 1799 Hornemann reported that Daura still paid tribute.[13] However, informants at Daura are unanimous that their state remained under Bornu's protection and control until after the Fulani invasion, and this claim is supported by the movements of Sarkin Gwari Abdu after his withdrawal from the town. Perhaps the crisis through which Bornu passed at this period, during which its Magumi dynasty was replaced by the present dynasty of (Kanemi) Shehus may account for their failure to recall the allegiance of the former vassal; but the available evidence indicates that Daura continued to render tribute and allegiance to Bornu, despite Gobir's demonstration of Bornu's weakness. As the smallest and weakest of the major Hausa states, several of which had military ambitions, Daura relied mainly on the support of Bornu and on its own accepted seniority as the ancestral Hausa state to preserve its frontiers and autonomy.

Chiefdom in 1800

As shown in map 1, during the late eighteenth century the territory of Daura extended between two and three thousand square miles. Even then its bound-

Map 1. The Chiefdom of Daura, c. 1800

aries were probably uncertain, since the jurisdiction of its chief followed the movement of his subjects to new settlements. In the wide northeastern wastes and in the southwestern quadrant which was later appropriated to the Kazaure chiefdom, Daura's territorial claims may have been at best purely nominal. In such regions the chief's jurisdiction was asserted by levying caravan tolls, by taxing the cattle of pastoral nomads, and by forbidding the construction of wells or new settlements without prior approval. Only in the west, where Daura adjoins Katsina emirate, do its present boundaries correspond closely with those of the eighteenth-century state; but here also Daura has suffered slight territorial losses, since the villages of Giginya, Makangara, and Kayawa were transferred to Katsina by the late Fulani emir of western Daura, Magajiya Murnai, in 1905.

During the eighteenth century, Daura apparently exercised suzerainty over the two small chiefdoms of Kworgum and Kance, situated in the northwestern quadrant of map 1. By the mid-nineteenth century these two chiefdoms had passed under the control of Zinder, together with all the territory that lay between them and the northern boundaries of Fulani Daura. According to Landeroin, the districts of Kance, Kworgum, Dambeda, Termini, and Gafei were given to Suleiman, the chief of Zinder, by Dankasawa, the Hausa chief of Katsina, who had reestablished his rule at Maradi in 1817-1820 with assistance from Zinder.[14] Apparently Dankasawa transferred Kance and Kworgum, Dambeda, and the other villages to the chief of Zinder in return for his aid. However, the same authority relates that Zinder only established control of Kance and Kworgum under Tanimu, who ruled from 1850 to 1884, despite their transfer by Dankasawa thirty years earlier.[15] My field inquiries at Maradi failed to confirm either of these Zinder reports. The contemporary Hausa chiefs of Maradi do not include Kworgum and Kance among the eighteenth-century vassal states of Hausa Katsina. It is, moreover, extremely unlikely that Dankasawa could have transferred these territories to Zinder in 1817, since he lacked jurisdiction over them. Dorugu, Barth's Hausa servant, who was born at Gambanas near Birnin Kance, relates his enslavement when Tanimu's troops took that town by a ruse after Kworgum and Kance had fallen.[16] This campaign may have occurred in 1851-1852, shortly before Dorugu was sent to Kukawa in Bornu, where Vogel bought him.

The Hausa of Daura say that Kworgum and Kance were vassal states linked by various ties to Daura as their suzerain during the eighteenth century. As evidence, they point to the Tabkin Kworgum in Daura city, a compound officially reserved for the chief of Kworgum when he visited Daura. They also say that the Tintima (Chief) of Kance was accommodated as a guest in the official compound of the Dan Sanwai, or senior malam, of Daura on his visits. The Galadima of Daura was at that time responsible for the supervision of these vassal chiefs and communications with them, but the Dan Sanwai dealt directly with Tintima of Kance and acted as his *kofa* (door) on behalf of the Galadima. Since the official who acted as *kofa* was

regarded as the status peer of the vassal whose affairs he supervised, the Galadima to this day still shakes hands with the Sarkin Kworgum, but not with the Tintima Kance, who shakes hands with the Dan Sanwai. Although obligatory whenever such persons meet, hand shaking is restricted to these relations. Accordingly, Daura Hausa cite these practices as evidence of local arrangements for the supervision of Kworgum and Kance during their historic vassalage to Daura. They also cite the fact that the citizens of Kworgum and Kance bear the facial marks that distinguish Daura subjects, namely, two vertical cuts that join at the base of either cheek. In addition, a slanting lateral cut on the left cheek distinguishes commoners, while a similar cut on the right cheek identifies members of the dynasty. Since Kworgum and Kance people bear the traditional Daura facial marks, which differ from those of Katsina, it seems likely that Kworgum and Kance were historically identified with the Daura state. According to Daura traditions, the ruling groups of both these subchiefdoms originated at Sirgau, among the Kushekawa hunters, whose chief, the Kusheka, originally lived at Kurni and ruled also the villages of Daraje, Koza, and Maiturmi. Kusheka, who was the senior village chief in eighteenth-century Daura, maintained relations of kinship with the chiefs of Kworgum and Kance. Marriage alliances continually took place between these vassals and the Daura chief; and even in 1959 the emir of Daura affianced his young daughter to the chief of Kworgum.

According to my informants, although the chiefs of Kworgum and Kance were chosen by the electoral councils in their chiefdoms, as vassals both were installed formally at Daura by the emir in a ceremony marked by drumming and bugling, at which they were turbaned, robed, and presented with a chief's burnoose, a spear, a horse, and riding equipment I failed to determine whether the two vassals took oaths of allegiance on their appointment; but following this ceremony each was escorted homeward by Daura horsemen and probably underwent another "coronation" in his palace. There is no tradition that any chief of Kworgum or Kance was ever deposed by Daura during the eighteenth century. It is said, however, that while fleeing from Zango to Maradi in 1854, the deposed Hausa chief of Daura at Zango, Nuhu, dismissed the Sarkin Kworgum Bawa and replaced him by Deji on the grounds of Bawa's disloyalty and poor hospitality. Before he took this action, Nuhu himself had already been replaced as chief of Daura at Zango by Mamman Sha, whom the Sarkin Zinder Tanimu had appointed in the peculiar circumstances related below. Daura informants cite Nuhu's deposition of Sarkin Kworgum Bawa as evidence of Kworgum's vassalage to Daura at that date, despite the fallen fortunes of the Daura chiefs; but it was probably these events that provoked Tanimu of Zinder to overrun and subjugate Kworgum and Kance in the following months. To incorporate these districts firmly into the state of Zinder, Tanimu also dispatched his general, the Kaura, to Kurni, the Kusheka's old capital, with sufficient forces to overawe the local population and hold the territory for Zinder against Fulani expansion northward. Since Zinder had already reduced to vassalage the successor

states of Hausa Daura at Zango and Baure following Lukudi's defeats at Yardaji and Toka, neither state could challenge these actions. Apart from the standard obligations of annual tribute and military support as required, we know little about the content of Daura's relations with Kworgum and Kance when these territories were affiliated to it. Evidently, from the special arrangements for the accommodation of these chiefs at Daura city and the delegation of communication with them to particular officials, relations between Daura and these vassal states were routinized and peaceful, both subordinate units being otherwise internally autonomous. Such conditions allow us to treat the political organization and history of Daura with marginal reference to Kworgum and Kance where necessary.

There are indications that during the eighteenth century the regions of Magaria and Baure may also have achieved sufficient levels of internal autonomy to approximate the condition of vassal states. It is reported that these territories were then supervised by the Sarkin Yara of Daura; but whether this tradition is sound or to what degree Magaria and Baure were genuinely autonomous at that period, we cannot determine, since the events that followed the Fulani jihad obliterated all previous political arrangements in these regions. Nonetheless, while it seems likely that the population of those eastern areas enjoyed a greater degree of internal autonomy than that of districts nearer the capital, it is doubtful that such loose controls were formalized as vassalage.

Capital

During the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Kaura and the Galadima exercised general responsibilities for supervising the eastern and western halves of Daura territory, respectively. The city itself was probably administered by the chief through his senior slave, the eunuch Sarkin Yara. Map 2, which is based on an official survey of Daura city, indicates the principal material structures of historical relevance in the town. It accordingly includes information drawn from various historical periods and illustrates the sort of data with which these ancient cities can furnish field historians. Here I shall only comment on those features of the city layout which clearly relate to its history before the jihad.

No one knows who built the present walls of Daura town; however, it is known that the gate through which the defeated Hausa chief withdrew in 1805 served as the traditional site for executions in the eighteenth century. After Abdu's flight this gate was renamed Kidi-da-Hauka (drumming and lunacy) and blocked up to memorialize the Hausa defeat. Thus the present city wall antedates the Fulani conquest. At Kidi-da-Hauka the newer wall crosses an older earthwork known as the Ganuwar Amina (the moat or ditch of Amina), which extends westward outside the present city walls. Within the city traces of this older wall can be observed, but without the parallel



Map 2. Daura Town

NOTE: For key to numbered compounds, see table 1.

TABLE 1

State Compounds at Daura City, 1800-1958

Compounds	Pre-1804	1807-1906	1906-present
1	Kaura	Kaura	Kaura-1952
2	Galadima	Galadima	–
3	Dan Sanwai	Alkali	Alkali
4	Alkali	?	Dan Sanwai
5	Shentali	Shentali	–
6	*S. Bai	?	–
7	Yerima	?	–
8	S. Yara	S. Yara	–
9	S. Makada	S. Makada	S. Makada?
10	Gara	Haska	–
11	Limam	Tambari	(1) Limam (2) Mutawalli
12	–	Murka	–
13	–	Yerima	–
14	–	Sa'i	–
15	S. Tafarki	S. Tafarki	Ma'aji
16	–	S. Fada	Limam
17	Fada Babba	Fada Babba	–
18	–	Bunturawa	–
19	S. Pawa	–	–

*S. = Sarkin (Chief of); Sarkin Bai = Chief of Slaves.

ditch. Daura people describe the remnants of this old wall as *tsohon birni* and say that it was built by pagan Hausa called *yan Tsawani,* who were the original inhabitants when Daura founded the city after abandoning her former capital. The impressive sunken fortifications that formerly ran outside the wall were apparently constructed later. The Kusugu well where Bayajidda slew the snake stands just within the eastern perimeter of this *tsohon birni* (old wall). The present wall, which encloses a wider area, lies about three hundred yards east of Kusugu.

A road that runs from north to south was cut by the British through the chief's palace, which stands in the center of the town. Previously the palace walls extended without a break eastward to the compound of the Sarkin Bai at the rear. This entrance, known as the Kofar Bai (the Slaves' Gate), was controlled by the Sarkin Bai and the Fada Babba, two senior throne slaves. In precolonial days only throne slaves were permitted to enter or leave the palace by the rear gate, while the front gate was open to persons of any status. Both gates were guarded by slaves, who occupied both the forecourt and the rear section of the palace grounds, the ruler's quarters, including the harem, lying in the middle. The area directly behind the chief's private quarters within the palace was known as *shamaki* (stables). Most of the state treasures were kept there in storehouses; and in one corner of the *shamaki* the slave Ajiya (Warder) had his prisons. These took the form of large sunken pits set inside rectangular structures with firm mud roofs and walls. A simplified diagram of the palace illustrates its layout.

During the nineteenth century the palace contained a splendid tamarind tree which served as the coronation place for the Fulani rulers of Daura. It probably had some ritual significance for their Hausa predecessors. A photograph taken by Mr. Madden, a former district officer of Katsina, after the return of Malam Musa and the Zango Hausa to Daura, shows the tamarind standing. However, by 1958 it had disappeared. It seems to have stood between the chief's private quarters and the palace forecourt, near the burial place of the Fulani emirs, in an area occupied mainly by the compounds of minor slave officials and some free clients, such as the Sarkin Zagi, who lived in the palace. This section, together with the open space which extends immediately in front of the palace, goes by the name of Kan Giwa, "The Elephant's Head." It is traditionally reserved for important state ceremonials and for the shows of horsemanship and homage to the chief that traditionally conclude the two major Muslim festivals. After their victory the Fulani built a new mosque at the Kan Giwa immediately beside the palace gates.

Northwest of the palace and close to the old market place was the old Hausa mosque, surrounded by the graves of former rulers of Daura. Diagonally opposite, at the southeastern extremity of the town and outside the *tsohon birni,* lay the cemetery where commoners were buried in the Unguwan Sassagi or Unguwan Kabura (the Ward of Graves). Malam Ishi'aku, the Fulani conqueror, is said to have built his new mosque beside the palace after refusing to use the old one because it was surrounded by the graves of the Daura chiefs. Unlike their predecessors, the Fulani emirs were all buried in the palace forecourt.

Traditionally Daura town is divided into twenty-seven wards, some of which are themselves segments of larger ones. Of these wards, the following lie wholly or partly outside the old town wall: Unguwan Sassagi, Unguwan Nassarawa, Unguwan Kwari, Unguwan Rimi, Unguwan Arewawa, Unguwan Madabu, and Unguwan Majema. The designations of these town wards



Diagram A. Palace Layout and Approaches at Zango, c. 1880-1906

are of considerable interest. The Unguwan Sarkin Pawa near the old Hausa market still contains the compound traditionally reserved for the Sarkin Pawa (Chief Butcher) of Daura, who administered the city market on behalf of the chief. The Sarkin Pawa also acted as head of the ward immediately south of the market, where he had his official compound. The Sarkin Tafarki in charge of caravan tolls and roadways administered the ward which lay immediately between the rear of the palace and the Kusugu well. Other wards administered by the senior officials resident in them include the Unguwar Limam under the Limamin Daura, the Unguwar Kaura under Kaura, the Unguwar Fada Babba under Fada Babba, and the Unguwar Makada under Sarkin Makada, the chief drummer.

Some wards take their names from wells—for example, the Unguwan Butulu, which is called after the Butulu well. This well, though deep, runs dry even within thirty minutes of a major downpour, hence the derogatory name given to it. The Unguwan Sarkin Fulani near the southern gate takes its name from the valuable well which was sunk there by a former Sarkin Fulani. Other wards such as those of the tanners, Unguwan Majema, or drummers, Unguwan Makada, are named after the occupational group that resides there. Under Fulani rule in the last century, and perhaps in preceding centuries also, the Unguwan Nassarawa (Ward of Victors) served as the parade ground on which troops were marshaled before setting out to battle. During the rainy season this eastern area between the old and newer walls is given over to the cultivation of grain; in 1958 it was still almost empty of compounds. Finally, to illustrate the hierarchic incorporation of smaller wards within larger ones, we may look at the Unguwan Kaura, situated due south of the palace. Traditionally this large area was controlled by the Kaura, who lived where the Kasuwar Dole (the "Compulsory [Meat] Market" or Slaughter Place) now stands. North and east of the Kaura's compounds there were a number of smaller subdivisions known as Butulu, Matsiga, Walawa, and Garake, each of which represented a distinct local unit. All were however, subordinate to Kaura, who appointed one of his staff to administer the entire area and supervise its population.

Most of the town gates of Daura now bear the names of slaves who once had charge of them. Thus Albarka was Sarkin Kofa (Chief of the Gate) at the eastern exit, Kwable at the southern, and Baru at the western. Probably the Kofar Guga, the "Gate of the Bucket," is also called after a slave of that name. Since the flight of Sarkin Gwari Abdu and his courtiers through the northwestern gate, Kidi-da-Hauka, had given it a peculiar significance, both the gate and its original name were obliterated.

The town map indicates the distribution of those official compounds whose positions and occupants at different periods were remembered in 1958. Three different periods can be distinguished: that before the Fulani conquest; the years of Fulani occupation and rule; and the period since 1906 when the Hausa returned from Zango. The occupants of official compounds during these different periods are listed in the table that accompanies the map. It will be noticed that all these official compounds stood within the

tsohon birni, the original town wall, and that most of them lay to the north and west of the palace. The Fulani are known to have made certain changes in the preceding allocation of compounds and to have built new ones for the Sarkin Fada (Chief of the Palace), the Sa'i, the Tambari, the Bunturawa, and other officials. Reallocations made in this century are mentioned later. The map shows that many state compounds reserved for particular Hausa offices during the eighteenth century have persisted until recently. This list includes the compounds for the Kaura, Gara, Yerima, Limam, Alkali, Dan Sanwai, Sarkin Yara, Galadima, Sarkin Pawa, Sarkin Makada, Shentali, Fada Babba, and the Sarkin Bai. Though this list is incomplete, we cannot say which other eighteenth-century offices had state compounds reserved for them.

This survey of the distribution of state compounds in Daura city indicates one important basis for the classification of Daura offices in the eighteenth century and later. While most slave officials lived within the palace and several free officials had state compounds attached to their titles, other officials exercised their offices from their own homes, that is, from a *gidan talauci,* a commoner's compound.

The distinction between *gidan sarauta* and *gidan talauci* indicated here reflects the more basic distinction between *masu-sarauta* (those holding office or having hereditary links with office) and *talakawa* (commoners). However, the term *gidan sarauta* has two connotations. In one sense it refers to the state compound reserved for a particular office—for example, the compounds mentioned above. These are state property and do not belong to the individuals or lineages who hold the offices concerned. However, in Hausa usage the term *gida* also connotes a family or descent group, particularly a patrilineal segment. Thus in some contexts the term *gidan sarauta* designates a descent group which has historic rights to a particular office or set of offices. Such offices may or may not have state compounds reserved for them. In the absence of such compounds, the official must exercise his office from his own private compound, or *gidan talauci.* Thus, the main difference between offices endowed with compounds and those without centered on rank, authority, political prominence, and administrative functions. Most offices of the highest rank had state compounds reserved for them; most of the lesser offices did not; and several officials closely associated with the chief were housed beside or inside the palace. Few officials of the Hausa state then lived outside the capital. Of these the Dan Bajida, Lifidi, and Sarkin Karma are the best remembered. Although often absent patrolling the caravan routes, the Sarkin Tafarki resided at the capital in his own home *(gidan talauci).*

Territorial Organization

Before I describe the central institutions of Daura as they probably functioned during the latter part of the eighteenth century, it is advisable to out-

line the prevailing territorial organization. As we have seen, Daura was ethnically heterogeneous during the eighteenth and later centuries. Besides the Muslim Hausa, the state contained Hausa-speaking pagans, or Maguzawa; settled and pastoral Fulani; Bugaje; and a Kanuri minority. For the most part, these ethnic groups were spatially segregated in distinct communities. This facilitated the application of a single general mode of territorial administration to them all, except for the nomadic Fulani.

It is a general requirement of Hausa political organization that each local community should have an officially recognized head. In such states as Kano and Zaria, these heads are routinely regarded as chiefs of their village communities, but in Daura different arrangements prevailed. There the heads of Maguzawa settlements bore such titles as Hakimi, Sarkin Gabas (Chief of the East), Sarkin Arewa (Chief of the North), Sarkin Daki (Chief of the Hut), or Sarkin Baka (Chief of the Bowmen), which did not confer authority over their communities. The rulers of Daura are quite explicit on this point and emphasize that one object of these indeterminate titles was to forestall any claim on the part of those who received them to chiefly authority over particular areas or their inhabitants. For this reason it was common for Maguzawa communities to contain several senior men bearing the title of Sarkin Noma (Chief of Farming). With the Sarkin Daura's assent, these titles were conferred by the ritual head of the Maguzawa, the Sarkin Lafiya, in return for substantial gifts from those who sought them. Thus, to qualify for the title of Sarkin Noma, a Maguzawa household head would amass huge stocks of grain, to be consumed in beer at feasts. He also made appropriate payments, known as *kudin sarauta* (money for office) to the Sarkin Lafiya, who would announce the donor's candidacy to the chief or official directly responsible for supervision of the community. On receiving his title, each Sarkin Noma acted as the official head of his lineage and conducted its communications with the Muslim authorities. In consequence, the population of a Maguzawa village was frequently subdivided under three or more *sarakunan noma,* each having equivalent status and jural responsibilities for his agnatic kin and household dependents. Representatives of the official who held the community in fief would deal directly with each of these *sarakunan noma* on the affairs of their respective lineages. These arrangements ensured the subordination of Maguzawa by subdividing them into relatively small groups for separate administration. If the Maguzawa community also contained a Sarkin Gabas or his equivalent, although recognized as senior by the central authorities and by the local *sarakunan noma,* he merely served as an intermediary between the fiefholders and the local lineages, being directly responsible only for his circle of kin. In consequence of these patterns, the powers and responsibilities of Maguzawa leaders were so fragmented that their primary roles were to collect tax at the chief's direction; to provide labor and other supplies, including the grain tithe *(zakka)* ordained by Muslim law, which was levied on them although they were heathen; and to transmit the communications they received. While obliged to mediate and arbi-

trate minor local disputes, Maguzawa headmen lacked authority to adjudicate issues involving land or compounds and could settle no local questions of theft, quarreling, bloodshed, or divorce without consulting the official who held their community in fief. The fiefholder, who remained at the capital, would communicate with the village through his personal staff of intermediaries (*jekadu,* s. *jekada*), some of whom might have had titles. The villagers were obliged to cultivate an official farm reserved for the fiefholder at the community. In addition, they could be summoned to repair the city walls, mosque, granary, and compound of the chief and to supply the necessary materials, such as thatch or beams of borassus palm. Provided that they fulfilled these obligations and remained peaceful, Maguzawa communities were otherwise left largely to their own devices.

During the eighteenth century, the sedentary Fulani were mainly concentrated around Gurdo and Sandamu and at Tsatsumburum in western Daura. Each of these communities was administered by a Sarkin Fulani, whose local authority corresponded in its measure and form with that exercised by Muslim Hausa community chiefs, such as Kusheka, Tsana, and Ajura. In larger settlements the local chief delegated some of his authority to ward heads, who thus became directly responsible for order and communications within their hamlets or wards. Besides their responsibilities for supplying the corvée labor and for ensuring prompt returns of such taxes and levies as the central administration required, these community chiefs, both Fulani and Muslim Hausa, were empowered to settle local disputes with the consent of their principals, but they lacked the authority to adjudicate without such agreement. No local chiefs were authorized to levy fines, and they were all required to refer any instances of divorce and inheritance to their supervisors at the capital. Although the arrangements by which cattle tax *(jangali)* was collected from the pastoral nomads at this date remain obscure, it seems probable that this was organized from the capital and formed no part of the function of these rural community chiefs.

Movements of population were sometimes combined with relations of descent *(asali)* to link together a number of dispersed settlements. Where the chiefship of a parent village passed by hereditary succession, people who had migrated from one village to establish another community elsewhere normally sent back to the parent community for some member of its ruling family to come and act as their local chief. In this way the same titles and chiefly lineages were sometimes found in several scattered communities. The relative age of these settlements would then correspond with the relative seniority of their chiefs and titles, irrespective of differences in their population and wealth. Accordingly, although the several settlements linked by such ties of kinship and history were normally administered by different fiefholders and did not form a common administrative unit, the political importance of such senior rural chiefs as the Kusheka, who could mobilize support in several communities by invoking these ties of kinship and historical connection, was recognized at the court. Following their eviction by the Fulani,

the Hausa chiefs of Daura developed various arrangements to maintain the loyalty of these senior village chiefs and through them to retain the allegiance of their numerous kinsmen in several communities.

Tarayya

Despite prolonged inquiry, I have not been able to recover the precise details of the allocation of local communities as fiefs among the senior officials resident at the capital of Daura during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Some senior *sarautu* (offices of state) had slave settlements (*rumada,* s. *rinji*) permanently endowed to them. Such *rumada* were either located in the fiefs of these offices, or, if forming separate settlements, they were attached directly to the title as official demesnes. Beyond learning that the Kaura and Galadima supervised the western and eastern frontiers of the state, respectively, my information on its eighteenth-century fief allocation is sketchy and unreliable. Subsequent changes of location, boundaries, and fief distributions have erased these details from the unwritten record of local tradition.

Of equal interest, despite our uncertainty, is the incidence of *tarayya* or *tarewa* in the territorial administration of eighteenth-century Daura. At Daura the term *tarayya* has two distinct but overlapping connotations, a political and an administrative one. In the first sense it denotes informal clientage between the subjects of one official and another official, the *ubandaki,* or patron, who thereafter represents his client's interests to the fiefholder. In the second sense, *tarayya* denotes the jurisdiction exercised by two or more officials over individuals who are scattered (*garwaye*—mixed up) in local communities. A related term, *tarewa,* denotes the cooperation *(tarewa)* of two or more officials in the administration of a community or set of communities whose members fall under their separate jurisdictions. *Tarayya* and *tarewa* normally coincide. However, if the localized lineages of a Maguzawa community are administered by different officials, *tarewa* may occur without *tarayya,* for administrative *tarayya* involves the irregular and interspersed distribution of the subjects of different lords on the ground, a mixture Hausa describe as *garwaye,* that entails a complex overlap of official jurisdictions which is minimized or absent in segmented Maguzawa communities.

The specifically political form of *tarayya* was based on relations of personal allegiance between a commoner and some official other than the fiefholder and was normally established by the commoner, who sought out the *ubandaki* and declared his *cafka* (loyalty, allegiance) in return for the official's protection and aid. Normally commoners only took such action to secure political assistance in the face of repeated threats or oppression from agents of their lord. Having accepted the gifts that accompanied such declarations of *cafka,* the *ubandaki* would seek to relieve his client by discussing

the latter's affairs with the responsible fiefholder. In this way a villager who had committed some offense or suffered injury might seek redress or arrange to have his case sympathetically reviewed. If his client had suffered injustice and if the responsible fiefholder refused redress or relief, the *ubandaki* might inform the Sarkin Yara, who could bring the matter to the chief's attention in his daily, or "little," council *(karamin majalisa)* if he thought the affair merited action by the chief. In this way commoners could seek political security by pitting one official against another. Thus, in this form of *tarayya* the patron lacked official jurisdiction over his client and only acted informally on the latter's behalf as an intercessor.

Once the relation was established, however, the client on all future visits to the capital regarded the compound of his patron as his *masauki* (hostel, accommodation). There he would report and discuss local affairs and matters of common interest with his patron. When other villagers who lacked *tarayya* patrons visited the capital, they also had to present themselves at the compound of their fiefholder or his *jekada* (administrative agent) and reside there throughout their visit. In this way absentee fiefholders maintained contact with their villagers and kept themselves informed about village affairs; but official communications and requests were directed through the village chiefs by means of *jekadu.*

The *tarayya* relation just described, which held between the client and his patron, involved no administrative rights to collect tax or other official dues, although it was oriented to their exercise by others. Such administrative responsibilities were features of other modes of *tarayya,* especially during the last century, when political upheavals generated population movements and redistributions which so scrambled the preceding personal and territorial alignments that in several communities the people were divided by their official attachments to different lords at the capital. This specifically administrative mode of *tarayya* denoted the relation of two or more lords whose subjects were thus scrambled together *(garwaye)* within compact communities. Under such conditions each lord had independent responsibilities for official communications with his subjects and levied their labor dues. When disputes arose between individuals subject to two different lords which could not be locally resolved by mutual agreement, they were referred by the village head to the lords at the capital, who would jointly try to reach a settlement.

Such dispersals of authority over the members of his community further reduced the initiative of the village head; but this was so under either form of *tarayya.* In traditional Daura, village heads were not recognized as chiefs (*sarakuna,* s. *sarki*), but were described as *masugari* (s. *maigari*), a term which means "owners of the town" but has the administrative connotations of "ward heads." By various institutions, including *tarayya,* the Hausa rulers at the capital reserved to themselves authority over all important affairs affecting village communities. Traditionally villagers were allowed to nominate suitable members of the appropriate lineage to the fiefholder, who would recommend them to the chief for appointment as village heads; but

during the last century, under Zinder's influence, several village headships which had hitherto been reserved for particular family lines were thrown open to anyone who could afford the appointment fee. Under the Daura constitution, a *maigari* could only be appointed by the chief. As the *sarakunan noma* were merely lineage heads, this restriction did not regulate their appointments. It is also unlikely that the various Tambaru (s. Tambari—headman) who presided over the Bugaje serf-villages were officially installed by the Daura chiefs, although they were probably notified of such appointments by the Tuareg who owned these communities.

Tarewa and *tarayya* could also be initiated from above. To illustrate this, we may cite Yanduna, on the border of Daura and Kazaure. Some of the Yanduna people were originally settled at Gieni but after the jihad, they were forcibly removed to this site by Hausa chiefs to forestall revolt. Then, to ensure their intensive administration, the population of Yanduna was divided among three and later four officials, each of whom exercised an independent jurisdiction over a number of households scattered within the village. As fiefholders, each of these officials levied tax, fines, supplies, and labor on the households attached to them and administered their legal affairs. How often such administrative arrangements were employed to subdivide and neutralize dissident communities in eighteenth-century Daura, we cannot say.

Before we proceed to describe the central institutions of the Hausa state at Daura, we must expose the order that underlies the mass of unfamiliar detail by outlining those concepts and categories that furnished the basis on which the government was organized.

Offices and Commissions

As in other Hausa states, the basic unit of government in Daura, both before and since the jihad, is office (*sarauta,* pl. *sarautu*), a unique corporation sole, distinguished from similar units by its peculiar designation, the title (also called *sarauta*); its specific functions and jurisdiction; hierarchic alignments; conditions of eligibility and tenure; endowment of fiefs; and various other properties. In all these Hausa states, government is the activity of an elaborate official structure, the peculiar details of which serve to distinguish each from its neighbors.

The center of gravity in all Hausa governments is their chieftaincy, the apical office that these systems presuppose and by reference to which they are initially differentiated. Chieftaincy manifests its authority through a pyramid of offices which has its ultimate base in the various local communities that the state incorporates. In Daura, however, community headmen, being denied the juridical status of chiefs, were designated by the special term *masugari* (s. *maigari*), which emphasized their subordination to fiefholders at the capital. The special status of the various *sarakunan Fulani* and

such other senior village heads as the Kusheka merely emphasized by its difference the disprivileged position of other village headmen. In Daura, *sarauta* and its manifestation in ruling *(sarauci)* are identified with the central administration at the capital, of which the chief's palace is the apex and hub. This concentration of *sarautu* distinguishes the people into two broad categories, the *masu-sarauta,* who hold office or have hereditary links with office, and the *talakawa,* or commoners, who do not. This distinction between rulers and ruled is common to all Hausa societies; but in Daura, where rural headmen are explicitly classified as *talakawa,* it coincides with the division of the state between the ruling elite in the capital city and the subjugated countryside.

The Hausa concept of office denotes a complex, persisting entity in a system of like units, from which each office is distinguished by its unique assemblage of resources, functions, authority, requirements, attributes, and relations with other offices and with the territory and its inhabitants. Hausa usage identifies each office as a unique perpetual entity by giving it a distinctive name, the title borne by its successive incumbents, for example, Kaura or Galadima. Hausa usage distinguishes sharply between the official who holds the office and the office that he holds, defining the latter as a specific, enduring, and integrated complex of rights, powers, duties, and privileges which forms a unit of the continuing structure of state. This Hausa distinction is virtually identical with that which contrasts the government as a system of units and specific procedures with the personnel who exercise these functions and occupy these positions at any moment of time. To Hausa, titles which lack political functions or privileges are hollow names *(suna kawai).* At any time an official system may contain several cases of this kind. Most of the princely titles at Daura fell into this class. Although such titles identified senior princes as potential successors to the throne, they also signified their exclusion, as princes, from participation in the affairs of state. But while titles that lack public functions are still described as *sarautu,* no untitled individuals who exercise public authority have that status. Official functions are routinely identified with specific titles; and perhaps for this reason, even those insubstantial titles allocated to princes are identified as *sarautu* by Hausa.

Individuals delegated to execute certain commissions, to supervise particular tasks, or to administer specific affairs are generally classified as *jekadu* (s. *jekada*). *Jekadanci* describes such administrative agency authorized by a superior official. Some *jekadu* have titled offices *(sarautu),* but many do not. In the former case, their positions are permanently attached to the senior office as a titled administrative staff through whom successive incumbents discharge their routine duties. Such titled administrative staff are described as *lawanai* (s. *lawani,* from the Kanuri *lawan*) of the superior office. The significant difference between *lawanai* and untitled *jekadu* turns on the *iko,* or capacity for autonomous administrative action which *lawanai* enjoy by virtue of their titles and distinct continuous administrative func-

tions. As Hausa see it, this expresses the primary distinction between office as a unit endowed with a continuing and specific set of administrative responsibilities, as well as the resources required to discharge them, and commissions which, however prevalent, remain discontinuous and depend on specific delegations by a superior official whose authority to create or revoke such allocations derives from his tenure of an appropriate office.[17] The distinction between titled *lawanai* and untitled agents remains important even when an officeholder transfers administrative roles from his titled *lawanai* to others. The latter, lacking titles, lack *sarauta* and accordingly depend, like retainers, on the whims of their lord. By contrast, under the institutions of Daura, an official's titled *lawanai* are likely to have been selected by his predecessor and appointed by the chief. They are thus not directly subject to dismissal by the officeholder, who may at most transfer their functions to his own chosen agents if he does not wish to employ them fully in his administration. As occasion permits, the new officeholder may try to fill vacant *lawani* titles on his staff with these assistants, provided that the latter are eligible for these positions by descent and other criteria. Failing this, the officeholder might simply continue to administer his office through a personal staff whose positions as untitled *jekadu* indicate their lack of office and specific *iko* (power, authority). In consequence the official assumes direct responsibility for the actions of his commissioned staff.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such *jekandanci* provided the principal means by which officials resident in the capital administered their scattered fiefs. Titled *lawanai* of senior offices with several fiefs were allocated particular settlements as their individual fiefs. Such *lawanai* normally administered these units until dismissal or death, and as officials the *iko* they exercised was expressed in their direct regulation of inheritance; dispute settlement; selection of the local headmen; and collection of taxes, labor, and other supplies. Like their superior, these titled *lawanai* often communicated with their fiefs through *jekadu* of their own choice.

Senior officials, including the chief, maintained another set of agents known as *fadawa* (s. *bafada*—courtier), some of whom held titles identified with the compound of the official they served. Of these establishments, the chief's *fadawa* were the largest and most highly differentiated group. A chief's retainers were free clients who held functionally differentiated offices. The chief recruited these *fadawa* without lineage restrictions and employed them as advisers, informants, counselors, and confidential agents and messengers on business of various kinds. Some also served as palace ushers and market agents, while others supervised the chief's farm, the care of his herd, and the economy and prestige of the chiefship and its holder. As necessary, an official might commision a *bafada* to execute particular tasks, authorizing him implicitly to take whatever action was necessary for these ends. *Fadawa* might thus be sent to rural fiefs as *jekadu* or directed to collect or administer the dues of office. However, in general the roles of *fadawa* and *jekadu* were kept apart. The *jekada* was a specially selected intermediary to a

particular fief or set of fiefs, whose people were required to stay at his compound when they visited the capital. The *bafada* was expected to present himself each morning at his lord's compound and to remain there until dismissed for the day. He was obliged to attend whenever summoned. These distinctions between the role of *bafada* and *jekada* are neatly expressed in the title *Jekafada,* which was reserved for slave messengers of the chief. The Jekafada, who lived within or just beyond the palace walls, served the chief as a *jekada* (messenger) to other officials within the town. His title means literally "Go to the palace" *(Je ka fada).* Thus, as a messenger, the Jekafada's function was purely instrumental; and apart from the privileges normally enjoyed by throne slaves, he had no independent authority.

Categories of Office

Hausa offices are differentiated from one another by function, rank, precedence and administrative alignments, and by the principles which regulate their allocation among persons of different status categories; within any status category they are differentiated by the presence or absence of hereditary restrictions on their distribution, by their differing modes of remuneration, by the differing material and political resources at their disposal, by the range and scope of the *iko* vested in them, by the technical or other qualifications required of their incumbents, and by their character as full-time or part-time vocations. While senior throne slaves and free officials were continuously engaged in political administration—that is, in the conduct or supervision of public affairs—many of the lesser officeholders were employed intermittently. Apart from throne slaves, who derived their subsistence from the chief, senior free officials whose office required continuous attention to the affairs of state were usually provided with state compounds, slave *rumada,* farms, and other resources sufficient to meet their normal requirements. Minor officials, many of whom gave only part-time service to the state, generally remained in their private compounds, farming and practicing their crafts during the intervals between official business. This was also the situation of free *fadawa* on returning to their compounds after attending court daily, though they also received support as largesse from their lord. Thus, in effect free members of the officialdom differed in their specialization as public officials and in their dependence on official sources of income. Some officeholders were thus more completely and intensively identified with the state than others. Like the senior throne slaves, the free full-time officials formed an inner core of specialized executives and dominated the government.

The functions exercised by minor officials who lived in their own compounds were usually instrumental in kind—for example, the collection of grain tithe *(zakka),* the supervision of wells, or the control of dye pits. The catalog of restricted functions that were distributed among these minor offi-

cials represents a large part of the total range of Hausa economic activities and interests. These narrowly functional offices were invested with the authority they needed to discharge their respective duties. They also provided an organization that could be mobilized to expedite or supervise work on large-scale projects in emergencies. Thus the chief of the blacksmiths was periodically instructed to organize the production of tools for war or farming at short notice by mobilizing all the local blacksmiths and setting them to work on large blocks of pig iron handed to him at the palace. In like fashion, the Sarkin Gini (Chief Builder) might be instructed to mobilize local builders for some particular public work such as the repair of the city walls, the mosque, or some other official structure. Thus the number of these functionally specific offices should not be casually interpreted as official hypertrophy. Though often latent, they were indispensable for the rapid and orderly execution of public tasks by organizing those citizens with appropriate skills and distributing the necessary supplies. It is difficult to conceive an equally flexible and efficient substitute for this organization under the prevailing forms of technology and society.

The most important offices were those that exercised the widest range of functions and enjoyed the widest freedom for authoritative delegation of specific routine administrative tasks. Such offices were classified as *rukunai* (s. *rukuni*)—first order titles—if the powers they exercised were secular in kind. The offices of Galadima and Kaura are prototypes of this order. Most *rukunai* presided over staffs of titled *lawanai,* through whom they exercised their routine functions. Although senior throne slaves are sometimes described as *rukunai,* under the Daura constitution they ranked apart from and below the free *rukunai,* as servile instruments of the chief. *Rukuni* offices were normally reserved for free officials whose wider autonomy and spheres of action paralleled their public responsibilities and ensured their control of the senior council of state, the *manyan majalisa,* or great (senior) council.

In neither of the state councils were *lawanai* represented. The lesser council *(karamin majalisa),* which met with the chief daily, consisted mainly of senior throne slaves, senior free *fadawa,* and palace staff. The senior council, which met to deliberate important matters, consisted of the Kaura; the Galadima; the Limam; the Alkali; and the senior official malam, Dan Sanwai, together with the chief. It had no slave members. Exclusion of *lawanai* from these policy-forming councils emphasized the executive status of their seniors and thus assured the latter's authority. Although each *rukuni* might consult his staff to seek their advice or information on issues under discussion in the council, as administrative subordinates, *lawanai* were formally segregated from the arenas in which policy was formed. *Rukunai* normally preferred to employ their *lawanai* as executive agents, while reserving to themselves decisions regarding the various issues that arose on the state council. In contradistinction to his *lawanai,* whose authority was thus restricted to specific functions and spheres, the *rukuni,* whose office embraced

a wide range of public functions and supervisory roles and entailed continuous political activities, was fully identified with the regime and in a certain sense personified the state whose authority he held in trust. But while such indeterminate authority and responsibilities distinguished *rukunai* from other officials, their influence tended to fluctuate with their political skills and personal situations, although their offices all ranked as the pillars of state *(shikashikai)* on which the chieftaincy rested.

Iko and Authority

The basic principle of Hausa government, *iko,* is too undifferentiated in its components and implications to predetermine the limits of an official's authority. For Hausa, *iko* represents a highly variable combination of authority and power, the former being an institutional administrative capacity manifested in set procedures, while the latter is highly labile and varies with differing offices, individuals, and situations. Minor offices with specific technical functions have limited *iko,* sufficient merely for routine performance of the tasks delegated to them. Senior offices with situationally variable functions and diffuse responsibilities require correspondingly diffuse and wide-ranging *iko,* the appropriate and effective limits of which may not coincide and can only be determined by confronting its assertion at considerable risk. As *shikashikai* and bastions of state, *rukunai* normally demand and receive unqualified deference, expressed as prompt obedience to their instructions and requirements; but within their respective spheres of competence, other titled officials have similar expectations, for example, the Sarkin Tafarki, who supervises caravan routes, or the Sarkin Garka, who collects taxes on marsh plots. What distinguishes the *iko* of *rukunai* from the powers of command vested in subordinate offices is the lack of any principles that set clear limits to the jurisdiction of *rukunai,* other than the prior transfer of specific functions to other officials and the obligation to avoid revoking the orders and arrangements of their peers. Thus, the factors which enable a *rukuni* to impose his authority in different situations are a complex medley of diverse relations and elements whose relative significance even a junior official may not be able to assess accurately. For this reason, among others, junior officials and commoners rarely question the authority of *rukunai* or their representatives, although they might appeal later to other officials for explanation or aid under the *tarayya* institution described above.

The passivity that such arrangements induced among subjects is described as *biyayya* (obedience) and attributed to religion or nature; but as an accommodation to the political order, the commoners' *biyayya* facilitated aggrandizements of official authority beyond the normal limits. Nonetheless, such passivity was an appropriate response in the absence of effective channels for appeal or redress by commoners against official oppression and abuse. In traditional Daura, complaints by commoners against officials were not

adjudicated by the Alkali but were normally reserved for the senior council, on which the Kaura and Galadima sat. After informal attempts to secure redress had failed, complaints against officials could also be brought before the lesser council by the Sarkin Yara or another member; but if agents of the Kaura or Galadima were involved or if there was any risk of disciplinary action against an official, the complaint would be referred to the senior council, where the malams could state the law for the chief and his *rukunai* to consider and apply.

Uncertainty about the basis and limits of *iko* in Daura indicates the ambiguous place of political considerations (for example, reasons of state) in the administration of law in Hausa chiefdoms. Islamic law *(shari'a)* offers little protection for the rights of individual subjects against the ruler and his officials. The Muslim doctrine of *siyasa* empowers a chief to suspend the *shari'a* when political considerations and reasons of state require. The traditional Muslim safeguard against tyrannical administrations based on this *siyasa* prerogative was the court of a *Nas'r al Mazâlim,* which had special jurisdiction over charges against the ruler and his officials. However, such are the political preconditions for an effective impartial administration of justice in the Mazâlim court that it has only rarely afforded the citizens protection against arbitrary rule in Muslim states. In any event, since the court's decisions depend for implementation on the will of the ruler, decisions that contravened the ruler's political interests and sympathies were likely to be nullified. Given this subordination of law *(shari'a)* to political considerations in Muslim jurisprudence and political doctrine, the Hausa conception of *mulki* (rule) assumed that *iko* was both legitimate and necessary; and this assumption was reinforced by the Muslim doctrine that a ruler's *siyasa* jurisdiction could be employed to suspend the *shari'a* in the interests of the welfare of the Muslim community as perceived by the chief. In other Muslim states, as in Hausa Daura, the heads of political communities habitually identified "the good" with their interests and power. Under such circumstances the principal criteria by which Hausa distinguished the proper and improper use of authority were tradition and precedent. Customary procedures and relations were regarded as intrinsically legitimate, while innovations were problematic and expressed power. Innovations could thus include new forms of relation and action or the repudiation or suspension of traditional practice. While the Shehu Usman and his circle abhorred them, Hausa regard both forms of innovation *(katsiro)* as expressions of *iko* in its modality of power; and since customary practice was considered authoritative, those innovations that instituted or expressed new conditions of power represented moments of change. Thus, as modifications or contraventions of hallowed practice, any procedural change presupposed power and was morally ambiguous until its innovations were institutionalized as traditional custom.

Lacking a code of customary law which prescribed and restrained administrative action, Hausa reliance on tradition and precedent as the warrant of authority is easily understood and might be deduced on theoretical grounds.

Of greater interest is the Hausa awareness that continuity and change are both intrinsic to government and that *mulki,* or government, assumes unstable combinations of power and authority, which invariably generate labile mixtures of continuity and change. The failure of Hausa to distinguish authority and power may reflect an awareness of their intrinsic mutuality and functional relations, which Islamic jurisprudence and political theory amply support. The Hausa language, which has borrowed heavily in turn from Arabic and more recently from English, could easily have found specific terms to distinguish these principles if such distinctions were palpably congruent with their political organization. However, their failure to develop or borrow denotative terms for these relations is consistent with Hausa political norms. Instead, by identifying *iko* as the basic condition of government, Hausa seem to deny that their political regimes require any other criteria of legitimacy besides those that custom and history provide. *Iko,* which is ultimately manifested as superior force, provides the indispensable basis for a form of government which is effective and predictable, however contingent its operations. Whatever the status of its other claims to legitimacy, without sufficient *iko,* government lacks validity and cannot operate. Thus, the index of a government's effectiveness is the *iko* the chief and his representatives exercise, as shown by the automatic obedience *(biyayya)* with which subjects greet the orders they receive. Instant obedience shows high *iko* and generates public confidence in the operational validity and stability of the regime. Discretionary compliance, evasion, or disobedience with impunity are alternative modes of *tawaye,* or rebellion, in Hausa political thought. When unpunished through lassitude or lack of adequate resources, such practices indicate the ineffectiveness of the ruling regime, its failure of *iko.*

Accordingly, Hausa recognize three alternative principles on which a regime may base its claims to legitimacy. First, on some interpretation of Islam which claims to be authoritative; second, on tradition, history, precedent, and accepted custom; third, on superior force. Traditional Hausa regimes attempted to integrate all three principles of legitimacy in their forms of organization. Accordingly, many Hausa regarded the Fulani jihad as an appeal to naked force masked by Islamic pretensions. The defeated Hausa chiefs of Gobir, Maradi, and Daura, who continued the struggle to reconquer their ancient dominions, committed themselves to this view; but many Hausa who remained under Fulani rule in the conquered territories also shared this opinion, as shown by their frequent revolts. Nonetheless, whatever most commoners felt about the legitimacy of the jihad and the regimes that followed it, by demonstrating superior force and effectiveness, the Fulani government manifested its capacity to rule and thus ascribed legitimacy to itself. Since the regimes they replaced were identified with tradition, these Fulani governments, the products of revolution and conquest, represented radical change to Fulani and Hausa alike. However, both the new Fulani regimes based on force and Islam and the old Hausa ones that

rested on tradition and history were equally identified by their *iko* and relied on that for effectiveness and security.[18]

Allocation of Office by Status

The offices that provided the primary organs of traditional Hausa polities before the jihad were differentiated by their distribution among the major categories of persons represented in the local society. Several offices besides the chieftaincy were reserved for members of the dynasty, and others, for throne slaves and free noble lineages; others were assigned to the Muslim intelligentsia, and others, to practioners of the various Hausa crafts, including the royal musicians. In most Hausa states the senior throne eunuchs also had offices reserved for them; and these were sometimes highly strategic.[19] According to the tale of Bayajidda, Magajiya's regime at Daura contained eunuch offices, through which the most important functions of government were exercised. Besides the Kaura and Galadima mentioned in the Bayajidda legend, there were the Sarkin Yara and Shentali.

Our data indicate that of these four eunuch offices, only the Shentali was a eunuch at the time of the Fulani conquest. It is said that the last eunuch Shentali of Daura was captured by Sarkin Zinder Ibram at Yardaji in Lukudi's reign, after which the office passed to free clients. It is known that the Galadima and Kaura, who were then in office, both left numerous progeny and were themselves descended from previous holders of these offices. We know also that the last two or three Hausa chiefs at Daura appointed free clients to the office of Sarkin Yara. Some time later, as related below, that office was given to slaves.

It is thus probable that at some early historical period the offices of Kaura, Galadima, Sarkin Yara, and Shentali were filled by eunuchs; but no tradition records the events which led to their transfer to other categories, and current tradition of the way in which these positions were filled seems highly improbable. It is said that when a eunuch office fell vacant, it would be offered to some adult member of the lineage in which it was vested: if he accepted, his testicles would be cut off; and if he recovered, he would be appointed. This unlikely story, which is currently accepted at Daura, suggests that eunuch offices were transferred to others at a relatively ancient date. It also asserts the antiquity and prevalence of official recruitment from particular lineages.

As we have seen, while many offices described as *karda* or *gadaje* were reserved for particular descent groups, others described as *shigege* or *katsiro* were not so restricted. I shall distinguish these categories of office as hereditary and appointive. However, even "appointive" offices were generally reserved by tradition and precedent to members of particular status categories, such as free commoners, malams, or slaves. In all cases that involved public functions, the proposed appointment required approval of the senior state

council. At Daura the great majority of official positions were reserved for members of particular lineages, free or slave, royal, noble, malam, or commoner. This distribution identified the officialdom as the instrument of a ruling oligarchy, whose members had differing status and interests in their common estate; but it also provided representation for the various categories of persons in the state and formally secured a broad social base of participation in routine governmental processes.

Limited Monarchy

As the Bayajidda legend indicates, the Daura Hausa conceive their regime as a constitutional monarchy in which the ultimately arbitrary powers of the chief are subject to various powerful checks and restraints. Of these constitutional safeguards, the Magajiya's prerogatives are the most prominent and may once have been the most effective. As related above, the Magajiya had the authority to forbid obedience to the chief; to countermand his orders; to revoke his legislation and cancel his policies; and, if necessary, to command her chief eunuchs, the Kaura and Galadima, to take the necessary steps to depose him and to have a new chief selected. I know of no case in which a Magajiya actually took such drastic action. Nonetheless, the constitutional form and importance of the Magajiya's prerogatives cannot be ignored. Apparently the Magajiya's powers do not allow her to countermand and overrule the Galadima and the Kaura as she may the chief. Moreover, in Daura constitutional theory, she may only act to overrule or forestall the chief on the joint advice of Kaura and Galadima. No rule obliges the Magajiya to take such action whenever Kaura and Galadima appeal jointly to her; but it seems unlikely that she could long resist the demands and intrigues of these experienced and powerful officials if they were resolute. On such occasions the Magajiya would instruct the Galadima and Kaura to summon the Alkali, Limam, and Dan Sanwai, who completed the senior council, and await her in one of the inner chambers of the palace. She would then robe herself in her ceremonial costume and put on the ostrich-feather shoes which are the distinctive insignia of her constitutional status and which are also part of the regalia of Kano chiefs, both Hausa and Fulani. Like other ceremonial items at Daura, it is probable that these shoes were copied from Kanuri models formerly used at the court of the Magumi Mais in Bornu. With the Kaura and Galadima on either hand, the Magajiya would enter the chamber known as the Sararin Dan Hadau, which was strictly reserved for the senior council, followed by the Alkali, the Limam, and the Dan Sanwai, in that order. The chief would then be summoned, and after a brief discussion the Magajiya would deliver her decision, following which she was escorted from the palace to her compound, where she resumed her normal civil role by removing her ostrich-feather shoes.

Although the most senior of eight titled princesses, according to available

genealogies and constitutional doctrine, the Magajiya was never the mother of the reigning king. Further, being authorized by the constitution to depose the chief, she was not herself subject to deposition. A ruler with autocratic intentions might therefore delay in filling the office after the death of the previous Magajiya; but the Kaura and Galadima could press for an early appointment. Whether this situation ever occurred before the eighteenth century in Daura, I cannot say; but by then the Hausa had developed constitutional arrangements to ensure that the office of Magajiya would never remain vacant for very long. The Iya, who ranked second to the Magajiya among the titled princesses, was expected to call a meeting of the women born into the dynasty to select a new Magajiya for the chief to appoint; and if this ceremony was long delayed, the Iya was authorized to conduct the appointment herself, after which the Kaura and Galadima could appeal to the Magajiya for help in their dealings with the chief. Moreover, since the Galadima and Kaura together controlled most of the territorial and military resources of state and the Magajiya could only act against the chief on their joint advice, when she did so the chief was rarely able to resist. To maintain or expand his authority and initiative, it was thus necessary for the chief to attach either the Kaura or the Galadima to himself and frustrate their collusion. Once this was achieved, with the support of the three senior malams who completed the senior council the chief could normally implement such policies as he chose, within the limits of the constitution. The traditional attachment of the Daura officialdom to this conception of a constitutional monarchy which the queen mother could overrule at the request of the senior *rukunai* is evident in their arrangements to ensure that there would always be a Magajiya at Daura whose authority could be invoked to countermand or depose the chief. Under these circumstances, the chief's *iko* reflected the particular political alignments that prevailed within his council and between his senior councillors and the Magajiya. To preserve the chieftaincy from domination by these secular *rukunai,* it was traditional that the Magajiya, who was likely to be either a widow or an elderly divorcee, should marry one of the official malams, preferably the Limam, soon after her appointment. Besides thus clothing her role with an Islamic aura, such a marriage provided the Magajiya, and indirectly the chief, with some defense against the intrigues and machinations of the latter's immediate rivals and advisers. As a malam and councillor, the Limam was expected to see through their schemes and counsel his wife accordingly.

Reallocations of Hereditary Office

In the same way that the Iya could select a new Magajiya in free discussion at a meeting of all who were eligible for the office, constitutional theory required the head of each lineage that held prescriptive rights to a given office to call its members together when the position fell vacant to discuss the selection of a suitable candidate. This nomination would then be passed on to the

chief, who would discuss it in the senior council and conduct the appointment if this was approved. Since the chief had no authority and little opportunity to influence the discussions of these lineage groups, he was normally constrained to accept the council's decision on the candidates presented to him. For their part, the various members of the council kept themselves informed on the course of these lineage discussions through their agents; but they also were expected to accept the lineage's choice. If the lineage could not reach agreement, rival nominations were presented to the chief in council. The council could then choose their own candidate to fill the position, and the descent group had to accept their selection.

According to my informants, regardless of the rank of the person who presided over these lineage councils, the merits and defects of the various possible candidates were freely discussed, so that, however exalted, the presiding senior had little chance to secure his own selection. The Iya, for example, rarely, if ever, became Magajiya. Any woman of the royal lineage who was fitted for the role by age, marital status, and personality could be appointed, even though she had held no previous title. Whether the practice of lineages that held important public office was similar in this respect, we may doubt. The lineage member of highest rank was often tempted to seek his promotion; if necessary, he could pursue this by dividing lineage opinion and transferring the decision to the chief and council. As the senior official in the lineage, he might then have a good chance of securing the higher appointment. Such individuals could normally deploy a sufficiently persuasive combination of inducements to ensure that their candidacy received serious consideration, especially when they conducted these lineage meetings in their own compounds. Whatever the details of such events, it was a formal rule that candidates for hereditary offices should be selected through joint discussion within the descent group concerned. This principle further restricted the autonomy of the chief, especially when buttressed by the rule that appointments to public office required the approval of the senior council.

These conditions had two correlates. First, only the chief could dismiss anyone whom he had formally appointed, a principle that prevented *rukunai* from dismissing the titled *lawanai* who had served their predecessors. Thus this rule gave all officials assured "tenure" of their titles, irrespective of relations with their immediate superiors. But another correlate required the chief to receive the approval of the senior council before dismissing anyone from office, a rule that further restricted his autonomy. As the chief was expected to install lineage nominees for hereditary offices and lacked the power to dismiss unsatisfactory incumbents, his control of the administrative apparatus, in which hereditary offices were the largest component, was severely limited. Nonetheless, as we shall see, in different situations various chiefs did set aside the hereditary claims of lineages to ancestral offices and appointed outsiders who were sometimes drawn from different status categories. One instance of such a change which is relevant to our history dates from the later eighteenth century.

During the reign of Sarkin Daura Kalifa, the third before the jihad, a cer-

tain Audu Masaki came from Bornu and settled at Dawambai, which was then administered by the Dan Kwaba, a senior *lawani* of Kaura. At that time, according to Daura traditions, the Kaura was a eunuch named Ahammed (but see p. 82), a Buzu descended from Tuareg serfs. His Dan Kwaba Garake recruited Audu Masaki as a client and, holding him in high esteem, placed him in charge of his slave settlement *(rinji)* at Yakanoma. In due course Kaura Ahammed died. As the Kaura's senior lieutenant, the Dan Kwaba at once set out for the capital to canvass his own appointment. To this end he sent Audu to a certain malam who was reputed to be a seer to seek the malam's aid. The malam informed Audu that he would shortly be given the office, and demanded a million cowries as his fee. After an interval Kalifa, the chief, ordered the Gamariga *tambari,* the large royal kettledrum used only on rare occasions, to be beaten to summon the townsfolk. A summons of this sort is still made only for matters of great moment, such as the appointment of a chief, war, or threat of a sudden attack. On hearing the summons, Dan Kwaba Garake sent Audu to Kalifa with an appropriate gift to solicit the *sarauta.* The chief told Audu that he would appoint Garake but intended to remove two towns from the fiefs of Kaura's office and would also retain the horse called Shedi that was formerly Ahammed's. In reply to Audu, Kalifa explained that he intended to give the horse and towns to one of his sons. Audu informed the Dan Kwaba of the chief's intentions and dissuaded him from accepting the office on the grounds that no one could guarantee that the chief would not further reduce the properties and status of the office. On this advice, Garake decided to refuse the office and sent Audu to tell Kalifa. Audu returned to the assembly at the Kan Giwa, where Kalifa was waiting to install Garake. It was already known that the chief intended to appoint Garake when Audu informed him publicly of the Dan Kwaba's refusal. In anger at this rebuff, Kalifa immediately announced that he would appoint Dan Kwaba's *bara* (client) to the office of Kaura and promptly dismissed Garake for contumely *(reno).* Thereafter the office of Kaura remained with members of the lineage of Audu Masaki, who thus became hereditary clients of the throne. Nonetheless, even today Daura informants commonly describe the Kaura as a eunuch's office, since this was its original condition. We shall encounter several other instances in which a chief abruptly transferred offices formerly reserved for the members of a particular status category or for some descent group within it to other persons and categories. Disloyalty and contumely are the commonest grounds for such action. However, the chief's capacity to dismiss disloyal officials depended on the prevailing distribution of power. During the last century several Hausa chiefs of Daura lacked the power to dismiss their Kauras, even though they were known to be subverting the throne.

Following his flight from Daura under Fulani pressure, Sarkin Gwari Abdu and his immediate successor, Lukudi, wandered widely for several decades. In the course of these travels, they lost many traditional office-holders. As required, these were replaced by new men recruited from their

immediate entourage or elsewhere. As an effect of these processes, the traditional eighteenth-century pattern of official allocations underwent substantial change. Other changes were also made in the distribution of offices after the Hausa settled at Zango, though at a slower rate. Like Kaura Audu Masaki's appointment, such nineteenth-century redistributions were made in response to specific political situations. The events associated with such changes are therefore well remembered. Nonetheless, in classifying these political offices, Hausa still describe them as having the constitutional attributes and relationships they possessed before the jihad. In consequence, several offices are still said to be reserved for particular lineages and status-groups, despite nineteenth century changes in their distribution. For example, the office of Sarkin Yara was transferred from eunuchs to free clients before the jihad. During the last century the office passed to a slave lineage. Following the flight of the Sarkin Yara Kwanyami from Daura to Niger in 1910-1911, the office lapsed for a while but was later revived at the request of a senior prince who sought the title. In 1958 this prince administered the southern half of Daura city. Thus, despite the tendency to maintain the pre-jihadic distribution of offices by status and lineage, the history of this office shows that its ideal allocation was continually liable to change in response to changing situations. Such redistributions can be found at most levels of the official system, although those that involved the senior offices are most widely known.

By giving priority to the traditional attributes of particular offices and by emphasizing as ideals the principles that once governed their historical allocation, the Hausa of Daura at Zango maintained their commitment to restore their old constitution when they recovered the capital; but they also thereby preserved principles of organization which were necessary to the establishment of the successor states. By abstracting from the historical record all known changes in the distribution of these Hausa titles following the withdrawal of Sarkin Gwari Abdu from Daura in 1805, we may thus reconstruct their allocation at Daura on the eve of the jihad, as summarized in table 2. The table includes offices reserved for members of the dynasty and demonstrates the preponderance of hereditary recruitment and the associated traditionalist orientations of the ancient regime of Hausa Daura. Apart from the few occupational offices, most of the unrestricted offices allocated to free men were held by retainers *(fadawa)* who did not participate actively in the public administration. Most of the craft titles were assigned to particular descent groups, as were most titled positions on the staffs of the Kaura and Galadima. Despite local conventions, the title of Kaura and its immediate *lawanai* are classified here as hereditary free offices, since this was their status after Audu Masaki's lineage had established their rights to these positions. The conventional classification of the Kauras as slaves suggests that at some period before its transfer to Audu Masaki the office had been filled by senior throne slaves. It is thus possible that Kalifa's Kaura Ahammed was himself a slave and is only described as a eunuch because the office had once

TABLE 2

Status Structure of the Daura Officialdom, c. 1800

Status categories	Sub-categories	Hereditary (*Karda*)	Nonhereditary (*Shigege*)	Not known
Royals	Princes	Yerima Murka Bunturawa Magaji Haska (Gara) Maiwa Sarkin Shanu Samba'a Magayaki		
	Princesses	Magajiya Iya Saraki (Maskome) Gabsai Yar Kuntu Magajiya Karya Dan Gawa Maidaki		
Free Rukunai and their staffs		Kaura Dan Kwaba Sarka Madaba Sarkin Dawaki Gilu Dan Takora Galadima Dan Bawo Dan Kumalo Dan Hungumi Yekuwa	Sarkin Fadan Kaura Matsai Binoni Sarkin Fadan Galadima	
Clerics		Limamin Juma'a Na'ibi Alkali Dan Sanwai Mardandana Samba'a Dan Kurege		

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Status categories	Sub-categories	Hereditary (*Karda*)	Nonhereditary (*Shigege*	Not known
Free clients	Courtiers (*fadawa*)	Sarkin Tafarki Dan Bajida (Baushi) Barde Barage Magaji Dankakulema Magaji Bayamadi	Sarkin Karma Sarkin Diya Dan Barau Tarno[1] Guyama Ubandawaki	
	Craft heads	Sarkin Pawa Sarkin Makera Bulkacima Sarkin Marina	Korama (f.) Sarkin Dillalai Madugu Sarkin Gini	Magajin Aska
	Court musicians and magicians	Sarkin Busa Sarkin Makada Sankira Magajin Tambari Magajin Turu Dan Tomo Dakama (f.) Dan Baroka (f.) Sarkin Masu		
Slaves	Senior	Sarkin Bai Fada Babba Sarkin Dogarai Hauni Shentali	Sarkin Yara[2]	Turaki Bai Karama Sarkin Ruwa
	Palace staff		Sarkin Garka Dan Maza Jekafada Sarkin Jarmai Lifidi Makama Ajiya	

NOTE: (f.) = Female (where not otherwise obvious). Holders of bracketed offices are agnatic kin.

1Concerning the status of Tarno, see chap. 3, "Fadawa."
2Concerning the Sarkin Yara, see chap. 3, "Senior Throne Slaves."

been reserved for eunuchs. Such retrospective classifications of offices may obscure their change and misrepresent the status of their holders. Thus, in 1958, although the offices of Turaki and Sarkin Yara were both held by princes, they were classified as slave titles. These classifications simultaneously preserve and perpetuate the outlines of the ancient regime, disguise its transformation, and sensitize the Hausa of Daura to such changes which they initially regard as deviations but progressively assimilate to their model of the past when they are successfully institutionalized.

The historic and continuing identification of government at Daura with a stable distribution of hereditary offices among the members of particular status groups has several significant implications. First, it emphasizes the exclusive character of the ruling stratum, for whom such offices were reserved by tradition and descent. Except for a few technical and military offices of little political significance, the officialdom was dominated by a relatively closed and internally stratified group of families and their attachments, to whom the preservation of their traditional rights was identical with the maintenance of the Daura state and its traditions. Clientage and slavery together provided the principal means of entry into this ruling stratum. We have seen that some informants believe that the price of obtaining certain offices at one time may have included the risk of death through castration. Such a cost seems the more formidable since eligibility for this test was restricted by descent within a privileged group. By such exclusiveness the ruling stratum maintained those differences between *masu-sarauta* and *talakawa* on which the effectiveness of the regime and the *iko* of its representatives depended. This oligarchic closure probably facilitated the Fulani conquest, since their exclusion divorced the subject population from the institutions of state, and their impotence may have alienated certain segments.

As the developments that followed the death of Sarkin Gwari Abdu indicate, its reliance on hereditary office facilitated the rapid fragmentation of the Hausa state by ensuring that rival princes in different areas could easily recruit officials for their splinter states from those descent groups with hereditary rights to particular offices in the ancient chiefdom. Until the Fulani conquest, such developments had been forestalled by the identification of the chiefship, the regime, and the chiefdom with the capital, Daura, where the resources of state were concentrated. However, once the Hausa rulers had abandoned Daura, nothing remained to prevent unsuccessful candidates for the throne from trying to establish themselves as chiefs in other areas, provided they had sufficient strength, skill, and followers. On such occasions the principle of hereditary recruitment to office enabled secessionist princes to recruit most of the administrative staff they needed from the state they had deserted. These new chiefdoms were accordingly liable to further fragmentation and loss of personnel. Conversely, when the British amalgamated the chiefdoms of Baure and Zango in the early years of this century, some officials from Baure removed to Zango to take up offices for which they were eligible by descent, while others, hostile to the Zango

regime, moved north to join Muhammadu na Baba at Magaria when the French reestablished this chiefdom in Niger. There the immigrants received the offices reserved for their descent groups. Thus, hereditary recruitment of officials permitted with equal ease the fission and fusion of these political communities, once the historic identification of the chieftaincy with a fixed capital and fixed territory had been destroyed by the jihad. If these developments allow generalization, they suggest that patrimonial states staffed by hereditary officials are highly fissile unless their chieftaincy is prescriptively identified with a fixed center, the capital, and a territory whose control assumes and ensures political and military dominance as well as exclusive legitimacy.

Official Hierarchies, Promotion, and Precedence

The prevalence of hereditary office in traditional Daura served to restrict the development of promotional ladders that might have linked junior and senior offices in hierarchic series. It accordingly inhibited those procedures and orientations that characterize regimes which institutionalize promotions to higher office as the reward for superior individual performance. Evidently conceptions of official service as a lifelong career need not entail promotional prospects if offices are assigned to differing descent groups. At Daura, where descent regulated the distribution of office, it also prescribed the limits of individual ambitions. As we have seen, only a minority of officials were continuously employed in state service; the majority, despite their obligations to discharge official functions whenever required, were mainly occupied with private activities. For such part-time functionaries, office was primarily significant as an assurance of high status, income, and privilege for themselves and their families rather than as a career. The central interest of these and other officials, including senior full-time staff, was thus to maintain the traditional modes of procedure which assured these benefits for themselves and their kin.

Only for the members of those descent groups which had prescriptive rights to several offices was promotion possible, since under the traditional constitution the members of one lineage could not normally be appointed to offices reserved for another. Neither, according to the constitution, should the members of one status category be appointed to positions reserved for others. During the eighteenth century, apart from the dynasty the only free lineages which held two or more offices were those of the Kaura, Galadima, Limam, and Dan Sanwai. At that time hereditary offices reserved for slaves were dispersed among different lineages, with the exception of the Fada Babba, Sarkin Dogarai, and Hauni, who were severally in charge of the palace and town guards, the city police, and executions. Of official clerics, only the Dan Sanwai had titled subordinate staff attached to him, these positions being distributed among descent groups linked collaterally with his

own. The Limam's deputy and probable successor, who held the title of Na'ibi, was normally drawn from the Limam's descent group. Such occupational offices as the Sarkin Pawa or Sarkin Makera (Chief of the Butchers and Chief of the Blacksmiths) had junior titles attached to them which were normally filled by their chosen heirs. In this way they replicated the pattern by which the ruler, with the assent of his senior council, appointed a Yerima as crown prince. If we exclude cases of this kind and ignore those ladders that emerged after the jihad, the only official units which had developed promotional structures in eighteenth-century Daura were those directed by the Kaura and Galadima.

The Kaura, the senior nonroyal member of two state councils and commander in chief, had the largest number of fiefs, apart from the chief, and presided over nine subordinate offices, six of which were reserved for his close kinsmen, his sons, or younger brothers. Of these six offices, that of the Dan Kwaba was most senior, and its holder served as Kaura's deputy in his absence. Under the Dan Kwaba were the Gilu, the Madaba, and the Sarkin Dawaki (Chief of the Horses), all of whom, as agnatic kin of Kaura, were eligible for promotion to the title of Dan Kwaba and thence ultimately to that of Kaura. Other *lawani* titles, the Dan Takora, Sarkin Diya, Sarka, and Kusheyi were also normally held by the Kaura's kinsmen, who thus became eligible for promotion to the ranks of Gilu, Madaba, or Sarkin Dawaki; but the Kaura's Sarkin Fada was always a client, his Kusheyi was normally a slave, and his Sarkin Diya might be either. In addition the Murka, a senior prince, was attached to Kaura, although he was not his subordinate.

During the eighteenth century the Galadima's titled staff was stratified in four levels. Of these the Dan Bawo outranked all others as the Galadima's deputy and chosen heir. Next came the offices of Dan Hungumi and Dan Kumalo, which supervised territorial fiefs and were also held by the Galadima's close kin. At the next level there were two *lawanai,* the Matsai, or Barden Galadima, and the Magayaki, who commanded the Galadima's military forces, the Magayaki title being formally reserved for princes but often given to the Galadima's kinsmen. Ranking below these military titles were the Binoni and the Yekuwa, who served as Galadima's armed *jekadu* and were frequently his kinsmen. Thus, promotional arrangements among the Galadima's and Kaura's staffs differed in form and range.

As the senior civil official, Galadima supervised all princes except the Murka, who came under Kaura. Women of the royal lineage were organized separately under the Magajiya and Iya, whose offices were ranked in that order without promotion. Princely titles were also ranked in order of precedence without promotional arrangements. Apart from the Yerima and the Murka, in eighteenth-century Daura the titles reserved for princes were Bunturawa, Gara or Haska, Maiwa, Samba'a and Sarkin Shanu. Of these the last two were transferred to the Sarkin Pawa after the Fulani jihad, as related below. As *lawanai* selected by and directly subordinate to him, the Yerima had two junior princes, the Magaji and the Magayaki. The Magajiya

also had as *lawanai* the Dan Gawa, Yar Kuntu, and Magajiya Karya, who were all royal kinswomen with no prospects of further promotion. As her *lawanai,* the Iya had the Dan Baroka and the Sarkin Masu (Chief of Witches), who were both distinguished magicians. Another princess, the Saraki, who led the royal dancers and ranked immediately below the Iya, had under her charge a ceremonial drummer, the Magajin Turu, who served the throne; while the Gabsai, who ranked fourth among the princesses, directed the Dakama, a female drummer on the *dajinji* drum, which forms part of the state regalia. Gabsai and Saraki led the music and dancing at court ceremonials for the installations of the chief and certain officials. As the senior magician of the dynasty, Iya presided over the spirit-possession cult and other pre-Islamic rituals and supervised their devotees, the witch doctors, medicine men, and prostitutes. Her office illustrates the pre-Islamic orientations and context of the Hausa chiefship.

The distinctions between the differentiation of offices in precedence and rank and their alignment in promotional series are partly obscured by linguistic and institutional assimilations of these two types of organization. Hausa denote both by the term *bi,* which means "to follow, to come after, to rank below, to be under." For example, Hausa say that the Iya "follows" Magajiya as the Saraki "follows" Iya, and that the Yerima and most princes *bi* the Galadima. Such statements all denote relations of seniority and precedence. But Hausa also describe relations between the *lawanai* and the Kaura and Galadima by the same term. In these contexts the term implies subordination, since the Galadima and Kaura direct and supervise the work of their *lawanai;* but as the staffs of these *rukunai* are also graded in rank, their junior *lawanai* are also said to *bi*, or "follow," their seniors and one another. Nonetheless, although these *lawanai* were organized in promotional series, these promotional structures were not chains of command. When the Kaura and Galadima were absent, the Dan Kwaba and the Dan Bawo, respectively, acted on their behalf. Otherwise these deputies were restricted to their particular duties unless given express commissions by their chiefs. Thus, among the Galadima's *lawanai,* although the Dan Kumalo and Dan Hungumi ranked above the Matsai and Magayaki, who in turn ranked above the Binoni and Yekuwa, so that promotion was possible between these positions, all shared the same status as *lawanai* of the Galadima; they did not form a chain of command. This was also the situation of the Kaura's staff. Thus, since offices aligned in promotional series did not form chains of command, differences in their rank were perceived in terms of precedence and seniority and were not associated with a hierarchic administrative organization. In practice the Galadima and Kaura dealt with their *lawanai* individually, except when they delegated special tasks to their deputies. Nonetheless, as these *lawanai* ranks differed in their status, requirements, resources, revenues, prospects, and autonomy, the precedence order in which they were ranked corresponded with their promotional alignments.

These organizational details can help us to see how prevailing emphases on

agnatic kinship and rank combined to obstruct the development of promotional administrative hierarchies within the officialdom. Since the Galadima and Kaura, like the chief, normally appointed their eldest sons to the senior positions at their disposal, other *lawanai* ranks were frequently held by kinsmen who were senior in terms of age, kinship, and tenure to their chosen successors and deputies, although ranked by office below them. Kinship and office provided alternative bases for the allocation of seniority; and under prevailing modes of hereditary appointment, these principles often conflicted, since the structure constrained senior officials to give preferential treatment to their sons. In consequence, even when offices were aligned in promotional series, they were not organized as hierarchic orders with reference to their jurisdictions or functions. The compromise solution to these problems adopted by Hausa emphasized the distinctness of these *lawanai* offices by differentiating their functions and rewards appropriately while making each directly accountable to their common superior. Although this solution minimized authority conflicts between *lawanai,* it probably did little to promote their cohesion, given the institutional stress on differential rank.

Apart from those titles perpetually attached to the Kaura and Galadima as *lawanai,* these *rukunai* could also create such minor occasional titles as Jarmai or Shentali and confer them on individuals who were employed in intramural services rather than public administration. The *rukuni* could fill such ad hoc intramural offices as he chose, with free or slave persons. He usually made such appointments at his own compound, following which his newly entitled subordinate was sent with appropriate gifts to greet the chief and inform him of his appointment. As we shall see, during the last century, the Kaura Bakula and his immediate successors exploited this prerogative to create an administrative structure which virtually replicated that of the chief in size and elaboration. Although accepted by the public as *lawanai* of the *rukuni* who appointed them, these ad hoc titles are not regarded by the Daura nobility as part of the institutional establishment of senior offices, since they were entirely dependent on the discretion of the *rukuni* for their creation or maintenance and formed no part of the necessary and permanent organization of state. In contrast, offices that are permanently attached to senior titles as their established *lawanai* can only be conferred by appointment before the chief at the palace and can thereafter be revoked only by the chief in person; but *rukunai* could terminate ad hoc appointments they had made without reference to the chief. However, since such ad hoc appointments were inevitably *shigege,* they enabled *rukunai* to attract supporters among people who were ineligible by descent for traditional titles. This feature was also exploited by the Kauras of Zango in the last century.

It is said that when a princely office fell vacant, the Galadima, who supervised the affairs of the princes in place of the chief, would summon them to his compound to discuss the vacancy and select a successor. According to senior members of the royal lineage, despite his prestige, the Galadima could not impose his will on such meetings, which were dominated by those princes

who were senior by title, age, and descent. In his role as official head of the princes, the Galadima was obliged to protect them against hostility or injustice from the chief, if necessary by persuading the Magajiya to nullify the chief's directives. He was also responsible for such disciplinary action as the princes required. On coming of age, each prince underwent at the Galadima's compound the weeklong rituals that preceded his first marriage, and he thereafter remained under the Galadima's general care. In the same way that the Galadima supervised the princes, the Magajiya supervised the princesses *(mairama).*



Diagram B. Classification of Royals in Hausa Daura, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Following Kanuri custom, the terms *yerima* (prince) and *mairam* (princess) are applied to all sons and daughters of a chief. Although also applied to *yerima,* the term *maina* distinguishes a prince whose father had not been chief. *Mairam* denotes a daughter of a male member of the royal lineage. A *maina*'s son is *maina,* while the son of a *mairam* by a nonroyal husband is called *tarno.* Though these descriptive terms distinguish various categories of royalty by reference to descent, the traditional polity also contained the offices of Tarno and Yerima, which were reserved expressly for members of the appropriate category, the Yerima being the crown prince and chief's chosen heir. Besides distinguishing various categories of royalty, these terms were used in reference and address to differentiate members of the dynasty from persons of nonroyal descent. This separation was reinforced by the distinctive facial marks of the dynasty and by its organization under the Galadima and Magajiya.

Appointment Fees

It was customary at Daura for individuals to make substantial payments on

appointment to office. These payments are described as *kudin sarauta* (money for office). For a list of the rates that prevailed at Zango in the later nineteenth century see Appendix B. *Kudin sarauta* was traditionally required of all officials on their appointment, except for the throne slaves, Limam, Alkali, the chief, and other royals. In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, the slaves lost their exemption, as the chief may have done much earlier, when his suzerain at Zinder obliged him to pay two million cowries on appointment. The amount of *kudin sarauta* normally varied with the economic value of the office and, to a lesser degree, with the cost of the insignia provided by the chief or other appointing official. The fee was kept by the official making the appointment, for example, *rukunai.* The catalog in diagram B illustrates the principal factors that underlay these variations. Besides the *kudin sarauta,* on his appointment each individual had to transfer a second sum, the *yankai* or *doriya,* which was equivalent to half the *kudin sarauta.* This was given to the Sarkin Yara for distribution among the chief's senior officials and courtiers in proportion to their rank. On his part the chief was expected to pass on some of the *kudin sarauta* he received to the Magajiya, Iya, Saraki, Yerima, and Maidaki, the last being the chief's senior wife, who was always a member of the dynasty. In thus sharing his receipts of *kudin sarauta* with his kinsmen, the chief implicitly acknowledged his role as trustee of the dynasty, whose title to the chiefship preceded his own formally as well as historically.

The *yankai,* or supplementary payment, which the Sarkin Yara distributed among the courtiers is not included in the *kudin sarauta* rates given below. In any event this list is mainly significant as a measure of the relative incomes of the various offices. The values actually transferred as *kudin sarauta* probably differed substantially from those listed below at different periods; and in the late nineteenth century, on Zinder's insistence, *kudin sarauta* was levied on throne slaves at their appointment, at rates listed in the table. As related below, this innovation provoked some resistance among the slaves, who traditionally paid for their *sarautu* by the deaths and injuries they suffered on the battlefield, since they formed the core of the royal troops. To indicate this, the praise-singer Sankira and Sarkin Busa, the chief bugler, who remained beside the chief in battle, would sing their praise-songs as each slave official fell, concluding with the standard refrain, *Wancan ya biya*—"So-and-so has paid [for his office]."

On behalf of the chief, the Sarkin Yara traditionally adjusted the amount of the *kudin sarauta* for each individual by a procedure known as *rangwame* (reduction, substitution). Since the sums required were rather large and rarely available to candidates in currency, equivalents in kind were accepted toward the *kudin sarauta.* In consequence, if the chief favored a candidate, the articles that he proferred would be overvalued, thereby reducing the price of his office. Conversely, if the chief disliked a prospective incumbent, he might instruct the Sarkin Yara to depreciate the value of the articles he

offered as *rangwame,* thereby increasing the cost of his *kudin sarauta.* Candidates for office would therefore seek and receive contributions toward these appointment fees from their immediate kin; and Hausa cite this among the rationalizations by which they justify hereditary office. However, the argument implied seems somewhat circular, for if privileged lineages could provide high *kudin sarauta* for their members on appointment, this was only because their political privileges and power ensured corresponding levels of income.

Though it is tempting to regard *kudin sarauta* as the candidate's contribution towards appointment costs, their inflated rates suggest that this view is too simple. On the other hand, the *kudin sarauta* should not be regarded as payments made to purchase the office. It did not convey rights to exploit the position with impunity, as may have been the case with tax-farming commissions in the later years of the Roman republic. *Tarayya* arrangements, with their implicit rights of appeal to the chief for redress, indicate otherwise; so does the Sarki's authority to dismiss any official with the approval of his senior council. *Kudin sarauta* seems rather to express the allegiance due from subordinates to those who appoint them. For certain offices a standard oath of allegiance was also required on appointment, including the chief on his accession; but *lawanai* and others attached to superior offices as subordinates or staff were not allowed to take this oath of allegiance, since they were subsumed under the allegiance of their superiors. For such officials payment of *kudin sarauta* indicated their assumption of these obligations.

Formalities of Appointment

Although varying in detail, appointments to office had a common form. Most were held at the palace before the chief, amidst fanfares of the royal trumpets (*kakakai*) and drumming on double-membraned drums (*ganga*). In the central act of investiture, the candidate was clothed in a new gown and turbaned, if his office warranted this. Senior officials also received an *alkyabba* (burnoose). Princes and princesses received elaborately embroidered shoes; lesser officials, such as the Sarkin Makera, Sarkin Ruwa, Sarkin Gini, and Bai Karama, were given gowns and woolen caps; and the Magaji Bayamadi, as Karbogari's descendant, received a woolen mat such as court ushers used.

The Magajiya personally appointed the Maidaki in the chief's private quarters. The Iya conducted the appointment of Sarkin Masu (Chief of Witches) and Dan Baroka at her own compound, presenting the latter, a woman, with a black cap and cloth, and the former with a black cap and gown.

Only the Limam and his deputy, the Na'ibi, were appointed without drumming. The chief usually presented the new Alkali with his own turban, and this appointment was drummed on the royal kettledrums (*tambari*). Ap-

pointments of the Kaura, Galadima, Alkali, and Dan Sanwai were accompanied by Dakama's drumming on her *dajinji* drum, with the Gabsai present. The appointments of princes and princesses were accompanied by drumming on the royal *turu,* which forms part of the chiefly regalia and is under the Saraki's care. Princesses received large cloths such as Hausa women wear. The Sarkin Busa (Chief Bugler), Sarkin Makada (Chief Drummer) and Sankira (Praise-singer), the leading court musicians, sang the praises *(kirari)* of newly appointed officials on these occasions. At the installation of such senior officials as the Kaura and Galadima, the Shentali, Sarkin Yara, Sarkin Bai, and, in the later nineteenth century, the Turaki and Sarkin Tafarki also, the Saraki would attend, bringing her drummer, the Magajin Turu, and the Gabsai to drum and dance their praises. Following the public investiture and celebration at the palace forecourt, the newly appointed official returned to his compound escorted by the court musicians. A few days later the chief usually sent him a horse with its riding gear, a sword of tempered steel, a shield, and sometimes a spear, these being the equipment of Hausa *barade* (cavalrymen). On the death or dismissal of an officeholder, these articles would be returned on the riderless horse. Thus, although transferred to the official, these items remained state property temporarily entrusted to his care.

It was the custom for newly appointed officials to celebrate their investiture seven days after appointment by donning their finery and galloping on horseback outside the palace forecourt, with musicians and praise-singers in attendance. This custom was known as *wankan sarauta*—"washing the title"; it marked the end of the individual's *rite de passage* of appointment to office. In militaristic Hausa states such as nineteenth-century Maradi, a new chief's *wankan sarauta* usually entailed a substantial military expedition. Its milder form at Daura illustrates the traditionally peaceful character of that state.

Accession and Installation of the Chief

The most elaborate installation ceremonial, and that which best exemplified and concentrated the essence of the state, was naturally the installation of the chief. Since this central state ritual may have changed little over the past one hundred and sixty years, we may reconstruct its provisional form in the late eighteenth century from details of the enthronement of Sarkin Daura Abdurrahman at Daura in 1911, with due allowance for all known changes in the distribution and character of *sarautu* since 1804.

As in other Hausa states, the selection of the chief vests in an electoral council, which at Daura is formally identical in composition with the senior council of state. This council consists of the Kaura, Galadima, Alkali, Limam, and Dan Sanwai, the last three being malams. Daura constitutional law requires that the chief should secure the approval of this council before

appointing anyone to the senior princely title of Yerima, while other princely appointments are presided over by the Galadima, although enacted before the chief. Senior officials of state emphasize that if the chief persisted in striving to appoint as Yerima some prince whom the council regarded as unsuitable, the Kaura and Galadima could invoke the Magajiya's support to restrain him. It was thus advisable for a prospective Yerima to court the favor of the two leading *rukunai* as well as that of the presiding chief. After his appointment, the Yerima came under the close and continuous scrutiny of the Galadima, Kaura, and three leading malams. His elevated position gave them ample opportunities to assess his suitability for the highest office. If they developed reservations about the Yerima or preferred some other prince, on the chief's death the electoral council had the authority and power to set the Yerima aside and select another prince to succeed. For example, of nine Yerimas to hold office between 1800 and 1910, only two, Lukudi and Haruna, eventually became chiefs. With this record it is understandable that contemporary princes have all rejected this office on the ground that it precludes, rather than assists, their ultimate promotion. The Yerima office accordingly lapsed at Daura in 1927 when its last holder, Idi, the district head of Mai Aduwa, was dismissed.

The electoral council met to select the new chief immediately after his predecessor had died in order to forestall dissension and possible violence by interested princes. While the council deliberated, the Fada Babba and senior palace slaves gathered together the traditional regalia. This includes three state swords, one of which has hieroglyphic inscriptions on its blade and is attributed to Bayajidda; another of which once belonged to Dan Baura, the chief of Maradi; and the third of which is named Gajere (The Short One—a dagger). The regalia also includes a string of amulets; a cap; a shirt of amulets; one large and one small finger ring; a silver pan; a Muslim rosary; the underground river Gigido; two royal saddles, one of which comes from North Africa and has a special knife in a silver case and a royal horn attached to it; copper stirrups; chain mail and silk-cotton armor; the Magajin Turu's drum; two kettledrums known as Ratakumkum; and three other *tambari,* of which Gamariga, the largest, has already been mentioned. The other two items are the drum of Dan Tomo and the calabash drums used by Dakama. Apart from Gigido and the riding gear, all remaining regalia are employed to enthrone the chief.

Having reached its decision, the electoral council instructs the Dan Tomo to drum the call that assembles the people. Throne slaves prepare a raised dais to serve as a throne beneath the ancient tamarind tree that formerly stood inside the palace forecourt. This platform is covered with the richest carpets and cloths in the palace. The garments in which the new chief will be clad are laid upon it, together with a turban, a burnoose, the rings and amulets mentioned above, and one of the state swords. A new pair of embroidered shoes decorated with ostrich feathers is placed before the throne. While the assembly waits, the Kaura and Galadima escort the chief-designate

to the mosque in the palace forecourt, which has a special room reserved for these occasions. Throne slaves follow, bringing the new garments. There the Kaura, Galadima, and Fada Babba dress the chief in his new clothes; the Galadima presents him with his robe, burnoose, and shoes of office; and the Kaura puts on his turban. Then the chief girds on his sword and returns to the forecourt while Dakama drums and sings the ceremonial song *(taki)* of the former chiefs of Daura, including the new ruler's ancestors. When this is over, the new chief takes a drumstick and beats the Gamariga *tambari* that stands before him a dozen times. This is perhaps the decisive act in the ceremony, the moment of accession. The senior throne slaves then set him on the dais for the first time and shield him from public view as he sits down by spreading their robes. The accession is completed.

When the chief has taken his seat, the Fada Babba takes two ostrich-feather fans from the heap of regalia beside the throne, handing one to the Kaura and the other to the Galadima. The Kaura takes up his position on the chief's left, the Galadima on his right. Both fan the chief gently with the ostrich-feather fans, as eunuchs are supposed to do. After an interval they are relieved by the Fada Babba and the Sarkin Dogarai (Chief of Police), who continue this ceremonial. The Kaura then bows down to the ground before the throne and greets the chief, "Wan gwaraje, na gaishe ka; wan gwaraje, na gaishe ka," ("Leader of mature men, I greet you"), meanwhile scooping earth from the ground in his cupped hands and pouring it on his head. This ceremonial obeisance known as *afi* takes different forms according to the rank of the officials concerned. The Kaura continues his greeting, "May God grant you victory, may God help you to hold the throne," and so forth, until the new chief says "Amen, amen, leader of mature men, I greet you," following which Kaura withdraws while facing the chief and sets himself slightly in front of the platform on its left side. The Galadima comes next, bows down before the chief and repeats the Kaura's greetings before taking his position on the right. Next comes the Yerima or, if he is now chief, the most senior titled prince, the Murka or Bunturawa, accompanied by all the princes, titled and untitled. They greet the chief without making *afi* and seat themselves beside but slightly behind the Galadima, opposite the Kaura. Next come the senior throne slaves, the Sarkin Yara, the Sarkin Bai, and the Shentali, each in turn greeting the king as the Kaura had done by pouring handfuls of dirt on their heads before moving to sit in a line on the Kaura's left, facing the Galadima and the princes.

Meanwhile the royal drums are beating, led by the Magajin Turu, whose duty it is to drum the new *kirari,* or praise-song, he has composed for the chief immediately after the latter has struck the Gamariga and taken his seat on the throne. The Magajin Turu and Dakama stand about seven paces in front of the chief on his right, near the seated princes. When Turu has finished his solo, Dakama drums and sings her *kirari,* beating the leather-covered calabash she carries in her hands. Following this, the Magajin Tambari, who stands near the palace entrance on the far left of the chief, begins to

drum the throne praises on the two smaller *tambari,* known as Lingare, and on the medium-sized ones, Dogon Kanya and Dogon Cili. The Sarkin Busa and his buglers also set to work, led by the Sankira, who sings the praises of the chiefs and officials as each steps forward to greet the ruler. This pressure of sound, color, and movement presents the enthronement as a major drama of a state steeped in tradition and splendid with authority and power.

After the senior throne slaves have greeted the chief, the leading malams—the Dan Sanwai, the Limam, and the Alkali—approach in order of precedence, each greeting the chief by shaking his hands and making a formal prayer for his prosperity and that of the chiefdom. Then only, and only once with each of these malams, may the chief shake hands. Such a gesture by the Yerima or any other would be regarded as a sign of contempt *(reno)* and effrontery. However, as leading representatives of Islam, these senior malams who participated in the selection of the chief are set apart by their religious status and accorded this mark of respect. When the malams have finished their greetings, they withdraw to the middle of the courtyard and seat themselves directly opposite the chief. Their places before the throne are taken by the lesser malams, titled or otherwise, who greet the chief and declare their allegiance without handshakes or *afi.* This done, the clerics arrange themselves behind the Limam, Alkali, and Dan Sanwai. Then the lesser officialdom, represented by the Sarkin Pawa, Sarkin Makada, Magaji Bayamadi, Sarkin Lafiya, Magajin Aska, Dan Baroka, Sarkin Masu, some senior nearby *masugari,* and the city ward heads present their collective greetings, kneeling on the ground before the throne and taking some earth in their right hands to pour it over their left shoulders, this being the form of obeisance appropriate to lesser officials. Other minor officials, slave and free, who participate intensively in the central system, do not advance to greet the chief, since the allegiance of their seniors subsumes their obeisance. Like malams, the princes are excused from making *afi,* as are most craft officials and the *lawanai* of the Kaura and the Galadima, whose allegiance subsumes their subordinates.

As the minor *masu-sarauta* advance in groups to greet the chief, the music and praise-singing continues. All use the same form of greeting, "May God give the chief victory, may God preserve him," each wave chorusing their salutes in unison. When the greetings are finished, there is a slight pause till all are seated and silent, while the drumming continues. As the drumming stops, the new chief rises and swears a standard oath on the Koran which the Dan Sanwai holds before him: "I will not betray the people's trust, I will not foster discord, nor will I permit oppression. If anyone breaks the law I will not protect him from the consequences. *Billahi allazi illā illāha illahua* [I swear before God, beside Whom there is no chief]." When the chief has resumed his seat, the officials, led by the Kaura, approach in order of seniority to swear allegiance. The Kaura swears, using the following formula: "I will not betray the trust of the chief. Should he give me any orders, if I do not carry them out, *billahi allazi illa illāha illahua.*" When the Kaura is seated,

the Galadima advances and swears as follows: "If I learn of any matter, however unpleasant it may be, and I do not tell you, *billahi allazi illā illāha illahua.*" After the Kaura and the Galadima come the senior throne slaves, the Sarkin Yara, the Fada Babba, the Sarkin Bai, and the Turaki, followed by the Shentali, the Sarkin Fulani, and the Sarkin Tafarki, who are free men. Last comes the Alkali, whose oath is unique, being addressed not to the chief but to the law *(shari'a).* "That which the *shari'a* enjoins, if I do not enforce it, *billahi allazi illā illāha illahua.*"

Only the Alkali and senior officials having *rukuni* or near-*rukuni* status take this oath of allegiance to the chief. The princes, malams, drummers, craft officials, magicians, *lawanai* of *rukunai,* the *fadawa* and lesser throne slaves, village headmen, and others are neither required nor allowed to take the oath. However, when the chief appoints someone to an office whose holder swears allegiance at his enthronement, the new official is required to take the oath on the Koran presented by the Dan Sanwai after he has been robed and turbaned.

Following these oaths of allegiance, there is a large distribution of kola nuts, which are brought to the forecourt in bundles by slaves and distributed by the Dan Barau. The ceremonial concludes with this distribution, which proceeds as the people disperse. In the late nineteenth century the new chief would then dictate a series of letters to the Shehu of Bornu, the Sarkin Kano, the Sarkin Gumel, the Sarkin Kazaure, the Sarkin Katsina, the Sarkin Damagaram (Zinder), and certain other chiefs, informing them of his accession and sending kola nuts to greet them. In preparing these gifts he was guided by the Kaura and the Galadima, who remained behind to assist him and to supervise their dispatch. In this way, on his accession the new chief established diplomatic relations with the chiefs of neighboring states at the same time that he informed his traditional suzerain in Bornu of the event.

Princesses do not attend this enthronement ceremony, not even the Saraki or the Gabsai; but while it proceeds the princesses conduct their own celebrations in the Magajiya's compound, and in the evening they accompany her to greet the new chief in his palace forecourt, the Magajiya wearing her full regalia and her ostrich-feather shoes.

The chief spends the following week in that section of the palace known as *shamaki* (stables), separated from his wives and family, who remain at his previous home. Throughout this week he lives in a temporary shed, isolated from all except the palace slaves and malams, who may visit and minister to him. Except for the Magajiya and her princesses, no official is allowed to call on the chief in his quarters during this period; and when he leaves the *shamaki* to enter the palace forecourt, the chief must always appear in full regalia, wearing his ostrich-feather shoes. Throughout this period he is subject to sex taboos and other restrictions and is expected to pray regularly in the mosque in the palace forecourt, where the malams assemble to read and expound religion and law. Meanwhile the chief's quarters in the palace are thoroughly cleaned and presumably doctored. Beyond the palace the town

celebrates the coronation with incessant drumming, singing, dancing, and feasting, led by the throne musicians. At the end of his week's seclusion the new chief, in full regalia, walks from the *shamaki* to his private quarters in the palace, amid general rejoicing. His entrance there establishes his chieftaincy. Throughout the preceding week of enforced inactivity, the security of his chieftainship and state rested primarily in the hands of the Kaura and Galadima. Now, having entered his quarters, the chief comes forth to meet his officials and concludes the installation with a public display of his horsemanship before the officials, amid drumming, dancing, and general acclaim. He then returns to the palace and removes his ceremonial attire.

Palace and Court

At Daura, court musicians fell into two groups, the senior of which performed only at dynastic rites and on especially important state occasions. This group, which included the Dakama and Dan Tomo, the Magajin Tambari and Magajin Turu, held hereditary offices, the Dakama and Dan Tomo being drawn from one lineage. While Dakama "followed" the Gabsai and Magajin Turu, the Saraki, Gabsai was herself attached to Saraki. The Dan Tomo and Magajin Tambari were directly attached to the chief, the Magajin Tambari having the Ratakumkum and Lingare kettledrums in his care, while Gamariga remained at the palace. Dan Tomo's drum, a large *ganga* which was part of the throne regalia, was used to summon meetings of the senior council. These four musicians were not allowed to play for any but the royal lineage. But when the chief especially wished to honor a senior official, he could send one of them to play at the man's compound; however, this was rarely done. The four musicians had to memorize all the throne music and to compose songs for new chiefs and historic occasions. The chief provided them with their compounds and subsistence; but none could expect promotion or transfer.

A second set of court musicians, who performed on all state occasions, enjoyed greater freedom, being allowed to address officials freely at their compounds throughout the city. The Sarkin Busa was the head of this group, followed by the Sarkin Makada and the praise-singer, Sankira. The Sarkin Busa and Sarkin Makada each appointed his brother or son as his Yerima and chosen successor. Like the dynastic musicians, these buglers, drummers, and praise-singers also depended on the throne for their income. In return they provided much secular pageantry and musical glorification of the chiefship and court.

These two sets of state musicians were sharply distinguished. Whereas the drums of Dakama, Dan Tomo, Magajin Turu, and Magajin Tambari formed part of the throne regalia and could only be used as tradition directed, the music and offices of the Sarkin Busa, Sarkin Makada, and Sankira were public and secular, a desirable elaboration but not a ritually essential part of the chieftaincy. While the secular musicians performed on all

occasions of state, their ritual seniors, whose music was reserved for the dynasty, could only play at private royal rites or at important ceremonies of state. Thus, together these two sets of court musicians distinguished the dynasty from the officials and populace and served to exalt and glorify the chieftaincy and the state. Moreover, since their praise-songs preserved the ancestry and deeds of former titleholders, the corpus of state music they preserved is a mine of historical information. Unfortunately I failed to exploit it.

The chieftaincy was also exalted by elaborate court ceremonial and etiquette, by a developed palace organization, and by a huge palace peopled mainly by slaves and the ruler's harem. The palace had two gates, the front gate under the care of the Makama and the Sarkin Garka, while the rear one was controlled by the Sarkin Bai and the Fada Babba. Only court officials, palace slaves and attendants, and people who had good reason for entry were allowed beyond these points. Just inside the forecourt stood the compound of the Sarkin Zagi, the chief's squire, who walked or ran before the chief's horse and looked after his quarters on campaigns. He also checked all strangers who entered the front gate. At the back of the palace the Ubandawaki, who lived behind the *shamaki* opposite the Kofar Bai, had similar duties. Ubandawaki also controlled the internal palace guard.

The palace contained the state arsenal and treasury, where most of the state wealth was kept. Military and other stores were generally kept in the *shamaki* directly behind the chief's quarters. On the eve of war, the chief distributed these weapons among his troops, collecting them for storage after the campaign. Apart from regalia, stores of clothing, and other valuables in kind, the treasury in the *shamaki* contained bags of cowries, silver thalers, and *kwandaye,* the silver anklets, valued at 200,000 cowries a pair in the late nineteenth century, which were prepared locally by melting down imported coins. Huge granaries that held most of the grain the palace needed stood in the courtyard outside the royal stables *(shamaki).*

According to local tradition, the eunuchs who supervised the harem during the eighteenth century had neither public office nor duties. At Abuja the palace eunuchs were influential private advisers of the chief,[20] but not at Daura. They may once have held palace titles, which have lapsed with their disappearance following Lukudi's defeats at Yardaji and Toka. Perhaps the traditional description of Kaura as a eunuch office preserves some trace of ancient arrangements by which this office was reserved for palace eunuchs; and if we accept local traditions that credit Lukudi with three hundred surviving offspring and Tafida, who died in 1904, with five hundred, it seems likely that the Hausa chiefs needed harem eunuchs throughout the nineteenth century, despite their losses at Yardaji. Nonetheless, we should note that these eunuchs had no place in the political organization and contributed nothing to the history of the state during the past two centuries, perhaps because, as my informants stressed, they were restricted at Daura entirely to the harem and were firmly excluded from participation in public affairs, but perhaps also because the senior offices had formerly been held by eunuchs.

Lesser Council

The chief held audience each morning in one of the larger chambers near the entrance to his personal quarters. As he entered with his slave escort to a fanfare of trumpets and bugles, the slave and free courtiers of the lesser council *(karamin majalisa)* seated around the hall awaiting his appearance would rise to their feet until he took his seat on the raised dais, shielded from view by the outstretched robes of the slaves about him. When the chief was seated, the Sarkin Bai, Jekafada, and Turaki would place themselves behind the dais. Holding the long wooden staves carried by guards, the Fada Babba, Sarkin Yara, Sarkin Tafarki, and Shentali then arranged themselves before the dais; but those behind the chief had no weapons. The courtiers would then take their seats along the walls at the farther end of the room, following which the formal greetings were made, interspersed with such discursive comments or inquiries as individuals thought appropriate. Before dismissing most of the courtiers, the chief might instruct the Jekafada to see that kola nuts were distributed among them. This would be done by Dan Barau, one of the palace experts in protocol, with due attention to the relative precedence and rank of the different *sarautu.* Following the distribution, the chief would signal the Sarkin Yara to dismiss the *fadawa,* except for members of the lesser council and those officials who stood guard during its meetings. These latter included the Makama and Sarkin Garka, palace slaves, and the Sarkin Jarmai (Chief of the Foot Soldiers). They usually waited in an antechamber at a suitable distance and took no part in the meetings of the lesser council unless summoned by the chief. Although expected to present themselves regularly for the morning meetings of court, no official attached directly or indirectly to some superior took part in the lesser council. The council consisted, with the Barde, of the seven officials who sat immediately before and behind the chief during the audience that preceded it. Of these the Turaki, a throne slave, routinely recited the chief's decision after each matter had been discussed, while the Fada Babba proclaimed these decisions publicly in the market and about the town through the town crier. The Barde, who commanded the chief's light cavalry and sat before the chief, staff in hand, also attended the lesser council.

Of these junior councillors, Fada Babba was the slave in charge of police and the palace and city guard; Sarkin Bai was the senior slave official attached to the chief; the Shentali, formerly or even then a eunuch, commanded the heavy cavalry and supervised the production of cotton armor *(lifida);* Sarkin Tafarki controlled the movements of caravans and policed the highways; Jekafada was the chief's confidential slave messenger; Turaki supervised the collection of *jangali* and the affairs of the pastoral Fulani; Sarkin Yara administered Daura city and was the chief's main channel of communication with such lesser officials as the ward heads and craft officials. Turaki may also at one time have served as the chief's scribe.

As a senior member with the greatest range of administrative duties, the

Sarkin Yara normally had a number of matters for the council to consider. During council sessions, it seems that the councillors placed behind the chief moved forward to sit before him. The chief might also raise whatever questions he wished, to secure the council's advice or support; but he could take no action in important matters without approval of the senior council of state and thus had to be circumspect. Only the senior council could authorize decapitation or dismissal of officials, banishment, forcible removal of population from one town to another area, war expeditions, legislation, changes in the forms and rates of taxation, and any action likely to create public unrest. These reservations identified the affairs that the chief and the lesser council could settle directly as mainly matters of routine daily administration or special arrangements to meet minor emergencies.

Senior Council and the Law

The two councils of state were rigidly segregated. Only the chief participated in both. Ideally, the two councils never held a joint session to discuss even the most urgent affairs; and since the senior council could overrule decisions of the lesser council, this rigid separation ensured that the senior council continued to dominate policy formation by restricting the autonomy of the chief and the lesser council, which was largely dominated by his throne slaves and close associates.

To summon the senior council, the chief directed Dan Tomo to drum the *kirari* (praise-songs) of council members in order of precedence, beginning with the Kaura's, then the Galadima's, the Alkali's, the Limam's, and finally the Dan Sanwai's. In contrast, if the chief wished to call a special meeting of the lesser council, he normally sent his Jekafada to summon its individual members with no drumming.

The senior council normally met in a special chamber reserved for it, the Sararin Dan Hadau. Entrance to the courtyard in which it stood was guarded by the Fada Babba and other throne slaves to ensure that its meetings remained secret. Unless the councillors had asked the Magajiya to attend, council meetings were confined to the chief and these five officials. As required by court etiquette, the Kaura sat on the chief's left hand, the Galadima on his right, and the senior malams directly before him, with the Alkali in the middle. Any member of the senior council could bring forward any matter for discussion; but probably the Kaura and Galadima, the two chief territorial administrators, mooted most topics. All nominations for appointment to hereditary offices or proposals for dismissals required the council's approval. Besides these affairs, which were referred to its final decision, the senior council also decided the establishment of new wells and settlements; the construction of town defenses; relations with nearby chiefs; and especially, before the jihad, relations with the suzerain state of Bornu. It decided such serious offenses as theft, bloodshed, murder, disloyalty, or refusal to

obey orders; reports and rumors of disaffection and possible rebellion were brought before it, as well as any general orders the chief proposed to make.

By Daura tradition the Magajiya had the power to reprieve offenders whom the chief intended to punish. This power of reprieve could be used if the offenses were personal to the chief and their punishment had not been formally approved by the council. Other offenses, such as bloodshed or theft, were usually settled by the senior council without the Magajiya's interference. Apparently the Alkali had no authority to decide these cases or order punishment in his court, although he could sentence offenders to pay fines. Decisions involving imprisonment, mutilation, or execution were reserved for the senior council, in which the Alkali could present the appropriate rules of Muslim law, which might be set aside by senior administrators. Thus, reserving to itself the jurisdiction over grosser torts and political offenses, the senior council restricted the scope of the Alkali's court to lesser issues *(karamin shari'a),* of which divorce, debt, and inheritance were the principal themes.

Such arrangements for administration of the *shari'a* clearly invited the criticism of Muslim reformers and jurists, perhaps especially because they institutionalized chiefly control over the most serious issues by improper extension of the ruler's *siyasa.* Undoubtedly such political administration of *haute justice* ensured a wide variety of abuse. Above all it denied the subjects adequate safeguards for the protection of their individual rights, as these were defined by Muslim law. In the traditional polity of Daura, such independently formulated civil rights had little place. The customary rights of subjects, which undoubtedly enjoyed the support of the state, were not equivalent to modern citizenship, in which the individual's independent capacity to assert his rights at law against the state or its agents is an essential feature.[21] These customary rights that the traditional state recognized and undertook to enforce for its subjects were so restricted by the unequal distribution of power *(iko)* that their maintenance presumed this inequality as the basis on which the political and judicial administration rested. The rights of subjects were thus always conditional on the maintenance of the political regime, including the differential rights and *iko* of all officials. Uniformity in the administration of law or the punishment of offenses was accordingly ruled out wherever political considerations prevailed. In consequence, only such personal issues as debt, divorce, and the inheritance of commoners' property were routinely administered by the Alkali. As we have seen, in rural communities, land disputes were reserved to the fiefholder or his agent for settlement. Disputes between free members of different ethnic groups might be referred to the Alkali or to the Sarkin Pawa if they occurred in the market. Serious disputes that involved risks or acts of bloodshed fell under the jurisdiction of the senior state council. Through the *tarayya* relation routine forms of administrative oppression and malpractice could be dealt with informally or reported to members of the lesser council; but serious disciplinary action against an offending official required the senior council's

approval. Thus, in effect, the customary rights of subjects in their dealings with officials varied as a reflex of differences in the political situations of the parties concerned. Because subjects understood the institutional ambiguities of their status and rights, they accommodated to the customary norms that governed their relations with officials by compliance and relations of clientage. As an official, the Alkali was probably no less subject to this milieu than his colleagues.

The chief learned of an official's death by the return of the horse and military equipment the deceased had received at his appointment. The compounds, farms, and slaves with which the state had endowed the office remained to it. Horses presented by the dead official to his political clients were returned to the office for distribution with its estate. Of these, the horses provided by the chief were returned to him for reallocation, while others were sequestrated, with the deceased's infertile concubines and treasures, for subdivision. Those possessions the deceased had given to members of his family before his death were excluded from the estate. Under Daura custom, one-half of the deceased's personal property was divided among his immediate kin. The remainder went to the chief for his use or reallocation; but when an official was dismissed for disloyalty or some other offense, the chief normally confiscated all of his personal property within the official compound. In these circumstances, if the office was hereditary, the lineage that held it were obliged to provide a successor, who thus learned by experience the risks of disloyalty; but if the office was nonhereditary, with the senior council's approval the chief would give it to someone he trusted, with varying portions of the confiscated estate. The administration of official estates was conducted by throne slaves, independently of the Alkali.

Military Organization

In the event of an unexpected attack, the large Gamariga kettledrum was beaten to summon all from nearby towns and villages to come inside the city walls. The chief might then direct his senior slaves to distribute arms from the palace arsenal to able-bodied males through fiefholders, ward heads, and *masugari.* A council of war would be called to discuss the situation and devise an appropriate response.

After the senior council had approved plans to raid some nearby town, the chief would discuss the details of the expedition with his war council, which consisted of the Kaura, the Galadima, the Shentali, Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Yara, Fada Babba, and Turaki, each of whom had sworn loyalty at his accession. Decisions of the war council rested with the chief, the Kaura and the Galadima. Though other councillors were senior captains, they may not have pressed their views freely against the senior *rukunai.* The time and objective of the raid having been settled, the Kaura estimated the composition and size of the necessary force, of which one-quarter were normally bowmen and

about one-sixth were cavalry. The captains in the council were then asked to estimate the number of soldiers of differing types they could furnish from their clients and followers. The number required was then subdivided among the major fiefholders in correspondence with current estimates of the populations subject to them. As the three largest territorial chiefs, the Sarkin Daura, Kaura, and Galadima provided most of the force. Other fiefholders were directed to tell their village heads what size and type of contingents they should provide on the appointed day. The council released no information about the expedition's objective, route, or plan of attack. Thereafter all questions of strategy and tactics fell to the Kaura, who normally commanded the field force during the eighteenth century, when the Daura chiefs themselves rarely went on campaign.

Once the expedition's composition and size were determined, the chief's slaves examined his arsenal to see what further equipment was needed. The Sarkin Yara would summon the appropriate craft heads, provide them with the raw materials they needed from the royal stores, and direct them to organize full-time production of the necessary equipment. This labor, which was unpaid, was obligatory for craftsmen at the capital and probably for those in its environs also.

Daura war weapons included spears, shields, bows and poisoned arrows, war axes, light throwing axes, swords, quilted cotton armor, suits of chain mail, and perhaps a few muskets. Rural contingents were recruited by *masugari* among their free commoners but would also include some slaves sent to represent their owners. When these contingents arrived at the capital, the Sarkin Yara distributed appropriate weapons to those who needed them through throne slaves at the Nassarawa marshaling ground. Since slaves were a small fraction of the population of Daura, most of its army were free men, including the light armed horsemen, *yan kwarbai* or *barade.* Heavy cavalry *(lifida),* who wore quilted cotton armor and were stationed around the Kaura and the chief, consisted almost entirely of royal and other state slaves. Free commoners provided the bulk of the bowmen and infantry.

In the nineteenth century when the chief went on campaign the battle organization was roughly as follows:

1. Jagaba and the scouts went ahead of the force.

2. The *yan kwarbai,* or light cavalry, under the Magayaki followed, accompanied by the Binoni, Jarmai, Matsai, and Lifidi. These were all *barade* (s. *barde*).

3. Next came Kaura and the main force, with some *barade* in front and the Shentali and Sarkin Bai behind, accompanied by all the craft heads and most of the village heads.

4. The chief's company followed after a space. First came the Barde and light horsemen, followed by the Dan Bajida and Sarkin Baka with the archers, then the Sarkin Karma with his infantry and pikemen, and the Fada Babba and Dan Barau with their troops; then, after an interval, the chief, surrounded by *lifida* (heavy cavalry) under Sarkin Jarmai, flanked on the

left by the Sarkin Tafarki and Magaji Dankakulema and on the right by the Sarkin Yara, Turaki, and official magicians and musicians, his rear being protected by the Dan Maza, Jekafada, and Makama with most of the throne slaves.

5. Behind the chief's force, at a distance, came the rear guard, commanded by the Galadima. It included the Sarkin Dawaki with a reserve of horses, all titled princes on the campaign, the Tarno, and those *lawanai* of the Galadima who were not attached to the Magayaki or Kaura ahead.

No malams or princesses went on campaign. During the ruler's absence the Dan Sanwai administered the capital and chiefdom, while Ajiya, who supervised its prison, guarded the palace.

On their homeward route the Galadima's detachment led the army, followed by the chief's, the Kaura's and the Magayaki's forces with Jagaba and his scouts, some of whom were Fulani pastoralists, bringing up the rear. We do not know whether the Hausa of Daura observed Islamic regulations governing the distribution of war booty during the eighteenth or nineteenth century. It seems that Daura had little experience of war before the jihad. Nonetheless, some informants relate that the Kaura distributed war booty in the presence of the Sarkin Yara and the Shentali, who represented the interests of the chief. Having removed the chief's share, the Kaura would distribute the remainder among the troops according to their performance, as he saw fit. The distribution favored horsemen, who took most captives, at the expense of bowmen, the main strength of Daura's army, whose poisoned arrows probably inflicted more fatalities. Such differential patterns of reward expressed and reinforced the preference of Hausa officials for horses and mounted troops.[22]

In Daura, as in other traditional Hausa societies, all officials and their agents, slave or free, with the exceptions noted above, were expected to take an active part in campaigns. Except for infantry captains, officials were mounted. The horse, its gear and trappings, the spear, the shield, and the sword were the military essentials of office. Leading clients of this officialdom and wealthier *talakawa* were also mounted. Thus the population on campaigns fell into two broad categories, the mounted and the foot soldiers. Official nobility, slaves, and princes formed the core of the former; free bowmen, that of the latter. The horses employed in battle were mainly stallions. Their acquisition and control were major objects of political and military action. A horseman's obligation to participate in expeditions when required by his immediate superior overrode all others. Free commoners had no comparable obligation to enroll in a levy; a *maigari* could appeal for recruits by directing his praise-singers and drummers to extol the courage of those who volunteered and to lampoon the unwilling as cowards, but he could not normally punish the laggards. The duties and risks of war were obligations of office, and such weapons of high prestige as the sword, shield, mace, spear, and the horse, however dubious their military value, were normally reserved for officials. The relatively high cost of a cavalryman's gear is indicated by the fact that the state undertook to provide its officials, and

through them their immediate clients, with this equipment. Most foot soldiers provided their own weapons and took along their own basic rations for the campaign. But beyond noting these gross differences in the nature and distribution of military obligations and equipment, we find it difficult to estimate the extent of voluntary participation in military expeditions by Daura commoners during the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, not only because we lack the necessary numerical data, but also because of the nature of the recruitment process. Some communities, notably those that were linked directly or otherwise with the Kusheka title and had particularly proud traditions as archers and hunters, furnished more than their due share of manpower on these levies, while others such as the Bugaje, the settled Fulani, and the Maguzawa, all of whom lacked close ties with the ruling Hausa, probably furnished less.

On campaigns the Sarkin Zagi served as the chief's personal bodyguard and servant. He led the chief's horse, carried water and rations for his master, and prepared and guarded his tent. The Sarkin Zagi also acted as usher to the chief for all messengers who wished to see him during the campaign. The chief would issue commands as occasion required through the Sarkin Zagi, directing sections of his force to assist the Kaura or instructing the Galadima to send spare horses to replace those lost in the battle. Princes who attended the campaign under the Galadima's care were required to take no active part, except for Magayaki, who commanded the *yan kwarbai.*

Between campaigns the chief occasionally granted the Sarkin Karma (Chief of Foot Soldiers) license to waylay caravans and raid the pastoral Fulani or scattered hamlets of nearby chiefdoms, receiving in return a major part of the loot. It seems that the chief could grant his Sarkin Karma such *iznin hari* (permission to raid) without consulting the senior council. The Sarkin Karma assembled his raiding force independently on such occasions.

Official Communications and Differentiation

For communication with officials in peacetime, the chief relied mainly on the Jekafada, Sarkin Bai, and Dan Sanwai. Sometimes two or even three slave Jekafada held office simultaneously as the chief's messengers. They were usually employed on minor errands, such as summoning officials or commoners. As messenger, the Sarkin Bai was charged only with harsh communications. When the chief wanted someone arrested, the Sarkin Bai was normally accompanied by the Fada Babba and Sarkin Dogarai. Dan Sanwai served as the chief's confidential messenger and ultimate guarantee of good faith; but he was only sent to princes or senior officials who refused to obey the chief's orders for fear of treachery. It is said that before undertaking such errands, the Dan Sanwai could ask the chief to swear on the Koran to the good faith of the message he bore; but in the nature of the case, this statement cannot be verified.

An important institution of Hausa political organization is the *kofa* (door,

gate; pl. *kofofi*)—that is, official intermediary. An office may serve as a *kofa* through which others communicate with their superior. At the lowest level of state organization, the *masauka* in which villagers were required to lodge during their visits to the capital illustrate this function. The head of the compound designated as a villager's *masauki* acted as his *kofa* to the fiefholder and often served as *jekada* to the village. A *kofa* was the prescribed channel of communication between persons occupying junior and senior statuses in the official system. Only in a few cases did the *kofa* exercise direct administrative control over those whose communications he conducted. With these exceptions, few *kofofi* had authority to issue commands on their own initiative to those junior officials whose communications they regulated. The principle that each individual was separately responsible for the conduct of his official functions, coupled with the systematic differentiation of offices by function, limited the role of most superior offices to that of communication and defined the status difference between senior and junior in terms of rank and precedence rather than in terms of a hierarchy of command and asymmetric responsibility. The ways in which official functions were differentiated and defined so dispersed authority that lines of communication represented by the *kofa* system indicated differences of precedence and rank rather than an administrative hierarchy. Only *lawanai* were directly under the command of their senior office; but even when aligned by rank in a promotional order, they were otherwise mutually independent. For example, the Galadima served as *kofa* to his *lawanai,* to the vassal chiefs of Kworgum and Kance, and to all princes, titled or otherwise, except the Murka. His relations with members of all these groups differed substantially, although he handled their communications in common.

Seniority of title was not a sufficient basis for designation as a *kofa.* The Yerima ranked above the Bunturawa but did not act as his *kofa.* Again, although of approximately similar status, the Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Yara, Fada Babba, and Shentali could conceivably be arranged in that order of precedence; yet none acted as *kofa* for the other. While the Magajiya presided over the affairs of the royal women, the chief communicated directly with the Iya, Saraki, or Gabsai, although he would normally route his instructions to the Dan Baroka, Sarkin Masu, Dakama, or Magajin Turu through the princesses to whom they were separately attached. However, while the chief could communicate directly with minor officials other than a *rukuni*'s *lawanai* as he wished, they were obliged to communicate with him through their appointed *kofa.* In consequence the two state councils had indirect representative functions, since they contained all senior offices that served as *kofofi. Rukunai* ineligible for further promotion acted as *kofofi* for the *lawanai* whose selection, promotion, and duties they controlled; but they themselves neither had nor needed *kofofi* to the chief, being entitled by virtue of office to private audiences whenever required. Titled princes however, being denied direct access to the chief, were obliged to communicate with him through their *rukunai.* The *kofa* institution, which integrated a clear network of communications with diffuse distributions of *iko* along the slopes

of precedence, prevented a clear and simple stratification from crystallizing among officials in two ways. First, in combination with the *lawani* organization, it segregated officials of essentially the same rank and status—for example, the *lawanai* of Kaura and Galadima—in a number of parallel groups distinguished by their alignments to differing superior offices. Second, and even where the *lawani* principle prevailed, the *kofa* organization emphasized finer differentiae that ranked offices of parallel or differing status and function in a continuum of precedence. Moreover, while embracing all offices in a single series of networks that emphasized precedence, the communication structure isolated each as a unique unit whose relative rank and relations to the others were neither directly reducible to, nor consistent with, a simple stratification scheme. At Daura the structure of official relations so institutionalized the differentiation of offices by rank and function that all seemed equally unique and essential to the total structure, even though some positions were vacant at any time. In consequence, apart from *rukunai,* offices were more readily differentiated by reference to the status groups for which they were reserved and the *karda-shigege* principles that governed their allocation, or by reference to their primary function as war titles, civil titles, malamships, occupational titles, and so forth, than by any simple stratification scheme. This condition was a major source of strength and adaptability for the traditional regime. As Hausa might say, though some offices were great and others small, since all owed equal allegiance to the chief, each preserved its own *mutumci* (manhood, distinctness), even those of titled slaves. Each thus preserved its own unique identity as a corporation sole.

The State Economy: Taxation and Rewards

To complete this account of eighteenth-century Daura, we must also discuss its police, revenues, and civil administration. The preceding account of territorial organization indicates how population movements, immigration, boundary disputes, and relations among different ethnic communities were routinely organized. For large-scale public works requiring corvée, the labor force of rural communities was mobilized and directed through the territorial administration, which provided the normal channels for communication of general orders from the capital. Able-bodied adult males resident in each city ward shared collective responsibilities for the maintenance of defined sections of the city wall. The city gates were controlled by the Sarkin Bai, as detailed below. The Fada Babba served as chief of police, while Makama was directly attached to the chief as his police bodyguard. Executions were conducted by Hauni at the market place; the condemned man was hurled from the top of the city wall at the Kidi-da-Hauka gate into the *Ganuwar Amina,* a trench some twenty to thirty feet below, where the body was left for the hyenas.

The principal traditional sources of revenue of the state were: (1) *zakka,*

the grain tithe ordained by Islamic law, which was collected by Dan Barau from Hausa, Fulani, Maguzawa, and Bugaje for the chief, who distributed much of it to officials and throne slaves; (2) *jangali,* a tax on cattle payable in cash or kind that was levied on pastoral Fulani throughout the territory; (3) war booty *(humushi),* which was probably small and occasional; (4) caravan tolls; (5) *karo,* a capitation tax levied, with certain exemptions, on all male commoners; (6) *mairam,* a heavier tax levied on occupational specialists; (7) certain market taxes and *al'adu,* or customary levies, which are detailed below; (8) the *kudin garka,* a special tax on fenced marsh plots, which in theory was levied on all plots equally, irrespective of their extent; (9) in addition, the chief received *kudin sarauta* from officials on their appointment and on their death or dismissal a portion or all of their estates *(gadon sarauta);* and (10) resources for the subsistence of senior officials included state compounds and attached slave estates *(rumada),* farms worked by local corvée at their various fiefs, portions of the tax collected by the official and his agents, rights to the *kudin sarauta* for subordinate titles which they filled by appointment, portions of the *zakka* collected by the chief, income from fines levied on offending commoners or in legal disputes, and shares of war booty.

Many minor officials were also remunerated by benefices that authorized them to levy dues on a specific set of articles.[23] Most of these benefices imposed burdens on the market, which was treated as a ready source of supplies and revenues by the chief and senior officials. While visiting merchants were usually exempt, local vendors were subject to irregular levies and *al'adu* (customs, excise). Most commodities on sale in the market were subject to some tax or *al'ada* (customary due), as were all the main articles of local production. By virtue of the *iko* that they exercised over particular segments of social and economic life in their communities, officials also received substantial gifts as *gaisuwa* (greetings) or *toshi* (bribes, inducements) from individuals interested in soliciting their favor or avoiding their enmity. Their *iko* also enabled officials to requisition supplies and labor from commoners, who could only expect redress through the institution of *tarayya.* The good conduct of the relatively small local population of slaves was assured by the provision that any ill-behaved slave could be deposited with the Magaji Dankakulema for export to Bornu as part of the annual tribute, their owners selecting from the Dankakulema a slave of similar age and sex in compensation. Finally, the chief and senior officials appear to have engaged in trade through the Dan Sanwai and his agents. Some senior officials also sought to manipulate the salt trade for their own profit.

During the last century, under pressure from Zinder the traditional patterns of taxation at Daura underwent considerable change; but this is not our only difficulty in trying to reconstruct the tax system of the later eighteenth century. Tax rates were normally assessed in cash but were convertible to payments in kind by those *rangwame* arrangements discussed above in relation to *kudin sarauta.* Through *rangwame,* articles offered in lieu of tax

could be undervalued or overvalued, according to the collector's inclination. Thus, the flat taxation rates in cash had a very uneven incidence in actual practice. Officials engaged in tax collection also kept variable proportions of their receipts for themselves. Perhaps the chief received at most one-half of the values turned in by the people. Officials who collected *gaisuwa* (payments of greeting) on particular articles from certain categories of persons usually gave some portion to the chief; but the amounts passed on bore no necessary or constant relation to their receipts; and for the most part, officials authorized to levy *al'adu* on market commodities made very minor returns to the chief.

To Hausa, *gaisuwa* differs from *al'ada* in that the articles levied by *al'ada* were intended for use by the state. For example, the cotton used to make quilted armor was levied by Lifida, who supervised its preparation, while the Fulani butter levied by the Magajin Tambari was intended to oil the royal drums. As might be expected, such *al'adu* invited substantial abuse by the officials charged with levying them. For example, their incidence among the sellers of cotton and butter in the market was highly irregular, since collectors were not obliged to distribute these burdens equally. In contrast, *gaisuwa* paid in the market represented dues paid in kind to market officials by grain sellers and certain other vendors. *Gaisuwa* paid by craftsmen to the heads of their craft could be regarded as payments for license to practice the craft. To Hausa, the significant difference between both these forms of payment and occupational or other taxation turned on the fact that tax was formerly levied at uniform rates for each category of people and assessed in cash at fixed amounts; but since *gaisuwa* and *al'adu* were indeterminate in value and generally paid in kind (although cash could be substituted if the collector agreed), they lacked fixed measure or regular incidence.

Such payments clearly date from an earlier day when currency was in short supply and the subsistence and luxury articles levied by officials formed an important share of the incomes of the state. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cash taxes remittable in kind were levied on some, but not all, occupations. This perhaps illustrates the progressive transformation of state incomes and methods of revenue collection from an earlier era, when the state depended on goods in kind, toward the present, when all state dues must be paid in standard currency and conversion to kind equivalents is formally forbidden. In the late eighteenth century, those occupations which were firmly integrated with the market and had predictable cash incomes were subject to taxes assessed in cowrie currency at standard rates, while other crafts with irregular cash incomes were not assessed for tax but were subject to *gaisuwa.* An illustration is provided by the local magicians, ritualists, and devotees of the spirit-possession cult, who were variably liable to demands for *al'adu* or *gaisuwa* from the three official magicians, the Magaji Bayamadi, who presided over Yemadawa, who were all classified as witches *(masu-maita);* the Sarkin Masu, and the Dan Baroka, who administered the male and female *bori* cultists. Hunters, who owed the chief such dues as

leopard skins and a proportion of the civet cats they caught annually, were exempt from taxes but were expected to turn out as bowmen and infantry in the military levy. The weakly Islamized Kushekawa formed perhaps the largest group of hunters.

During the late eighteenth century, the *karo* and *mairam* taxes were collected in the rainy season from all free married males resident in the kingdom, with certain exceptions. *Karo* can be regarded as a capitation tax, while *mairam* fell on wealthier individuals and on those craft specialists who had relatively high cash incomes. All men subject to *mairam* were exempt from *karo,* and vice versa. Exemption *(hurumi)* from both *karo* and *mairam* was granted to the hunters just mentioned; to all malams; to the members of the royal dynasty; to slaves; to all officials; to all women; to all commoners who served as *yan karma* (infantry) in the military levy; and to the *asoka,* or town crier, who sounded the curfew in Daura city at night. Under the traditional regime, no tax was collected on slaves; but heads of compounds and families were responsible for taxes due from all free married men who lived with them. As mentioned above, one of the principal uses of the income from *gandu* farms was to meet such demands.

During the nineteenth century the prevailing rates for *karo* and *mairam* were 5,000 or 5,500 cowries and 11,000 cowries, respectively, per taxpayer. It seems that during the later eighteenth century, besides the *karo* and *mairam* taxes to which its subjects were liable, strangers who visited the chiefdom during the dry season after harvest were also subject to a levy or tax known as *kudin baki* (money of [from] strangers), the rate for which I could not determine. In the nineteenth century, when the *mairam* payments were sent to Zinder as tribute in the form of dyed indigo cloth while the *karo* payment was converted into white cloth for the same purpose, the terms *karambaki* (money for blue cloth) and *karan fari* (money for white cloth) acquired general use. In this way the former *mairam* and *kudin baki* payments were assimilated as *karambaki,* while the old *karo* payment remained distinct from *mairam* and recognizable despite its new name, since it was levied on the same sections of the population as before.

Mairam is a Kanuri term which Daura adopted under Bornu influence to denote occupational taxes. Thereafter the word underwent various changes of meaning as an effect of Daura's political history. Originally, according to local etymologists, it may have denoted those men who did not pay the *karo* but were liable to special taxes on their income *(arziki)*—for example, merchants, long-distance traders *(fatake),* substantial farmers, and specialists who mined and smelted iron. One meaning of *mairam* which is still current denotes a tenth of the iron ore obtained at each smelting. This tithe, which took the standard form of a pig *(bwuya),* weighed about eighty pounds and was due to the chief at each smelting. Since all blacksmiths were exempt from *karo,* they were liable to *mairam,* either in this form or in cash. As we have seen, they were also obliged to produce such articles as the state required by unpaid labor. Similar obligations fell on the members of other crafts.

We do not know what rates for *karo* and *mairam* prevailed at Daura during the later eighteenth century. The rates current at Zango in the later nineteenth century were undoubtedly higher. In any event, cash rates vary in material significance with the purchasing power of currency; and in the traditional Hausa economy, this fluctuated secularly as well as seasonally, since the local supply of cowries increased by continued imports. According to the Kano Chronicle, it was only in the reign of Muhamma Sharefa (1703-1731) that "cowries first came to Hausaland."[24] Thus, although *karo* and *mairam* were assessed by fixed rates in cowrie currency at Daura in the late eighteenth century, given the limited currency then in circulation, these rates were probably low and paid in kind by *rangwame.* Alternatively, at that date taxes might still be assessed in the older cloth currency of *turkuda* (s. *turkudi*), fixed lengths of special weave, which the cowries slowly displaced. But with the expansion of commercial activities which the more flexible cowrie currency promoted, craftsmen and traders alike became liable to two types of cash tax, the *mairam* calculated at twice the prevailing rate of *karo,* whatever that may have been, and a second, smaller occupational tax which was collected from the less lucrative crafts in addition to the *karo* these craftsmen had to pay. In consequence, despite their differences, such occupational tax is often assimilated to the traditional *mairam* by analogy. By the close of the eighteenth century, such occupational taxes were levied on salt sellers, commission agents, visiting *fatake* (traveling traders), praise-singers, drummers, butchers, weavers and dyers, and leatherworkers, all of whom also paid *karo,* while *mairam* was collected from blacksmiths and wealthier traders. This occupational tax was probably then levied on moderately prosperous crafts at a flat rate of about twelve hundred cowries per craftsman per annum. During the nineteenth century the rate was increased.

Perhaps the best way to describe traditional patterns of taxation and *al'adu* in eighteenth-century Daura is simply to list the various dues collected by particular officials. It is said that the Sarkin Masu received about twenty-five hundred cowries per annum from each male *bori* cult initiate, while the Dan Baroka collected a similar amount from female initiates. Probably this rate prevailed at Zango in its final decades. The Magaji Bayamadi had power to levy fines or dues on anyone from Yamadi—all the inhabitants of which were classified as witches. Sellers of grain and other measurable foodstuffs in the market gave the Korama and the Sarkin Pawa portions of the articles they sold. Pot sellers were expected to give Dan Hungumi a small *gaisuwa* in cash or kind whenever they brought pots to market for sale. Barber-doctors rendered *gaisuwa* to the Magajin Aska as head of their craft. Vendors of honey, sugar, and other sweetstuffs were obliged to give *gaisuwa* to the Sarka, Kaura's *lawani,* whenever they attended market. All who entered the town gates paid 10 cowries on each occasion to the gatekeeper. A sum ranging from 200 to 500 cowries known as *kudin kabari* (money for the grave) was collected by the Kusheyi, one of Kaura's *lawanai,* whenever an adult was buried. The Sarkin Diya, another of Kaura's subordinates, collected 5,500

cowries on the sale or manumission of each slave, the vendor and purchaser contributing equally to this amount, which was fictitiously regarded as *ushira*, or one-tenth of the price. The Sarkin Dawaki, another *lawani* of Kaura, collected 1,200 cowries for each horse from their owners annually, officials being exempt. The Bai Karama, a lesser throne slave, collected 1,200 cowries a year from the fathers of girls twelve years or more in age until they married. The Sarkin Ruwa, another throne slave, collected *gaisuwa* from water sellers in the city, together with an annual payment of 1,200 cowries from the owner of each well. He was also authorized to seize the water buckets at Fulani wells and to destroy or keep them unless they were ransomed with money or bundles of grain. The Sarkin Ruwa collected the substantial fee imposed by the chief on the construction of new wells, while the Bulkacima, or chief's well-digger, was responsible for supervising the work. The Sarkin Shanu, an office which was formerly reserved for princes but later transferred to the Sarkin Pawa (Chief Butcher), collected a tax on all cattle sold in the market, for slaughter or otherwise. The Magaji, another princely office which was generally filled by the Yerima's son, had rights to levy dues *(al'adu)* from all who sold rope, straw platters, baskets, paper, and similar articles of Bornu origin in the market. The Tarno collected taxes on weavers and dyers and levied *gaisuwa* on all mat weavers and female hairdressers. Native *fatake* (traveling traders) were required after each trip to render *gaisuwa* through their leader, the Madugu, in proportion to their profits. Besides the Magajin Tambari and the Lifida, whose customary rights to appropriate butter and cotton have been mentioned above, the Ajiya, who supervised the palace prisons, could requisition such grain and other foodstuffs in the market as he needed to feed the prisoners. Builders *(magina)* were not subject to tax but rendered *gaisuwa* to the Sarkin Gini whenever they put up a structure. The Sarkin Lafiya, who held the senior Maguzawa title, collected *gaisuwa* from the various *sarakunan noma* and other Maguzawa in the territory, giving some of the proceeds to the chief. Caravan tolls levied by the Sarkin Zango on Bugaje *fatake* and by the Sarkin Tafarki on all others had the following rates: 2,000 cowries per camel load, 1,000 cowries per ox load, 500 per donkey load, 200 per sheep, and 100 per goat. Dan Maza was responsible for collecting the 1,200 cowries due annually from tanners and leatherworkers. The Sarkin Garka collected a similar sum for each *garka,* or fenced marsh plot. The *jangali* seems to have varied between 2,000 and 3,000 cowries per beast, according to size. In addition, migrant pastoralists were required to render a *kudin ciyawa* (grazing tax) of 300 to 500 cowries per head during the dry season. Though this list is incomplete, it probably indicates the range and specificity of the traditional system of revenue collection by taxation, by *gaisuwa,* and by *al'adu.*

Officials who were not empowered to levy taxes on specific categories of goods or persons fell into two classes: some were charged with territorial administration, a highly prestigious and rewarding activity, while others were economically dependent on the chief or on the senior *rukunai* whose

agents they were. If we exclude malams, who derived their subsistence mainly from fees and *sadaka,* we can therefore classify offices by their modes of remuneration into three groups: retainers, who depended on their superiors for subsistence; territorial administrators, who received shares of the tax gathered from their fiefs and had *iko* to levy fines; and those officials who were remunerated by benefices in the forms of *al'adu, gaisuwa,* or by powers of levy on specific classes of goods and persons on particular occasions. These three categories of office also differed in the *iko* they exercised. Territorial officials could directly or indirectly claim jurisdiction over all who lived in their fiefs; and they accordingly regulated interpersonal disputes, inheritance, land rights, divorce, assault, and other matters. Offices endowed with benefices enjoyed an *iko* restricted to the activities or people from whom they derived their revenues. Retainers attached to such important officials as Kaura or Galadima rarely exercised formal *iko;* nonetheless, as agents of their lord, they represented his office and enjoyed a correspondingly indeterminate power.

The Fulani leader Shehu Usman dan Fodio wrote a careful account of some ways in which revenue was collected in Gobir and adjacent Hausa states during his lifetime.[25] These practices figured prominently in the Shehu's denunciation of traditional Hausa rule. The accuracy of his account and the validity of his criticisms are not open to question. Several practices the Shehu condemned prevailed at Daura before the Fulani jihad. Nonetheless, despite the Shehu's express proscription, these practices also flourished in Daura and northeastern Katsina during the latter half of the nineteenth century under Fulani rulers whose regimes derived from the jihad. The problems presented by such deviance from the Shehu's injunctions cannot be resolved by dismissing these Fulani rulers as decadent, worldly, or avaricious, for these qualities do not entirely explain their revival of the proscribed Hausa levies and requisitions. Moreover, at Kano and in central Sokoto, Fulani chiefs avoided these practices. The revenues of Sokoto, which included imperial tributes, and of Kano, "the emporium of the western Sudan," apparently assured their rulers sufficiently large incomes to satisfy their needs. But in Fulani Daura and adjacent Katsina, after prolonged wars legitimate sources of revenue were not sufficient to meet the rulers' needs. Such legitimate revenues were accordingly supplemented by arbitrary levies and market exactions, most of which followed forms known in Hausaland before the jihad.

At Daura neither the chief nor his officials distinguished their public and private incomes and expenditures. Although formally subject to periodic inspection by the Dan Sanwai, who served as the ruler's scribe, the state treasury was poorly separated from the ruler's privy purse. To complicate accounting, official incomes and expenditures combined values in cash and in kind. Given prevailing shortages of cash, the principle of convertibility *(rangwame)* was accepted, but its equivalences were subject simultaneously to seasonal, regional, and secular fluctuations and to pressures of power and

need. From the revenues of their offices, titleholders were expected to finance the routine administration of the units or affairs put under their charge. Thus, in the absence of salaries, some offices were remunerated by prebends, others by benefice.[26] A principal object of official expenditures was the maintenance of an adequate body of mounted clients available for duty whenever required; officials depended heavily on their administrative activities for the incomes they needed to equip and subsist their staffs. Moreover, since the duties of office were highly specialized, officials needed staffs with appropriate special skills and experience. To attract and maintain such staff, they had to offer handsome rewards and opportunities; and as currency was in short supply and salaries unknown, the modes of official remuneration included *al'adu, gaisuwa,* and *rangwame.*

HAUSA OFFICIALDOM

We can best review the government of eighteenth-century Daura by giving a comprehensive account of its various offices, their relations, functions, and powers. Since the following account is based primarily on information derived from Hausa survivors of the nineteenth-century Zango chiefdom, which sought to preserve the prejihadic Hausa institutions as faithfully as conditions allowed, I have frequently been unable to distinguish details of the prejihadic regime from those of Zango. To notify the reader on such occasions, I have accordingly specified those practices that prevailed at Zango for which data from eighteenth-century Daura are absent or obscure.

The official table of organization is represented in chart A on page 216. As the chief's election, installation, powers, prerogative, and obligations have been amply discussed above, I will confine this inventory to other offices of the central system, beginning with the Kaura and Galadima and their *lawanai.*

Free Rukunai

Kaura.—The senior subordinate office under the chief, in charge of the Daura military forces, Kaura held large territories east of Daura city in fief and acted as head of the electoral council. Excluding the chief, he was also the senior member of the war council and the main state council. He administered the city ward in which his state compound stood. With the Galadima he could request the Magajiya to overrule and, if necessary, to depose the chief. Kaura was selected by a meeting of the lineage which had hereditary rights to this office. He selected his *lawanai* but lacked independent power to dismiss those whom the chief had formally appointed. Traditionally reserved for eunuchs and classified as a slave office, after Kalifa's reign this position remained hereditary in a free client lineage. As commander in chief, Kaura

presided over the distribution of war booty, and as senior territorial chief, he was responsible for collecting *karo* and *mairam* in his fiefs. State horses attached to the office were supervised by his *lawani,* Sarkin Dawaki. Kaura's official slave estate was at Kwajali.

Kusheyi.—A slave *lawani* of Kaura, he collected the *kudin kabari,* or burial tax, of 300 to 500 cowries, according to the wealth of the deceased, for each adult. This money was handed over to Kaura for transmission to the chief. Kusheyi served also as a councillor and *jekada* of Kaura. Although selected by Kaura, Kusheyi was formally installed by the chief.

Madaba.—Normally the Kaura's son or junior kinsman, he served as an agent, adviser, *bafada,* and messenger. Sometimes he would be placed in charge of a specific fief or set of fiefs. In battle he stayed with the Kaura.

Sarka.—Another of the Kaura's kin, Sarka had the right to levy *al'adu* in the market from all vendors of sweetstuffs such as *alewa,* honey, and sugarcane. He served Kaura as a *jekada* or territorial administrator, adviser, and minor captain in battle.

Dan Kwaba.—Kaura's son, chosen successor, and deputy, he remained with Kaura, served as his senior executive and deputy, and normally administered several fiefs through his own staff of *jekadu.* In battle he also remained with Kaura. In the Kaura's absence, Dan Kwaba administered the office.

Sarkin Dawaki.—He was also one of Kaura's agnatic kin and had charge of the horses attached to Kaura's office. He collected an annual tax on horses and a tax of one-tenth *(ushira)* of the price of all horses sold locally. In battle he remained with the rear guard in charge of the horse reserve.

Gilu.—One of Kaura's close agnatic kin, he assisted Kaura as a councillor, agent, and *jekada.*

Dan Takora.—Another of Kaura's kinsmen, he collected *gaisuwa* from all woodworkers, calabash workers, and vendors of wooden articles; and he also served as a *jekada.*

Sarkin Diya.—He was not generally a kinsman of Kaura but was often a slave. He collected the *ushira* (one-tenth of the price) for all slave sales or manumissions.

Sarkin Fada.—A free client, he was selected and appointed by Kaura personally and served as his majordomo and messenger to the chief and to other officials at the capital.

Galadima.—The senior councillor after Kaura, he sat on the main council of state, on the electoral council, and also on the war council. With Kaura he could request Magajiya's intervention against the chief. Before the jihad, his fiefs lay to the west of Daura city. Like Kaura, he administered the city ward around his state compound. He served as *kofa* to the vassal chiefs of Kworgum and Kance, the Dan Sanwai acting as his intermediary to the latter. He was also the *kofa* for all princes, titled and untitled, with the exception of Murka, who was placed under Kaura. Though the Galadima's office was formerly reserved for eunuchs, throughout the eighteenth century it was held

by a free noble lineage. Nonetheless the Galadima still acted as the chief's deputy in relations with all princes and served as the official head of the dynasty. He presided over meetings of princes to discuss recruitment to princely titles, reported the decisions of these meetings to the chief, and presided over the following installations. He alone had the authority to discipline princes and could order their physical chastisement if he thought fit. He also conducted their marriages at his state compound. In battle Galadima remained in the rear with the princes. Like Kaura, Galadima had rights of private audience with the chief whenever he wished and usually came to greet the chief at the palace on Fridays, followed by the Yerima and junior princes. By his oath of office the Galadima was obliged to inform the chief about public affairs and shifts of opinion.

Dan Bawo.—Galadima's deputy, senior subordinate, and chosen successor, he was generally his close kinsman, a son or younger brother. He normally administered some of the Galadima's fiefs as his own, and he was responsible for keeping the Galadima informed of current events and opinion. In the Galadima's absence, he administered the office.

Dan Kumalo.—Another kinsman, he served as one of the Galadima's councillors, agents, *jekadu,* and territorial administrators. He was usually a son or younger brother of the Galadima.

Dan Hungumi.—Like Dan Kumalo, he was one of the Galadima's close agnatic kin selected by the Galadima but appointed in the presence of the chief. He had the rights to *ushira* (one-tenth of the sale price) of pots sold in the market and also to *ushira* of rope and potash sold in the city market and throughout the Galadima's fiefs. In return he was responsible for shoring up the sides of the potters' clay pits with timbers as they became unsafe. He served also as a *jekada* and territorial administrator for the Galadima.

Yekuwa.—Another of Galadima's kin, a *jekada* and *bafada,* Yekuwa had the right to demand money from all commission agents *(dillalai)* in the city at each of the Muslim festivals.

Matsai (also called *Barden Galadima,* the Galadima's Barde).—He commanded the Galadima's cavalry, collected the tax in the Galadima's fiefs, and served as his *jekada* to rural communities whenever force was required. This office could be given to a free client but was frequently held by the Galadima's kin.

Binoni.—He also captained a detachment of Galadima's cavalry. With the Matsai, he was employed by Galadima to collect the *karo* and *mairam* throughout the Galadima's territory and served as a *jekada.* Like the Matsai, Binoni was often a kinsman of the Galadima, though this was formally a client office.

Magayaki.—Although this title was reserved for princes, the Magayaki served as one of the Galadima's senior advisers and *jekadu* and was frequently his kinsman. Formally it ranked apart from the Dan Bawo as a royal title. In war Magayaki commanded the vanguard of *yan kwarbai* (light cavalry).

Sarkin Fada.—A free client, selected and appointed by Galadima at his compound, the Sarkin Fada served as majordomo and messenger to the chief and to other officials in the city. He was also one of Galadima's principal advisers.

The Princesses

Magajiya.—She was the official queen mother, the successor of Daura, but was never the mother of the reigning chief, though she was always a senior woman of royal descent. She selected the Yar Kuntu, the Dan Gawa, and Magajiya Karya, whom the chief installed. Magajiya lived in a separate compound away from the palace. She was normally either a widow or the wife of a leading malam. All girls of royal descent underwent the week-long ritual preparations for first marriage at the Magajiya's compound and under her care, since she was the head of the dynasty's women. Constitutionally the Magajiya had the authority to countermand the Sarki's instructions and, if necessary, to depose him. She herself was not subject to dismissal, being in this respect the chief's superior. She received from the chief a share of the *kudin sarauta* of all candidates for office and appointed one of the chief's wives as Maidaki in his quarters. The symbol of her constitutional authority was her ostrich-feather shoes. Dressed in these, she ceased to be a private individual and personified the authority of the queen mothers who had preceded her and once ruled the state. Magajiya could grant reprieve to offenders and was much sought after as a *tarayya* patron. She accordingly had numerous clients scattered throughout the country, for whom her Sarkin Fada, generally her younger brother or husband, served as *kofa.* The facial marks borne by all Daura natives are those of the ancient Magajiyas. In addition, Magajiya and other members of the dynasty are distinguished by certain markings attributed to Bayajidda, which include two cuts on the abdomen *(cibiya)* and a series of light cross-hatchings on the temples above the cheekbone.

The Galadima could consult Magajiya if the chief requested disciplinary action against any princes. He was expected to do so when the punishment was serious. Magajiya was expected to act on the joint advice of Kaura and Galadima when the senior state council was deadlocked due to the chief's opposition on some matter of policy. She might also be called on to depose chiefs who passed general laws, dismissed officials, or made senior appointments without prior approval of the council. On such occasions, Magajiya would summon a meeting of the senior council, which the chief was obliged to attend. Otherwise she had no part in the council, nor could she overrule the actions of Kaura or Galadima. Like all royal titleholders, Magajiya took no oath of loyalty to the chief.

Iya.—After Magajiya, this was the senior title reserved for women of the royal lineage. Iya was officially regarded as the chief's sister and had her

own state compound. She selected the Dan Baroka, the Sarkin Masu, and the Magaji Bayamadi for appointment by the chief. Of these, the first two were attached to her as *lawanai,* while the Magaji Bayamadi had the Sarkin Yara as his *kofa.* At her compound Iya presided over the ritual washings, seclusion, and instruction of every prince on his first marriage, which was always solemnized at the Galadima's compound. She also had charge of all magicians and initiates of the spirit-possession cult *(bori)* throughout the country, the Sarkin Masu and the Dan Baroka supervising them on her behalf. She received from these officials the larger portion of the *gaisuwa* they collected. When an office reserved for women of the dynasty fell vacant, Iya would summon them to meet at her compound to discuss nominations and make a selection. She then informed the Sarki, who conducted the appointment. Iya was expected to arrange the selection of a new Magajiya in this way when that office fell vacant; and if the chief delayed appointing the woman chosen, she was expected to do so herself before the assembled women of the royal lineage to ensure that there would always be a Magajiya in the town. Having many *tarayya* clients scattered throughout the country, Iya appointed one of her younger brothers as Sarkin Fada to deal with their requests. Her compound served as the official *masauki* (hostel) for all rural or foreign herbalists, magicians, and spirit-possession initiates who visited the city. Her ritual functions on behalf of the chief remain obscure, but he always visited her compound for a private audience on his way to the Sallah prayer ground *(masallacin Idi)* at the two major Mohammedan festivals. Like Magajiya, Iya received a share of the *kudin sarauta* paid by non-royal officials. As Magajiya's deputy, Iya's role was confined to relations with the women of the royal lineage. She rarely, if ever, succeeded as Magajiya and had none of the Magajiya's constitutional rights vis-à-vis the chief and senior councillors.

Saraki (also called *Maskome*).—Another princess, she was the senior royal dancer in charge of such royal musicians as the Magajin Turu, Dan Tomo, and Dakama, who were attached primarily to the dynasty and provided music for its family ceremonials. However, while the Magajin Turu was directly under the Saraki, Dan Tomo was attached to the chief; and Dakama was attached to Gabsai, who was herself attached to Saraki. Saraki accordingly presided over the music and dancing that accompanied royal marriages and naming ceremonies. The celebrations were opened at her direction by the Magajin Turu, who would play the individual's praises, after which Dakama and other musicians joined in. Saraki also attended the appointments of such senior officials as the Galadima and Kaura, the Shentali, the Sarkin Yara, and the Sarkin Bai and directed the music and dancing that celebrated these events. When the new official was robed and turbaned, she instructed the Magajin Turu to play the *kirari* (praise-song) of his office and danced to this accompaniment. Following music and praise-singing by the Sarkin Busa, Sarkin Makada, and Sankira, the Saraki would return to her compound, escorted by the Magajin Turu. Saraki was much sought after

by commoners as a *tarayya* patron; but how she administered these clients is not known. Like other titled princesses, she had her own compound and could not be dismissed.

Gabsai.—She "followed" Saraki, although she was not directly subordinate to her. She accompanied Saraki at the installations of senior officials and the celebrations of royal marriages and naming ceremonies. She carried the chief's babies on her back outside the palace and supervised the ritual of staining with henna the hands and feet of all members of the dynasty on their first marriage. Dakama attended upon her.

Yar Kuntu.—She was a princess who was selected by Magajiya and attended her as her agent and adviser.

Magajiya Karya.—She was another princess selected by Magajiya as her confidante.

Dan Gawa.—She had the same role as the Magajiya Karya. These three lesser offices had little prospects of promotion and could be filled by any younger woman of the dynasty.

Maidaki.—This title was usually given to that one of the chief's wives who was also his agnate. The formal appointment was conducted by Magajiya in the palace. The Maidaki could not succeed to any other office reserved for royal women. Although she received a portion of the *kudin sarauta* from ordinary appointments, she had no public role. Whether at some earlier date the Sarki's offspring by the Maidaki were especially favored for princely titles or the succession, we cannot say, though this seems probable.

Princely Ranks

Yerima.—The crown prince and chief's chosen successor, his appointment could only be made with the approval of the senior state council, which in its role as electoral council could also set aside an appointed Yerima and select some other prince to succeed to the throne. The Yerima was usually a senior son or younger brother of the chief who appointed him. Of Bornu derivation, this title outranks all other princely positions, and the Yerima was the most senior prince under the Galadima's care. This was stressed every week on the Muslim sabbath, when all other princes except the Murka assembled at the Yerima's state compound to escort him to greet the Galadima, who would then lead them all to greet the chief. When they had escorted the Yerima back to his compound, these princes were dismissed. At his appointment the Yerima received a royal mat *(wundi),* shoes, robe, turban, burnoose, and spear, to drumming by the Magajin Turu, Dakama, and the *tambari.* The Saraki and Gabsai danced in his honor. Like other princes, the Yerima did not take an oath of loyalty to the chief on his appointment and had no rights of access to him. The Galadima, who supervised most titled princes, served as Yerima's *kofa.* In battle the Yerima and other princes remained with the Galadima in the rear but took no active part. It is said that

during the eighteenth century the Yerima had several fiefs but that the Sarkin Yara collected their taxes. Yerima received his share of the *kudin sarauta* paid by newly appointed officials through the Sarkin Yara, but like other royals, he paid nothing on his appointment. In the eighteenth century he selected the Magaji and Magayaki, the former being generally his eldest son or heir. The Magayaki, another prince selected for his military prowess, generally served as one of Galadima's captains; however, the Magayaki was frequently one of the Galadima's kinsmen. Yerima was provided with a state compound, household slaves, farms, and a slave estate *(rinji).* Apart from his *lawanai,* who were appointed by the chief on Galadima's recommendation, he had no authority over other princely officials. However, Yerima could levy fines and punish *talakawa* who offended him. Like other princes, he did not visit the palace unless directed by the Galadima, who would then accompany him. Princes had no part in any council of state.

Murka.—During the eighteenth century, the Murka, who ranked second to the Yerima among the princes, was attached to the Kaura for supervision and communication. This office was generally given to one of the chief's close agnatic kinsmen who had displayed military prowess, normally a parallel cousin or brother. Although the office was probably furnished with a state compound and fiefs, we lack evidence of this. Its holder paid no *kudin sarauta.* Alone of the princely officials, Murka "followed" Kaura, who served as his *kofa,* instead of the Galadima. This arrangement emphasized the virtual parity of Murka and Yerima and their rivalry for the succession.

Bunturawa.—In order of seniority and precedence, this was the third princely office. Its holder was selected by the Galadima at a meeting of princes and thereafter fell under his direction. Bunturawa had a few fiefs attached to him during the eighteenth century.

Haska or *Gara.*—Like Saraki and Matsai, this office had two names. It was generally filled by a prince who was ineligible for succession to the throne because his father had not been chief. The office was provided with a state compound, farms, and slaves. We lack information about its administrative roles.

Maiwa.—This was another position generally reserved for *jikokin sarki*—that is, those grandsons of chiefs who were ineligible to succeed because their fathers had not been chiefs. Maiwa was selected by the Galadima at a meeting of royal princes and appointed by the chief. Like other princes at this time, he was rarely dismissed.

Sarkin Shanu.—During the eighteenth century, this was a minor position filled by junior princes, who were probably ineligible for the throne. In the early nineteenth century it was transferred to the office and lineage of the Sarkin Pawa. The Sarkin Shanu had rights to collect *ushira* (one-tenth) on the price of all cattle sold in the market.

Samba'a.—Another minor royal title reserved for distant princes, this was transferred from the royal ranks during the nineteenth century.

Magaji.—Normally the Yerima's eldest son, he was nominated by Yerima for appointment by the chief and assisted the Yerima as a *lawani.*

Magayaki.—Though selected by the Yerima for military prowess and appointed by the chief, he served as one of the Galadima's senior advisers and *jekadu,* commanded the light cavalry in war, and was frequently a kinsman of the Galadima during the last century.

Clerics

Limamin Juma'a.—The senior priestly office, its holder conducted the weekly services on Fridays at the city mosque. As the office was hereditary, the Limam selected one of his kinsmen to act as his deputy and probable successor with the title of Na'ibi (Deputy). The Limam did not pay *kudin sarauta* on appointment and was installed without the usual drumming and singing. He sat on the senior council of state and the electoral council. His office had neither territorial jurisdiction nor *al'adu* or *gaisuwa* prerogatives. For subsistence the Limam depended mainly on *sadaka* (alms), on a share of the state *zakka* (grain tithe), and on the crops grown by the slaves attached to his official compound. Having direct access to the chief, the Limam had no *kofa,* nor did he serve as *kofa* for any official. The Ladan, or muezzin, who declaimed the prayers at the prescribed times, was selected by, and subordinate to, the Dan Sanwai. In Daura constitutional theory, the Limam was an ideal husband for Magajiya, but we cannot estimate the frequency of such unions. The Limam acted as head of the city ward in which his compound was sited.

Na'ibi.—He was the Limam's chosen deputy and successor and generally his close agnatic kinsman. He assisted the Limam in the rituals of Islam. The Limam and Na'ibi were both drawn from a learned lineage located at Gazobi.

Alkali (Judge).—This was another hereditary office held by a lineage from Gazobi. Its holder was an elector and member of the senior council. He occupied a state compound reserved for the office and administered the city ward in which his compound stood. The office was endowed with a slave settlement in lieu of fiefs. On appointment the Alkali did not pay *kudin sarauta;* and he took an oath of loyalty, not to the chief, but to the *shari'a* (Muslim law) instead. His appointment was celebrated with drumming on *tambari* and *turu* and was distinguished by the chief's transfer of his own turban to the Alkali's head. The Alkali was allowed to retain the *ushira* prescribed by Muslim law for the cases he heard in court. This fee represented one-tenth of the values subject to legal administration in debt, inheritance, return of bridewealth, or other civil suits. However, unless instructed otherwise, the Alkali was obliged to pass all fines levied in his court to the chief, who might then return him a portion. As related above, the Alkali lacked authority to order mutilation, execution, imprisonment, or exile, these punishments being reserved for decision by the senior state council, on which the Alkali sat as the legal expert. Even when the chief or other senior officials referred such cases to the Alkali's court, his recommendations were reviewed by the

senior state council before enforcement. The Alkali did not adjudicate land or farm disputes, nor could he apply the law to the forms of official malpractice routine at Daura. Like the Limam and Na'ibi, the Alkali did not go on campaigns; and no subordinate offices were attached to his title.

Dan Sanwai.—This office was reserved for members of another clerical lineage from Gazobi. Although ranked below the Alkali and Limam in precedence, the Dan Sanwai had an especially prominent administrative role as the ruler's favorite malam, scribe, and confidential assistant. Dan Sanwai was one of the traditional electors and a member of the senior state council. He needed no *kofa,* having direct access to the chief. He conducted all Muslim rites at the palace for death, marriage, or naming and presided over the nightly Koranic readings and prayer meetings that were held there during the month of the Fast. Before the major Muslim festivals he verified that the new moon had appeared, and he conducted the Idi prayers at the prayer ground outside the city on the following day. Under the Galadima's guidance, he supervised official distributions of alms to malams and acted as *kofa* and supervisor of the chief of Kance, whose *masauki* (hostel) at the capital was Dan Sanwai's compound. He administered the city ward in which his state compound stood. He did not go on campaigns but remained behind in the chief's absence to govern the capital and state as his deputy *(wakili).* He conducted whatever sales or purchases the chief and members of the senior council requested and arranged for the accommodation of visiting malams and wealthy merchants near to the city market. He usually married the chief's daughter or sister and was frequently a cross-cousin of the chief. In addition, the office of Tarno, which was reserved for sons of the royal women, was sometimes held by a son of the Dan Sanwai and the princess he married. As the chief's confidential malam, the Dan Sanwai administered the Koranic oath before, or on behalf of, the chief whenever required. As the chief's scribe, he drafted his letters to other rulers, kept his correspondence, calculated the distribution of *zakka* on the chief's instructions, and kept a list of the major items of wealth in the chief's possession, whether these were stored in the palace or in the Dan Sanwai's compound. Thus Dan Sanwai served as state treasurer during the eighteenth century. He also acted as official head of the order of malams, although formally ranked below the Limam and Alkali. His *lawanai,* whom he selected for appointment by the chief, included the Magajin Malam, also called Mardandana; Dan Kurege; Samba'a; and Ladan (muezzin). The Mardandana, or Magajin Malam, was Dan Sanwai's chosen successor, though, as in the case of Yerima, the incumbent could be passed over in favor of some other member of the Sanwaiyawa lineage whom the reigning chief preferred as his clerical adviser. Like other senior officials, the Dan Sanwai was selected by the senior state council. In traditional Daura, dismissals from this office were extremely rare. Dan Sanwai was appointed with robe, turban, burnoose, drumming, and bugling, but without beating of the *tambari.* He paid a *kudin sarauta* of 500,000 cowries but neither made *afi* nor swore allegiance to the chief. Dan Sanwai indi-

rectly controlled the salt trade throughout the country but had no territorial fiefs. As the chief's confidential messenger and ultimate guarantee of good faith, he was only employed on such errands in delicate situations with serious political implications—for example, to heal misunderstandings or resolve confrontations between the Kaura or Galadima and the chief. Since he acted in this capacity only on the chief's behalf, the latter could employ him to dissuade the Magajiya from accepting the advice of Galadima and Kaura.

Mardandana, or Magajin Malam.—Despite repeated inquiries, it remains unclear whether these titles referred to one or two offices during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The titles have identical role descriptions and were probably at some time in the past alternative designations for a single office, much as Gara and Haska are equivalent, or Maskome and Saraki. Some informants cite the Magajin Malam as the Dan Sanwai's chosen successor; others, the Mardandana. Both sets of statements present identical evidence. I accordingly incline to the view that during the eighteenth century Mardandana and Magajin Malam were simply alternative designations for the Dan Sanwai's deputy and chosen heir, although after the jihad and subsequent migrations, the titles were separated. Mardandana served as the *kofa* at the city to all people from Gazobi. Its holder was a close agnatic kinsman of the Dan Sanwai, often his brother or son. He administered the distributions of *sadaka* (alms) and chiefly largesse to malams and presided over distributions of *sadaka* that accompanied the rites of death, naming, and marriage at the palace. He also served as Dan Sanwai's assistant in other affairs, conducted a Koranic school, and provided or arranged suitable accommodation for visiting clerics. The *kudin sarauta* for this office was approximately 150,000 cowries, subject to *rangwame*. One of the famous Magajin Malams of the nineteenth century, an immigrant from Garko named Kacakuri, who was given the title of Magajin Dan Sanwai, was especially prominent in the salt trade at Zango. It was probably in Kacakuri's time that the offices of Magaji and Mardandana separated. Until then the Samba'a and Barage had supervised the salt trade for Dan Sanwai.

Samba'a.—This was another hereditary malamship filled by the Dan Sanwai's nominee whom the chief appointed, for a *kudin sarauta* of 200,000 cowries. The Samba'a specialized in the sale of slaves and salt. He also provided accommodation for visiting malams or salt merchants.

It is said that during the eighteenth century there was a princely Samba'a title, concerning whose role little is known. It is also said that after his flight from Daura, the Sarkin Gwari Abdu transferred this title to his Sarkin Pawa in appreciation of his loyalty. According to this tradition, the titles of Samba'a and Sarkin Shanu were transferred from the royal ranks to the Sarkin Pawa's family on the same day, and thereafter throughout the nineteenth century these two offices remained in his lineage. Even so, there were two Samba'a titles in nineteenth-century Daura, one attached to Dan Sanwai and the other to Sarkin Pawa. The status, roles, and history of these two offices were quite distinct; and it is presumed that this was also the situation during

the eighteenth century, when one of the Samba'a titles was reserved for princes. For the anomalous existence of two distinct offices bearing the same name, I have found no explanation. As far as my knowledge goes, the historical record suggests that this anomaly is not of recent date. It remains possible that the old princely title of Samba'a may have passed to the Dan Sanwai's office after a brief tenure by some member of Sarkin Pawa's lineage, but however attractive, this seems rather unlikely, since the Samba'awa Ward at Zango was supervised by the Sarkin Pawa, to whom its head, the Samba'a, was responsible. As with the offices of Mardandana and Magajin Malam, we must admit ignorance.

Dan Kurege.—This was an old hereditary malamship conferred by the chief on the Dan Sanwai's recommendation. Dan Kurege assisted Dan Sanwai in trade and conducted the Koran school in the Dan Sanwai's compound. Dan Kurege was obliged to accommodate visiting traders in his own home. Apart from the Ladan, whose work was described above, this completes the list of malams attached to the office of Dan Sanwai.

The Fadawa

Sarkin Tafarki.—This hereditary office was reserved for free men. Its holder collected the *kudin fito* (tolls) at rates already listed from all caravans that entered or traversed the country, excluding those of Bugaje traders, who were taxed by the Sarkin Zango, a throne slave. The Sarkin Tafarki was also responsible for patrolling the caravan routes and arresting or dispersing brigands. In these duties he was assisted by a *lawani* entitled Ubandawakin Sarkin Tafarki, whom he selected and appointed. Given these functions, the Sarkin Tafarki's office was regarded as especially lucrative, and its *kudin sarauta* was correspondingly high—1,000,000 cowries, with a *yankai* of 500,000. Besides the *iko,* horses, and equipment necessary to execute his task, at Zango the Sarkin Tafarki received a state compound and a seat on the lesser council and administered the villages of Tumfafi and Biciko. He may also have had *tarayya* rights with the Kaura in Gwamba. In battle the Sarkin Tafarki remained beside the chief. He was responsible for keeping the chief informed about all unusual movements or events on the chiefdom's thoroughfares.

Dan Bajida, or Baushi.—This title had two names, the second serving to identify it with the bush. The office was hereditary in a lineage of free hunters. Dan Bajida, who had charge of all hunters in the chiefdom, normally remained at his home in Yardaji but was summoned by the Dan Sanwai to guard the palace and police the town when the chief was absent in peacetime. He would then bring his hunters to the capital, where they quartered in the palace and imposed a curfew on the city. In wartime Dan Bajida commanded the chief's bodyguard and remained beside him. He took care of the chief's baggage and only returned to Yardaji after escorting the chief

to the palace. As head of the Daura hunters and bowmen, Dan Bajida had precedence over the Sarkin Karma, the Sarkin Zagi, and Barde. His senior assistant was the Sarkin Baka (Chief of the Archers), whom the chief appointed on Dan Bajida's recommendation. This office was also hereditary in another hunter lineage. Dan Bajida collected no tax but received *gaisuwa* from hunters under his charge. *Kudin sarauta* for this office ranged between 300,000 and 500,000 cowries. Being resident at Yardaji, Dan Bajida had no place on any of the state councils.

Sarkin Karma.—This office was filled by free men without lineage reservations. The Sarkin Karma captained the infantry *(dakaru, yan karma)* that remained with the chief in the Daura battle formation and came under the command of the Shentali in battle. In peacetime he was obliged to assist Dan Bajida with the palace and town guard whenever required. He also commanded the guard that escorted the state tax and *zakka* to the palace, and he supplied escorts for senior officials as necessary. All *yan karma* exempted from *karo* on condition of continuing infantry service were under his command. The Sarkin Karma had neither fiefs nor territorial powers and duties. For subsistence he depended on gifts from the chief, which he sometimes extracted by drumming and dancing, or on the chief's permission to raid some nearby community or passing caravan. Only the Sarkin Karma received such *iznin hari*—permission to raid—from the chief, to whom he was expected to give the pick of the booty. In ordinary Hausa speech, *karma* means "profligate" or "wastrel." The category of *yan karma* may thus have been equivalent to the Mende "war boys," and the Sarkin Karma corresponds roughly with the captain of a Mende chief's retinue of bully boys and part-time brigands.[27] Immigrant pastoral Fulani were ready targets for the Sarkin Karma's raids. The high income of this office is indicated by the *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries traditionally levied on it. Nonetheless, as head of the chief's private force of bullyboys, the Sarkin Karma had no place in any state council.

Barde.—This office was reserved for a free lineage. Its *kudin sarauta* ranged between 300,000 and 500,000 cowries. The Barde commanded the light cavalry *(barade, yan kwarbai)* grouped before the chief in war. He sat on the lesser council and had to swear allegiance on appointment. Although the chief might place Barde in charge of towns attached to the throne, the office had no fiefs vested in it; nor had it any state compound or power to levy fines. Like the Sarkin Karma, Barde was expected to assist the Dan Bajida when he guarded the palace and town during the chief's peacetime absences.

Sarkin Zagi.—This office was reserved for free men without lineage restriction. Sarkin Zagi was the head of those who walked beside and in front of the chief's horse whenever he left the palace precincts. His compound stood in the palace forecourt near its entrance, and he depended entirely on the chief for subsistence. On campaign he had charge of the chief's food and water, took care of his horse and equipment, guarded his tent, prepared his

bed, and acted as *kofa* to all messengers. Sarkin Zagi had no promotional prospects, no role in the public administration, nor any part in the state councils.

Dan Barau.—This was another office reserved for free men without lineage restriction. Its *kudin sarauta* varied between 300,000 and 500,000 cowries. Dan Barau lived in his family compound and had no territorial administrative powers. Besides presiding over palace protocol and the distribution of kola nuts at the chief's request, Dan Barau's main duty was to collect the grain tithe *(zakka)* throughout the chiefdom. This was organized through the *masugari* of all the rural communities, including the Maguzawa, Bugaje, and Fulani settlements. With the Sarkin Karma's escort, Dan Barau arranged to transport the *zakka* as it was needed to the palace, where the Dan Sanwai estimated its volume and divided it as the chief directed for distribution to the various officials of state, slave and free. Dan Barau had no seat on the lesser council, although he normally attended to distribute kola nuts before council sessions. At the chief's installation, he prepared the gifts of kola nuts for dispatch to neighboring chiefs. Since his official duty of collecting the *zakka* was highly profitable, the Dan Barau paid a *kudin sarauta* of 500,000 cowries and a proportionate *yankai.*

Tarno.—This office was always reserved for the free son of a princess, usually the daughter or sister of the preceding or reigning chief. Thus Tarno and the chief were often cross-cousins and joking relations. Tarno was often, but by no means always, the son of a Dan Sanwai. Tarno had charge of all mat weavers, weavers of cloth, dyers, and dye beaters throughout the territory, and he collected their tax. In addition, he collected tax from the women hairdressers, keeping some and giving the chief the rest. Besides their individual tax, dyers paid a tax of 3,300 cowries per dye pit. Pits of similar design and type were also used by mat weavers in the dry season to preserve their straw against the dry wind, and all who owned a *diga* (weaving pit) were liable to tax. To assist him, Tarno appointed an Ubandawaki who supervised the affairs of the dyers and dye beaters. Tarno seems to have dealt with the mat weavers, cloth weavers and female hairdressers directly himself. He also collected taxes from tailors and embroiderers. The office had no state compound or fiefs; and Tarno had no seat on any state council. Being outside the royal lineage, Tarno was not subject to the Galadima but had a special place among the chief's courtiers. From his levies on the clothworkers, Tarno was required to supply the Sarkin Jarmai with sufficient cloth for the quilted cotton armor which the slave *lifida* prepared under the direction of the Sarkin Jarmai and Sarkin Lifidi. Although Tarno's office was especially lucrative, its *kudin sarauta* varied between 300,000 and 1,000,000 cowries according to the chief's inclination. In battle Tarno remained with the princes beside the Galadima in the rear.

Barage.—This office was hereditary in a free lineage. Its holder administered the trade in potash and salt at the capital. Barage negotiated with visiting merchants to secure the necessary supplies of these two commodities. He

bought the chief's requirements in bulk and, as head of the local salt sellers, regulated its local price. In this capacity he collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from every salt seller. At the fast of Ramadan, the chief would give the Barage a large *kantu* (bundle) of salt for distribution within the city.

Magaji Dankakulema.—This office was reserved for men of a particular free lineage. Before the jihad its holder served as the *jekada* from Daura to Bornu and supervised the transport of the annual Daura tribute of 100 slaves, which he escorted with a small cavalry force. This journey may have removed the Magaji Dankakulema from Daura for two or three months annually. Between journeys he kept the slaves selected for tribute at his compound and derived considerable benefit from their services; but he was obliged to accept any unsatisfactory slave whose owner wished to export him to Bornu in return for another of similar sex and age selected by the owner. It seems likely that the Magaji Dankakulema had a state compound reserved for his office. On appointment he paid a *kudin sarauta* of 200,000 cowries. He did not sit on any state council.

Magaji Bayamadi.—He was the head of the Yemadawa, all of whom were said to be descended from Karbogari, Bayajidda's son by the Gwari concubine. Magaji Bayamadi's office was therefore hereditary and symbolized the tradition of Karbogari, by whose name its holder was known. A third name for this office current in nineteenth-century Daura was Magaji Bagwiwa. All people from Yamadi were regarded by other Daura Hausa as witches on grounds of descent, and all fell under the jurisdiction of the Magaji Bayamadi as chief witch. He was allowed to administer them as he pleased and could seize articles, levy fines and supplies, and requisition labor for his own use at will, the chief receiving none of these incomes. However, Yamadi was not a simple fief of this office, since the Magaji Bayamadi's *iko* applied only to Yemadawa, but to all of them, wherever located. The Magaji Bayamadi furnished a *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries on appointment, attended the chief in war, and was frequently summoned to act as usher at court in lieu of his ancestor Karbogari. On appointment he was provided with a gown, blanket, usher's mat, and the black cap characteristic of magicians and witches. His *kofa* was the Sarkin Yara.

Craft Officials

Sarkin Pawa.—This hereditary office was held by a leading lineage of free butchers. The Sarkin Pawa collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from all Daura butchers who did not pay *mairam.* The Sarkin Shanu also collected *ushira* (one-tenth) on the price of all cattle sold in the market. Before the mid-nineteenth century the Sarkin Pawa was rarely, if ever, dismissed from office. As head of the city market, he was continuously engaged in supervising its affairs and accordingly delegated the administration of butchers to the Yeriman Pawa, his son or younger brother, whom he selected and

appointed at his own compound. To supervise the grain sellers in the market, the Sarkin Pawa also selected and appointed a senior female grain seller to the title of Korama and authorized her to regulate the prices and measures of grain and other foodstuffs, such as chili peppers, that were sold by measure. As head of the market, the Sarkin Pawa was responsible for order within it and mediated or settled minor disputes as they occurred, dispatching troublesome or serious cases to the Sarkin Yara, who administered the city for the chief. As market head, Sarkin Pawa arranged accommodation for visiting entertainers, drummers, praise-singers, and minor traders at his state compound or elsewhere. His compound, which adjoined the market, was one of the prescribed *masauka* (s. *masauki*) for *bori* cultists. To meet these entertainment expenses, Sarkin Pawa collected daily *gaisuwa* from butchers and contributions of grain from the Korama. During the Muslim Fast he also had to supply the chief with free meat daily, and when it ended, he received the gift of a horse. At some time during the month of the Fast each year, the Sarkin Pawa would arrest the market and confiscate all goods presented for sale. These would later be returned to their owners for suitable payments in cash called *pansa* (ransom). This custom, known as *agama,* was listed by Shehu dan Fodio as one of the typical abuses of Hausa rule.[28] Part of the sum collected as "ransom" would be given to the chief by the Sarkin Pawa as "greetings from the market." The chief's slaves also made an independent levy on similar lines during or after the Fast; but being slightly different in form, it was known as *ka-ki-saida* ("you refuse to sell"). On such occasions the slaves walked through the market and seized whatever they wished; they produced a decrepit cow or horse as "payment" and left the vendors to sort out questions of individual compensation among themselves. Being especially lucrative, the office of Sarkin Pawa carried a *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries and proportionate *yankai.*

Korama.—This position was filled without lineage reservations by an elderly free woman. The Korama was selected and appointed by the Sarkin Pawa as head of all grain sellers in the market. The Sarkin Pawa received and kept her *kudin sarauta,* but I failed to learn its amount. Korama was required to see that grain sellers observed prevailing regulations of price and measure. She received a daily *gaisuwa* of grain from all other vendors and used some of this to feed visiting prostitutes, *bori* cult members, and other unattached women, for whom her compound was a prescribed *masauki* (hostel). Perhaps for this reason Korama was responsible to the Sarkin Pawa and his superior, the Sarkin Yara, for locating any stolen goods and finding the responsible thieves.

Sarkin Dillalai.—The Sarkin Dillalai was chief of the commission brokers. This is usually classified as an office reserved for free men without any restrictions of lineage; however, during the nineteenth century it was successively held by two slaves, Ali and his son Nata; by a prince, Ngulumi, the son of Yerima Mai Nasara; and by a free client, Gulu. The Sarkin Dillalai super-

vised all who sold cloth on commission and collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from each of them. He assisted the Sarkin Zango by arranging local sales for the goods of visiting merchants at or above the minimum prices they set and by purchasing their requirements, delegating these tasks to other brokers while remaining surety for their good faith. In the event of failure to return unsold goods or to hand over the amounts required, the offending broker was severely punished, and the Sarkin Dillalai risked dismissal. In such cases the Sarkin Zango was expected to report the fraud to the Sarkin Yara, who would relay the matter to the chief. Sarkin Dillalai was also charged with arranging the compensation of vendors whose goods had been seized under the *ka-ki-saida* type of levy mentioned above. Being lucrative, the appointment carried a *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries.

Madugu.—This office was given to a free man without lineage restrictions. As head of the native Daura *fatake* (long-distance traders), its holder was responsible for organizing their caravans and guiding these safely along the traditional trade routes and also for handling relations between the members of caravans and the agents of the chiefs whose towns they visited. To assist him, the Madugu selected and appointed an Ubandawaki who served as a scout and surveyed the route. The Madugu and his Ubandawaki received *gaisuwa* from the *fatake* they led.

Sarkin Makera.—This office was filled by members of a certain free lineage. Its holder, the chief of blacksmiths, was responsible for the annual collection of tax from all smiths in the kingdom. He also collected the slabs of pig iron due to the chief from each smelting but delegated this task to the Yeriman Makera, whom he selected and appointed and who was generally his brother or son. Whenever necessary, the Sarkin Makera was obliged to organize the production of such articles as the chief required by temporarily conscripting all blacksmiths and allocating the materials and work among them. The office, being lucrative and seldom subject to dismissal, carried a *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000.

Bulkacima.—This office, which may derive from Bornu, was reserved for members of a free lineage who specialized in digging wells. The Bulkacima was the chief's expert well digger. Seeking suitable sites, he stuck dry sticks in the ground and examined the earth and the sticks for loam and evidence of water. Bulkacima had no tax or *al'adu* rights and only received *gaisuwa* from those whose wells he had helped to construct, repair, or replace. He was also responsible for keeping the chief informed about all new wells under construction.

Sarkin Marina.—This was a free office filled from a particular lineage of dyers. As chief of the dyers, its holder was responsible to Tarno's assistant, the Ubandawakin Tarno, for collection of the tax due from dyers and for the performance of any other services imposed upon them. The *kudin sarauta* for this office varied between 200,000 and 400,000 cowries.

Sarkin Gini.—This office was reserved without lineage restrictions to free

men. Its holder was the chief's master builder and directed repairs or new building in the palace, the city mosque, any other public buildings, and the town wall. For these tasks the Sarkin Gini was authorized to summon all local builders for corvée, while the chief supplied building materials and the public, the necessary unskilled labor. Since most Daura villagers could construct their own huts, the term *builder (magini)* was reserved for those who could construct units with two or more rooms and a mud roof supported on cantilevered beams and central columns, the roof being surfaced with native cement against the rain. Sarkin Gini was usually selected as one of the most skilled local *magina* (builders). His office allowed him to levy a yearly *gaisuwa* on all who had built their huts during the period.

Magajin Aska.—The Magajin Aska was chief of the barber-doctors. This free office was probably reserved for men of a certain lineage. As the chief's barber-doctor, the Magajin Aska cut facial and body marks on royal infants; conducted circumcision, bloodletting, and other types of native surgery for the dynasty and nobles; and shaved the chief's face and head. The Magajin Aska collected *gaisuwa* from all who practiced his craft in the chiefdom.

Court Musicians and Magicians

Sarkin Busa.—The chief's senior bugler, he was recruited from a particular lineage for a *kudin sarauta* that ranged between 700,000 and 1,000,000 cowries. On appointment the Sarkin Busa received a burnoose *(alkyabba)* to indicate his precedence over other court musicians. When not required at court, he was allowed to bugle the praise-songs of other officials. His services at court were rewarded by the chief with a horse, clothes, foodstuffs, and other articles, as well as money. The Sarkin Busa specialized in playing the *algaita,* a reed instrument that sounds like a bagpipe, and the *kakaki,* a long royal trumpet. In battle he remained by the chief and sounded the praise-songs of all who had fallen. He collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from all buglers throughout the country.

Sarkin Makada.—The Sarkin Makada, chief of drummers, was recruited by descent from a particular free lineage. He acted as head of the ward in which his official compound stood and collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from drummers throughout the chiefdom. Nonetheless, he depended heavily for his subsistence on gifts from the chief and other officials, whose praises he was free to drum. On appointment he paid a *kudin sarauta* of 700,000 to 1,000,000 cowries and thereafter worked closely with the Sarkin Busa and Sankira.

Sankira.—The chief's senior praise-singer, Sankira was recruited from a particular free lineage and collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from all *maroka* (praise-singers). Like the Sarkin Busa and Sarkin Makada, Sankira had no *kofa* between himself and the chief, being directly attached to the lat-

ter. Moreover, he was allowed to sing the praises of other officials when not required at court.

Magajin Turu.—This free hereditary office was conferred for a *kudin sarauta* of 100,000 cowries. Its holder played on the *turu* as directed by the Saraki at dynastic ceremonies and on certain state occasions. The Magajin Turu was not allowed to play for nonroyal officials without instructions from the Saraki.

Magajin Tambari.—Recruited from a special free lineage attached to the throne, the Magajin Tambari was custodian of the kettledrums which formed part of the throne regalia. Forbidden to drum the *tambari* except at the chief's direction, he kept the two smaller *Lingare* drums and *Ratakumkum tambari* at his compound. Magajin Tambari had *al'adu* rights to take from the market as much Fulani butter as he needed for oiling the *tambari* drum skins. This benefice being lucrative, the office carried a *kudin sarauta* of 500,000 cowries. The Magajin Tambari was directly attached to the chief and so needed no *kofa.*

Dakama and *Dan Tomo.*—These titles were vested in a free lineage of drummers attached to the throne and the dynasty. The Dakama, a woman, "followed" the Gabsai and played at her direction, while Dan Tomo remained directly under the chief. Both offices had identical *kudin sarauta* of 100,000 cowries each. Neither drummer was allowed to play for nobles or commoners, official or other, since their drums formed part of the throne regalia. However, to summon the senior council, the Dan Tomo drummed the praises *(taki)* of its members in order of rank, as related above. Both were expected to compose the praise-songs that extolled the heroic origins and deeds of the chief and dynasty. Both depended heavily on chiefly and royal largesse for their incomes. Neither had rights to *gaisuwa* or *al'adu.* Once appointed, neither was subject to promotion or dismissal.

Dan Baroka.—This was another free hereditary office given to a woman whom the Iya selected and appointed. Dan Baroka served as executive head of all female magicians and *bori* initiates in the chiefdom, on whom she levied *al'adu* for the Iya.

Sarkin Masu.—Another court magician, this office was hereditary in a free lineage. Its holder, a man, was selected by the Iya and appointed before the chief. Like Dan Baroka, the Sarkin Masu was directly subordinate to Iya. He administered all male *bori* initiates and *bokaye* (herbal magicians) throughout the country. Like Dan Baroka, he could levy "taxes" or *al'adu* on *bori* initiates and on magicians, turning over some of the receipts to the Iya and keeping the rest. The chief received no share of this. We do not know the rates of *kudin sarauta* attached to these two offices.

The groups of free officials enumerated above—the *fadawa,* craft officials, and court musicians and magicians—held different positions. While the first group was attached to the court, the second consisted of craft offi-

cials, most of whom were charged with tax collection, and the third consists of court musicians and magicians only. For various reasons the chart of the Daura officialdom does not represent these groupings exactly.

Senior Throne Slaves

Daura Hausa distinguish two classes of throne slaves, namely, the senior slaves *(manyan bayi)* with their *lawanai* and the palace slaves *(bayin gidan sarki)*. The chief duties of *manyan bayi* and their *lawanai* lay outside the palace, while palace slaves were identified with the palace even when they did not live there because their functions and authority were normally exercised solely within it. *Manyan bayi* are often described by the Hausa of Daura as "slave *rukunai*," and several of them had elaborate installation ceremonies —for example, the Sarkin Yara, Fada Babba, Sarkin Bai, and Shentali. However, on appointment none of these senior slaves received the *tambari* drumming or *alkyabba* (burnoose) which were given to free *rukunai*. Instead, all four were installed to drumming on the *ganga* and music from *kakaki* and *koso* and received turbans and gowns. *Manyan bayi* were really the senior slaves through whom the chief exercised his public executive powers. In the following catalog the roles of these senior slaves and their subordinate staffs are described before those of the titled palace slaves.

Sarkin Yara.—Formerly reserved for eunuchs, by the eighteenth century this position was filled by free clients, but shortly after the jihad it was entrusted to a slave lineage, and it is now classified by Hausa informants as a hereditary slave title. Despite anomalies, this description is appropriate, given the Sarkin Yara's functions and relation to the chief.

At some time in the eighteenth century the Sarkin Yara was placed in charge of the Daura city administration. He thus became responsible for the repair and maintenance of the city walls, mosque, and other public installations, the necessary work being organized by corvée through the ward heads, each of whom was traditionally responsible for a special section of the wall. He also supported the Sarkin Pawa in keeping order at the market and would either settle disputes referred to him or forward them to the Alkali or the chief. As executive head of the city, Sarkin Yara served as *kofa* to all the occupational offices listed above, received the chief's share of their taxes for deposit in the palace, and relayed their instructions or requests. How craftsmen were organized to execute the ruler's orders has already been described. Sarkin Yara was also the office through which the chief administered the numerous towns and villages attached to the throne. These units were administered on commission by various royal, free, and slave *jekadu* whom the chief and Sarkin Yara selected and the latter supervised. Sarkin Yara was also the principal *kofa* through whom commoners made their requests and complaints to the chief. As head of the lesser council, he brought forward most of the matters that council discussed and was expected to keep the chief

fully informed about all affairs outside the palace. As the chief's slave vizier, or *waziri,* a term that was commonly used to describe this office, the Sarkin Yara adjusted the *kudin sarauta* required for appointment by varying the *rangwame* within limits the chief would accept. He also collected the *yankai* for redistribution. At Zango c. 1900 the Sarkin Yara's *kudin sarauta* was 1,000,000 cowries. Although a slave, its holder was usually either married to a sister of the chief, or descended from such a marriage, or both.

To assist him in his diverse responsibilities, the Sarkin Yara had as *lawanai* the Guyama, the Ubandawaki, the Shentali, and the Jekafadan Sarkin Yara, who was often called the Sarkin Fadan Sarkin Yara. Sarkin Yara appointed his own Sarkin Fada and Shentali, who served as *jekadu* and messengers to other officials. The Ubandawaki, his messenger to the chief, lived in the palace. Guyama, who was generally a free client of Sarkin Yara, captained the *lifida* (heavy cavalry) attached to the office and served as a *jekada* in Sarkin Yara's territorial administration. The Guyama and Ubandawaki, although selected by Sarkin Yara, were both appointed by the chief, the Ubandawaki's office being formally attached to the throne rather than to the office of the Sarkin Yara. Thus, although its holder was directly responsible to Sarkin Yara, he was known as the Ubandawakin Daura and not the Ubandawakin Sarkin Yara. At the palace the Ubandawaki supervised a detachment of guards, and in war he commanded the Sarkin Yara's light cavalry.

Turaki.—The character and duties that this office may have had in the eighteenth century have been obscured by the numerous changes to which it has since been subject. Before the jihad it seems to have been reserved for slaves; but whether it was then hereditary, I cannot say. Like the Sarkin Yara, the Turaki occupied a special state compound. He was an important member of the lesser council and supervised the collection of the cattle tax *(jangali).*

Sarkin Bai.—This hereditary slave office had charge of the palace and city guards. Sarkin Bai also served as a guard at meetings of the senior council but was not a member. His official compound was near the rear gate of the palace. He selected and controlled the slaves who policed the city gates and charged everyone ten cowries on entering, handing a portion of their receipts to the Sarkin Yara each week and keeping the remainder. Sarkin Bai was a member of the lesser council and administered the towns attached to his office through two *lawanai,* the Shentalin Sarkin Bai and Sarkin Fadan Sarkin Bai, whom he appointed at his compound. Sarkin Bai also bore and executed the chief's sterner messages to officials and others. At Zango c. 1900 the office had a *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries and served as *kofa* for the minor slave titles of Sarkin Ruwa and Bai Karama.

Sarkin Ruwa.—Whether this slave office was hereditary in the eighteenth century, we cannot say. Sarkin Ruwa was responsible for collecting the annual tax on wells and water sellers. He also collected such fees as the chief required before a new well could be used. It seems unlikely that during the eighteenth century any Sarkin Ruwa was ever promoted to the senior office

of Sarkin Bai. However, after the jihad, when these offices were vested in the same lineage, such promotions occurred. The position carried a *kudin sarauta* of 300,000 cowries at Zango c. 1900.

Bai Karama.—We cannot say whether or not this slave office was hereditary in the eighteenth century. The Bai Karama collected a tax from the fathers of all nubile unmarried girls annually until the maidens married. To levy the tax, Bai Karama toured the country and inspected the girls at each village. At the same time he took note of all handsome women, free and slave, married or not, to report their whereabouts to the chief. Being lucrative, this office carried a *kudin sarauta* of 400,000 cowries at Zango c. 1900.

Fada Babba.—This slave office was hereditary from the eighteenth century. Its holder, who served as the chief of police, directed the executioner, Hauni, and the Sarkin Dogarai, who captained the slave police squad. All three were drawn from the same lineage, the Sarkin Dogarai being eligible for promotion to Fada Babba. As the public announcer, Fada Babba proclaimed the chief's orders at the market and other public places. He also supervised Hauni's executions at the old gate renamed Kidi-da-Hauka and policed and controlled the *dajin sarki,* that is, the uninhabited wastelands in Daura, but had nothing to do with the prisons, which Ajiya supervised inside the palace. In eighteenth-century Daura the Fada Babba had a state compound and administered the city ward around it.

Sarkin Dogarai.—This hereditary slave office was vested in the lineage that held the titles of Fada Babba and Hauni, who were all said to be of Gwari origin. The police attached to Sarkin Dogarai were young throne slaves who also served as infantry and escorted the state tax and *zakka* to the palace under the Sarkin Dogarai. As city police and night watch, they were called on to arrest thieves, brigands, and other troublesome persons. *Kudin sarauta* for this office varied between 400,000 and 500,000 cowries in 1900.

Hauni.—This was a hereditary slave office. As state executioner, Hauni also carried out such mutilations as were ordered. Although a slave, he lived outside the palace and derived his subsistence from the chief's gifts. The *kudin sarauta* of this office at Zango is unknown.

Shentali.—Originally the office of a eunuch, for much of the eighteenth century it was held by slaves on a hereditary basis and was later filled by free clients without descent restrictions. The Shentali had charge of all *lifida* attached to the throne. In battle he commanded the Sarkin Karma, Sarkin Jarmai, and the Lifidi. He had a state compound, could levy fines, and served on the war council and lesser council. He was frequently employed by the chief as a messenger to the Kaura and the Galadima and may have administered some of the towns and villages attached to the throne. To assist him the Shentali appointed his own Sarkin Fada for a *kudin sarauta* of 100,000 cowries, which he kept. It seems that the rate to free men for his office varied between 300,000 and 1,000,000. As commander of the chief's heavily armed slave cavalry, Shentali was the senior slave captain; nonetheless the Sarkin Jarmai and Lifidi, who prepared the quilted cotton armor, only came under his command during campaigns.

The Palace Slaves

Sarkin Garka.—This office was allocated to slaves without further restrictions. As his title indicates, the Sarkin Garka collected the tax due on all fenced plots (*garake,* s. *garka*) in which onions, sugarcane, maize, tobacco, or cassava were grown. He levied the annual tax of 1,200 cowries per fenced plot *(garka)* throughout the country, handing over most of this to the chief. His quarters lay inside the west gate of the palace, which it was his duty to close and guard at night, while the Ubandawaki performed a similar role at the east gate. Sarkin Garka also served as one of the guards at meetings of the lesser council. The Sarkin Garka had precedence over the Jekafada and Dan Maza, paid a *kudin sarauta* of 500,000 at Zango c. 1900, and supplemented his receipts from the *garka* tax and his income as court usher by gifts from the chief. He also served as one of the chief's messengers.

Dan Maza.—During the eighteenth century this slave office was filled without descent restrictions. Its holder lived in or close by the palace. He was authorized to collect an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from leatherworkers and tanners throughout the country. Since the tanners and leatherworkers at Daura had no occupational chiefs of their own, Dan Maza regulated their affairs and served as their *kofa.* The office carried a *kudin sarauta* of 500,000 cowries at Zango in 1900. Dan Maza also served as a court messenger and remained behind the chief in battle.

Jekafada.—This slave office was not restricted by descent. Jekafada was the chief's messenger to other officials; he served also as one of the court ushers, lived in the palace, and was in constant attendance on the chief. For this reason there were sometimes two or more slaves who bore this title. As ushers they could delay or deny access to the chief on various grounds, and as messengers it was believed that they could influence his decisions. Accordingly these officials derived handsome irregular incomes from *gaisuwa* and other payments for their good offices. In war they remained with the chief.

Sarkin Jarmai.—This office was given to slaves of proven bravery without lineage restrictions. The Sarkin Jarmai was head of the *lifida* (armored slave cavalry), who were grouped around the chief in battle. He directed the preparation of *lifida* (suits of quilted cotton armor), which the Lifida undertook. Cloth required for this purpose was provided by Tarno, while the cotton for stuffing was levied on the markets by Sarkin Jarmai or Lifidi. Either official could grant individuals reprieve from their levies for suitable *gaisuwa.* Sarkin Jarmai served as guard for meetings of the lesser council and had his compound within the palace.

Lifidi.—This was another slave office free of descent restrictions. Its holder normally remained with Dan Bajidda at Yardaji. The Lifidi was responsible for preparing all the *lifida* (cotton armor) that the chief required for his own force or for distribution to others, such as Kaura. In this task Lifidi worked under the direction of the Sarkin Jarmai, who served as his *kofa* and captained these troops in battle. Whether the Lifidi was obliged to go to war remains undetermined; but he took no part in any state council

and had no public duties besides the preparation of *lifida.* For this purpose he was empowered to take as much cotton as he wished from any market in the territory.

Makama.—This was another slave office without lineage restrictions. Its holder lived outside the west gate of the palace, which was under his guard. With the Sarkin Jarmai, Sarkin Zango, and Sarkin Garka, he also guarded the meetings of the lesser council. As the chief's personal policeman, Makama kept close to the chief, ready to apply force whenever necessary. He generally carried a long wooden staff and may also have helped the Ajiya to supervise prisoners in the palace dungeon. In battle he remained with the chief.

Ajiya.—This was another slave office unrestricted by descent. Ajiya administered the palace prisons. Executions and mutilations were the Hauni's function. Public police duties were shared between the Fada Babba and the Sarkin Dogarai, while police duties in the palace were the Makama's responsibility; but the Ajiya was solely responsible for the security of his prisoners. These included no women, since the *shari'a* prescribed whippings *(bulala)* as their heaviest punishment, which the chief was obliged to witness unobserved, to protect the women against injury. Being responsible for feeding the prisoners, Ajiya was empowered to take whatever foodstuffs he needed from the market. Until the late nineteenth century Ajiya also guarded the state wealth, which was hoarded at the *shamaki* inside the palace where the prison was situated. This treasury function was later transferred to another office. To discharge these duties Ajiya was required to live in the *shamaki* beside the prison.

I have now presented a reconstruction of the political organization of Daura on the eve of the jihad. This account is partly based on explicit descriptions of the eighteenth-century organization by elderly officials and members of the local dynasty and partly on information derived from the histories and regimes of Zango and Baure during the last century. Though incomplete and not without error, this reconstruction of the Hausa polity on the eve of the jihad enables us to identify the institutional changes and continuities that developed in its various successor states. These regimes differed in the traditional elements that they preserved with or without modification, as well as in those that they lacked. Nonetheless, all recognizably derived from this common model. By analyzing the processes of institutional change and by comparing its forms and effects in these successor states, we shall try to isolate the conditions by which political regimes of this general sort develop or persist; but without a clear and comprehensive account of the original form of government which sets its concrete details in their social and ecological contexts, such understanding is hardly possible.

4
Defeat and Fragmentation

SARKIN GWARI ABDU (1798-?1825)

Start of the Jihad

The Fulani jihad of 1804 to 1810 is a decisive event in the history of Daura. It terminated an era, dislocated the state, and overran the chiefdom. The jihad began in Gobir during 1804 with the flight *(hijra)* of the Fulani Muslim teacher, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, from his home at Degel to Gudu near Sokwai, which lay just beyond the Gobir frontier inside the territory of Kwonni. For several years previously the Shehu had preached the revival of Islam and the observance of its laws and doctrines throughout the territories of Gobir, Zamfara, and Kebbi. By these missions he had won for himself an unrivaled position as leader of the devout Muslims in western Hausa, among whom the settled Fulani were the largest and most fervent section. Years earlier the Shehu's reputation for learning and piety had induced the chief of Gobir, Bawa Jan Gwarzo (1778-1794), to appoint him as tutor to the Gobir princes; and it was with one of these former pupils, Yunfa, who became chief in 1802, that the Shehu came to blows.

Given the nature of his mission, an open conflict could have been avoided only if the Shehu failed to win popular support or if the Gobir chiefs agreed to enforce Islam as the Shehu directed. Neither condition obtained. By his person and message, the Shehu attracted a large audience and following wherever he preached. In essence he demanded the strict observance of Islam by chiefs and people alike. He emphasized that as Muslims, all owed their first duty to God and His Prophet; and he made its implications clear. Only so far as they observed the rules of Islam were the orders and arrangements of temporal governments legal and binding; if the laws of God and those of chiefs diverged, it was the duty of all true Muslims to uphold the former. By such doctrines the Shehu sought to establish Islam as the measure of legitimacy and legality in secular and religious affairs alike.[1] The Shehu and his

followers were thus especially critical of self-declared Muslims in whose lax observance of Islam they saw a prominent cause of the impure and oppressive practices around them. By sounding his call for reform and for stricter observance of Muslim rules, the Shehu provoked criticism from "venal malams" and aroused the hostility of local officials but increased his following.[2] On the evidence available, political conditions in Gobir were probably not unlike those of eighteenth-century Daura set out above; but the Gobir regime may have been rather more oppressive to the peasants and nomads. It was then the essential attribute and condition of Hausa chieftainship in Kano, Daura, Katsina, and Gobir alike that subjects should neither question the will of their chief nor challenge his *iko;*[3] but the Shehu taught that such patrimonial rule deviated from Islam whenever it contravened Muslim law *(shari'a).* As regards belief and ritual, Shehu demanded the elimination of those polytheistic and magical elements that prevailed in Gobir as in eighteenth-century Daura. In his view, contemporary corruptions of faith, ritual, and legal observance were so intimately associated that no lasting reform was possible in either sphere alone. Accordingly, in preaching the purification of Islam, the Shehu addressed himself to the people rather than to the rulers or rival scholars.

The Sarkin Gobir Nafata (1800-1802) had tried to isolate the Shehu and to limit the effect of his teaching by three decrees. The first prohibited anyone besides the Shehu from preaching to the people. The second prohibited individual conversion to Islam and ruled that only those who had inherited this religion from their fathers should be regarded as Muslims. The third forbade men to wear turbans and women, veils.[4] These rules were still in force at Yunfa's accession. The conflicts they generated led swiftly to the Shehu's flight and the battles that followed. When the Shehu fled to Gudu, many of his disciples and adherents went with him, while others set out to join him there. Some of the latter were harrassed by the Gobir horsemen on their way. In June 1804 the Shehu's supporters retaliated by attacking the towns of Matankare and Birnin Kwonni; and shortly afterward they inflicted a sharp defeat on the Gobir army at Tabkin Kwotto. According to Mamman Bello, Shehu's son and successor as *Amir al-Muminin* (Sarkin Musulmi, or caliph), when Yunfa had returned to his capital, Alkalawa, after the battle of Tabkin Kwotto

> he sent messages to his brother chiefs, Sarkin Katsina, Sarkin Kano, Sarkin Zazzau, Sarkin Daura and Sarkin Adar. He informed them that he had left a small fire in his country and it had grown till it had surpassed his power and had overcome him. He had failed to extinguish this fire and now it had burnt him. He warned them to be careful lest a fire like this burnt them also. Thereupon each one of them rose up and attacked all those who had allied themselves with Shehu, they slew them and captured them.[5]

After the battle at Tabkin Kwotto, Shehu also wrote a circular letter to the chiefs of other Hausa states, explaining the causes of his disputes with the Sarkin Gobir and asking them to refrain from supporting the Gobirawa or

harrassing the local Muslims, his followers. Of the various Hausa chiefs who received these two letters, only the ruler of Zazzau is said to have accepted the Shehu's appeal, and he was later overruled by his council. Other Hausa chiefs heeded the call of the Sarkin Gobir and sought to root out the Muslim party in their midst. Bello remarks that "the chiefs of these countries had never combined before our jihad. Even in war they did not unite. But as soon as our jihad broke out, they became united as one hand."[6] The Sarkin Katsina and Sarkin Daura Abdu set out together to help the Hausa chief of Kano, Alwali. They "set out together with a vast army of which God alone knows the numbers. They marched till they approached the villages of our people at Kano. There some of their Fulani kindred joined our folk, followers of the Faith. The name of their leader was Dan Tunku; his following was a small one. The army of Katsina and Daura was defeated and returned home empty-handed."[7]

Fulani Conquest of Daura

The Shehu replied to these attacks on his followers by advising them to combine and by dispatching flagbearers to head them against the Hausa. Thus, on his return from Kano, the defeated chief of Katsina found himself beset by Fulani attacks at Ruma, Runka, and Awai. In several battles his forces met repeated defeat. The Fulani then besieged Katsina city; and when the chief marched out in defense, his army was routed and he was killed. Though the Katsina nobility redoubled their efforts and fought strenuously, they were driven from the city. Mamman Bello also relates that after his defeat at Kano,

> when Sarkin Daura returned to his town, the party who had allied themselves with Shehu attacked Sarkin Daura. Dan Tunku and Musa Sarkin Zazzau aided them. They fought a hotly contested battle until Sarkin Daura fled and took refuge in his outlying villages, and his town was captured. Afterwards, when he heard what Sarkin Ahir Mohamadu Bakari had done to the Sarkin Katsina, who had been elected by the Tuareg, he fled to Bornu and he is in Bornu to this day.[8]

The Shehu's flagbearer to the Muslims and Fulani of Daura was Malam Ishi'aku, the son of Malam Isa, a member of the Kuninkawa Fulani "clan." Malam Isa had moved before 1774 from Sukwanawa south to Daura, where the Yerima Dan Kwaido, a brother of the Sarkin Gwari Abdu, employed him to teach his children the Koran. At that time the Yerima lived at Kurneji, not far from Sandamu. The Fulani village chief of Sandamu gave Malam Isa his daughter in marriage, and Malam Ishi'aku was their only son. Some time later, when Ishi'aku was a young man, the Tuareg killed his father and wounded him. On recovering, Ishi'aku left Daura and went to Degel, the home of Shehu dan Fodio, to join his disciples. When the Hausa chiefs took up arms against his Fulani supporters, the Shehu gave Ishi'aku a flag and

commission to lead the jihad in Daura. Ishi'aku accordingly returned and, with the help of Musa and Dan Tunku, defeated the Daura army and forced its chief, the Sarkin Gwari Abdu, to abandon his capital and flee.

The Daura Chronicle and oral traditions say very little about the local jihad. We are told that Malam Ishi'aku and the Fulani forces camped at Salin Zari near Kurneji, east of the city, and cut off the town from its grain supplies. By this tactic Ishi'aku may have sought to force the Sarkin Daura to come out and fight; but the Hausa record does not mention a battle. It suggests instead that the Sarkin Gwari abandoned his capital when his food supplies ran out rather than face the Fulani forces at Kurneji. He is said to have left Daura in good order with most of his court through the northwestern gate called Kidi-da-Hauka, heading toward Mai Aduwa. On learning this, Malam Ishi'aku and his men moved into the city. An oral tradition relates that on his arrival at the palace, Ishi'aku found that one of the Sarkin Daura's younger brothers had already installed himself as chief, presumably to lead the resistance. Ishi'aku is said to have persuaded the young man by a ruse to move out and then installed himself.[9] If Daura fell to the Fulani in the dry season of 1805-1806, it was probably the first Hausa chiefdom to do so.[10]

Sultan Bello's account is our only guide to the course of the jihad at Daura. When the British established their rule in 1901 to 1903, they found Fulani rulers at Daura and Hausa rulers at Zango and Baure. Despite the repeated inquiries of H. R. Palmer, Miller-Stirling, and others, less was learned about the Daura jihad from local sources than from Arnett's paraphrase of Sultan Bello's *Infaku'l Maisur*. As it is unlikely that the Fulani and Hausa consciously withheld such information, the campaign may have been forgotten or transformed into legend. No chronicles of Fulani Daura have since been found; and the written summary of Hausa history during the nineteenth century only begins with the departure of Sarkin Gwari Abdu from Daura city. In its failure to preserve the history of the Fulani conquest, either in chronicles or oral traditions, Daura is not unique. Comparable gaps occur in the historical records of Katsina and Zaria. In these states neither the Fulani conquerors nor the defeated Hausa evidently desired to preserve a complete and accurate account of these events. Instead, local traditions move swiftly from the tale of the Shehu's flight to Gudu to his selection of the local flagbearers, and so to the establishment of Fulani rule. Perhaps the historical details of local struggles have been forgotten to emphasize the legitimacy and inevitability of Fulani rule as a requirement of Islam. Perhaps to justify the political results of these local campaigns, it has been necessary to stress their ideological significance to the exclusion of their historical details. The resulting inconsequential accounts of local conquests furnish examples of structural amnesia, one function of which was to legitimate Fulani rule on religious grounds, while another was to facilitate the mutual accommodations of conquerors and conquered to their new situation. For Sultan Bello, by contrast, it seemed essential to record the history of the

jihadic campaigns; but while his account ceases with the conquest and establishment of Fulani rule, the development of these regimes can be traced thereafter in increasing detail by careful study of local events and traditions.

Bornu and Daura

Concerning "Sarkin Gwari" Abdu of Daura, our information is sketchy. Early British administrators say the Fulani gave him this name as a mark of contempt.[11] According to Hausa traditions, his Hausa subjects had nicknamed him thus for marrying a Gwari woman. Abdu was the son of Sarkin Daura Tsoho and is said to have succeeded in 1798.[12] According to the local text, on leaving Daura by the Kidi-da-Hauka gate, he went to Kworgum via Mai Aduwa and Dagura and remained there for six months as the guest of its chief, his vassal. He then set out with all his entourage for Tsirkau, then the town of his vassal, the Tintima of Kance, where the defeated Hausa chief of Katsina, Magaji Halidu, is said to have thrown himself down a well in despair, and the Katsina officials had chosen Dankasawa to succeed. The Sarkin Daura's visit to Tsirkau was probably linked with these events.[13]

From Tsirkau Abdu returned to Kworgum and made another march into Katsina, following which he set out on a long journey to Bornu via Balbarkia near Tumfafi, Damagaram, then the capital of a minor chiefdom under Bornu suzerainty, and Miria, a Sosebaki vassal state of Bornu, whose chief, Ibel, was linked by marriage to the Sarkin Gwari. According to the Daura text, Sarkin Gwari spent twenty days at Damagaram and ten at Miria.[14] From Miria he set out for Bornu via Goribi, Zarmu, and Gijimu until he reached Nguru, the residence of the Galadima of Bornu, whose high rank and westerly position made him a suitable *kofa* between the Mai (King) of Bornu and its petty vassal states in this region. According to the Daura Chronicle, when the Sarkin Gwari arrived at Nguru, the Galadima Umaru greeted him with the news that famine had desolated Bornu and driven out the Mai. This garbled report of the Fulani capture of Gasrgamo, the Kanuri capital, enables us to date Abdu's visit to Nguru between March 1808, when Gasrgamo fell, and October 1809, when Bornu forces recaptured the town.[15] On learning this, Sarkin Gwari returned to Miria, where he remained for the next nine years.[16]

Neither the Daura text nor local traditions record that the chief of Bornu sent assistance to his vassals at Daura and Katsina in their struggle against the Fulani. The Daura text suggests that famine prevented Bornu from providing aid. According to local tradition, despite Gobir's repudiation of Bornu's suzerainty under Bawa Jan Gwarzo, Daura maintained its allegiance and continued to send the yearly tribute to Bornu. Thus when the Sarkin Gwari Abdu saw that he could not recapture Daura alone or with help from the defeated Katsina Hausa, he set out from Kworgum to Bornu to seek the aid that he could claim as a loyal vassal. Nonetheless, although

Daura records do not acknowledge assistance from Bornu, Sultan Bello claims that Bornu attempted to help them and thus involved itself in a war with the eastern Fulani that endangered its own survival.

As Bello says:

> At the time when our people in those countries were pressing against the Sarkin Daura and Sarkin Katsina and Sarkin Kano, all these chiefs sent to Sarkin Bornu and sought aid from him against our Moslems. Then Sarkin Bornu sent to his Waziri and bade him direct himself to their aid. And Waziri did what is known. The chiefs were aiding their brother chiefs against the enemy who was conquering them. Then [the] Waziri [of Bornu] directed his forces as he had been commanded. He sent a raiding force to the people of Daura and made preparations in order to come to the aid of Sarkin Daura and Sarkin Kano and Sarkin Katsina, even as the Sarkin Bornu had commanded him. When their neighbours, our folk, who were there heard news of his coming, they assembled together in one force. The Waziri of the Sarkin Bornu sent his army against them and God turned this army to flight. Then Waziri came forth himself and raided our people and drew up his force in battle against them. God turned him to flight. According to our information, the Waziri's people did not desist from this until some of our folk attacked him and drove him out of his city. Then affairs became serious. Our folk in Bornu who were in alliance with Shehu did not wait for Sarkin Bornu to attack them but started to go and join Buba Yero in Bauchi and assist him in the *jihad,* others of them went to Abdua and assisted him in the *jihad.*[17]

Thus in Bello's account the Fulani uprising in Bornu followed on the attempts of the Waziri (Kaigama) of Bornu to assist the beleaguered Hausa chiefs of Kano, Katsina, and Daura, all of whom were then Bornu vassals. Bello cites these incidents again to justify the Fulani attack on Bornu in his correspondence with Alhaji Aminu El Kanemi, who later took charge of the Bornu defense. In the face of vigorous Fulani onslaughts, "the people of Bornu sought to abandon what they had undertaken, viz., to assist their neighbours. They sought rather how they should help themselves."[18] After several battles, the Fulani under Gwanni Mukhtar occupied the Kanuri capital, Gasrgamo, and the Mai of Bornu fled eastward into Kanem. The Bornu forces retook Gasrgamo in October 1809 and lost it once more before the Fulani were finally expelled, leaving the town in ruins. Thus pressed and thrown on the defensive, the suzerain state could send no effective aid to its western vassals. The Hausa of Daura were forced to fend for themselves. Moreover, in the course of its struggle against the Fulani, the effete Magumi rule of Bornu was gradually usurped and replaced by that of their champion Alhaji Aminu El Kanemi, from whom the new dynasty of Shehus trace descent.

It is instructive to compare Daura traditions of the Fulani conquest and of Sarkin Gwari's appeal for Bornu aid with Sultan Bello's account of these events. Since Bello sought to record the history of the jihad from the beginning to its successful conclusion, he reports all the relevant military and political events in considerable detail; and though the affairs of Daura form a very small part of his story, his account of its conquest is much fuller than the local tradition of these events. Nonetheless, however uninformative, this

local tradition is not misleading. The events it reports can be substantiated from Bello's work and other sources, and these events were evidently selected for inclusion in the local tradition because of their significance to the people. Hausa would need no explanation for Sarkin Gwari's flight from Daura, since it is unthinkable to them that a chief should abandon his chiefship unless he is forced to do so. The Sarkin Gwari's unsuccessful appeal to Bornu for military assistance is explained without further detail by the "famine" then desolating Bornu because Bornu affairs are of marginal interest to the people of Daura. What matters to the Hausa of Daura is the response their chief received in his hour of need when he appealed for Bornu aid. This was as the tradition relates: the Hausa of Daura received no effective aid from Bornu, despite Bornu's attempt to provide it.

According to the Daura Chronicle, after nine years at Miria the Sarkin Gwari Abdu moved to Falke, thence to Babban Ruwa, and then to Kalgo, where he remained for four years, following which he went to Sallewa ta Kuykuyo, where he stayed for six years and six months.[19] At some stage during these movements he was attacked by the Dingas of Jere near Kuranzubau. However, shortly before the attack was launched, its plan was revealed by a Fulani herdsman to the Sarkin Gwari's brother Lukudi (Suleimanu), who then held the title of Murka. Lukudi took the appropriate precautions to repulse the attack, which is still celebrated in the song composed by Dan Tomo and drummed before the chief on the Sabbath eve at the palace: "Samarin Jatau—Da kayarka suka ci Jere—Da kayarka aka kore su—Samarin Jatau—Da kayarka aka ci Jere." From Sallewa, Sarkin Gwari Abdu moved to Yekuwa, about twenty-five miles east of Daura city, where he is said to have reestablished his rule over most of his former territory except the southwestern portion close to Daura, which the Fulani controlled. Sarkin Gwari died at Yekuwa and is buried there.[20]

A Chronological Problem

It is not possible to determine finally when the Sarkin Gwari died. W. F. Gowers and S. J. Hogben say that he was killed in 1809 "in an unsuccessful attempt to retake" Daura;[21] but there are several objections to this account. Oral traditions at Daura relate that the Sarkin Gwari tried to retake the city on three occasions and penetrated its walls to the Kusugu well on his final attempt. Defeated once more, he withdrew and resigned himself to the loss of Daura. No tradition relates that he died attacking Daura, but all confirm the chronicle that he died at Yekuwa.

A second difficulty with the date proposed by Gowers and Hogben for the Sarkin Gwari's death is the careful listing of the time he spent in various towns as recorded in the chronicle. After six months at Kworgum and twenty days at Miria, he visited Nguru, probably in 1808-1809, and returned to Miria, where he remained for nine years. Leaving Miria, he went to Falke

and thence to Kalgo, where he spent four years before moving to Sallewa ta Kuykuyo, where he lived for six years and six months before finally settling at Yekuwa. Thus, according to the chronicle, the Sarkin Gwari reigned for at least twenty years after losing his capital. On these data, he may have died between 1825 and 1829.

This interpretation is strengthened by a tradition that Sarkin Gwari was attacked at Mazanya by an army from Zinder shortly before he moved to Yekuwa. The army was led by the Sarkin Damagaram Ibram (1822-1841, 1843-1853), who is said to have sought to seize the regalia of the Hausa chiefship and thus to subjugate it. In 1821-1822 Ibram's father, Suleiman I of Zinder (1812-1822), having already conquered Damagaram and taken the new title of Sarkin Damagaram, was exploiting a dynastic conflict at Miria to extend his power. Ibram's attack on the Hausa at Mazanya, twenty miles northwest of Yekuwa, may thus have been linked with Zinder's interests in Miria, whose chief, Ibel, had given his daughter in marriage to the Sarkin Gwari when the latter spent nine years at Miria on his return from Nguru. Ibel died in 1817 and was succeeded by his son Mohammed Kosso, whose brother Mai Nasara fled to Daura territory not long after. Suleiman summoned Mai Nasara to Zinder, persuaded him to rebel, and sent him back to Miria with the necessary support to dethrone Kosso. After his expulsion, Kosso appealed to the Shehu Aminu El Kanemi, then the master of Bornu, and was briefly restored against Suleiman's will before Mai Nasara finally resumed control as a vassal of Zinder. If the Sarkin Gwari supported Kosso in these struggles, he may thus have brought Zinder's attack on himself.[22] By losing their homeland and having to take refuge in the capitals of their allies, the chiefs of Daura had involved themselves in the political affairs of their hosts; but their inability to establish a capital exposed their weakness and invited the attentions of Zinder, a predatory state which only began to expand in earnest when Ibram succeeded his father, Suleiman, in 1822. Since it is unlikely, although not impossible, that Ibram led the attack at Mazanya on the Sarkin Gwari during Suleiman's reign, it seems probable that the Sarkin Gwari did not die before 1822.

The local king list which sets out the lengths of the reigns of all chiefs who succeeded the Sarkin Gwari would seem to indicate that he died eighty-nine Muslim years, or eighty-seven Western ones, before the accession of Malam Musa at Zango in 1904. This would set 1817 as the earliest date for the Sarkin Gwari's death and oblige us to reject the chronicle of his wanderings as inaccurate. However, the chronicle records that Ibram of Zinder forced the Sarkin Gwari's successor, Lukudi, to allow his son Nuhu to be appointed as his cochief. Lukudi and Nuhu reigned together at Toka for five years and at Zango for another four before Lukudi died; thus Lukudi continued as chief for at least nine years after Nuhu's accession. The king list which accompanies the chronicle credits Lukudi with thirty years on the throne and Nuhu with fifteen, but it does not indicate how many of these fifteen years Nuhu reigned after his father's death. If, as seems likely, the chronicle dates the

start of Nuhu's reign from his accession rather than Lukudi's death, then at most Nuhu had the throne to himself for five or six years before he fled to escape Tanimu, Ibram's successor at Zinder.[23]

If we add the listed lengths of the reigns of Nuhu's six successors, including Tafida, who died in 1904, and subtract this total from the latter date, the king list indicates that Nuhu abandoned his throne in 1861, forty-three years before Musa's accession. Lukudi may thus have died at Zango in 1855-1856; and since he is credited with thirty Muslim years on the throne, on this reckoning the Sarkin Gwari's death at Yekuwa probably occurred in 1825-1826.

However, the chronicle relates that "Lukudi died after four years at Zango and Nuhu became king. Three years later Ibram, Sarkin Damagaram, came to Zango and spent nine months there."[24] Ibram visited Zango in 1853 in order to employ it as a base for his attack on the Fulani capital of Daura in an effort to stamp out the rebellion of his brother Tanimu, who had moved there on the advice of the Fulani sultan of Sokoto, Aliyu Babba (1842-1859). In the ensuing conflict Tanimu was victorious, and Ibram died defeated in December 1853, according to an entry in Barth's journals.[25] Two years earlier, in January 1851, Barth's companion James Richardson was told at Zinder that "Soho [Old Man] Lukudi" still ruled the six hundred villages of Hausa Daura that "belonged to" or "obeyed" the sheikh of Bornu.[26] Thus, unless Richardson was misinformed, Lukudi did not die at Zango three years before Ibram's visit, as the local chronicle seems to suggest. On the other hand, the chronicle states explicitly that "Lukudi died after four years at Zango."[27] If we interpret the chronicle to mean that Ibram's visit to Zango occurred the year before Lukudi's death, then Lukudi reigned from 1825 to 1854. On this reckoning, his son Nuhu was appointed by Ibram in 1846 and fled from Zango in 1861, dates which accord with the lengths of subsequent reigns recorded in the king list.

Whether this interpretation is valid depends primarily on the choice made by those who compiled the king list of the date at which Nuhu's reign began. It is possible that the list treats Nuhu's accession as the end of Lukudi's reign and implicitly distinguishes Lukudi's abdication from his death. In that case Lukudi's reign of thirty Muslim years spanned 1817-1846, and his death nine years later occurred at Zango in 1855. Thus the Sarkin Gwari could not have died before 1817. While this interpretation is not materially incongruent with subsequent dates, to reconcile it with the record of Sarkin Gwari's movements following the loss of Daura requires us to reduce the last twenty years to about ten. For this reason I conclude that the compilers of the king list treated Lukudi's death as the end of his reign and Nuhu's appointment as the start of his, leaving the years of their cochieftainship unspecified. If so, Lukudi spent a total of twenty-nine years at Yardaji, Toka, and Zango. Since the chronicle normally reports the time that Lukudi and the Sarkin Gwari stayed in any given place, its failure to report the periods that either spent at Yekuwa or that Lukudi spent at Kawari, Acilafiya, Dan Ali, and Zugai suggests that they did not remain in these places for long. It is thus

possible that the sum of the time Lukudi spent during his reign at places other than Yardaji, Toka, and Zango is less than one or two years. If so, the chronicle's account of Lukudi's reign corresponds exactly in length with that recorded in the king list.

A third reason for adopting the proposed chronology is its congruence with other chronological data. We know that Musa succeeded at Zango in 1904 from British records. If we sum the recorded reign-lengths of the chiefs who ruled at Zango between Musa and Nuhu, the total is forty-four Muslim years, or forty-two to forty-three Western ones. Thus the king list indicates 1861-1862 as the probable date of Nuhu's flight, 1846 as the likely date of his accession, and 1850-1851 as the probable date at which Lukudi and Nuhu moved to Zango. Information on subsequent relations of Zango, Zinder, and Fulani Daura are consistent with this chronology and contradict it at no point. Accordingly I shall adopt 1825 as the year of Lukudi's accession, since it fits the facts I have and also has the merit of providing a base line which is consistent with all subsequent accession dates. In any event, as we shall see, the uncertainties of absolute chronology are less significant for our narrative than those of relative chronology and sequence. For the structural analysis of Daura's political development it makes little difference whether Lukudi succeeded in 1817 or 1825; but it is important to know that despite Nuhu's accession, Lukudi continued to dominate the government for several years until Nuhu assumed effective control before Lukudi's death. Again, if Yardaji was destroyed twenty years after Lukudi's succession in 1825, then, allowing five years for his residence at Toka, he could not have moved to Zango before 1850. Once again the absolute dates of these relocations are less significant than the circumstances of severe distress in which the moves from Yekuwa to Yardaji and from Toka to Zango were made.

Struggle for Survival

We know little from available documents about the internal affairs of the defeated Hausa during the reign of the Sarkin Gwari Abdu. By listing all known holders of the principal Hausa titles at that time and by inquiring about their tenures of office, I have found it possible to identify several Hausa officials who withdrew from Daura with the Sarkin Gwari or who joined him at some time during the following years. This list is incomplete but includes, besides most of the royal titleholders, the Kaura and the Galadima together with their *lawanai* and kin; the Alkali and the Dan Sanwai; the Fada Babba and his subordinates; the Shentali; the Sarkin Pawa, the Sarkin Makera, and certain other craft heads; together with the dynastic musicians, whose drums were among the essential regalia. During his struggles against the Fulani, the Sarkin Gwari lost at least two Kauras, Jongo and Dan Jaji, and the Galadima Kakigudu. He also lost many of his lesser officials, especially those who served as war captains; but we cannot say whether his Sar-

kin Bai accompanied the Sarkin Gwari on the flight from Daura. Nonetheless, despite defeat and flight, the Sarkin Gwari preserved the essential units of state: the regalia, the dynasty and its offices, the senior *rukuni* titles, the lineages and *lawanai* of the Kaura and Galadima, the throne slaves, and some of the technical *sarautu*. Probably most of these officials accompanied his withdrawal, but he also filled several vacant positions from his loyal following. Thus, despite the loss of his capital and part of his chiefdom, the Sarkin Gwari preserved his chieftaincy and ensured the continuity of the Hausa state as a structure of certain essential organs, whose alignments were regulated by constitutional norms, criteria of status, and traditional procedures.

A tradition which is undoubtedly authentic, although confused in its details, relates that the Sarkin Pawa (Chief Butcher) of Daura and his family followed the Sarkin Gwari on his extensive travels. After years of ill fortune, the Sarkin Gwari one day asked the Sarkin Pawa why he continued to do so. After pointing out that the Sarkin Pawa was a *talaka* (commoner) by birth and not a *mai-sarauta* (ruler), Abdu advised the Sarkin Pawa to return to Daura, where the Fulani ruled, on the ground that the distresses and misfortunes of *masu-sarauta* were not his affair. In reply, like the Biblical Ruth, the Sarkin Pawa declared that he intended to remain with the Sarkin Gwari and his successors and share their fate. Then or soon after, the Sarkin Gwari decided to ennoble the Sarkin Pawa and his lineage. To do this he appointed the Sarkin Pawa's sons to the princely titles of Samba'a and Sarkin Shanu, thus transferring these formally to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage. He also arranged that one of his daughters, one of the Kaura's daughters, and one of the Galadima's daughters should marry the Sarkin Pawa's kinsmen, thereby assimilating the Sarkin Pawa's lineage to the political elite by kinship, marriage, and high-ranking hereditary titles.

The tradition that ascribes these changes to the Sarkin Gwari is indirectly supported by similar innovations which Lukudi and Nuhu initiated at different times. However, whether the Sarkin Gwari personally or his immediate successor took this first step toward the ennoblement of the Sarkin Pawa's lineage is not material. More significant is the breach with traditional practice. As we have seen, until the jihad the ruling stratum of Daura differentiated itself from the commoners and from lesser officials in numerous ways. Marital exclusions were especially important mechanisms of differentiation, since they served to perpetuate the segregation of descent groups distinguished as noble or commoner and endowed both categories with differing, though complementary, sets of political rights, obligations, and prospects. By initiating these marriages between the families of senior officials and that of the Sarkin Pawa, the defeated Hausa chief sought to attach his subjects to the regime symbolically by assimilating one of their lineages to the ruling stratum. Perhaps the Sarkin Pawa was selected for these honors because he was the most appropriate symbol of the new policy, given his occupation and role as head of the market. Thus, when successive defeats

had taught the Hausa rulers that social isolation entailed military and political weakness, they recognized the need for novel measures to conserve and renew the loyalty of those commoners who supported their cause. To compensate these people for the deprivations they suffered and to strengthen their allegiance, Lukudi and Nuhu also made novel intermarriages in situations of similar distress.

As with many other details of Daura's history in the last century, we cannot assign a date to this innovation. However, neither the event nor its novelty is seriously in doubt. The titles of Sarkin Shanu and Samba'a, which had been held by minor princes throughout the eighteenth century, thus passed to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage early in the nineteenth. Until then, tradition does not record any marriages between *rukunai* or royals and craft officials. Since the similar measures that were taken later by Lukudi and Nuhu are distinguished clearly by local traditions, the initial acts of ennoblement and identification of rulers and ruled were probably made by the Sarkin Gwari Abdu as the tradition relates.

Policy Alternatives

Before he died, the Sarkin Gwari Abdu warned Lukudi that their father's brother, Dan Shufini, might revolt and attempt to secede if the succession passed him by. It is said that Abdu had heard that Dan Shufini had paid a leading malam a considerable fee for rites and prayers to assure his accession. The dynastic genealogy shows that Dan Shufini and other members of the senior generation had been twice passed over, when the chiefship was given to Jirro and then to Abdu, the sons of Tsoho. Since only those princes whose fathers were chiefs were eligible to succeed, the electors of Daura were tacitly disqualifying the descendants of Tsoho's brothers by successively appointing his sons. This senior generation of princes was further embittered by Abdu's responsibility for the loss of Daura. Those who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Sarkin Gwari also felt better qualified than their juniors Abdu and Lukudi to administer the residue of the former state.

Various traditions indicate that the Sarkin Gwari was deeply concerned that his people should maintain their unity after his death. On several occasions he is said to have stressed that only by remaining united could the Hausa of Daura hope to overthrow the Fulani. But besides those dynastic rivalries that succession procedures promoted and stressed, their situation provided a number of policy issues which served to divide the Hausa. The lost city of Daura lay at the center of these. By his three unsuccessful attempts to recapture it, the Sarkin Gwari had established its recovery as the primary goal of his policy; but by moving north and east of the city, he had managed to retain control of these areas and restrict the spread of Fulani rule to the west. Thus, the Sarkin Gwari had pursued two complementary but implicitly competing objectives, the recapture of Daura and the maintenance of Hausa rule throughout the northern and eastern parts of the terri-

tory, that ultimately permitted the establishment of a successor regime. Neither of the Sarkin Gwari's policies had proved very successful, and his attempt to pursue them both simultaneously probably reflects his accommodation to the changing demands and opportunities of his situation and the divergent opinions of his court on these alternatives. In the end the Sarkin Gwari succeeded neither in recapturing Daura nor in establishing a viable successor state. His movements from one site to the next may have been made to retain or strengthen his tenuous grip on the northeastern half of his former kingdom. On leaving Daura, the Sarkin Gwari was a chief who had lost his chiefdom; and although he recovered a large part of his territory after returning from Miria in 1817 and preserved the rank and organization of chieftainship, he remained an anomaly until his death. The Sarkin Gwari's failure to recover his lost chiefdom or to create a new one in its place are both symbolized by his lack of a capital. Yekuwa, to which he moved shortly before he died, lacked a *birni,* or earth wall, the essential sign of a chief's headquarters and a chiefdom's capital. The Sarkin Gwari had thus preserved the state, but he had neither recovered nor established a chiefdom as its territorial base.

Their experiences under Sarkin Gwari's leadership served to divide the Hausa into at least two bodies of opinion. Some believed that the recapture of Daura city should remain their primary objective, while others felt that the establishment of a viable successor state with a fortified headquarters should have priority. The party that advocated recovery of Daura by subversion or force recognized that this was not likely so long as the Hausa court remained remote from the city. They accordingly urged a move closer to Daura city in order that their presence should be felt by their Fulani enemies and former Hausa subjects alike.

The opposing party favored the establishment of a new chiefdom and a permanent capital in the eastern sector of the territory, which the Fulani may once have ruled but had lost to the Sarkin Gwari by or after 1817. This policy entailed some movement away from Daura rather than toward it, unless it was decided to rebuild Yekuwa as the capital of the new state. These policy issues were inevitably drawn into the sphere of dynastic rivalry over the succession and accordingly served to imperil the unity of the group. It was evidently in response to these cleavages that Sarkin Gwari made his repeated appeals for unity and sought to pursue both policies at different times, without striking success.

LUKUDI (?1825-1855)

Accession and Revolt

Lukudi had held the title of Murka when the Dingas of Jere attacked the Hausa at Kuranzubau as they were en route from Kalgo to Sallewa ta Kuykuyo. By organizing and leading the successful Hausa defense on that occa-

sion, Lukudi had distinguished himself above other princes and ranked as the likeliest successor to Sarkin Gwari.

On Abdu's death, Lukudi was selected to succeed him at Yekuwa. Bearing in mind the Sarkin Gwari's warning, he immediately issued orders that the gates of Yekuwa, then a stockaded town, should be closed so that none within could leave. This order was intended to prevent rival princes from withdrawing to lead revolts to set up separate chiefdoms elsewhere; but the Sarkin Gwari's son and chosen heir, the Yerima Mai Nasara, had already fled from Yekuwa before Lukudi gave this command. Mai Nasara had evidently expected to succeed his father, perhaps because as crown prince he outranked his rivals. It does not seem that he received much support from the people of Yekuwa, few of whom accompanied his flight.

Having ordered the town to be closed, Lukudi set out to pursue Mai Nasara and sent messengers ahead to declare his peaceful intentions. Recognizing his weakness, Mai Nasara halted to meet Lukudi. It is said that Lukudi offered to resign the chieftaincy so that his accession should not provoke dispute among the Hausa of Daura and protested that he had not sought the office but had been chosen by the electors. He begged the Yerima Mai Nasara to return, assured his personal safety, and recalled the Sarkin Gwari's warnings that without unity Daura could not be recovered. Mai Nasara was persuaded to accept Lukudi's accession and agreed to return to Yekuwa. As a gesture of reconciliation he volunteered to take an oath of loyalty to Lukudi as chief, although this had never before been done by any Yerima or titled prince. Lukudi returned to Yekuwa encouraged by this success but anxious to forestall repudiation by other royals. Mai Nasara retained his office as Yerima and the town gates of Yekuwa remained closed, whether from fear of Fulani attack or to prevent other princely withdrawals remains unclear.

After a while the inhabitants of Yekuwa became short of food. As the shortage increased, Lukudi, who was responsible for closing the town gates, lost a good deal of popular support. By then his vigilance seemed also to have relaxed. His father's brother, Dan Shufini, who was already old, approached Lukudi and sought permission to leave Yekuwa to collect supplies of grain. Lukudi evidently expected no further trouble from Dan Shufini and assented. Dan Shufini set out with some of his immediate followers and went to Maiyaki, a small village about twelve miles south of Yekuwa, where he proclaimed himself chief. He seems to have won support rapidly in the nearby communities, from which Lukudi had isolated himself by closing Yekuwa. Lukudi assembled his forces and marched to Maiyaki; but before he captured the village, Dan Shufini had escaped to Dan Mairam, farther east. There Dan Shufini was joined by his son Tsoho and his younger brothers Kitari and Zangi, who were also Lukudi's uncles. These men may either have escaped from Yekuwa after Lukudi's departure to Maiyaki, or, if they had accompanied Lukudi thither, they may then have deserted to join Dan Shufini at Dan Mairam. With them went many members of Dan Shufini's

faction *(kunjiya)* and others who had been moved by dissatisfaction with Lukudi's rule to join the flight. Placing the Kaura Idi in charge of his forces, Lukudi marched from Maiyaki to Dan Mairam, which stood near the modern village of Bacebace. On this occasion he succeeded in capturing Dan Shufini as well as the village. However, he failed to take the ward known as Tsada Kuma, to which Tsoho, Kitari, and Zangi withdrew; and they escaped east toward Magaria, which they quickly fortified against the expected attack.

Having seized Dan Shufini, Lukudi was at a loss over what to do with him, since the rebel prince was his father's brother. There are two tales of Dan Shufini's end. One tradition relates that Lukudi, not wishing to shed his blood, had Dan Shufini buried alive at Dambadada on his way back to Yekuwa. According to the other, the Kaura Idi ended Lukudi's indecision by having Dan Shufini killed and throwing his body into a well. On being informed of this by Idi, Lukudi promptly fined him 1,000,000 cowries. Perhaps both traditions are partially correct, and Idi had Dan Shufini slain although Lukudi wished him to be buried alive.

Dan Shufini's death made an irreparable breach between Lukudi, his followers, and the descendants of Tsoho on the one hand, and those who supported Dan Shufini and Tsoho's brothers on the other. It thus split the Hausa of Daura into two hostile sections. Further, the manner in which Lukudi fined his general and leading supporter for eliminating his rival must also have served to alienate the loyalties of some of Kaura Idi's kinsmen, who were required to contribute their wealth to pay the fine by the prevailing norms of lineage office. This demand may have been especially galling because the Kaura's lineage could claim that Lukudi owed his victory to them and that their loyalty scarcely deserved such a crippling fine.[28]

Lukudi and his forces returned to Yekuwa. By countenancing Dan Shufini's death, Lukudi had irrevocably destroyed the unity of the Sarkin Gwari's following. Perhaps he hoped to shift responsibility for this to the Kaura Idi in the hope that he could still negotiate an agreement with Dan Shufini's supporters. But any such agreement with Dan Shufini's supporters following his death would require Lukudi to exculpate himself by punishing the Kaura Idi further. The Kaura's kinsmen were probably alert to these implications.

The Foundation of Magaria

Although its main outlines are clear, the details of Magaria's history under Kitari and his immediate successors are confused and obscure. A tradition from Baure relates that Tsoho and Kitari set out from Magaria to the court of the Shehu Aminu El Kanemi at Kukawa in Bornu to report the Sarkin Gwari's death and Dan Shufini's murder by Lukudi and to ask the Shehu to install one of them as Sarkin Daura. Kitari was Dan Shufini's younger

brother, while Tsoho was Dan Shufini's son. Thus, in their rivalry for the succession at Magaria, they reproduced the alignments that had prevailed between Dan Shufini on the one hand and the Sarkin Gwari and Lukudi on the other. Kitari's claim to succeed echoed that of Dan Shufini before him, being based on the principle of collateral succession and seniority by generation; but Tsoho could argue that his father had initiated the new chiefdom independently and thus that it should pass directly to his sons. It is said that the Shehu Aminu El Kanemi selected Kitari and appointed him as chief of Daura. According to this tradition, El Kanemi selected Kitari on the grounds that Tsoho's father, Dan Shufini, had never been formally appointed as chief, whereas Kitari's father, Kalifa, had ruled as chief of Daura. Dissatisfied with the Shehu's actions and reasons, Tsoho left Kitari at Kukawa and went to Kabogi near Guma.

The Shehu set out for his western vassal state of Gumel, taking Kitari with him. A border state on Bornu's western frontier with Kano, Gumel was then at the height of its vigor under its Manga chief, Dan Auwa (1811-1828). The Baure tradition relates that on his visit to Gumel the Shehu Aminu deposed Dan Auwa, appointed Muhammad Dan Tanoma to succeed, and instructed him to escort Kitari to Daura and depose Lukudi. Since Dan Auwa was deposed in 1828, Kitari's installation as chief of Daura could have taken place that year. However, according to traditions of Gumel, El Kanemi did not visit Gumel but summoned Dan Auwa to Balmare in Bornu to depose him.[29] Thus, if we allow a year for the fragmentation of Hausa unity under Lukudi, this tradition seems to support the view that Sarkin Gwari Abdu died in 1825 or 1826. However, the Hausa of Zango who supported Lukudi's successors strenuously reject this tale of Kitari's visit to Bornu as a political fabrication intended to clothe his rebellion with false legitimacy.

According to the Baure tradition, on learning of El Kanemi's instructions to Sarkin Gumel Dan Tanoma, Lukudi sent his messengers to Gumel to persuade the chief to dispose of Kitari or at least to bring or send Kitari to him for punishment as a rebel. The Sarkin Gumel replied that he would escort Kitari to the borders of Daura and leave him there, thus fulfilling the Shehu's instructions. Kitari was thus escorted to the eastern perimeter of the old Daura chiefdom by Dan Tanoma and made his own way to Magaria, where he established himself as chief with *tambari, turu,* and other essential regalia. His rival Tsoho may have already settled in Baure; but this remains obscure.

Lukudi promptly dispatched a force under his client, the Shentali Bacici, to attack Magaria and capture Kitari. Instead, the Shentali's bowmen and infantry deserted him at Kayau and made their allegiance to Kitari, being dissatisfied with Lukudi's rule and hoping that Kitari would replace him. Lukudi dispatched another company of troops to reinforce the Shentali, but these also deserted to Kitari's side. Not long after, when Kitari surprised the Shentali at his morning prayers, the Shentali himself transferred his allegiance and was installed by Kitari as Shentali of Magaria. Thus Lukudi lost three bodies of troops and many horsemen to Kitari. These incidents re-

leased a flow of emigrants from western Daura to join Kitari and their kin at Magaria. To indicate his disapproval of Bacici's desertion, Lukudi appointed his slave Kakurma to replace him, thus transferring the Shentali title to the order of slaves.

Lukudi had already moved to Yardaji, thirteen miles west of Yekuwa, and set about building a capital. By moving westward he drew closer to Daura but farther away from Magaria and the villages that lay between it and Yekuwa. Several of these easterly settlements seem to have transferred their allegiance to Kitari—whether voluntarily or under pressure, we do not know. However, Lukudi's loss of men to Kitari was more important than mere loss of land. As Magaria's population increased, the number of Lukudi's subjects declined, until at some point after Shentali Bacici's desertion, Lukudi decided to attack Kitari before the balance shifted further against him. How soon Lukudi's attack on Magaria followed the Shentali's desertion, we cannot say; but before he set out, Lukudi made overtures to Sarkin Damagaram Ibram of Zinder, soliciting his help. By these means, he hoped to augment his own forces; but having once received this invitation to intervene in the affairs of the Daura Hausa, the rulers of Zinder never withdrew.

With Ibram's support, Lukudi marched on Magaria. The town was besieged; but although its main defenses were only a stockade and ditch, the attackers could not take it. Ibram recognized this and withdrew to Zinder; but Lukudi continued the siege for thirteen days more until he received a message from Dan Sanwai, who had remained in charge of Yardaji, saying that the Fulani emir of Daura, having learned of Lukudi's absence in the east, was preparing an attack and would probably take Yardaji unless Lukudi returned at once. Lukudi returned to Yardaji by forced marches with the *tambari* drumming to announce his return. According to the tradition, the Fulani broke their camp and withdrew to Daura on hearing Lukudi's drums. The Hausa song that celebrates this event names Mamman Bello, the son of Malam Ishi'aku, as leader of the Fulani force, so that this incident may have occurred after 1837, when Mamman Bello succeeded at Daura.

Baure and the Struggle for Magaria

After this unsuccessful assault, Lukudi made no further attacks against Magaria but seems to have tacitly recognized Magaria's independence. This situation enabled Kitari to recruit such officials as his chiefdom required from lineages that had remained with Lukudi at Yardaji and held hereditary rights to these positions. Lukudi could not effectively forbid such persons to move to Magaria to seek their ancestral offices, since the two Hausa chiefdoms were then at peace and ranked as brother states. These relations persisted until Kitari's death, which probably occurred around 1840.

Shortly before his death Kitari had to face a revolt at Jengini, a village on the southeastern border of Magaria, whose people had decided to repudiate

their allegiance and constitute themselves as a separate state. The circumstances behind this revolt remain obscure, but there is no indication that it was headed by another prince seeking to imitate Kitari and Tsoho. Kitari found that he could not reduce Jengini with his own resources; but neither, given the historic enmity between them, could he appeal directly to Tsoho at Baure for aid. He therefore appealed to Lukudi for assistance; but Lukudi, remembering his earlier experience, hesitated to remove his entire army from Yardaji and risk the loss of his capital to a Fulani surprise attack. In this situation Lukudi seems to have taken the initiative to invite Tsoho's assistance. Tsoho agreed and together the three Hausa chiefs of Daura marched on Jengini, Lukudi in the van as their senior while Kitari and Tsoho followed behind. By then Tamila had succeeded Idi as Lukudi's Kaura and accompanied Tsoho at the rear. Together the three chiefs sacked Jengini, destroyed the village, and scattered its people. Following this they set out for home.

A tale that is current among those Daura Hausa who trace their chieftaincy back to Lukudi relates that on the homeward march Tsoho first persuaded the Kaura Tamila to slay Kitari and when this was done pretended surprise and innocence and levied a fine of 1,000,000 cowries on Tamila, thereby repeating Lukudi's conduct on the death of Dan Shufini. Another tradition asserts that Kitari died naturally of old age at Magaria; and I have not been able to establish which is true. It seems likely that the tale of Kitari's violent death is polemical and misleading. Lukudi's supporters and subjects later had cause to regret the activities of Tsoho and Kaura Tamila, and accordingly they harbor a tendency to heap villainy and mischief on their heads. Where such villification is not confirmed by independent sources such as Baure, it should therefore be treated with reserve. The combined attack on Jengini, which occurred very shortly before Kitari's death, probably facilitated the allegation that he was murdered; but the incident also reveals the impotence of the Daura Hausa following their fragmentation among the three princes. Only by pooling their separate military resources could these chiefs suppress a single village whose rebellion threatened them all with the specter of popular repudiation.

Although the traditions that report the events that followed immediately on Kitari's death are obscure and polemical in their details, they agree in their main events. Given the subsequent fate of Magaria, such divergences are perhaps inevitable. On some accounts Tsoho, Dan Shufini's son, had already established himself at Baure during Kitari's lifetime; but despite his independence, Lukudi and Kitari had refused to recognize Tsoho as chief until the attack on Jengini. According to one tradition, on Kitari's death Tsoho marched to Magaria and seized control with the help of its Kauran Magaria Dan Gata, who had Kitari's son, the Yerima Abdu, slain. As against Kitari's sons, Tsoho evidently felt that he had a prior claim to Magaria, since that chiefdom owed its foundation to his father's initiative. A second tradition, which reports Tsoho's seizure of Magaria without these details, adds that Mai Gizo, who later became Kaura of Magaria, appealed to

the Sarkin Damagaram Ibram on behalf of Kitari's sons and the people of Magaria for aid against Tsoho, whom he represented as a violent usurper. Ibram responded by sending a force to drive Tsoho from Magaria, but Tsoho learned of its advance in time to escape to Baure, where he had left his family, following which he set out to visit Ibram. Meanwhile Ibram had appointed Kitari's son, Masallaci, as the Sarkin Daura of Magaria, having been assured by Mai Gizo that Masallaci was the electors' choice. Thus, immediately after Kitari's death his chiefdom became a vassal state of Zinder, whose ruler, the Sarkin Damagaram, could thereafter appoint and dismiss the chiefs of Magaria. This was the unexpected but perhaps unavoidable result of continuing strife between the petty chiefs of units too weak to sustain or resolve their dynastic feud.

At Zinder, Tsoho told Ibram the particulars of his claim, of his father's revolt and death and Kitari's succession and his own displacement from the Magaria chiefship by Kitari's sons. Since Magaria had remained independent until Mai Gizo appealed to Ibram, Tsoho had not impugned Ibram's rights by seizing the chiefdom. However, recognizing the new situation, Tsoho made allegiance *(cafka)* to Ibram, withdrew his claim to Magaria, and sought Ibram's recognition of his chiefdom at Baure. Ibram assented, although whether he formally appointed Tsoho as Sarkin Daura of Baure remains uncertain. At the end of these negotiations Tsoho evidently felt that he could renew his attacks on Magaria without risking Zinder's disapproval. Lukudi, who was then at Yardaji, thus became the last chief of the Daura Hausa to remain independent. While Kitari's son Masallaci ruled Magaria as Sarkin Daura, Tsoho ruled Baure and Lukudi ruled Yardaji by the same title. Since all three chiefs bore the title of Sarkin Daura, they inevitably committed themselves to struggle for precedence.

We cannot date these events precisely, although their relative order is clear. If the Sarkin Gwari died in 1825, then his chiefdom split into three warring and precariously independent units within ten years. If he died in 1817, these progressive fissions developed more slowly. Kitari's reign links the two main events, the initial division of Daura Hausa into two rival chiefdoms and their subsequent division into three. Unfortunately our information does not allow us to estimate the length of Kitari's reign. With Ibram's recognition of Tsoho's chiefdom at Baure, the Hausa of Daura were finally split into three mutually hostile units of similar form, status, and claims, even though two were already linked to Zinder by ties of dependence which could be easily converted into formal vassalage and the third remained autonomous. Of these chiefs, only Lukudi at Yardaji had built a *birni* (earth wall) around his capital. On other grounds also he could claim rank as the senior chief. However, Tsoho now set about constructing his chiefdom at Baure on the model of Daura and recruited supporters from those of Lukudi's subjects whose lineages traditionally claimed particular offices of state. Thus Lukudi lost several families to Tsoho as he had to Kitari before; and he was further weakened by the development of Baure. Traditions sug-

gest that at this time Tsoho may have had the larger following, perhaps because he also had the more secure territory and virile reputation. Lukudi seems to have had little popular appeal for the Hausa *talakawa,* who probably noted his failure to attack Daura despite his long stay at Yardaji.

Tsoho attempted to expand his chiefdom at the expense of Masallaci and Lukudi alike. By skillful mixtures of threats and appeals, he won over several villages on the western borders of Baure which had formerly rendered allegiance and tax to Lukudi, whose weakness prevented him from checking this. To his north, Tsoho also attacked Masallaci after the latter had set the boundary between Magaria and Baure at Garke, five miles northeast of Baure. Tsoho succeeded in pushing the Magaria border farther and farther northward by attaching the southernmost villages of Magaria to his chiefdom. At some stage during this struggle, for tactical reasons Tsoho made overtures of peace to Masallaci, meanwhile sending gifts and allegations to Ibram at Zinder to secure his support. To signify goodwill he visited Masallaci at Magaria but resumed the struggle on returning to Baure. In response Masallaci requested Ibram, as their common overlord, to mediate the dispute with Tsoho and to delimit their boundaries. In thus attacking Masallaci, Tsoho was merely reasserting his claim to the chiefdom, which derived from his father's revolt. On his reckoning, Kitari and Masallaci were both usurpers, since as Dan Shufini's heir, he was the legitimate chief of Magaria.

On receiving Masallaci's appeal, Ibram summoned the two Hausa chiefs to Damagaram for discussions. According to the tradition, he made a serious effort to establish peace between them; but he also took the opportunity to extend his power over both. Holding the Galadima of Magaria (who was also called Masallaci) and the Kaura of Baure, Nasalla, as the men who were primarily responsible for the feud between Masallaci and Tsoho, Ibram demanded their dismissal. Whether he did so directly by his own orders or indirectly by persuading the two chiefs that this was necessary for the settlement of their dispute, we do not know. The tradition simply relates that Ibram dismissed the Galadima and the Kaura. If Ibram did order these dismissals directly, he then formally assumed the power and authority to regulate the internal affairs of Magaria and Baure, including the distribution of their senior offices; but even if he merely secured these dismissals by negotiation and persuasion as conditions of settlement, he had demonstrated his capacity to regulate allocations of senior offices against the wishes of their chiefs. Thus Masallaci's appeal for Ibram's arbitration marked a further stage in the subjugation of Magaria and Baure to Zinder.

The evidence obscurely suggests that Ibram may have agreed with Tsoho clandestinely at this meeting that the chiefdom of Magaria should lapse after Masallaci's death. Apparently by his conduct or by an explicit decision, Ibram also indicated to Tsoho that Baure was senior to Magaria, probably on the ground that Dan Shufini had initiated both chiefships and that while his younger brother, Kitari, had succeeded in one, the other, Baure, was held in the direct line of descent by Tsoho. To complete the settlement, Ibram

provisionally delimited the boundary between Magaria and Baure from Zinder and directed the chiefs to settle any further disputes without fighting.

It is characteristic of the fluid political situation that then prevailed that the dismissed Galadiman Magaria Masallaci and Kauran Baure Nasalla both removed with their families to Yardaji to join Lukudi. It is also characteristic that despite Ibram's boundary settlement, Tsoho continued to wage war on Masallaci and brought other villages of Magaria under his own jurisdiction. On this occasion Masallaci appealed to Lukudi to mediate his dispute with Tsoho, perhaps because he had already invoked Ibram's protection in vain. Lukudi undertook to do this, but with what effect we cannot say.[30]

The Fall of Yardaji

Throughout these years Lukudi had remained at Yardaji, too weak either to attack Fulani Daura or to prevent Tsoho from dominating the eastern villages which lay near his border with Baure. Despite Ibram's decision, the boundaries of the three Hausa chiefdoms remained unsettled and fluctuated with assertions of effective jurisdiction over particular settlements by the competing chiefs. It seems likely that in this situation several villages simultaneously provided tribute and appropriate services to two or more chiefdoms, each of which then claimed them as its own. Exploiting his advantages of position and his superior force, Tsoho was the most aggressive and successful chief in asserting his jurisdiction over the neighboring settlements. He may also have derived some security from his relations with Ibram and remoteness from Zinder.

By 1845 Lukudi had already survived three attacks by the Zinder forces on Yardaji. We have no detailed explanation of the reason for these attacks, but the political context in which they occurred, their repetition and their common target, are most revealing. Evidently Ibram had determined to subjugate Lukudi's segment of the Daura Hausa as he had already done with Magaria and Baure. By 1835 Ibram had subdued Miria and pushed the southern frontiers of Damagaram to the old boundaries of Daura. As Bornu's senior and strongest vassal in this region, Ibram could claim that by establishing Zinder's power throughout this area, he was merely acting to strengthen the northwestern perimeter of the Kanuri empire. He could also justify his domination of the Daura successor states as the only way to prevent them from falling to the Fulani. Ibram's political aspirations and motives were probably different from these justifications. His father, Suleiman, had set Zinder on a policy of expansion at Bornu's expense by conquering Damagaram and intervening at Miria in 1821. Whether by these measures Suleiman sought to repudiate the authority of El Kanemi, the Shehu Aminu who had usurped control of Bornu from its Magumi rulers, we cannot say; but on that occasion El Kanemi had summoned Ibram and ordered him to replace his father, Suleiman, on returning to Zinder and to restore the legitimate chief of Miria,

Mohammed Kosso.[31] Probably Suleiman resented El Kanemi's usurpation of the Bornu government from the Magumi Mais, to whom he had sworn allegiance. On loyalist grounds he may thus have opposed El Kanemi's authority and sought to subvert or subjugate those western vassals of Bornu who had accepted the new dispensation and tacitly abandoned their allegiance to the Mais.

Ibram, who had experienced El Kanemi's power, seems to have adopted Suleiman's orientations; and perhaps it was his acknowledgment of El Kanemi's supremacy that stimulated his imperialist designs on them after the latter's death in 1835, when the last Magumi sultan, Ibram, revolted unavailingly against Umar (1835-1881), El Kanemi's son and successor. Certainly Suleiman's sons Ibram and Tanimu struggled to free Zinder from the Shehus of Bornu and directed their imperialist aggression against Bornu's western vassals, Miria, the Daura successor states, Gumel, Muniyo, and finally against Nguru, the seat of the Galadima of Bornu, the Shehu's senior official. It is thus possible that, as Cohen suggests, "the excessive rebelliousness of Zinder (against Bornu) in the 1830s and 1840s was due to their ancient allegiance to the former dynasty that was still in existence, at least until 1846. Thus they were, in fact, refusing to be a tributary to the new royal house of Bornu."[32]

Lukudi for his part refused to accept Ibram's claims to Zinder's seniority, extraterritorial responsibilities, and supervisory power on behalf of Bornu. As the Sarkin Gwari Abdu's successor, he continued to acknowledge the Mai and/or Shehu of Bornu as his suzerain and looked to Bornu in vain for protection against Ibram. Further, despite its growing power, Zinder—or Damagaram, as its rulers styled it—was a parvenu among local states, being in 1836 less than a hundred years old. As the chief of Daura, which had traditionally ranked as the senior Hausa vassal state of Bornu, Lukudi rejected Ibram's claims to superior authority and sought to maintain his independence from Zinder by fighting whenever attacked; but in this situation Lukudi was permanently forced on the defensive and could attack neither Fulani Daura nor Baure. Ibram's fourth assault on Yardaji was successful. Yardaji probably fell in 1845 or 1846.

The fall of Yardaji proved no less disastrous for the Hausa of Daura than the fall of Daura forty years earlier. According to local tradition, Ibram achieved a total surprise and captured Yardaji before Lukudi had distributed his war gear to the people. According to Lukudi's descendants, when the people heard the drums and music of Baure advancing, Lukudi ordered the gates to be opened to welcome Tsoho. However, the force that entered Yardaji was not Tsoho's but Ibram's from Zinder. Unarmed, Lukudi and his immediate circle could only take to flight. While many officeholders escaped, the remainder were captured by Zinder. It was at this time, according to local traditions, that the palace eunuchs were seized, probably with most of Lukudi's harem, and disappeared as an official order.

At Zinder, the explorer Richardson received a different account from one of Ibram's slave soldiers in January 1851.

> Three years ago this Sarkee (Ibram) went to attack him of Daura (Lukudi) in his capital. On arriving before the town the army of Zinder set fire to all the *ghaseb* stubble and garden trees around it. This done, they commenced a regular battle with the besieged. The fight continued till night, when the Sarkee of Daura fled. The Zinder people carried off a large booty; the share of the Sultan (Ibram) alone was nine hundred.[33]

If Ibram's share was the legal fifth *(humushi),* Lukudi probably lost four to five thousand subjects as well as his capital, but it is more likely that Ibram took two-thirds for himself. Although Richardson's account appears to contradict the Hausa tradition of Yardaji's fall, the two are not necessarily inconsistent. It is quite probable that under cover of darkness Ibram tricked Lukudi and entered the town, as the tradition relates, by bugling and drumming the Baure war-songs and Tsoho's *kirari.* Lukudi may then have opened the gates to welcome the relieving force. Without some such misfortune it is difficult to account for Lukudi's flight by night after the day's successful defense, in which "the terrible arrows of the Daura people" had kept Ibram's army at bay.[34]

Yardaji fell within a few years of Kitari's death and Zinder's assumption of suzerainty over Magaria and Baure. During his stay at Yardaji, Lukudi's Kaura was Tamila, a senior member of the lineage descended from Audu Masaki, whom Kalifa had appointed more than sixty years before. Sometime before Kitari's death on returning from Jengini, Lukudi had appointed Tamila to succeed his father, Idi, who had been fined for the murder of Dan Shufini. Tamila's enemies secretly accused him of having murdered Kitari at Tsoho's request and continued to intrigue against him until Lukudi began to suspect his loyalty and came to believe that Tamila had designs on the chiefship. Since Tamila was ineligible by descent to hold the chiefship, Lukudi feared that he might conspire with Tsoho or with Ibram at Zinder to have another appointed as chief. However, as Kaura, Tamila had commanded Yardaji's successful defense against the preceding Zinder attacks; and even before the political situation thus stressed his role as war leader, the Kaura's office was second only to the chief's in power and prestige. Evidently, despite his suspicions, Lukudi could not dismiss Tamila. Since Tsoho had appropriated several of his fiefs southeast of Yekuwa and harassed others, Tamila pressed Lukudi to allow him to recover these villages and stop the harassments by force. Lukudi ruled against this, partly to avoid further warfare with his kinsmen, but also because of the threats to Yardaji from Zinder and Fulani Daura. Tamila probably interpreted Lukudi's refusal to let him recover his fiefs as evidence of his hostility and distrust.

There is a tale that Tamila, suspecting his wives of adultery, waited one night for their lover, whom he seized and identified as a prominent throne slave. To save his life, the slave told Tamila that he had come to warn him that Lukudi was plotting his death. In the nature of the case this tale cannot be verified, and it seems a palpable invention designed to "explain" the breach between Tamila and Lukudi without assigning responsibility to either. It may thus have been put into circulation by Tamila's kin and successors

sometime later. But whatever his reasons, before Tanimu marched against Yardaji, Tamila had entered into a secret agreement with Ibram, some of the terms of which were made public by his actions before and after the town was seized.

Shortly before Yardaji fell, Tamila assembled his kin and supporters and announced his intention to withdraw from the town, alleging that Lukudi planned to take his life. Lukudi heard this and sent the Dan Sanwai to assure Tamila on oath that he had no such designs and to ask Tamila to remain in Yardaji as his Kaura. Tamila withdrew nonetheless with many supporters and a large body of horse, taking with him Muhamman Kyenkyere, one of the Sarkin Gwari's many sons. Shortly before the fall of Yardaji, and probably while Tanimu's army was on the march, Tamila brought Muhamman Kyenkyere to Ibran at Zinder for appointment as Sarkin Daura. With Ibram's approval, Tamila selected the village of Kulukulu, whose site remains obscure, as Kyenkyere's headquarters. He himself settled there and proceeded to rule the vicinity through Kyenkyere.

Deserted by Tamila, who may also have suggested the ruse of bugling and drumming the Baure praise-songs so that Yardaji might be taken by surprise with less slaughter, Lukudi was probably incapable of withstanding another attack. Ibram and Tamila evidently expected that Lukudi would be captured and removed from the scene by exile or death, following which Muhamman Kyenkyere would replace him as chief of the western Daurawa and the vassal of Zinder. Lukudi escaped, however, and for a while there were four Hausa chiefs of Daura—Lukudi at Toka, Masallaci at Magaria, Tsoho at Baure, and Muhamman Kyenkyere at Kulukulu. Of these only Lukudi, despite defeat, remained defiant and beyond Zinder's control.

On hearing of Tamila's treachery and Kyenkyere's installation by Ibram, Tsoho bided his time and assembled his forces before marching to Kulukulu, which he took by assault. Tamila and Kyenkyere both fell into his hands and were promptly executed. As a gesture of solidarity, Tsoho sent Tamila's head to Lukudi, who was then at Toka with his followers. When the head was brought to him, Lukudi turned to those around and asked whose head it was. They recognized Tamila and said so. Lukudi commented, "The head of a traitor. Go, bury it." According to another tradition, he demanded 1,000,000 cowries from Tamila's lineage to permit the burial of his head. Lukudi then appointed Sabo, Tamila's cousin, to succeed. By this act Lukudi tried to show the Kaura's lineage and people that he harbored no hostility toward them, despite Tamila's treachery; but the appointment also suggests that only a minority of the Kaura's lineage remained with Lukudi after Tamila's withdrawal. Despite his ultimate failure and death, Tamila had shown how the Kaura could employ the superior power of Zinder to destroy the reigning chief and select his successor. Although this attempt misfired, its significance was not lost on Tamila's successors. By appointing Sabo to succeed Tamila as Kaura, Lukudi may have intended to show his magnanimity and loyalty to his followers, as the tradition asserts, but he also

revealed his political weakness. Since he dared not alienate even that lesser segment of the Kaura lineage which had remained loyal to him by abolishing their rights to the *sarauta,* Lukudi sought to attach them more firmly to him and appointed Sabo.

Following Lukudi's flight, the territory he had ruled from Yardaji lacked a capital and a chief. At Kulukulu Tamila had tried to fill the vacuum with Kyenkyere. The village chiefs he had supervised as Lukudi's Kaura were summoned to Kulukulu to swear allegiance to Muhamman Kyenkyere. The Fulani chiefs of Gurdo and Tsatsumburum and many others had obeyed; but the Kusheka of Dargage had refused. Even before the fall of Yardaji, Tamila had tried to persuade Kusheka to abandon Lukudi and make his allegiance to Kyenkyere. The Kusheka had rejected Tamila's appeals and apparently had let Lukudi know what was afoot. After the fall of Yardaji, Tamila had joined forces with Tanimu to attack Dargage, as the Kusheka remained defiant. However, being formidable bowmen, the Kusheka's people had repulsed the attack and maintained their allegiance to Lukudi.

Tsoho's attack on Kulukulu seems to have taken place within twelve months of the fall of Yardaji and within eighteen months of Kyenkyere's appointment, that is, in 1846 or early 1847. By then Masallaci had lost to Baure most of the eastern and southern villages which had once formed part of Kitari's Magaria. Ibram accordingly had to punish Tsoho for his rebellion and murder of Kyenkyere, whom he had appointed as chief in place of Lukudi, or to invite further conflict. Moving to Mazanya, he summoned Tsoho, who wisely refused to attend but instead sent his son Habu. Ibram appointed Habu as Sarkin Baure at Mazanya in place of Tsoho, who was thus deposed. Baure's vassalage to Zinder was now explicit and its conditions were clarified. Apparently Ibram had not expected that his vassal Tsoho would take up arms against Kyenkyere, whom he had appointed. He was probably no less surprised by Tsoho's ruthlessness at Kulukulu than Lukudi was by Tanimu's entry at Yardaji. For his part, Tsoho must have foreseen Ibram's displeasure at the elimination of Kyenkyere and Tamila. Thus, by that act he had risked his chieftainship at Baure for the political good of the Daura Hausa as he perceived it, since Lukudi was then far too weak and distressed to take any initiative against Kyenkyere and Tamila. Tsoho was probably deposed and replaced by Habu in 1847.

Tsoho emerges as a sinister figure in the traditions of the western Daura Hausa identified with Lukudi and Zango. They assert that Tsoho persuaded Ibram to attack Yardaji in the hope that he would then succeed Lukudi and reunite the Hausa of Daura. By then Tsoho apparently anticipated the early end of Magaria. These traditions interpret Tsoho's ruthless treatment of Kyenkyere and Tamila as the punishment he meted out because they had tricked him. But being designed to discredit the Baure chiefdom by asserting the treachery of its founder, the import of these traditions is polemical and not historical. They express relations of structural antagonism and seek to justify one side by misrepresenting the character and actions of its opponents

and rivals. Notably, since Magaria soon lapsed and ceased to compete with Zango, the traditions of Zango make no similar allegations about Magaria; but Tsoho, a more effective leader and serious rival, is denied any credit. The historical context in which the rivalry of the chiefdoms derived from Lukudi and Tsoho unfolded is sketched below, and it was in that context that each chiefdom developed its historical traditions as polemics against the other.

Lukudi and Zinder

With the fall of Yardaji, Lukudi set out on his travels, hotly pursued by the Zinder forces. He fled first to Toka and, when this was attacked, to Kawari near Kagare, about eight miles south of Yardaji; then to escape his pursuers, he moved to Sandamu, five miles south of Daura city in Fulani territory, and thence to Acilafiya in northeastern Kazaure, whose ruler, Dambo, had married one of Lukudi's daughters. Dambo, a Fulani emir whose father, Dan Tunku, had created the new chiefdom of Kazaure by seizing adjacent districts of Daura and Kano during the jihad, extended a seemingly generous welcome to Lukudi, as became a son-in-law, and invited him to select a site in Kazaure where he would dwell and govern his people. Lukudi or his advisers correctly perceived the political significance of this invitation. By accepting Dambo's offer, Lukudi would abandon his status as the legitimate chief of Hausa Daura and become a village head under the Fulani emir of Kazaure. Lukudi accordingly left Acilafiya and returned to Toka, twelve miles southeast of Daura city, where he at once set to and built an earth wall *(birni)* around the town. Shortly after returning to Toka, Lukudi received Tamila's head from Tsoho of Baure. Thus we may date his return to Toka within a year of the fall of Yardaji, in late 1846 or early 1847.

Ibram sent the Zinder forces against Toka three times and sacked it twice, on the first occasion almost immediately after the capture and destruction of Yardaji. On the second occasion Toka withstood the attack, thanks to its new earth wall and ditch; but before he withdrew, Ibram made a gesture of friendship *(amana)* to Lukudi and followed this up with diplomatic negotiations. We do not know the details of these negotiations, although we can guess their nature and purpose. Ibram first made his peace (*sulhu*—an agreement) with Lukudi by acknowledging their common allegiance to the Shehu of Bornu. Whether their preceding struggle was directly linked with the futile revolt of the last Magumi sultan in Bornu, whose defeat and death in 1846 left the Shehu Umar the undisputed master of Bornu, remains uncertain.[35] But the chronological coincidences are highly suggestive; and so too is Ibram's acceptance of Shehu Umar as his suzerain as the condition of peace with Lukudi. Following this, Ibram sent messages to Lukudi saying, "If you approve our alliance that we have made, select your son or younger brother for me to appoint as chief, for you are too old."[36] At first Lukudi asked for

time to consult his councillors; but in reply to further messages from Ibram, he nominated his son Nuhu, saying that his council approved. Ibram gladly accepted Lukudi's nomination and installed Nuhu as chief at Rogogo Cidare while Lukudi was still at Toka. This event probably occurred in late 1846, perhaps before the deposition of Tsoho. Nuhu abandoned Rogogo shortly and returned to Toka, where he remained for the next five years as the chief recognized by Ibram, although locally subject to Lukudi's influence. After Kyenkyere was killed, with Ibram's agreement Nuhu reestablished his claims to most of the villages west of Baure that Lukudi had formerly administered from Yardaji.

By abdicating at Ibram's request and by sending his son Nuhu for Ibram to install, Lukudi formally accepted defeat and Zinder's suzerainty. Since Ibram had acknowledged the Shehu's overlordship in their preceding negotiations, Lukudi may have felt that he could still appeal from Zinder to Bornu if the occasion arose; thus he could reciprocate Ibram's recognition of the Shehu as suzerain by accepting Ibram as his own. What such vassalage might entail had already been illustrated by the example of Tsoho's deposition at Baure. Lukudi could scarcely have failed to remark this. If he nonetheless accepted Ibram's demand that he should resign the chiefship and select someone else for Ibram to install, he probably did so for lack of any real alternative. Apparently Ibram still held the villages made chiefless by Kyenkyere's death. Lukudi had lost heavily in men and resources at Yardaji. At Toka he was exposed equally to attacks by the Fulani of Daura and the Kanuri of Zinder. His councillors may have overruled his desire for independence, partly because they did not wish to resume their travels again and partly because they perceived that given the inequality of resources and situation, the alliance with Zinder they needed in order to retain their territories in peace could be obtained only by accepting vassalage. On this view, with Zinder's support, Toka would at least be assured of protection against the Fulani; without it, the future may have looked dark.

Following his losses at Yardaji, Lukudi had lost other supporters on his flights from Kawari to Sandamu and Acilafiya before returning to Toka. The Sarkin Makera Dan Baba, for example, elected to stay at Acilafiya when Lukudi moved on to Toka. By so doing, Dan Baba forfeited the title for himself and his descendants, but in response to appeals he pointed out that he could not provide for his family under conditions of ceaseless movement. Lukudi wisely made no attempt to replace the Sarkin Makera, and for the next few reigns this office remained unfilled, despite its importance. How many other officials and their families Lukudi lost on his flight we do not know; but at Toka he was evidently in need of several officials, some of whom he recruited from immigrants and others from his Daura Hausa. Some years earlier Lukudi had been given a man called Danko, whom the Sarkin Karma and his troops had seized on a raid licensed by Lukudi. Danko was a Hausa from Gezawa in Maradi. By his capture and presentation as booty to the chief, Danko found himself enslaved; but Lukudi took a liking

to him and kept him near him for several years. When the office of Sarkin Yara fell vacant on the death of its holder, a free client, Lukudi decided to appoint Danko, a slave, as Sarkin Yara. This was the first time a slave had been given this office. Having taken the formal oath of loyalty on appointment, Danko asked permission to revisit his kin. Lukudi assented. Whether Danko was called on to provide a substantial *kudin sarauta* for this unusual appointment, we cannot say; but since *kudin sarauta* was never demanded from slaves until Tafida's reign some decades later, and since there is no explicit reference to its payment in this case, it is probable that Danko was not required to provide it. On returning to Toka, Danko brought his three daughters and two "brothers." He presented two of his daughters to Lukudi's two eldest sons, Nuhu and Haruna, as wives. The third, with Lukudi's permission, he gave to the Sarkin Zinder. Lukudi in return appointed Danko's younger brother, Tanko, to the vacant slave title of Turaki and ruled that hereafter the two offices of Sarkin Yara and Turaki should vest in the descendants of these two men. Until then neither the Turaki title nor that of Sarkin Yara had been hereditary. Danko's third brother was also given the title of Dan Maza, thereby vesting these three slave offices, whose differing functions distinguished them, in a single lineage. Not long after, when Lukudi became Ibram's vassal, the Sarkin Yara Danko, who was Ibram's affine, was the obvious person to serve as Lukudi's messenger to Zinder. In response, Ibram appointed his own Sarkin Dawaki of Zinder as *kofa* or *jekada* to Lukudi's chiefdom, and thereafter the Sarkin Yara and Sarkin Dawaki handled all official communications between the two states.

We have already mentioned the tradition that some Jelko immigrants joined Lukudi at Yardaji. One section of this group adopted the Dan Sanwai as their patron, and after a while he conferred the title of Magajin Dan Sanwai on Kacakuri, their leader, who rapidly assumed control of the local trade in salt and natron. The other section who joined Lukudi entered into his service in an ambiguous capacity by undertaking duties normally reserved for slaves, although they remained free. For some years these immigrant Jelko looked after Lukudi's cattle. When he lost the slaves who held the titles of Sarkin Bai and Bai Karama at Yardaji, Lukudi transferred these titles to his Jelko followers, ruling that hereafter they would be filled from that lineage. My informants say that Lukudi was driven to bestow high offices on these immigrants who were personally attached to him because he had lost so many men and officials, first to Kitari and Tsoho and then at Yardaji, but also because he had lost confidence in many followers whose loyalties had worn thin under his rule, some of whom probably shared Tamila's disillusion.

To renew the morale of his defeated following and to bind them more closely to the chiefship, Lukudi announced at Toka that thenceforth the chiefs of Daura would marry into the families of the Kusheka, who had shown his loyalty in response to Tamila's subversion; the Sarkin Pawa, already ennobled by Abdu; the Sarkin Makada; and the Magajin Kacakuri.

He also ruled that henceforward the Daura chiefs would give their daughters to men of these descent groups. Finally he announced that thereafter his sons and daughters would marry commoners and slaves. However, the Maidaki title was still reserved for that wife of the chief drawn from the royal lineage. To implement his decrees, Lukudi gave his daughters in marriage to the Sarkin Yara and other officials. The intent and effects of such royal marriage policy are clear. By these means Lukudi sought to bind his followers to the chiefship through ties of kinship and affinity as well as through political allegiance. Since the exchange of women thus initiated was reciprocal, these marriage alliances indicated a great reduction in the social distance that had previously separated the dynasty and senior officials from the people. Lukudi thus decided to reward his loyal followers with changes of status, the gifts they valued most, which were also perhaps the only valuable rewards he possessed in his impoverished state.

In 1850-1851, when Lukudi and Nuhu had been five years at Toka, the Zinder forces attacked again. Once more they caught Lukudi's people by surprise. Nuhu assembled a force to hold the attack while Lukudi and other noncombatants fled westward to Dan Ali, then a small village. Shortly after noon that day, Nuhu and his rearguard joined Lukudi there, followed by the Zinder troops. Once again Nuhu held back the attack until Lukudi and his people had fled farther west, to Zugai in Katsina emirate, where they halted briefly until Ibram withdrew, after which they returned to Toka once more for lack of any other refuge.[37] However, Toka was no longer defensible, and fearing another assault, Lukudi decided to move elsewhere.

By then Dan Dawambai had succeeded as Kaura, Sabo having died at Acilafiya. As his name suggests, Dan Dawambai had been brought up in the village of Dawambai, three or four miles north of Yardaji. It was a town whose people had a proud tradition as bowmen and hunters. Lukudi sent his Kaura to Dawambai in secret to consult the people and win their allegiance. If the men of Dawambai were willing to welcome their Hausa chief, Lukudi advised the Kaura to direct them to persuade their kin and neighbors under Fulani rule in the villages west of Dawambai to move eastward to Dawambai and settle around it, outside the Fulani state. Dan Dawambai's mission was highly successful; and when Lukudi learned that the people were moving east, he gathered his followers together and moved first to Gurdo between Dawambai and Daura and thence shortly after to Tsohon Keffi, or Zango, as it is better known.[38]

Perhaps as a gesture of sympathy and compensation to his Hausa vassals for the losses Tanimu had inflicted on them at Toka, Ibram sent a message to Lukudi and Nuhu and invited them to select a site for their capital; and in response the Hausa around Lukudi and Nuhu at Gurdo selected Tsohon Keffi, or Zango, between Daura and Dawambai. As a Fulani village and a fief of the Kaura, Gurdo was clearly unsuitable as a permanent residence for the chief. Early in 1851 Lukudi and Nuhu moved to Zango, where tradition says that Lukudi prayed that his people would never have to move again

before they returned to Daura. As its name implies, Zango (Camp) was at that time a small village surrounded by a simple wooden stockade *(keffi)*. The new capital was built on the old site *(tsohon keffi)* but was very much larger.

In attempting to determine when the Sarkin Gwari died, I have argued that Lukudi and Nuhu moved from Toka to Zango in 1850-1851. Although this seems the likeliest date, the chronology is inferential and tentative. In rejecting 1842-1843 as an alternative date for Tanimu's final attack on Toka and Lukudi's flight, I have also rejected 1842-1843 as the probable date of Lukudi's transfer to Zango.[39] The years 1850-1851 accord best with the data known to me. However, the preceding account of Dawambai's subversion and Lukudi's transfer to Zango, which is based on the local chronicle dictated to me by the Limam Ishaka at Daura in 1958, differs in several points from that published by H. R. Palmer. Palmer writes that after Ibram's successful assault on Toka,

> Kaura, son of (i.e., Dan) Dawambai suggested to Lukudi that they should persuade the Daura *talakawa* (commoners) to revolt from the Fillani and return to their old allegiance. And Lukudi agreed and when the people of Zango had driven out the Fillani, Lukudi went to Gurdo and had a house built for him in Zango in the *Ungwa* (ward) called Tsohon Kafi. Then Lukudi and his son Nuhu entered Zango and they spent their days in fighting the Fillani.[40]

I cannot account for the differences between these translations of the same passage in what seems a common text; but once more the details in dispute do not materially affect our account or interpretation of the event.

Lukudi and his followers were now dependent on Zinder for protection, preservation, and for their new capital. Events had forced them to accept subordination as the condition of survival; but although they had lost political independence, they still possessed internal autonomy. Their chiefs and council still regulated the community's affairs, including distribution of office, the administration of justice, the forms and rates of taxation, and so on. Moreover there is no evidence to suggest that as yet they paid tribute to Zinder. Given their experiences of the two preceding years, Lukudi's community could scarcely have offered much tribute, but it is also true that they had suffered their heaviest losses at the hands of their Zinder protectors. The tokens by which Lukudi and Nuhu acknowledged Ibram's superior authority as chief of Zinder were far more valuable than the tribute to him.

NUHU (1846-1861)

Assumption of Power

Shortly after settling at Zango, Nuhu, who had already passed five or six years as chief under his father's tutelage, determined to assert his authority. Subsequent events showed the folly of Nuhu's act. Apparently, while at Yar-

daji, Nuhu, ambitious to succeed, had sought the support of Mazawaje (Dan Gyerta), one of the Kaura Tamila's senior *lawanai.* Nuhu and Mazawaje had then made a private agreement that whoever first received his family office would secure the other's appointment to his own. Nuhu evidently expected that if Mazawaje became Kaura he would secure his accession. Meanwhile, he urged Lukudi to appoint Mazawaje. However, Lukudi twice passed over Mazawaje when he appointed Sabo and Dan Dawambai, both of whom served loyally. What part, if any, Mazawaje played in securing Nuhu's nomination when Ibram demanded Lukudi's abdication, we cannot say. However, at Zango Nuhu informed Lukudi of his agreement with Mazawaje and his wish to appoint him. Presumably Mazawaje had pressed Nuhu to fulfill their agreement. Lukudi replied that most of the Kaura lineage were inclined to intrigue and treachery but that Dan Dawambai was loyal. However, being installed and recognized as chief by Ibram, Nuhu decided to ignore his father's protest and fulfill his obligation. He therefore dismissed Dan Dawambai and appointed Mazawaje. Presumably Lukudi was by then too discredited by failure and enfeebled by age to prevent this. Dan Dawambai at once withdrew from Zango and moved northwest to Maradi.[41]

Thus far our narrative has been primarily concerned with the successive schisms which followed the death of Sarkin Gwari and led to the foundation of states at Magaria and Baure and with the external relations of Lukudi's segment and Zinder. Henceforward these relations with Zinder increased in importance and intensity until they penetrated and transformed the inner fabric of the Zango state. Once they had settled at Zango, the Hausa were progressively weakened by conflicts between their Kauras and chiefs, and Zinder's dominance increased until it threatened the integrity of the chiefdom.

We have seen that at Daura the electoral council had constitutional authority to set aside the Yerima and other senior titled princes at the succession and to select some other prince of superior promise from those eligible by descent. The council that selected the chief was traditionally dominated by the Kaura and the Galadima, even though the three malams who sat on it held the formal majority. However, following the loss of Daura city and its immediate environs, the Galadima's office declined in importance vis-à-vis that of the Kaura, since the Fulani now held most of the Galadima's fiefs. Their more or less continual state of siege had also compelled the Hausa chiefs to transfer increased military resources and political responsibilities to the Kaura in the continuing crisis. Meanwhile, there being no firm basis for a stable civil administration throughout this period, the Galadima's office, as the senior civil position, lost many of its functions. Finally, by contracting with Mazawaje to secure his selection as chief, Nuhu implicitly authorized his partner before or after he became Kaura to take whatever measures seemed necessary to secure his succession. Thus Nuhu's bargain implicitly assigned the role of chief-maker to Mazawaje, a role he could only perform at the expense of the electoral council.

In dismissing Dan Dawambai, Nuhu committed another illegitimate and

unconstitutional act. It is not known whether any preceding chief of Daura had ever dismissed his Kaura from office, but it is unlikely that this would have taken place without some serious offense to justify the dismissal. Dan Dawambai, however, had committed no offense; instead he had demonstrated his loyalty and ability when both were urgently needed.

According to Daura constitutional doctrine, the chief could not dismiss any senior official without prior approval by the senior council of state. Like the electoral council, this senior council was dominated on secular issues by the Galadima and the Kaura, and on matters of law or religion by the malams. To dismiss Dan Dawambai constitutionally, Nuhu accordingly required the consent of a council of which Dan Dawambai was the senior member. It is thus highly unlikely that Nuhu followed this procedure and took the matter to the council, which his father, Lukudi, still dominated. Had he done so, with Lukudi's support Dan Dawambai might easily have overridden Nuhu and, if necessary, secured his deposition. Thus, it seems likely that in dismissing Dan Dawambai, Nuhu committed an act which was unconstitutional in form and substance, as well as politically unwise. To appoint Mazawaje he discredited himself with Lukudi, with Dan Dawambai, and with the senior council of state. In promoting Mazawaje under these circumstances, Nuhu implicitly guaranteed his Kaura against dismissal, since he would dishonor the obligation on which it was based if he revoked the appointment. But in return for this inexplicit guarantee, Nuhu received no assurance that his new Kaura would not subvert or depose him. Apparently he had considered this possibility neither when bargaining with Mazawaje nor when appointing him; yet this was what befell. By dismissing Dan Dawambai and installing Mazawaje, Nuhu made himself politically dependent upon his Kaura; and further, by weakening the chiefship internally, he transferred the political initiative to his client, the Kaura, and made the latter his master.

Siege of Daura

Lukudi died four or five years after moving to Zango, where he is buried. Following Dan Dawambai's dismissal, he seems to have taken little, if any, part in political affairs. Nuhu now ruled as the sole effective chief. Three years after the Hausa had moved there, Ibram came from Zinder at the head of a large army and settled in Zango for nine months. During these months he converted the town into a military base and built a strong earth wall *(birni)* around it. He then launched daily attacks on Daura city, where his brother Tanimu had lodged in an attempt to capture the throne at Zinder.

Tanimu had already once rebelled against Ibram and seized the throne at Zinder; but in the following year he was defeated. After some years he made a second attempt to dislodge Ibram and proceeded to Kukawa by way of Muniyo to seek his reappointment from the Shehu Umar, who had restored

Ibram.[42] Failing to secure the Shehu's support, Tanimu decided to seek the throne by force and went first to Kano and then to Sokoto, where he appealed to the Sultan Aliyu Babba (1842-1859) for aid. The Fulani were then at peace with the Shehu of Bornu, and Aliyu refused to support Tanimu directly but suggested he should proceed to Daura, which was close to Zinder. Tanimu accordingly returned to Daura and presented himself to Muhamman Bello, the Fulani emir. When Ibram learned from Nuhu at Zango of Tanimu's arrival, he decided to attack Daura and capture Tanimu. Assembling his allies, the Tuareg of Damargu and the Hausa chiefs of Gobir and Maradi, Ibram moved to Zango, which he then extended and fortified.[43] Meanwhile Mamman Bello, the Fulani emir of Daura, had appealed to the Fulani emirs of Katsina, Kazaure, and Kano for reinforcements against the expected assault. To Nuhu and the Hausa of Zango, Ibram's assault on Daura offered the exciting prospect of an early return to their lost city. To Maiyaki, the Sarkin Gobir, and Dan Baura, the Hausa Sarkin Katsina of Maradi, the prospect of overthrowing a Fulani state and seizing its capital had never been quite so close; and with Ibram's support they probably hoped this campaign would mark a turning point in their fortunes.

Ibram was accompanied at Zango by Tanimu's son Suleiman, whom he had adopted and reared. During the early months of the siege, as the Zinder cavalry circled Daura's walls, the defenders would bugle Suleiman's praise-song and call him to join them, after which those attackers who sympathized with Tanimu would bugle Tanimu's praise-song in reply. These exchanges destroyed the morale of Ibram's forces and paved the way for the continual desertions from Ibram's troops which began when the Fulani opened their gates to receive Suleiman, thus setting the pattern for others. After the siege and desertions had continued for several months, Tanimu decided to give battle in the open. Finally, when Ibram marshaled his forces for the battle, he discovered that his allies, the Kel Owi Tuareg, had arranged to desert him. Soon after the battle was joined, the Sarkin Gobir Maiyaki also took flight, leaving the Sarkin Maradi Dan Baura, the Sarkin Daura Nuhu, and Ibram to face Tanimu and the Fulani forces. Dan Baura, the Sarkin Katsina of Maradi, was killed; and Ibram, severely wounded, fled northeast to Kiru, where he died some twenty days later.[44] Nuhu retreated to Zango, and Maiyaki returned to Gobir, leaving the way open for Tanimu to take possession of Zinder at his leisure. But before moving north, Tanimu punished Nuhu for interfering in the affairs of Zinder by supporting Ibram against him, as Nuhu was required to do by his vassalage. This fine, which imposed "tribute of a thousand cowries per man,"[45] marks the beginning of tributary payments by the Hausa of Zango to Zinder. Nuhu could only be grateful for this costly reprieve.

On his death, Ibram's body was taken to Zinder for burial. There, recalling that the Shehu of Bornu had formerly refused to countenance Tanimu's claim after reappointing Ibram, the electors chose Mohammed Kace, Ibram's son, to succeed; but on Tanimu's arrival outside the gates of Zinder,

the people, eager to avoid further bloodshed, rushed out to acclaim him. Mohammed Kace fled to Muniyo and thence to Kukawa, leaving Tanimu to rule Damagaram. These events occurred in 1853-1854.[46]

Tanimu and Nuhu

This was probably the first time that Lukudi's community had become directly embroiled in the conflicts between Ibram and Tanimu for the Zinder throne. Now, under the conditions of vassalage, which involved oaths of personal loyalty to chiefs of suzerain states, the Hausa could do little to avoid such entanglements. Nuhu may well have feared further punishment for his support of Ibram. To avoid this he made allegiance to Tanimu and conducted himself so as not to give offense. For several years Nuhu rendered tribute and secured Tanimu's toleration, until his favorite, the Kaura Mazawāje, subverted Nuhu at home.

It was common knowledge that Tanimu resented Nuhu because of his role in the recent war. Mazawaje pointed out to his colleagues on the senior council that before Nuhu's reign the Hausa of Zango had never paid tribute to Zinder and blamed Nuhu for their present and future misfortunes, although tradition reports that Nuhu had advised Ibram against attacking Daura on the ground that the city was protected by a spirit called Rangwamgwam, which made it impregnable.[47]

After Mazawaje won over the senior councillors to his views, the sedition spread further. One of Nuhu's slaves surprised the Shentali Kakurma and the Alkali Kashibu discussing how to get rid of Nuhu. He was silenced by an obscure remark, and the plotting continued. When his colleagues asked Mazawaje for guidance, he pointed out that Tanimu could depose Nuhu. Mazawaje was then commissioned to negotiate the affair with Tanimu and even to ask Tanimu to choose Nuhu's successor. Since the Sarkin Yara, who was the official messenger from Zango to Zinder, remained loyal to Nuhu, Mazawaje communicated with Tanimu through Fige, the eunuch in charge of Tanimu's personal quarters in the harem. Mazawaje informed Tanimu through Fige that Nuhu remained disloyal and hostile and that he had lost the confidence of his people, who were equally anxious to win Tanimu's favor and to be rid of their chief. Tanimu accepted Mazawaje's reports and at his suggestion sent a letter to Nuhu instructing him to send his warriors under the Kaura to Zinder to assist him on one of his campaigns. Under the norms of vassalage in both the Fulani and Bornu empires, vassals were obliged to furnish military support for their immediate superiors as required. Accordingly Nuhu suspected no plot on receiving the letter; and to avoid offending Tanimu, he called Mazawaje and asked him to carry out the instructions. Mazawaje assembled the entire military forces at Nuhu's disposal and set off for Zinder, taking a few senior princes with him and leaving Nuhu at Zango virtually defenseless.

On arriving at Zinder, Mazawaje went to greet Tanimu. According to the Daura Chronicle, he began by asking whether Tanimu wished to carry out their agreement. Tanimu replied, "Of course." Mazawaje then summoned Muhamman (or Mamman) Sha, a son of Sarkin Gwari Abdu, and asked Tanimu to appoint him as chief. As the electoral council, which only met when the chiefship was vacant, had not selected him, Mamman Sha was Mazawaje's personal choice, and Mazawaje made this clear in presenting him to Tanimu, who at once carried out the ceremony of appointment and imposed the oath of vassalage on Mamman Sha.[48]

One of Nuhu's slaves, Barka, who witnessed this scene escaped at the earliest opportunity and rode to Zango to tell his master what had happened. Nuhu commanded the slave to say nothing to anyone until a letter from Tanimu confirmed his deposition. Tanimu's letter, which soon followed, instructed Nuhu to vacate the palace before Mamman Sha returned. Enraged and momentarily forgetting that his army was absent, Nuhu at first declared that he would do nothing of the sort but would fight for his throne. He was eventually dissuaded from this course by his mother or by his father's sister, the reigning Magajiya. Taking his family with him, Nuhu fled to Rafa in Maradi, guided by the Dan Bajida Ranau, who dwelt at Yardaji.[49] Dissatisfied with the reception provided by his "vassal," the Sarkin Kworgum Bawa, Nuhu dismissed him and appointed Bawa's kinsman, Deji, as Sarkin Kworgum. Though his decision was loyally accepted by the Sarkin Kworgum, his family, and his people, Nuhu seems to have forgotten once more that he was no longer chief but had recently been deposed.

Nuhu's troubles were not over. At Rafa he continually received messages and gifts from Tanimu expressing solicitude and inviting him to Zinder. After remaining at Rafa for a while, Nuhu moved to Kandamka with some of his immediate followers and then decided to go to Zinder to meet his end. He still had with him some of the Dan Bajida's men, including the Sarkin Baka Dan Giwa, who urged him to revolt. He refused to attempt this, not merely because it was hopeless, but also, it is said, because he wished to avoid heaping further troubles on the people of Zango. At Kandamka Nuhu decided to accept Tanimu's invitation and set out for Zinder, sending his son Tafida and other family south to Zango. However, Tanimu had anticipated this and arranged for their capture. He had also sent to summon Mamman Sha and the Kaura Mazawaje to Zinder. When they arrived he told them of Nuhu's arrest. According to the Daura Chronicle, Tanimu "handed Nuhu to them and Kaura had him murdered."[50] Oral traditions say that Tanimu asked what they wished to do, and they advised him to kill Nuhu. Tanimu thereupon ordered them to do it themselves. The Kaura Mazawaje supervised Nuhu's death while he was strangled by slaves with the string that bound up his trousers. Thus Tanimu showed Mazawaje where the final power lay by compelling him to execute the chief to whom he owed his appointment as Kaura.

On learning of Nuhu's death, Tanimu asked whether he left any sons.

Tafida was mentioned. Tanimu had him brought forth and bound to a stake in the open forecourt of the palace (the *kangiwa*), where he remained throughout the day without food or water. At this stage two men spoke up on Tafida's behalf, the Sarkin Dawaki Manzo (Messenger) of Zinder, who as Tanimu's *kofa* to Zango had a vague responsibility for its chief and people, and a passing malam who invoked the names of mercy and Islam. Tanimu decided to spare Tafida and kept him in his palace as a page for several years before allowing him to go to Maradi, the successor state of Hausa Katsina, west of Kworgum.

The account of these events is preserved in all versions of the nineteenth-century Daura Chronicle. There is no reason to doubt its substantial accuracy. Its most puzzling feature, Nuhu's move from Kandamka to Zinder, may be accounted for by Tanimu's enticements to Nuhu and by the demands he made for Nuhu on the chiefs along the western route. Palmer's version of the Chronicle merely says that Nuhu "was summoned to Damagaram (Zinder) alone, leaving all his family at Kandamka."[51]

Rise of Zinder

From 1861 until 1900 the Hausa of Zango remained subordinate to Zinder, and throughout this period Zinder's domination increased severely. By the death of Tanimu in 1884, Zango's internal autonomy was as heavily compromised as its external independence. Under successive sovereigns Zinder had pursued aggressive policies of territorial expansion and increasing centralization. To appreciate the experience of Zango under Zinder's rule, we need to know something about the development of Zinder; and since the affairs of Daura were subject to the changing situation at Zinder, I list the chiefs of Zango, Zinder, and other relevant units in a single table to exhibit their chronological relations. This is done in table 3, which assembles data on Zinder drawn primarily from Landeroin and Tilho,[52] with appropriate modifications, and others on Fulani Daura, Baure, and Zango drawn from local chronicles, king lists, dynastic genealogies, and administrative histories. The genealogy of the Zinder dynasty is also taken from the *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho.*[53]

Until 1812, when Suleiman I became chief, Zinder was a petty state of five or six villages, one of which, Kircia, was ruled by a prince of the Zinder dynasty. At that time the chiefdom of Zinder was subject to demands and attacks from Tuareg nomads and from the powerful Sosebaki state at Miria. When attacked, the Zinder rulers typically withdrew; but Suleiman I (1812-1822) first brought the six village units which constituted Zinder under central rule, and then, having conquered Damagaram, an important town near Zinder, he proclaimed himself chief of the wider territory of Damagaram. Dynastic conflicts at Miria enabled Suleiman to increase his power relative to the Sosebaki state, and when a Fulani force under Malam Yero invaded

TABLE 3

The Rulers of Zinder (Damagaram), Fulani Daura, Baure, and Hausa Daura at Zango, c. 1800-1911

Time scale	Daura at Zango	Baure	Damagaram (Zinder)[a]	Fulani Daura
1800	Abdu, Sarkin Gwari (1798-?1825)		Ahmadu (1799-1812)	M. Ishi'aku (c. 1806-1830)
			Suleiman (1812-1822)	
1820	Lukudi (?1825-1855)	Tsoho (?1826-1847)	Ibram (1822-1841)	Yusufu (1830-1836)
				Muhamman Sani (1836: 6 months)
				Zubairu (1837: 3 months)
				Muhamman Bello (1837-1868)
1840			Tanimu (1841-1843)	
	Nuhu (1846-1861)	Habu (?1847-?1850)	Ibram (1843-1853)	
		Jibo (?1850-1854)	Muhamman Kace (1853-1854)	
		Habu (1854-1859)	Tanimu (1854-1884)	
		Jibo (1859-1865)		

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Time scale	Daura at Zango	Baure	Damagaram (Zinder)[a]	Fulani Daura
1860	Mamman Sha (1861-1864) Haruna (1864-1871)	Ali (1865-1874)		Muhamman Altine (1868-1876)
	Dan Aro (1871-1877) Tafida (1877-1884)	Zakari (1874-1887)		Muhamman Mai Gurdo (1876-1906)
1880	Sule (1884-1886) Yusufu (1886-1891)		Ibrahim Goto (1884) Suleiman (1884-1893)	
	Tafida (1891-1904)	Kalgaba (1887-1888) Ali (1888-1890) Zakari (1890-1894) Abdu (1894-1903)	Ahmadu Majerinji (1893-1899)	
1900	M. Musa (1904-1911)	Haliru (1903-1906)	Ahmadu Dan Bassa (1899-1906)	Sogiji (1906: 19 days) Magajiya Murnai (1906: 4 months)
1910	Abdurrahman (1911-)			

[a]Adapted from Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:455.



Genealogy 1. The Hausa Dynasty of Daura and Zango



After M. Landeroin, including dates. See Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), vol. 2, p. 453.

Genealogy 2. The Rulers of Damagaram (Zinder)

Zinder, Suleiman defeated them at Durum and captured war gear and several hundred horses. Following this, he incorporated the country around Durum, Dogo, Guna, and Dinnai into the expanding Zinder state; and when next the Tuaregs of Damargu attacked, they were surprised to find the Zinder forces ready and were obliged to flee.

In 1822 Suleiman abdicated under pressure from Bornu, after appointing his son Ibram as chief.[54] As we have seen, Ibram pushed the frontiers of Zinder southward by diplomacy and war. Besides subjugating the Hausa of Magaria, Baure, and finally Yardaji, he overthrew the Sosebaki state at Majia, raided Kazaure and northern Kano, and finally pushed east to attack Muniyo, where he levied tribute on some of its villages. The Shehu Umar, as suzerain of Zinder and Muniyo alike, decided to intervene on behalf of the Muniyoma (Chief of Muniyo) Kosso and marched toward Zinder. Fearing the Shehu's punishment, Ibram fled, and Umar installed his brother Tanimu in his place. Tanimu immediately attacked Miria, which had supported Ibram in the recent dispute. Meanwhile Ibram proceeded to Kukawa, where he made his allegiance to Umar, excused his previous misconduct, and was duly reappointed when the Shehu recognized that Tanimu was less prone than Ibram to maintain peace with nearby Bornu vassals. Anticipating Tanimu's resistance, the Shehu sent an army to install Ibram at Zinder. After a bitter struggle that lasted thirty-five days, Tanimu's resistance was broken.[55] Ibram was restored, and Tanimu quit Zinder for several years before deciding to seek the throne a second time by force. We have seen how, having failed to win support at Kukawa, Kano, and Sokoto, Tanimu moved to Daura, where he invited Ibram's attack and emerged victorious, the self-made chief of Zinder, whose vassalage to Bornu, always in doubt since the Shehu's usurpation, was now acutely compromised.

When Tanimu seized its throne in 1854, Zinder was already the most powerful state north of Kano, the largest, strongest, most populous, best led, and best situated for trade or war of the surrounding Bornu vassals. However, at that time most of the Zinder domain remained under the immediate jurisdiction of vassal chiefs, while the area that Tanimu administered directly as the Sarkin Damagaram was rather small. Miria, only a few miles southeast of Zinder, still enjoyed internal autonomy. Tanimu may have been hostile to the claims and status of these Zinder vassals; but having first overthrown his brother Ibram, whom Umar had appointed, and then Ibram's son Muhamman Kace, whom the electors of Zinder had chosen to succeed, he lacked external sources of support, had cause to fear reprisals from Bornu, and thus sought to ensure his own security by centralizing control of his domain and reducing the autonomy of his vassals.

Some of the measures by which Tanimu centralized the administration of his vassal states and subverted their identity and internal autonomy are related in the following account of developments at Zango. But Tanimu did not rely solely on such administrative centralization for the security of his throne. To assure his power, he set about building a truly formidable fight-

ing force. To this end, "il fait venir de Tripoli des fusils à pierre, des fusils à piston, des approvisionnements de poudre, de plomb, de capsules; il fabrique lui-même la poudre dont il a besoin, fond des canons et des boulets, et fabrique les affuts."[56] Following a model from Tripoli, Tanimu had cannons cast at Zinder by two local blacksmiths, Maje and Abubakar. His gunpowder was prepared under the direction of two North Africans, Fradji and Mohammed Makarsu, the sulphur being imported from Tripoli while the saltpeter was mined at Kicendi, forty miles south of Zinder, and mixed with local charcoal. An Arab called Sta Mohammed showed Tanimu's blacksmiths how to cast iron wheels so that the cannons could be dragged along with Tanimu's army. Landeroin estimates that at the end of his reign Tanimu possessed forty cannons of varying size, six thousand muskets, and ample stores of gunpowder and pellets of differing types.[57] "Tanimu est le premier soultan de cette partie de l'Afrique qui ait eu l'idée de fondre lui-même les canons."[58] "Il rêve alors d'établir son hégémonie sur tous les sultanats environnants et cherche pour cela a porter le puissance de son armée au plus haut degré."[59] As his neighbors and vassals learned of these developments, their fears of Tanimu increased.

Meanwhile, without the Shehu's permission, in two to four months Tanimu completed a formidable new wall around Zinder by mass corvée; and to finance his armaments, he embarked on a program of state-directed economic development which merits further study.[60] He established several plantations of dates and laid out large farms of wheat, rice, tomatoes, and citrus. He purchased a thousand camels from the Tuareg to start local camel breeding and organized regular caravans from Zinder to Tripoli and Egypt to increase Zinder's export trade, introduce new techniques, and import sulphur and other munitions. In these administrative, military, and economic enterprises, Tanimu displayed his originality and understanding of the connections between economic, political, and military growth. At his death in 1884, Tanimu left Zinder in a commanding position as the most powerful and heavily armed state between Masina and Lake Chad.

To celebrate his accession, Tanimu launched a heavy attack on northern Kano but suffered severe losses when his cavalry floundered in the marshes on their journey home. He followed this by resuming his earlier attacks on Miria, where Muhammed Toro now reigned. Failing to conquer Miria by force, he resorted to fraud: after five years he invited Toro to visit Zinder to make an alliance and imprisoned him. He then attacked Kance and tightened his grip on Kworgum as well. In 1857 he revisited Kano and raided Duguyawa. On his homeward route he attacked Kazaure and slew its Fulani emir, Dambo, with whom Lukudi had once taken refuge at Acilafiya. This was followed by another attack on Muniyo in which its chief, Mamudu, was captured. The Shehu of Bornu, Umar, promptly ordered Tanimu to release Mamudu; Tanimu obeyed, then attacked Muniyo a second time and had Mamudu killed. Umar at once appointed Mamudu's younger brother Musa as Muniyoma; but like several other chiefs, Musa accepted an invitation to

visit Zinder, where Tanimu put him in prison and refused Umar's demands for his release. Umar then appointed another Muniyoma, who fled at the end of two years, being unable either to rule or to withstand Zinder's threats, whereupon Tanimu finally incorporated Muniyo into the state of Damagaram.[61]

MAMMAN SHA (1861-1864)

In 1864 Tanimu directed a major assault on the Fulani emirate of Hadeija, northeast of Kano. For this attack he summoned his vassal, the chief of Zango, Mamman Sha, to bring all his forces. At Hadeija, Umaru, the son of Buhari, had succeeded in 1863 with the approval of the sultan of Sokoto. Umaru's accession thus restored Hadeija's allegiance to Sokoto, which his predecessor, Buhari, had broken.[62] In attacking Hadeija, Tanimu may only have wished to demonstrate his solidarity with Bornu, which had supported Buhari against Sokoto; and although the Zinder forces advanced to the walls of the capital, which they might well have seized, they withdrew without serious fighting. On witnessing this retreat Mamman Sha bitterly contrasted the cowardice of the Zinder troops with the valor of the Zango Hausa, who had to endure their domination. These comments were relayed to the Kaura Mazawaje, whom Mamman Sha had already estranged. After preparing the ground by secret messages through Fige, Tanimu's eunuch, Mazawaje reported Mamman Sha's remarks as evidence of contempt *(reno)* and disloyalty and suggested his deposition. This occurred in 1864 or 1865. Tanimu agreed and asked Mazawaje to nominate a successor. Mazawaje selected Dan Aro, another of Sarkin Gwari Abdu's sons, but when the Zango officials were brought before Tanimu at Zinder for his installation, Dan Aro could not be found, and Tanimu accordingly appointed Haruna, the son of Lukudi, who was then Yerima. It seems reasonably certain that Tanimu required Haruna to pay *kudin sarauta* as an appointment fee. If a precedent was necessary, this had already been set when Mamman Sha handed over some of the Daura regalia and throne slaves on his accession; but in addition Tanimu increased the annual tribute from Zango to 2,000,000 cowries. Thus by independently selecting Haruna, by demanding the *kudin sarauta* and increasing the tribute, Tanimu again showed Mazawaje the cold edge of his power.[63]

Mazawaje instigated Mamman Sha's deposition primarily because he had tried to obstruct and weaken Mazawaje's power. Being aware of the way in which Mazawaje had removed Nuhu, Mamman Sha had tried to avoid offending Tanimu or providing Mazawaje with any basis for alleging disloyalty. To these ends he cultivated Tanimu's favor by obeying his orders and fulfilling his requests. Meanwhile at Zango he sought to restrain and balance Mazawaje's power by placing the Sarkin Yara Jibirin, Danko's son, and the Turaki Tanko in charge of those villages, resources, and affairs that

remained to the throne. However, in the senior state council Mamman Sha could take no action to secure Mazawaje's dismissal, since the Kaura had anticipated and countered this move by cultivating the support of the Galadima Masallaci, who had formerly held office at Magaria. Set between a ruthless despot and a senior subordinate who was equally treacherous and powerful, Mamman Sha had an untenable position. To have retained office for three years in these conditions indicates his ability and self-control.

Given Tanimu's readiness to dismiss the Hausa chiefs on Mazawaje's allegations and given their inability to remove Mazawaje, we may well ask why the senior princes of Daura at Zango continued to seek the throne or allowed themselves to be placed there, as Haruna had done on Mamman Sha's dismissal. Such desires and compliance may be accounted for on several grounds. As the dynastic family tree illustrates, by this date that segment of the dynasty descended from Sarkin Daura Tsoho, which ruled at Zango, was divided into two groups, or *dakuna* (huts), derived from the Sarkin Gwari Abdu and Lukudi, respectively. These segments competed as rivals for the succession, thus ensuring a ready supply of candidates drawn from the opposite house whenever the chiefship fell vacant. Such segmental rivalry makes it possible that Dan Aro deliberately absented himself from Tanimu's court because he had no wish to replace his brother, Mamman Sha, and by so doing to weaken the solidarity of Sarkin Gwari's sons. It was only after Mazawaje had nominated Dan Aro before Tanimu that Dan Aro's absence from Zinder was noticed. He may have taken care to conceal his whereabouts, since the ensuing search failed to find him. Haruna, then the senior prince of Lukudi's segment, was thus appointed for lack of any alternative from the house of Sarkin Gwari Abdu. Had Haruna refused to accept the office, he might thus have given Tanimu a pretext for abolishing the chiefship at Zango and dispossessing the dynasty, as had already occurred at Magaria after Masallaci's death; or he might have provided an excuse for Mazawaje's succession as chief. Moreover, by refusing Tanimu's nomination, Haruna would have forfeited the chiefly prospects of his descendants forever. Perhaps also, like other candidates, he believed that he could best preserve and strengthen the chiefship and state in their hour of need. As the princes were well aware of Kaura Mazawaje's powerful grip on the chieftaincy, they may thus have sought the succession to reduce Mazawaje's power in order to restore the chiefship to its lost preeminence. Yet another powerful motive common to eligible princes was the desire to be chief both as an end in itself and as a necessary means to the various gratifications the office provided. As a by-product of their socialization and segregation from commoners within the community, princes shared these attitudes and desires. The wealth and splendor of the chiefly office attracted ambitious men, and while the rules of succession invested eligible princes with exclusive claims to seek the throne, they penalized all who failed in the contest by disqualifying their descendants perpetually from the quest. Thus, given the rivalry between the sons of Lukudi and those of Sarkin Gwari Abdu that had

emerged within this context of vassalage and subversion, it is not difficult, when all relevant considerations are borne in mind, to understand how the office continued to attract candidates.

HARUNA (1864-1871)

Haruna reigned from 1864 to 1871. Like Mamman Sha, he tried to preserve the Zango chiefship by fulfilling Tanimu's requests, and he also tried to check the growth of Mazawaje's power; but following the depositions of Nuhu and Mamman Sha, the Kaura Mazawaje was easily the most powerful man at Zango. Nonetheless, in the face of Mamman Sha's intelligent and sustained opposition, he had been unable to extend his authority in the internal administration of the chiefdom's affairs. Thus, although the senior council could probably make few decisions without his approval, his power was most evident in the periodic depositions of Zango chiefs.

In Mamman Sha's reign Tanimu had formally abolished the Magaria chiefdom and placed his slave commander, the Kacalla of Zinder, in charge of the former state. This event was interpreted at Zango as a sign that Tanimu might also abolish their chiefdom, given a suitable opportunity.

It was probably during the reigns of Mamman Sha or Haruna that Tanimu removed the territory which lay between Fulani Daura and the southern perimeter of Kworgum and Kance from the control of the chiefs of Zango. Following Nuhu's deposition of Sarkin Kworgum Bawa in 1861, Tanimu had forcefully incorporated Kworgum and Kance into the Zinder state. He then found that during and after the Zinder civil wars and Lukudi's defeats at Yardaji and Toka, Fulani from Daura had begun to move north of Mai Aduwa, seeking sites for settlement. As the area lacks surface water, the immigrant Fulani had to dig a well wherever they settled. Under prevailing political practices, the chief's permission was required to sink new wells; but as Fulani from Daura, the immigrants neither chose to recognize the authority of the Hausa chief nor, given the collapse of Lukudi's power, did they need to do so. However, as ruler of Zinder, Tanimu regarded this migration in a different light. Since the Hausa of Zango were vassals of Zinder, in Tanimu's view their territory now formed part of his dominion; and since his vassals at Zango were no longer capable of enforcing their boundaries and policing these parts of their territory, Tanimu undertook to do so by incorporating the area directly into Zinder and placing one of his generals in charge of its administration. This arrangement probably recommended itself to Tanimu because it assured his military domination of Kworgum, Kance, Zango, and the unpoliced area north of Fulani Daura. Thus, after failing to halt the Fulani movement northward by having their wells refilled with earth, Tanimu instructed one of his officers to move to Kurni with a force sufficiently large and well equipped to dominate the area. At Zango this official was known as the Kauran Kurni, the Kaura of Kurni, a village which had



Map 3. The Fragmentation of Daura, c. 1860-1870

previously been governed by the Kusheka's lineage. With the Kaura's transfer from Zinder, the area of Kurni, as well as Kance and Kworgum to the north of it, were finally removed from the control of the Zango chief.

We cannot say precisely when the first Kaura settled at Kurni or when the Kacalla took charge of Magaria, although it seems probable that these developments followed hard on each other early in Tanimu's reign, being part of his general design for the expansion and defense of his southern and southwestern frontiers. Through Magaria, Zinder now controlled a direct route to Kano; and the selection of Kurni as Kaura's base served to block Fulani thrusts against Zinder from Daura or Katsina. It seems then that strategic considerations were crucial in Tanimu's decision to place the Kacalla at Magaria and the Kaura at Kurni.

During Haruna's reign the Zango levy was twice called out on Tanimu's orders. On the first occasion he directed the Kaura Mazawaje to carry out an independent attack on Mega in northern Kano, while Haruna remained at Zango. Later Tanimu mobilized the levies of Zango and Baure under his own command to attack Garun Kaya and Kantan Magaria in Kano following Mamman Sha's dismissal after the Hadeija campaign. These expeditions institutionalized Zinder's right to employ the forces of Zango as it pleased in pursuit of its own interests. Before the attack on Hadeija which led to Mam-

man Sha's dismissal, Zinder had not employed the Zango levy on any campaign. Presumably, in mobilizing them twice during Haruna's reign, Tanimu wished to impress the chiefs and people of Zango with their military obligations. But at the same time and by the same processes, the chief of Zango lost his original authority to summon the local levy for a campaign. In future he could only do so at Zinder's direction or when threatened with an attack. Thus, by political means Tanimu had neutralized Zango's military capacity and ensured that it could no longer resist him.

During Haruna's reign the Galadima Masallaci was dismissed, but whether at Haruna's instigation or on the demand of Kaura Mazawaje remains obscure. Masallaci was replaced by Tsatso, also called Musa, a son of that Galadima Alhassan who had left Daura with Sarkin Gwari Abdu. As Tsatso is known to have supported Mazawaje against Haruna in the senior council of state, it seems likely that he owed his appointment to Mazawaje. Thus Haruna gained nothing by Masallaci's replacement except the knowledge that several leading members of the Galadima's lineage were now more loyal to the Kaura than to the chief.

Haruna was the younger brother of Nuhu, who had made him Yerima; after Nuhu's deposition he was the senior prince of Lukudi's segment at Zango. On Nuhu's death, Haruna accordingly inherited his status and obligations as head of Lukudi's lineage and thus became responsible for the care and protection of those sons of Nuhu who had escaped from Kandamka to Zango. Under Mamman Sha, the head of the rival segment, Haruna could do little to help his brother's family. Of Nuhu's sons, Tafida, the elder, was absent at Maradi, but Haruna arranged for Musa, the younger, to learn the Koran and Arabic at Zango. However, while chief, Haruna helped Tafida at Maradi by periodic gifts and continued to finance Musa's training as a malam. As Nuhu's senior surviving brother, Haruna was also required to maintain the dead chief's daughters and arrange their marriages. These kinship obligations were represented to Tanimu by Mazawaje as evidence of Haruna's sympathy with Nuhu and disloyalty to Zinder. Although he had murdered Nuhu, Mazawaje reminded Tanimu that he also was responsible for Nuhu's death and urged that he could not rely on any chief at Zango whose sympathies with Nuhu were clear. Presumably for his own reasons, Tanimu accepted this advice and summoned Haruna to Zinder and dismissed him in 1871. To succeed, Tanimu appointed Dan Aro, whom Mazawaje had nominated in 1864. Dan Aro was Mamman Sha's brother and the senior member of the segment descended from the Sarkin Gwari Abdu.

Tanimu ordered Haruna to remain at Zinder with his sons and family. According to tradition, however, he failed to provide adequately for their subsistence there. Haruna and his kin were soon impoverished. Shortly afterwards, Haruna's son, the Murka Gawaye, came to blows with one of the Zinder princes, whom he accused of seducing his wife. The matter was brought before Tanimu, who ordered Haruna and his family to settle at Dambadada, where Haruna farmed until he died.

DAN ARO (1871-1877)

The Chief and the Kaura

When Dan Aro succeeded, Mazawaje had been Kaura for twenty years, having been appointed in 1851. He had already engineered the deposition of three chiefs and could claim that Mamman Sha was appointed on his voice alone. On Mamman Sha's dismissal, Mazawaje had nominated Dan Aro for the succession but failed to find him at the critical moment. Haruna, whom Tanimu had selected, had thus taken office with no feeling of obligation to Mazawaje for the nomination, but rather the desire to frustrate him. Recognizing from the start of his reign that he lacked the Kaura's support, Haruna had pursued a policy of steady opposition. Having secured Haruna's deposition, Mazawaje selected the Yerima Sule, Dan Aro's brother, to succeed; but Tanimu overruled him, recalling that Mazawaje had nominated Dan Aro six years ago. Thus, like Haruna, Dan Aro ascended the throne aware that the Kaura opposed his accession and had nominated another prince. This may have been exactly Tanimu's purpose in appointing successive chiefs who did not have Mazawaje's backing but owed their appointments directly to Zinder and their tenure of office indirectly to the Kaura. Evidently Tanimu was not prepared to allow Mazawaje to decide who should succeed, although he was quite willing to depose the Zango rulers on Mazawaje's allegations. It seems clear that Tanimu exploited Mazawaje's treachery to increase his control of Zango affairs, while appointing chiefs whom Mazawaje opposed on differing pretexts to restrain the Kaura's power.

Dan Aro sought to reduce Mazawaje's power by dismissing the Galadima Tsatso, who had supported the Kaura in council and beyond. As he could not dismiss *rukunai* without the council's consent and did not expect the Kaura to approve Tsatso's dismissal, Dan Aro took a leaf from Mazawaje's book and had the Sarkin Yara tell Tanimu that Tsatso was subverting the loyalties of Zango people to Zinder and to himself. With Tanimu's support Dan Aro dismissed Tsatso despite the Kaura's protests and appointed Tsatso's younger brother, whose nickname was Sarkin Nufe. When the latter died, Dan Aro appointed Takurce, who was also called Bature. Although Sarkin Nufe and Takurce were Tsatso's brothers, they supported the chief against the Kaura.

Not long after Tsatso's dismissal, Dan Aro learned that his Sarkin Karma Amale, the son of Lango, had attached himself to Mazawaje as an informer. It seems that the Sarkin Karma had undertaken to keep Mazawaje informed of the chief's intentions and plans and, by moving freely among the townspeople, to collect their opinions and complaints for the Kaura so that he could relay these to Tanimu through the eunuchs and have Dan Aro dismissed. Dan Aro accordingly replaced Amale as Sarkin Karma by his younger brother, Dan Dodo. Thereafter he also handled his minor officials with greater circumspection, since many had become the Kaura's clients, believing they owed him their offices.

Meanwhile, Dan Aro was pressed by Tanimu to increase the annual tribute from 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 cowries. Following the Hadeija campaign, Tanimu had concentrated on Zinder's economic development and had invested heavily in camel rearing; date farming; the cultivation of wheat, rice, tomatoes, and citrus; and state-financed caravans to Tripoli and Egypt. He also invested in the manufacture of cannons, muskets, and ammunition and relied mainly on slaves, cloths, and cowries to meet his expenses. To increase his revenues for these purposes, Tanimu pressed Dan Aro to double the Zango tribute. It is said that despite similar pressure, Haruna had provided no more tribute than Mamman Sha before him; and this was probably one ground for his dismissal. It is also said that Dan Aro resisted Tanimu's demands, but whether with partial or total success we cannot be sure, as there are indications that *karambaki* first appeared during the latter part of his reign. Under Tafida, who succeeded Dan Aro, *karambaki* was collected annually at Zango and the tribute doubled. In Dan Aro's reign, Zinder ruled that the *mairam* tribute should be paid in lengths of indigo-dyed cloth *(baki),* and it was probably then that the *mairam* began to be called *karambaki.* The wet season tribute was also converted into lengths of white cloth *(fari; karanfari).* Yet despite these two annual levies, it does not seem that there was any substantial increase in the per caput payments of Zango to Zinder during Dan Aro's reign. His excuses and resistance on this point are also cited among the reasons for his eventual dismissal.

Relations between Dan Aro and the Kaura Mazawaje worsened steadily until they reached such a high point of animosity that Tanimu decided to intervene. Dan Aro had a painful fissure in his anus, perhaps a carcinoma *(basuri),* which appeared after his accession. He thus became unable to mount a horse and could neither go to war nor attend the Id-el-Kebir and Id-el-Fitr on horseback, as a chief should. During his reign the Zango levy was not called out, since Tanimu was occupied with the development of Zinder. However, at the local Sallahs Dan Aro was represented by his riderless horse. Noting this, and having been taught to identify horsemanship with virility as a requisite of chieftaincy, many people were led to doubt Dan Aro's capacity to act as chief. Mazawaje's agents were not slow to exploit this condition.

Meanwhile, either independently or at the suggestion of others, Dan Aro came to believe that Mazawaje had inflicted the illness on him by means of "medicine" *(magani).* It is said that Mazawaje had a medicated snake placed inside the palace. Without crediting these traditions, we may be certain that Dan Aro knew that Mazawaje had appealed to Zinder for his deposition on the grounds that "Sarki rago ne"—"the chief is worthless" (that is, utterly incapable), confined permanently to the palace and particularly the harem. At first Dan Aro tried to counter these criticisms by letting it be known that he was plying his trade of hand-sewing and embroidery to avoid *zalunci* (oppression, extortion). Meanwhile he nursed the belief that the Kaura was pressing for his dismissal on grounds of incapacity. One morning Dan Aro visited Mazawaje at his compound, and as the Kaura entered his forecourt, he threw a handful of powdered chili peppers at the Kaura's eyes. Tradition

relates that the chilies were doctored with "medicine"; but Mazawaje was already old and may have been partially blind. He remained blind from that day. News of this event reached Zinder shortly after, but Tanimu took no action.

At the next Idi festival Mazawaje directed his supporters and dependents —who may have been about half the community at Zango—to prepare a new prayer ground on the farther side of the wall from that which the chief and people were wont to use, declaring that he would not attend the same *masallacin Idi* as Dan Aro. He appointed the malam who ministered to his religious needs to act as Limamin Idi at his own Sallah celebrations on the far side of the town wall. There was thus for the first time in the history of Daura a double celebration of Sallah and two separate processions on horse and foot at Zango that year. This event dramatically expressed the mutual hatred of the blind Kaura and the lame chief; but it also split the townsfolk and the state into two contraposed segments of approximately equal strength. Neither the Kaura nor any of those who attended his Idi prayer ground went to greet the chief and declare their allegiance after completing the service, as is usual at Hausa Sallahs.

Tanimu's Reorganization

These events were also reported to Tanimu at Zinder; and perhaps they neither surprised nor displeased him. Nonetheless he consulted his advisers about them. His son Ibrahim (also called Abba Gwoto) suggested that Tanimu should summon Dan Aro and Mazawaje to Zinder and dismiss them both, since one was lame, the other blind, and both incapable. In their place Abba Gwoto proposed that Tanimu should appoint Tafida, the son of Nuhu, as chief, since he was familiar with the Zinder court and with Tanimu personally, and suggested that Mazawaje should be succeeded by one of his brothers. Thus, while changing the individuals whose hostility had rendered government impossible, Tanimu would preserve those divisions between the Kaura and Sarki at Zango which were of such value to Zinder.

Tanimu approved his son's advice and summoned Tafida from Maradi, as well as Dan Aro and Mazawaje. He then dismissed Dan Aro and Mazawaje; appointed Tafida as chief and Bakula, the son of Tamila, as Kaura; and decreed that thenceforward the Sarki and the Kaura should each send tributes to Zinder of 1,000,000 cowries twice yearly. The new chief and his Kaura were thus made independently responsible to Zinder for the provision of the tribute levied separately but equally upon them. The territory, though not the state, was informally but effectively divided in two. Kaura was instructed to collect his semiannual tribute from the numerous towns attached to his office as fiefs, while the chief was responsible for collecting his tribute from all other settlements in the chiefdom. At that date, of some fifty settlements of differing size which formed the chiefdom of Zango, the Kaura



Map 4. The Chiefdom of Zango, 1880-1900

controlled between twenty-one and twenty-four, as shown on map 4. Thus, in holding the Kaura and the chief separately responsible for equal volumes of tribute, Tanimu did not distribute the additional burden unfairly. However, as the map shows, the Kaura's towns and the chief's were so interspersed that their territorial jurisdictions could not be segregated to parallel their independent and equal tributary obligations. In effect Tanimu had deliberately halved the authority of the Zango chiefs and split the integrity of the vassal state by holding the Kaura directly responsible for half the annual tribute. Such measures illustrate the policies by which Tanimu enhanced and

centralized his control of local administration throughout the dominions of Zinder by subverting the exclusive jurisdictions of his vassals and thus destroying the juridical integrity and autonomy of their chiefdoms. For Tanimu the irregular geographical distribution of the Kaura's towns at Zango offered pleasing prospects of future jurisdictional conflicts between the Kaura and chief which would so divide and weaken their authority that neither could oppose direct administration by Zinder. By thus setting the Kaura and chief in direct competition, Tanimu also secured the increase of tribute from Zango he had demanded in vain for so long. But it seems that his main objective in dividing responsibility for the tribute between the Kaura and chief was to disrupt the Zango state by establishing within it two equal and contraposed political centers where formerly there had been one and by creating a situation in which the responsibilities and authorities of these two were likely to generate tension and conflict.

To complete his reorganization of the Zango state, Tanimu instituted a new arrangement for the collection of cattle tax *(jangali)* from the pastoral Fulani. He had the *sarakunan Fulani* of Gurdo and of Tsatsumburum brought before him. The Sarkin Fulani of Gurdo, Gauke, was made responsible for collecting the annual cattle tax from all Fulani east of Gurdo throughout the territories of Zango, Baure, and Magaria as far east as Danchia, while his peer, the Sarkin Fulani of Tsatsumburum, was charged with the collection of *jangali* west of that town throughout all Zinder territories, including Kworgum, Kance, the area under Kauran Kurni, and northward to the boundary of Zinder itself. The two *sarakunan Fulani* were then placed under separate *kofofi,* the Shentalin Damagaram serving as the *kofa* for Sarkin Fulanin Gurdo and the Sarkin Bai Ali of Zinder as *kofa* for Tsatsumburum. By these arrangements Tanimu asserted a new right to the cattle taxes of his southern vassals and thus extended Zinder's authority over the subject states. It is said that the Fulani tax collectors of Gurdo and Tsatsumburum were required to hand one-half of the tax they collected to their *kofofi* at Zinder, to give the chief and the Kaura of Zango one-fifth each, and to keep the remainder as their fee. On his periodic visits to the Sarkin Fulanin Gurdo, the Shentali of Damagaram collected his own *gaisuwa* in cattle. To the chief of Zango, apart from losses of personal revenue, these new arrangements for the collection of the cattle tax signified further losses of political authority and territorial jurisdiction. However, since they were instituted at the same time that he was appointed, since his Kaura was made responsible for separate tribute, and since they were backed by the overwhelming power at Tanimu's command, Tafida could only accept them.

By these measures Tanimu simultaneously removed the fiscal and civil administration of the pastoral Fulani at Zango from the Hausa chief and officials and divided the Hausa state by imposing equal and separate responsibilities for tribute on the Kaura and chief while leaving the distribution of political jurisdiction between them undetermined. Tanimu had elaborated Abba Gwoto's suggestion in masterly style. To erode further the territorial

TABLE 4

Fief Distribution at Zango, 1884-1903

Fiefholders	Administrators	Territories
Throne fiefs	Sarkin Yara	Zango, Rogogo Masabka, Baramua, *Fioni,* Kufan Sana, Garba, ¼ of Yanduna,* Arusu, Yan Tubu, Kawarin Kyako, Beciya, Kyaukyawa, Insharuwa, Rindi, Dasha, Kawarin Gwassa, Hammai, Tsohon Gari (Zango), Gwammaji
	Magajin Tambari	Dargaji
	Shentali	Bukudu, Kajarawa, Acakwale, U. Dagum
	Guyama	Ishiawa
	Ubandawaki	Kwabo, Kagara, Komo na Habe
	Sarkin Bai	Kawarin Maicibi
	Bai Karama	Takari
	Turaki	*Gieni,* Psaski, Kokitiko
	Shamaki	Fantaika
Kaura's fiefs	Kaura	Rogogo Arautake, Bedawa, U. Sarkin Dako, Dawai, Kawarin Mallamai,Maibara, Kuka, Jawu After c. 1886, acquired from Galadima: U. Kalla, Kawarin Sa'idu, Duffe, Hakum, Maigari, Rafin Azbinawa
	Dan Kwaba	Yardaji, Dunawa, U. Dimma, Rijiyar Mata na Gwomba After c. 1886, acquired from Galadima: Komo M. Kinci, Komo ta Ubandawaki
	Gilu	Mazabo, Kanda, Garba Koremi, Garba Tudu, Tsara, *Kwajali*
	Sarkin Maru	¼ of Yanduna,* U. Kaura at Zango, Gwomba
	Sarkin Fada	U. Gaji, Rogogo Cidare, Gurdo, Jagala
	Ajiya	½ of Wallawa*
Fiefs allotted to others	Sarkin Tafarki	Tumfafi, Biciko, Dangogi
	Jarmai	Dawambai
	Magajiya	Bulungudu
	Iya	½ of Wallawa,* U. Dawa, Rahamawa
	Saraki	Hakimi, Cediya
	Alkali	*Gungara*
	Yerima	Rogogo M. Ache, Yekuwa, Tsatsumburum
	Galadima	*Madanmuna,* Runkuba, Dishi, Yakubawa, Gazobi (Lost to Kaura c. 1886: Hakum, Maigari, U. Kalla, Duffe, Komo Kinci, Rafin Azbinawa) (Kusheka's towns lost to Kauran Kurni: Kurni, Maiturmi, Koza, Garage)
	Sarkin Pawa	Dirani
	Murka	Dan Cibau, Makiyayi

Note: Towns italicized (*Fioni*) contain the slave estate attached to the office.
*(¼ of Yanduna, ½ of Wallawa) = towns divided between more than one fiefholder.
U. = Unguwan (Ward of or Hamlet of).

integrity of Zango, he decreed that thenceforward all Beriberi (Kanuri) natives of Zinder who lived in the settlements of Zango would remain directly under Zinder for purposes of taxation, military levy, and legal administration. Thus at one stroke Tanimu removed all Zinder immigrants to Zango from the jurisdiction of its chief. Thereafter the Hausa ruler's authority was limited to those Bugaje, Maguzawa, settled Fulani, and Muslim Hausa who lived in the towns from which he drew tribute; Kaura's half of the state, the pastoralists, and immigrants from Zinder were beyond his control. By thus appropriating for Zinder the sole rights to administer the Beriberi settled in Zango, Tanimu simultaneously institutionalized *tarayya* on an ethnic basis and assured himself of comprehensive information on Zango affairs through this network of scattered *(garwaye)* subjects. By extrapolation from later data, there may have been over five hundred Beriberi in Zango at the time, most of whom were probably citizens of Zinder.

Tanimu also secured a foothold for Zinder at the southern extremity of the Zango domain by subdividing Zango's section of the border town of Yanduna into three portions, one of which he gave to his Zinder client, Dan Dako; another of equal size to the Zango chief; and the third and largest share to the Kaura. The remainder of Yanduna was claimed by the Fulani emirate of Kazaure. Tanimu could justify his appropriation of a foothold in this strategic town by the need to keep informed about relations between Kazaure and Zango. However, by this measure he also indicated his readiness to place other Zango communities under officials from Zinder if the need arose.

By dismissing the Kaura Mazawaje and appointing Bakula at Zinder, Tanimu asserted his right both to appoint and to dismiss the Kauras of Zango and thus removed from the chief of Zango his traditional authority to allocate the office. As mentioned above, it was a basic principle of political organization in these patrimonial states that an official could only be dismissed by the official who had appointed him, or his successor. This principle operated to conserve the authority of the senior office from usurpation or dispersal and simultaneously to preserve the structure of the officialdom by defining and perpetuating its chains of accountability and obedience. Nonetheless, under the traditional constitution of Daura, the Hausa chief lacked the authority to dismiss his senior officials *(rukunai)* at will. For such purposes he had to seek the approval of the senior council, which was dominated by the Kaura and the Galadima.

During Tanimu's long reign at Zinder, when Mazawaje dominated the affairs of Zango, these constitutional restrictions on the power of the chief had made it politically impossible for him to take any effective action to preserve his office against the Kaura's subversion. Thus, by appropriating the authority to appoint and dismiss the Kauras of Zango, Tanimu asserted a new power which was formally inconsistent with Zango constitutional norms but congruent with current political realities. Jurally and as an effect of their changed circumstances, the Daura chiefs could not dismiss their Kauras,

while the last Kaura had repeatedly secured the dismissal of his chiefs. Thus, by assuming direct powers of appointment over this Zango office, Tanimu could claim that he was supporting the Zango chief against the Kaura. Mazawaje's dismissal, which extended Tanimu's powers, appeared to demonstrate this also. But by usurping their powers to allocate the office of Kaura, Tanimu effectively destroyed the last claims of the Zango chiefs to command their Kauras and made the latter virtually independent at Zango by subordinating them directly to himself and his successors.

Thus Bakula's appointment formally represents a significant new stage in the decline and fall of the Hausa chiefship. Like other measures taken by Tanimu at this time, the Kaura's appointment indicated Zinder's willingness to regulate the distribution of other Zango offices also, if the necessity or opportunity arose. Thus, by imposing on Kaura an oath of allegiance to himself as chief of Zinder, Tanimu implicitly and finally abrogated the Kaura's obligation of loyalty to the ruler of Zango. As Mazawaje's career had shown, this had long been a hollow formality. To signalize these changes, Tanimu also directed Bakula to pay him the customary *kudin sarauta* of 1,000,000 cowries for appointment as Kaura and to hand over the *yankai* of half a million to Tafida as chief. In painful recognition of his higher status as chief, Tafida was required to provide a *kudin sarauta* of 2,000,000 to Zinder; but as the chief received half a million from Bakula as *yankai,* their losses were equal.

As we have seen, the Hausa chiefs of Daura had traditional rights to a share in the personal estate of deceased officials and could take whatever they wished from the estates of those who fled or were deposed. With minor variations, such rights formed part of the prerogatives of all chiefs in the surrounding states.[64] Thus, when Zango fell under its dominion, the chiefs of Zinder soon asserted their rights as suzerains to administer the estates of their vassals, the chiefs of Zango. Excluding Lukudi, whose abdication marks the beginning of Zinder's overrule, no chief at Zango had yet managed to die in office under Zinder's supervision; and at each deposition, as custom allowed, the sultan of Zinder sent his agents to Zango to enumerate the estate of the chief and to remove whatever items or proportions he wished. These successive levies at frequent intervals made it difficult for the Zango chiefs to accumulate or retain reserves of horses, cattle, cloth, and other forms of liquid wealth. The chieftaincy, already impoverished by successive defeats, migrations, and increases of tribute to Zinder, was thus prevented from recovering the prosperity prerequisite for power by periodic losses at each deposition; and these recurring destitutions facilitated the growth of the Kaura's power under Mazawaje, whose accumulation of wealth during his twenty-six years in office contrasted sharply with the progressive impoverishment of the throne. Since Mazawaje remained while chiefs came and went, officials and commoners alike had learned to respect his interests and power rather than those of the chief; and since Mazawaje's wealth greatly exceeded the chief's, he could also provide superior economic

rewards, inducements, and incentives, as well as political protection, to increase his following. Dan Aro, by contrast, could offer little of either.

On deposing Mazawaje, Tanimu had the greater part of the ex-Kaura's personal estate removed to Zinder. He thus asserted his right to appropriate the estates of other deposed officials at Zango as well as those of the chiefs. Such rights were a valuable source of occasional revenues to whoever held them; and by appropriating these rights to the Kaura's estate, Tanimu accordingly enriched himself further at the expense of the Zango chief. By the same token he also served notice that if he or his successors had occasion to replace any other Zango officials, they would exercise their right as suzerain to administer the official estate.

Under the terms of their vassalage, the chiefs of Zango had long lost all independent power of levying troops or waging war. They had also been forbidden to fortify their settlements by building earth walls and were not even permitted to repair the town wall at Zango, which Ibram had built in 1852-1853. Tanimu's permission was also required before a stockade *(keffi)* could be erected. He also forbade any judicial mutilations or executions at Zango. When the *shari'a* ordained such penalties and the *kadi* at Zango imposed them, the local chief was obliged to send the offender to Zinder, together with an account of the offense and the judicial ruling. Tanimu reserved to himself the right to grant reprieves. Fines, whipping, and imprisonment thus became the most severe legal sanctions available to the chiefs of Zango.

It is possible that the capacity of the Zango chief to order mutilations or capital punishment may have been restricted in the reign of Nuhu or Mamman Sha; but with the simultaneous appointments at Zinder of Tafida and Bakula as virtually equal and ostensibly independent vassals of Zinder, this pattern of legal administration was intensified, despite the new ambiguities of jurisdiction and responsibility then introduced. As mentioned above, the senior officials of Zango, by virtue of their traditional *iko,* could levy fines on commoners for conduct that was not always classified as an offence in Muslim law. Such fines were a profitable source of personal revenue to officials, but they were also an effective instrument for securing public compliance and could be used to aggrandize official power. After the chiefs of Zango had lost the authority to order mutilations or executions, fines became the principal local form of penalty. When decreed by the Alkali, whippings were conducted at the palace in the *shamaki.* Imprisonment was also hardly possible without the chief's assent, since the state prisons stood in the palace. Finally, the senior council of state had traditionally reviewed those cases brought to the Alkali that entailed severe punishments, including crippling fines. When Zinder reserved to itself the right to execute or review sentences of death or mutilation, the senior council of Zango increasingly relied on heavy fines to avoid transferring cases to Zinder in order to conserve their authority. However, since the Kaura, the Galadima, and other senior officials such as the Sarkin Yara, the Sarkin Bai, the Shentali, and the Yerima already exercised individual powers of fine which, although varying with the

personnel and issues involved, probably differed little from those of the senior council, the latter, like the Alkali's court before it, gradually lost effective control of many issues that were punished by fines. Important officials to whom complaints were brought might simply summon the offending party, inquire into the affair or confront him with their evidence, and levy a fine. If the offender failed to pay the fine within the period stipulated, the matter might be referred to the Kaura, to the chief, or to the senior council, who would generally increase the penalties, since the culprit's failure to pay constituted a second offence described either as *kin umurci* (refusal to obey orders) or *renon iko* (contempt of authority, office).

Clearly, such increases in the exercise of their informal powers of levying fines by senior officials at Zango after the chief had lost his traditional prerogative of mutilation and execution institutionalized a dispersal of jurisdiction that permitted new and various types of abuse. During Mazawaje's long tenure of power, successive chiefs had lacked the power that was necessary to regulate such abuses. Following Mazawaje's dismissal, when the office of Kaura was removed from the jurisdiction of the Zango chief by Zinder, the juridical situation deteriorated further, since the chief could now take no action against the Kaura and his *lawanai* or clients without risking Zinder's reproof. To preserve his own following among his senior officials, it was also impolitic for the chief to prohibit their use of illegal fines. In any event, as oral traditions attest, there was a rapid deterioration in the rule of law at Zango, which Zinder viewed with indifference.

TAFIDA (1877-1884)

The Chief and the Kaura

By the middle of Tafida's first reign, that is, around 1880, there was a steady emigration of Hausa *talakawa* from Zango territory to Fulani Daura. This movement had various causes, but recent increases in tribute and the decline of the position of commoners vis-à-vis officials at law figured prominently among them. Some reports attribute responsibility for this popular movement to Tafida on the ground that he ordered the vendors of the Zango market to give purchasers from Fulani Daura overweight and compensate themselves by short-weighting subjects of Zango in order simultaneously to stimulate the growth of the market and to attract possible immigrants from Fulani Daura. Other factors which may be more closely connected with this movement are indicated obliquely below. As the emigration proceeded, the officials of Zango found that they could not stop it, although it reduced their revenues. The outflow was thus brought to the notice of Tanimu. He promptly sent a message to Muhamman Mai Gurdo, the emir of Fulani Daura, authorizing him to take or sell into slavery any immigrants from Zango territory he could trace. Superficially this message might be inter-

preted as showing that Tanimu's attitude to his subjects at Zango was callous and hostile. What Tanimu may have felt on this score we cannot say, but his message to Muhamman Mai Gurdo was clearly intended to halt the outflow from Zango, which it did with complete success as soon as Mai Gurdo enslaved and sold the first Hausa immigrants he caught. When the news of this welcome reached Zango, those who were planning to emigrate decided to say where they were. Thus, by apparently authorizing the enslavement of his subjects, Tanimu ensured that they remained at home.

In dividing the tributary responsibilities for Zango between the chief and the Kaura, Tanimu had finally hit on a way of doubling Zango's payments. To insure against default, he had split their tributary responsibilities and set them both in competition as tax gatherers for Zinder, authorizing each to keep all receipts in excess of the tribute due. Originally the chief of Zango had received his share of the *karan fari* and *mairam* taxes from local fiefholders, including the Kaura, together with shares from those who collected the occupational rates. From these revenues he normally set aside a portion as tribute to Zinder. Following Tanimu's reorganization, the Kaura had no obligation to share his tax receipts with the Sarki, but only to send his tribute to Zinder. From reports of elderly informants, the chief received little of the taxes collected by Kaura and that irregularly, as *gaisuwa.* The Kaura could therefore claim that the sultan of Zinder had received all that he could spare. The chief could take no action against him on this account, directly or otherwise.

Traditionally the Kaura had supervised the collection of *karan gona* and *mairam* from the fiefs attached to his office. In addition some of his *lawanai,* such as the Sarka, the Sarkin Diya, the Kusheyi, and the Sarkin Dawaki, levied special taxes as already reported. In some cases this authority represented a duty, while in others it rather resembled a privilege. With these exceptions, neither the traditional Kaura nor his *lawanai* had any interest in the numerous specialized taxes to which the citizens and craftsmen of the Hausa state were subject. Most of these special taxes were collected by craft officials whom the chief appointed and placed under the supervision of his Sarkin Yara, by *fadawa* such as the Tarno, or by such slaves as the Dan Maza and the Sarkin Garka.

As the official directly responsible for state finances, with the assent of the senior council the chief could institute or alter special taxes, organize their collection, and retain the receipts. He could either use these revenues for such private or public purchases as seemed necessary or disburse them as gifts or emoluments among his officials, clients, or kin. Under Zinder's suzerainty some of these special revenues served to swell the tribute; and following Tanimu's division of tributary duties between the chief and the Kaura, the latter soon came to appreciate the importance of these specialized taxes. Since the chief and Kaura had approximately equal numbers of towns and subjects, if the chief continued to exercise his traditional right of levying occupational taxes throughout the country, half his revenues therefrom

would be collected in the Kaura's fiefs. Thus not only would the Kaura lose these useful revenues, but they would augment the income of his rival, the chief.

Once Tanimu had doubled its tribute, the incidence of taxation at Zango rose steeply. It was probably not much later that several occupational taxes in those towns that remained to the chief were increased from 1,200 to 2,500 cowries annually per craftsman. This increase followed the Kaura's assertion of exclusive rights to levy these taxes in his fiefs in order to pay his tribute to Zinder. Thus the Kaura asserted exclusive rights of taxation in those towns attached to his office as fiefs on the basis of his tributary obligations to Zinder. The chief of Zango accordingly lost his traditional right to the special taxes on craftsmen, markets, *garka,* and the like in the Kaura's towns. As we shall see, Kaura also exploited his new position to appropriate some of the few fiefs that remained to his former peer, the Galadima.

Traditionally the Kaura's *lawanai* were mainly charged with the supervision of particular fiefs and the duties of *jekadu.* When Tanimu made Bakula responsible for a fixed tribute twice yearly, the Kaura found that this traditional staff could not handle his increased administrative burden. After some early difficulties in securing the tribute, Bakula first claimed the occupational and market taxes throughout his fiefs and proceeded to develop the implications of this acquisition to their fullest extent.

Like the Sarki, the Kaura had lost substantial revenues by Tanimu's allocation of *jangali* collection to the *sarakunan Fulani* of Gurdo and Tsatsumburum. He could also claim, unlike the chief, that the revenues he had formerly received from his fiefs were together insufficient to meet his tributary dues and maintain his staff. On such grounds, with Zinder's approval, the Kaura soon acquired exclusive control of taxation in his fiefs and the authority to reorganize its collection and incidence as he found necessary. These new fiscal rights enabled the Kaura to keep all fines levied by himself or his agents in his domains. Simultaneously the chief and his officials lost the power to fine the Kaura's subjects. Thus, as fines were then the primary means of official punishment, by denying the chief's right to any part of those he collected, the Kaura simultaneously rejected the chief's power to review or rescind his sentences and achieved complete legal control of the people in his fiefs, subject only to overrule by Zinder.

Having excluded the chief's occupational tax gatherers from settlements under his control, Bakula appointed substitutes bearing identical titles, powers, and duties. Thus, having prohibited the chief's Sarkin Makada (Chief Drummer) from levying tax on drummers in his fiefs, the Kaura appointed a Sarkin Makadan Kaura, who thereafter collected the tax in his fiefs and handed the Kaura the proportion due to the chief. In like fashion Kaura appointed his own Lifidi empowered to levy the customs *(al'adu)* on cotton sold in his markets; he appointed his own Sarkin Busa and Sankira to tax buglers and praise-singers. He appointed a Sarkin Rafi (Chief of Streams) with the functions of the chief's Sarkin Garka; a Sarkin Dillalai to tax the

commission agents in his territory; a Sarkin Pawa to administer the markets throughout Kaura's territory and to supply him with *gaisuwa* of grain and meat. Bakula also instructed his Sarkin Pawa to appoint a Korama in charge of grain sellers. In a bid to seize the majority of the caravan tolls, Bakula appointed a Sarkin Tafarki, whom he directed to collect tolls at prevailing rates from all caravans that followed the route between Rogogo and Gwamba, one of his fiefs that lay twelve miles south. The Sarkin Tafarki appointed by the chief of Zango was thus thereafter restricted to the routes between Tumfafi and Gurdo. Over the next few years the Kaura's official staff grew to include the Turaki Amne, the Ajiya Dan Masusu, the Jarmai Burgu, the Jekafada Adam, the Limams Dan Sabo, and Sha'ibu, the Zagi, and others, all of whom were personally appointed by the Kaura at his compound, paid their *kudin sarauta* to him, and could be dismissed by him directly. Of this new staff, most of the craft officials and some of the war *sarautu,* such as Ajiya or Jarmai, were free, while others were slave. To supervise his *rinji* at Kwajali, Kaura appointed a slave overseer with the title of Gandu. To supervise the affairs of the ward at Zango which was directly under his control, he relied on a client who is known only as Sarkin Masu, from a nickname he had acquired in the traditional play-associations of young men, known at Daura as *magi.* Besides serving as Kaura's ward head at Zango, Sarkin Masu was his official *jekada* to Damagaram. It will be seen from this incomplete list of Kaura's new subordinates that in its titles, functions, and modes of organization, his staff replicated that of his model, the chief. Nonetheless, even at the end of the century, the Kaura's staff did not match the chief's in its size or elaboration. Kaura made no attempt to replicate several offices, such as those of Tarno or Dan Hungumi, perhaps, as some suggest, because their holders agreed to hand over to him appropriate portions of the revenues they collected in his fiefs.

The officials under Kaura's command can be classified as his kin, free clients, and slaves. All of the offices held by his kin were traditional components of the Kaura title—for example, Madaba, Sarka, Dan Kwaba, Sarkin Dawaki, Gilu, and Dan Takora. Kusheyi, who collected the grave tax for Kaura, was normally a slave, and the title of Sarkin Diya was filled irregularly by men of differing status. Under the traditional system, Sarkin Fada was the only office reserved for a client on the Kaura's staff, and he was also the only subordinate whom Kaura himself appointed. Other traditional *lawanai,* being appointed by the ruler, could not be dismissed by Kaura; and this remained their position despite other changes. These old *lawanai* accordingly ranked above the Kaura's new staff by virtue of their traditional status, constitutional position, territorial jurisdiction, and kinship with Kaura, whose successor would normally be chosen from among them. Slaves whom the Kaura appointed to new titles enjoyed high security of tenure as a function of the status of their offices; but the Kaura could dismiss the free clients he had appointed to the new offices on his staff at his own discretion. He was accordingly able to ensure their prompt and loyal observance of his

TABLE 5

Kaura's Lawanai at Zango, 1880-1903

Traditional	New
Dan Kwaba	Limam (Sha'aibu)
Madaba	Turaki (Amne)
Sarka	S. Masu (Nakawo)
S. Dawaki	S. Tafarki (Gumto)
Gilu	Jarumai (Burgu)
Dan Takora	S. Rafi (Mati)
S. Diya	Lifidi (Amale)
S. Fada	S. Pawa–Korama (f)
Kusheyi	Gandu
	Ajiya
	Jekafada
	S. Busa
	S. Makada
	Sankira

Note: S = Sarki.

decisions. In this respect Kaura had more effective control over his new staff than over the old and more than the chief could deploy against his officials. To the people of Zango, who had witnessed the rapid growth of the Kaura's administrative staff, its replication of the chief's, and the division of the chiefdom's territory and tribute between these two rulers, it seemed, as they sang, that "Sarki yana da goro goma, Kaura yana da rabin ashirin"—"the chief has ten kola nuts while Kaura has half a score."

However, relations between the chief and Kaura were not that simple. The Kaura still sat on the chief's senior council, where he could exercise a virtual veto over the chief's proposals. From this position he could also increase his usurpation of legal authority over the people under his administrative control without facing any check. He could take equally effective action to promote or protect those whom he favored and to incommode those he opposed, and as Mazawaje had shown, he could unhorse the chief at appropriate intervals. As the senior elector of Zango and the official with the greatest influ-

ence at Zinder, the Kaura was courted by ambitious princes of rival segments who feared that they would otherwise forfeit their chances of office to less honorable kin. Finally, the Kaura retained his command of the Daura army and senior seat on the chief's war council. An ambitious Kaura thus had ample opportunities for removing some of the chief's ten kola nuts to add to his own; and perhaps the population of Zango recognized this.

Other Officials

Not long after Tafida took office the Yerima Dan Ladan died. As chief Tafida was obliged to administer the dead prince's estate. This included three men and two women whose legal status was disputed. The Yerima's heirs claimed that these people were his slaves, while the five people denied this. The issue was brought to Tafida for decision. Inquiry revealed that the five bondsfolk were kin. Several years earlier, a member of their family had committed some unmentionable offense against Yerima Dan Ladan. In retaliation the Yerima had seized Ayashe, who was the mother of the other four bondsfolk and declared that he would have her killed to square the account. Ayashe's children and kin then besought the Yerima to spare her life and to impose a fine instead. After some delay, he relented and ransomed Ayashe for 1,000,000 cowries, which far exceeded the family's means. In lieu of payment the Yerima then attached Ayashe and her four children to himself, but whether as bondsfolk or slaves remained obscure. These five had served the Yerima till he died, when his heirs claimed them as part of his estate. Tafida ruled otherwise, holding that Ayashe and her children were not slaves, since they had neither been captured nor purchased in the market but had entered bondage to pay off the Yerima's fine. Declaring that fines might be paid by bondage but could not be employed to enslave free persons, Tafida ruled that Dan Ladan's death released Ayashe and her children from bondage, and they were thenceforth free. He also attached Ayashe's eldest son, Musa Jinjiri, to himself and placed him to live in the *shamaki* in charge of his treasury, which included the chiefly regalia. Some time later Tafida conferred on Musa the new title of Shamaki, with official responsibility for the storehouses in the palace. In this way Tafida took some tentative steps toward the establishment of a state treasury, probably imitating the Fulani organization at Daura city and perhaps because Zinder's financial demands made it advisable to formalize control of his stores; but the Kaura had already developed a separate treasury for his revenues and outpayments.

Tafida also rewarded Habu, the son of Dan Bajida Ranau, who had guided Nuhu from Zango to Fara in 1851, by conferring on him the title of Dan Bajida. Not long afterward, when the Shentali Jongo died, Tafida awarded this office to Garake, a wealthy free man of Gurdo. For this appointment Tafida received a handsome *kudin sarauta,* which he kept entirely

to himself. Kakurma and Jongo, who had preceded Garake as Shentali, had both been slaves and had therefore been appointed without *kudin sarauta*. However, to increase his revenues, following Garake's appointment Tafida began to transfer slave titles to free men for heavy payments of *kudin sarauta,* which he retained, thus converting these payments into a lucrative source of irregular revenue.

Though the appointments of Tafida and Bakula in 1877 implicitly relegated the Galadima's office to a secondary rank, its relations with those of the chief and Kaura retained their traditional form. By tradition the Galadima and the Kaura were equal in status, power, and influence under the chief; and Mazawaje's dominance had not destroyed this convention. However, Tanimu's reorganization of 1877 had defined the chief and the Kaura as virtual equals in power and status and contraposed them. Thereafter, as both were so much the Galadima's superiors, he could not avoid choosing between them. Thus, if he supported the chief in council against the Kaura, the Galadima indirectly aligned himself with the chief in other ways also; and if he supported the Kaura against the chief, he virtually placed himself in the Kaura's hands. In the current situation the Galadima could neither stand apart from the rivalry between the Kaura and chief nor serve as an effective referee, and he could not avoid subordinating his office administratively to whichever principal he chose to support. Thus, if he aligned himself with the chief, he implicitly undertook to contribute toward the chief's Zinder tribute, but not to the Kaura's. The converse held equally. The fiscal and administrative relations of the Galadima's office thus tended to reflect his political alignments. However, under traditional arrangements which had not entirely lapsed despite Tanimu's reorganization, the Galadima had held and administered his fiefs by a grant from the chief and on his behalf, being responsible *inter alia* for turning over some of the tax he received annually to the chief and for turning out his levy at the chief's command. Until 1877 this had also been the Kaura's position; and till then, even when the Galadima had supported Kaura against the chief, both had been obliged, as his senior fiefholders, to remit substantial portions of tax from their fiefs to the chief for dispatch to Zinder as tribute or for other expenditures. After 1877, while the Galadima's administrative relation with the chief remained unchanged, his political position had altered as an effect of the changes in those of the Kaura and chief.

Dan Aro had dismissed the Galadima Tsatso because he suspected collusion between Tsatso and Kaura. Any support that the Galadima gave to the chief or the Kaura was likely to be regarded as collusion by the other. Nonetheless, in Mazawaje's later years, the Galadima had tended to support the Kaura against the chief. However, after 1877, by supporting the Kaura politically the Galadima would have given his administrative superior, the chief, ample reason to doubt his loyalty. Thus his situation presented two clear alternatives: the Galadima could either identify himself politically with his



Genealogy 3. The Galadima Lineage of Daura and Zango

administrative superior, the chief; or, if he chose to support the Kaura, he had to choose between risking the loss of his office or transferring his fiefs to Kaura.

The Galadima Takurce, whom Dan Aro appointed, is said to have told Tanimu at Zinder that Tafida had broken Muslim law by taking two sisters simultaneously into his harem. Tanimu sent to question Tafida about this and ordered him to release one of the girls. Learning that Tafida knew the source of this report, the Galadima immediately took to flight, while the Kaura Bakula, who seems to have instigated the allegation, escaped untouched. Tafida, whose accession Takurce had opposed from the start, then appointed one of his closest clients, Abba, in Takurce's place, although Abba was neither a member of the Galadima's lineage nor had he previously held any office. His only qualifications for his high appointment were his loyalty to Tafida and the latter's favor; but although the Galadima's office is traditionally reserved for members of a particular lineage, since Takurce's flight confessed his disloyalty, Tafida as chief probably acted within his prerogative when he transferred the office immediately afterward to a stranger *(shigege)* with no hereditary claim. Such practices were familiar examples of traditional political technique.

Galadima Takurce's flight enhanced Bakula's power by publicly demonstrating the Galadima's disaffection from the chief and his attachment to the Kaura's party. However, within a few years of this incident, Bakula made his first mistake when he gave his daughter in marriage to a leading member of the ruling family of Fulani Daura. This alliance was immediately reported to Tanimu at Zinder, and Bakula fled to Fulani Daura when he learned of Tanimu's response. Tanimu was understandably hostile to such alliances between his remoter vassals and adjacent Fulani, since he was even then having trouble with the Hausa of Baure, whose preference for the Fulani in place of Zinder increased with Zinder's demands. On some reports, Bakula fled after learning that Tanimu had ordered his dismissal; on others he fled in the expectation that this would follow shortly. At Daura Bakula learned of his replacement by Kardaji, the son of a former Kaura, Danjaji, by a daughter of Lukudi. Since Kardaji was Lukudi's grandson, it is possible that Tafida selected him as Kaura in the hope that he would be more in sympathy with the chief than his two predecessors; and perhaps Kardaji owed his nomination to Tafida. However, like Bakula, he owed his appointment to Zinder, paid Tanimu his *kudin sarauta,* and had to furnish his tribute to Zinder.

Kardaji had held the office of Kaura for one and a half years before he was dismissed by Tafida on instructions from Zinder. The reasons for Kardaji's dismissal are quite well known and had nothing to do with disloyalty to Zinder or to the local chief. Instead, his kinsmen in the Kaura lineage demanded his removal on the ground that he was arbitrarily dismissing from office *lawanai* selected by Mazawaje and Bakula. As we have seen, the Kaura's senior *lawanai* held traditional titles conferred by the chief, who alone could withdraw them. With two exceptions, these titles were held by



Genealogy 4. The Kaura Lineage of Daura and Zango

prominent members of the Kaura lineage. Mazawaje and Bakula had predictably filled most of these offices with their close kin drawn from Tamila's segment of the Kaura lineage, while Kardaji's family had received very few appointments; but when Bakula fled, he was accompanied by some of his sons, including the Sarkin Dawaki Lushe and the Gilu Kala. Kardaji gave these positions to his own sons and seems to have threatened the security of the Dan Kwaba Malam, Bakula's younger brother.

By this time the kin and supporters of Mazawaje and Bakula were by far the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful segment of the Kaura lineage. By comparison, Kardaji's line was weak and unimportant. Thus, in dismissing *lawanai* who had held senior traditional offices under Bakula or Mazawaje and by appointing their successors personally without consulting Tafida, securing Tanimu's support, or winning over the Kaura lineage, Kardaji had acted unconventionally and unwisely. The descendants of Tamila and Mazawaje protested vehemently against Kardaji's dismissals and aroused widespread support in Zango town. Kardaji seems to have lost public confidence, perhaps because his senior officers and kinsmen opposed him vigorously. He also lacked the wealth and political skills by means of which Mazawaje and Bakula had carried public opinion, even in their most nefarious schemes. In response to protests and appeals by Bakula's faction for his intervention, Tafida pointed out that since the sultan of Zinder had appointed Kardaji, only he could depose him. In response to further protests, he undertook to relay the complaints of the Kaura lineage to Zinder and did so. It is not clear whether Tafida actually asked Tanimu to dismiss Kardaji or left this to others; but on Tanimu's request, shortly before the end of both their reigns, Tafida informed Kardaji that he was dismissed. As usual in such cases, he sequestrated the Kaura's estate until further orders arrived from Zinder. Bakula was then living at Daura city among the Fulani.

Civil War at Zinder

Five or six years before his death, Tanimu had selected his son Kiyari to assist and succeed him in governing Zinder. To signify this, Tanimu conferred an imperium on Kiyari that was subject only to his own, thus creating a situation not unlike the regime of Lukudi and Nuhu. His appointment and role presented Kiyari to the dynasty and people as Tanimu's chosen successor; and as cosultan Kiyari enjoyed excellent opportunities for gathering the reins of power into his own hands. Embittered by this move, Tanimu's eldest son, Suleiman, left Zinder and set out for Sokoto, where he sought asylum with the Fulani sultan. On hearing of Suleiman's flight, Tanimu sent a column to capture him, but Suleiman escaped. Tanimu than withdrew the powers he had given Kiyari and resumed sole direction of the government in order to remove Suleiman's hostility and distrust. However, remembering the fates of others who had visited Zinder at his father's request, Suleiman

decided to remain away but moved to Daura to await his father's death, as Tanimu had done before him.

At Daura Suleiman met Bakula, who promised him all the military support at his command in the coming succession struggle and undertook to arrange this with the Kaura's people at Zango. Kardaji had already been dismissed, but his successor had not yet been appointed. Bakula accordingly directed his younger brother, the Dan Kwaba Malam, who was then administering the Kaura's office as Kardaji's deputy and probable successor, to arrange that the Kaura's *lawanai* and followers would rally behind Suleiman in the event of another civil war at Zinder.

On Tanimu's death in 1884, Suleiman also attempted to secure promises of support from Tafida at Zango. Years before, an unguarded comment by Tafida about his conduct on Kiyari's elevation had been relayed to Suleiman at Zinder; in consequence, Suleiman was anxious to know where Tafida's sympathies lay. But following Tanimu's death the traditional electors of Zinder set aside the claims of Suleiman, Kiyari, and Rufa'i, Tanimu's eldest sons, and chose Ibrahim, also called Abba Gwoto, to succeed. Like other vassals of Zinder, Tafida was summoned to the capital and obliged to swear allegiance to the new chief. Thus when Suleiman sought his support against Abba Gwoto, not long afterward, Tafida was formally correct to refuse. For the same reason, Suleiman's appeals for aid to Tafida's close supporters, the Galadima Abba and the Shentali Garake, drew similar refusals. However, on securing troops from the Izagaren Tuareg, Suleiman set out for Zinder and defeated Abba Gwoto at Zagawa west of Katifo after he had reigned for only eighty-four days. From Zagawa, Suleiman moved direct to Zinder and sent detachments to capture Abba Gwoto, whom he assured of safety and settled amicably at Zinder near the court.[65]

SULE (1884-1886)

On learning the news of Zagawa, Tafida at once prepared for flight. Accompanied by his family, the Galadima Abba, the Sarkin Yara Jibirin, the Shentali Garake, Shamaki Musa Jinjiri, and one or two others, Tafida went to Maradi, while Bakula advised Suleiman to appoint his namesake, Sule, the son of Sarkin Gwari Abdu, as chief of Zango. Sule was summoned and formally installed by the new sultan of Zinder at Dan Barto before Suleiman proceeded farther north; and either then or very shortly after, Suleiman restored Bakula to Zango as Kaura in reward for his valuable support, the office having remained vacant since Kardaji's dismissal. Thus, for the second time in less than eight years, Zango received a new chief and a new Kaura together. However, on this occasion the Kaura Bakula was being reinstated by a sultan who stood in his debt for assistance in securing his throne. Thus, besides such assets as his experience in the Kaura's office and the loyalty his staff had shown in protesting at Kardaji's regime and securing his

removal, Bakula could also rely on the favor of the new sultan whom he had helped to place on the throne at Zinder. By contrast, the new chief of Zango, Sule, lacked any independent support and was entirely dependent on Bakula, to whom he owed his nomination and appointment. As we have seen, Sule was first nominated for the chiefship by Mazawaje when Haruna was deposed, but Tanimu appointed Dan Aro instead. Since then he had had no chance to win further prominence. His appointment merely illustrated Zinder's practice of selecting successive chiefs of Zango from opposing segments of the royal lineage.

Since Tafida was accompanied on his flight by the Galadima Abba, Zango was simultaneously without a chief, a Kaura, or a Galadima. On learning this, Bakula pressed Suleiman of Zinder to recall Jatau, who had held the office of Dan Bawo under Galadima Takurce and had fled from Zango with Takurce during Tafida's reign. Jatau's father, Makori, had been appointed as Galadima by Lukudi at Acilafiya after Alhassan's death; but neither Makori nor Jatau belonged to the lineage in which the Galadima title traditionally vested. However, as Takurce had lost his office through disloyalty to Tafida, while Abba, by sharing Tafida's flight, had exhibited his disloyalty to Suleiman, Jatau, who had shared Takurce's flight from Tafida, was a candidate whom Zinder could approve.

In nominating Jatau for the vacant position of Galadima, Bakula also consulted his own interests as Kaura. As Takurce's client, Jatau had owed his appointment as Dan Bawo entirely to Takurce's favor. A native of Kanda, one of the few towns that remained to the Galadima, Jatau lacked sufficient resources to pay the *kudin sarauta* for his appointment as Galadima independently. It is said that when recalled from exile for installation, he did not even have a horse. Bakula undertook to contribute Jatau's *kudin sarauta,* and to publicize his domination of the new Galadima, he presented a horse to Jatau on his appointment. Thus, in pressing Suleiman to appoint him, Bakula astutely sought to remove the office of Galadima from the chief's control and to attach it to himself instead or, at the very least, to neutralize it by placing it under the direct supervision of the sultan of Zinder. In return for securing his appointment and paying his *kudin sarauta,* Bakula required Jatau to transfer to him the Galadima's rights in Kanda, Komo ta Malam Kinci, Komo ta Ubandawaki, Anguwan Kalla, and Dushe settlements. Together these represented about one-half of the fiefs that still remained to the Galadima. To signalize his control, Bakula then directed his Sarkin Pawa to make Kanda, which had a flourishing market, the headquarters for his market administration.

The new chief of Zango, Sule, bitterly resented Bakula's high-handed actions. By placing the new sultan of Zinder in his political debt, Bakula had surpassed Mazawaje's greatest achievements. He had simultaneously secured his own reinstatement; the appointment of a Galadima and chief he had chosen; and, perhaps most important, the removal of the Galadima's office and fiefs from the chief of Zango's jurisdiction. Lacking the power to

weaken Bakula and humiliated by the circumstances of his appointment and by his continuing impotence, Sule expressed his frustration and anger by pouring abuse and scorn on Bakula whenever occasion offered. Despite his superior power, Bakula was obliged to hold his peace and avoid offensive replies not only by the norms of Hausa conduct, but also by the fact that he was on such occasions generally surrounded at the palace by the chief's attendants. Perhaps Sule hoped by these taunts to provoke Bakula to some rash act which could then be reported to Zinder as evidence of *tawaye* (rebellion) or as rejection of the chief's authority *(kin umurci);* but he must have foreseen the probability that Zinder would support Bakula in that event. Nonetheless, Bakula took care to give Sule no cause for such charges; and since Sule clearly found his situation intolerable, Bakula decided to have him removed.

As Kaura of Zango, Bakula commanded the military forces of the chiefdom. He had no authority to summon them to arms, this being part of the chief's prerogative; but as the senior member of the chief's war council, he could influence the chief's decision to call out the levy. To secure Sule's removal, Bakula exploited these relations. By preparing circumstantial evidence at Yanduna and elsewhere, he convinced the war council that the chief of Kazaure, Muhamman Maiyaki (1866-1914), had prepared an attack on Zango. The council then advised Sule to make ready enough war weapons to equip every man in Zango town to meet this expected attack. While the weapons were being forged, Bakula secretly informed Suleiman of Zinder that following the advice of his Yerima Jirro, the chief of Zango was preparing to rebel. He concluded by inviting Suleiman to send a messenger forthwith to Zango to investigate the report; and on the eve of the messenger's arrival he informed the chief that his secret information indicated that the Kazaure forces would probably attack that night or early the next day. Sule, unsuspecting, at once summoned the townsfolk to the palace and distributed the weapons. Thus, when the Sarkin Dawakin Zinder arrived at Zango on the following day, he found its population fully armed and ready for hostilities. Accepting Bakula's allegations, he dismissed Sule on the spot, as the sultan of Zinder had ordered him to do in such circumstances. Bakula was then asked to nominate a suitable successor and selected Yusufu, Haruna's brother, a son of Lukudi. As the Yerima Jirro had been charged with persuading Sule to revolt against Zinder, he was also summarily dismissed. Thus, having already obtained control of the Galadima's office and nominations for the chiefship, Bakula displayed a new range of power by having the Yerima Jirro dismissed. This event warned other officials attached to the chief that although their tenures of office depended directly on the chief's goodwill, they depended indirectly on the Kaura's complaisance. The manner in which Sule was deposed after a reign of two years and two months ensured that all at Zango, including his successor, recognized Bakula's predominance.

YUSUFU (1886-1891)

When Yusufu succeeded in 1886, he was already old and ill, and after his appointment he soon lost his vigor. Unlike Sule, Yusufu recognized the Kaura's political superiority; and to protect the chiefship from further humiliations and loss of authority, he avoided challenging him. Following Sule's behavior, Yusufu especially sought to avoid offending Bakula either personally or by intervening in his administration. Thus, when required by Suleiman to lead the Daura levy to join the Zinder forces in Suleiman's attacks on Madaka and Zuru in northern Kano, Yusufu obeyed but placed Bakula in command of the Zango troops. However, having seized the throne of Zinder by force, to legitimate his rule, Suleiman reestablished the relations of vassalage with the Shehu of Bornu, which Tanimu had broken. Together with his numerous expeditions against the Jelkos, Kazaure, the Tuareg, and Kano, this renewal of vassalage, which entailed tribute to Bornu, led Suleiman to seek further revenues from his subjects. During Yusufu's reign, Zinder accordingly increased its demands for tribute on Zango; but since the people were already taxed near the limits of their capacity, Bakula and Yusufu managed to prevent any major increase in the rate of tribute. Thus Suleiman found that the only source from which he could obtain further revenues was the local officialdom. He accordingly demanded that the major portion of the *kudin sarauta* received by the Zango chief for local appointments should thereafter be sent on to Zinder. By this means, besides increasing his revenues at Yusufu's expense, he simultaneously established rights to portions of the estates of those officials whose *kudin sarauta* he received. Thus these new burdens fell squarely on the chief of Zango without affecting his officials.

Suleiman's second innovation aroused more disturbance. He began sending his *jekadu* to Zango with summary instructions to levy predetermined fines on particular officials for offenses they were alleged to have committed against the authority of Zinder. These *jekadu* would come to Zango with a mounted escort of slave riflemen who announced their arrival by volleys of gunfire. The Sarkin Yara would at once go to greet them and escort them to his compound or take them to the palace, where, after salutations and refreshments, they would disclose their business to the chief. If an official had been fined for an alleged offense, the Sarkin Yara would summon him to the palace, where the chief would inform him of the charge and the sultan of Zinder's decision. Although the accused official might deny the allegation, it was not subject to refutation, since that implicitly impugned the sultan's veracity and justice. Thus to avoid implicating themselves further by serious political offenses, accused officials took care not to push their denials too far.

For his part, the chief of Zango could do little to assist his subordinate without inculpating himself as disloyal. The *jekada* from Zinder who was

charged with levying the fine also lacked authority to withdraw the charge or modify the sultan's demand. Only when the *jekada* pronounced the fine and set the period of payment could the chief of Zango intervene effectively to help his subordinate by seeking *rangwame* on his behalf. At Zinder, as at Zango, official cash payments could be converted into kind equivalents by *rangwame* at variable rates. On favorable terms, such substitutions could significantly reduce the values transferred. Alternatively, kind equivalents offered in place of money might be so disvalued that the amount transferred would exceed the original sum. As patron of all his officials, the chief of Zango could appeal to the Zinder *jekada* to accept a favorable *rangwame,* and he could also undertake to stand security *(ceto)* for some part of the fine or, alternatively, contribute toward its payment; but he could neither cancel the fine, absolve the accused of the charge, nor settle the rate of *rangwame* himself. Thus, apart from his intercession, he was a powerless witness of his officials' humiliation; and by his passive role during these events, he revealed his impotence.

Daura informants assert that most of the reports on which these individual accusations and fines were based were sent to Zinder in secret by the Kaura Bakula. In the nature of the case there is no independent evidence to confirm this; but there is no reason to doubt that the attribution is at least partially true. For many years previously, the Kauras of Zango had maintained private channels of communication with the sultans of Zinder, which had been used to discredit and depose various chiefs. Following the deposition of Sule and the Yerima's dismissal in 1886, the possibility that the Kaura would use this resource to weaken further the chief's position by subverting the loyalties of his officials became clear to all. In the current situation, such subversion promised the Kaura the greatest rewards, including the ultimate possibility that Zinder might abolish the discredited chiefship, with local support, and thereby leave the Kaura in charge of Zango, as his namesake was at Kurni. To support their claim that Bakula fed the Sarkin Zinder with these malicious reports, my informants pointed out that none of Bakula's *lawanai* or followers ever suffered such accusations or fines, unlike officials attached to the throne.

Bakula may have been guided by personal motives in selecting particular members of the chief's entourage for accusations of disloyalty to Zinder; but these procedures also diverted attention from the conduct of his office. There are many indications that the Kaura's fiefs suffered severely from maladministration at this time. For example, Bakula's agent, the Gilu Wandale, developed a habit of levying *agama* at the Kanda market for his own profit whenever he saw fit. Since they were most easily confiscated and converted into cash, he specialized in seizing cloth and robes. In consequence the cloth sellers, and especially the commission agents, were so severely plundered that they eventually arranged for the market drummers to station themselves at strategic places and drum prearranged signals whenever they saw the Gilu or his people approaching the market. The cloth sellers would

then hurriedly remove themselves and their goods. Their appeals to the Sarkin Pawa and the Kaura for protection against the Gilu's *agama* were apparently futile.

Bakula had had to assemble new staff and organize the tax collections for the Zinder tribute at considerable speed. In doing so he had failed to define the delegated *iko,* and he had also failed to prevent the appropriation by his traditional *lawanai* of new powers over their fiefs. Gilu Wandale's market activities illustrate the latter development nicely. Alternatively, either Bakula did not care to protect his people against his officials, since the people were still formally subjects of Zango, or he may have felt that such conduct by his agents would do him little harm. He may even have reasoned that if such oppression impressed the public with the new range and intensity of his power, it should increase the stream of people who would seek his protection and favors as supporters and clients. Undoubtedly some men from the Kaura's towns visited the chief to seek his intervention and personal assistance; but the old *tarayya* relations could no longer bridge the gulf between the Kaura's administration and that of the chief. In response to such appeals, Yusufu could only undertake to speak personally to Bakula on behalf of the petitioner; and when this failed to secure relief, recognizing his own incapacities, he would point out that the Kaura held his power from the sultan of Zinder, independently of Yusufu himself. Yusufu was thus obliged to acknowledge publicly that he could do nothing to protect his subjects against the depredations of the Kaura's staff.

When the people under Kaura recognized Yusufu's inability to protect them against Bakula's agents, some began to seek the protection of officials at Zinder through the *tarayya* institution which also flourished there. It seems that while some officials at Zinder were willing to extend their patronage to the wealthier people under Kaura's control, they regarded less wealthy subjects as neither politically nor economically worth the trouble. Nonetheless, one of the latter, a free Hausa called Shagori from Garba Koreni, one of the Kaura's fiefs, distressed by the extortions of Bakula's agents and by Yusufu's inability to help, set out for Damagaram to complain to the Sarkin Zinder about the way in which Bakula's fiefs were administered. Having listened to the complaint, Suleiman dispatched Shagori under armed guard to the Kaura with orders to send him back to Garba Koreni and execute him on his farm as a lesson to other commoners not to bring reports against their rulers to Zinder. According to my informants, Shagori was duly executed in the presence of his wife.

Shortly after this incident, a free client of Bakula who had earned the nickname "Almajirin Kade" (The Crocodile's Pupil) by his thievish habits was accosted by the *maigari* of Ajuru village and struck out and killed him. The matter was reported to Yusufu, who sent it to the Alkali Yusi, also called Yusufu, for decision. The Alkali established the accused's guilt under the *shari'a* and sentenced him to death. Since capital punishment could no longer be carried out at Zango, Almajirin Kade was sent to Zinder under

CHART A

State Organization at Daura, c. 1800

Chief	Rukunai and their staffs	Royals	Courtiers (freemen)	Craft officials	Slaves
S A R K I	KAURA*+≠ {Dan Kwaba, Madaba, Sarka, Sarkin Dawaki, Gilu, Dan Takora} SARKIN FADA {Sarkin Diya(1), Kushey(1)}	Princes Yerima – Magaji Murka Bunturawa Haska (Gara) Maiwa Sarkin Shanu Samba'a	Fadawa {Guyama, Ubandawaki} Sarkin Tafarki Dan Bajida (Baushi) Sarkin Karma Barde Sarkin Zagi Dan Barau Barage Magaji Dankakulema Magaji Bayamadi	Sarkin Pawa (Korama [f]) Sarkin Dillalai Sarkin Zango Sarkin Makera Sarkin Marina Sarkin Gini Magajin Aska Bulkacima Maduqu	Senior throne slaves Sarkin Yara(2)≠ (Shentali) (Jekafada) Sarkin Bai ≠ (Sarkin Fada) Bai Karama Turaki ≠ Sarkin Ruwa Fada Babba ≠ Sarkin Dogarai Hauni Shentali ≠ Palace slaves Sarkin Garka Dan Maza Jekafada Sarkin Jarmai Lifidi Makama Ajiya
	GALADIMA*+≠ — Magayaki {Dan Bawo, Dan Kumalo, Dan Hungumi, Yekuwa} SARKIN FADA {Matsai, Binoni}	Princesses MAGAJIYA (f) Yar Kuntu (f) Magajiya Karya (f) Dan Gawa (f) Saraki (f)	Court musicians Sarkin Busa Sarkin Makada Sankira Magajin Tambari {Magajin Turu, Dan Tomo}		
	Clerics Limamin Juma'a*+ Na'ibi Alkali*+ Dan Sanwai*+ {Mardandana (Magajin Malam), Samba'a, Dan Kurege}	Gabsai(f) Iya (f) Maidaki (f)	Dakama (f) Court magicians {Dan Baroka (f), Sarkin Masu}		

Tarno

LEGEND:
- (f) = Female (all others are male).
- * = Electors.
- + = On senior council of state.
- ≠ = On war council.
- (1) = Throne slaves attached to Kaura's staff (see text).
- (2) = Concerning Sarkin Yara's status c. 1800, see text, pp. 138.

CHART B

State Organization at Zango, c. 1895

Chief

SARKI

Free rukunai and their staffs

+Kaura

1 {
- Sarka
- Dan Kwaba
- Sarkin Dawaki
- Gilu
- Dan Takora
- Sarkin Diya
- Sarkin Fada
- Kusheyi

2 {
- Limam
- Turaki
- Sarkin Tafarki
- Jarmai
- Sarkin Rafi
- S. D. Hali
- Lifidi
- S. Pawa (Korama [f])
- Gandu
- Ajiya
- Jekafada
- Zagi
- Sarkin Busa
- Sarkin Makada
- Sankira

+Galadima
- Dan Kumalo
- Dan Hunqumi
- Dan Bawo
- Magayaki
- Binoni
- Yekuwa

S. Fada (Barde/Matsai)

Royals

Princesses

Magajiya {Yar Kuntu, Magajiya Karya, Dan Gawa}

Iya {Dan Baroka (f), Sarkin Masu (m)}

Saraki (Maskome)
Gabsai

Maidaki

Princes
- Yerima
- Murka
- Bunturawa
- Magaji
- Maiwa
- Gara

Clerics

+Limam
Na'ibi

+Alkali

+Dan Sanwai
- Mardandana*
- Magajin Malam*
- Samba'a
- Dan Kurege

Courtiers
- Tarno
- S. Tafarki
- Ubanda waki
- Dan Bajida
- S. Baka
- Dan Barau
- S. Zagi
- Barde
- S. Fada
- S. Karma
- Magaji Dankakulema
- Barage
- S. Zango
- S. Lafiya
- Magaji Bayamadi

Craft officials
- S. Pawa (S. Shanu)
- (Samba's)
- Korama (f)
- Magajin Aska
- S. Marina
- S. Gini
- S. Makera
- Yeriman Makera
- Bulkacima
- Madugu
- S. Dillalai

Court musicians
- Magajin Turu[1]
- Dan Tomo
- Dakama (f)[2]
- Magajin Tambari
- S. Busa
- S. Makada
- Sankira

[1] Directly under Saraki.
[2] Directly under Gabsai.

Throne slaves

Slave rukunai and their staffs		Palace slaves
Sarkin Bai	Bai Karama	Sarkin Garka
	Sarkin Ruwa	Makama
	Sarkin Fada	Dan Maza
Sarkin Yara	Guyama	Sarkin Jarmai
	Shentali	Lifidi
	Sarkin Fada	Shamaki
Fada Babba	Hauni	Ubandawaki
	Sarkin Dogarai	Ajiya
Turaki		Jekafada
Shentali	Sarkin Fada	

LEGEND:
- * See p. 129.
- \+ On senior council of state.
- (m) Male (where not clear).
- (f) Female (where not clear).
- 1. Kaura's traditional *lawanai*.
- 2. Kaura's new *lawanai* (c. 1891-1906).

guard, despite appeals on his behalf by Kaura. Bakula then sent his Sarkin Masu to Zinder with gifts and asked Suleiman to grant Almajirin Kade a full reprieve. Bakula appealed for this reprieve on the ground that if Suleiman executed the Alkali's sentence, it would seriously weaken his (Bakula's) authority among the people of Zango and could thus stimulate disobedience and unrest. Suleiman accepted the bribe and the argument and returned Almajirin Kade to Bakula clothed in finery. To convince the people that his power was ultimately beyond or above the law, Bakula directed Almajirin Kade to revisit Ajuru, the scene of his crime, and relate his experience to its people. This incident impressed on all the futility of challenging Bakula's power by invoking the law against his agents and *lawanai.* Suleiman's decision to support and strengthen Bakula by reprieving his agent even though the law had clearly been broken illustrated his decision to administer the Hausa of Zango indirectly through Bakula while maintaining their political divisions. Given the same situation, Tanimu might have decided otherwise.

It is said that during Yusufu's reign Bakula acquired control of all Kushekawa towns that remained to the Galadima merely by issuing orders which their chiefs and people did not dare to evade or resist. However, I have been able neither to verify this appropriation nor to trace its details adequately. Dargage, the senior Kushekawa town after Kurni, which was then occupied by the Kaura of Zinder, was still officially attached to the throne; and I cannot date the Kaura's acquisition of Koza or Maiturmi, two other Kushekawa communities. Perhaps the main significance of this report is to show that following his recent demonstrations of political and legal inviolability, the Kaura could now issue orders to commoners living beyond his territories which they dared not disobey. The formal dispersion of administrative authority among the chief's fiefholders no longer served to restrain the Kaura's power. Those of the chief's officials who sought to overrule such orders by Kaura exposed themselves to secret reports to Zinder, charges of disloyalty, and punitive fines.

Perhaps to hide his responsibility for these reports, Bakula tried to place the blame for Zinder's imposts on Yusufu, whom he accused of receiving part of the fines as chief and of seeking to impoverish his officials to satisfy his avarice. Yusufu duly learned that Bakula had spread this allegation and visited Bakula one morning to protest that he had neither any knowledge of these reports to Zinder nor any desire for his subordinates' wealth, offering to swear his innocence on the Koran, which the Dan Sanwai had brought along with him. Bakula disclaimed all knowledge of these allegations and effectively prevented Yusufu from taking the oath by protesting his own inferior status. "Why should the chief want to come and swear his innocence before me?" he asked, "Why me?" Yusufu, who was then quite ill, returned to the palace without taking the oath.

At this stage Bakula made a second error. Mamman Kace, who had been elected at Zinder to succeed his father, Ibram, but had been swept aside by the victorious Tanimu, prepared to rebel against Suleiman in an attempt to

seize the throne. In 1890-1891 Mamman Kace put his troops in the field. Suleiman sent an army under his Ciroma Jibril to meet them. The two forces met at Rogogo near the boundary between Fulani Daura and Zango, where Mamman Kace was conquered and killed. At some stage of this campaign one of the senior Zinder princes, Ahmadu Majerinji, a younger brother of Suleiman, came to Zango and visited Bakula to seek hospitality and aid, being famished and without resources. Bakula, who was loyal to Suleiman, may have believed that his guest belonged to the party of Mamman Kace; but it appears that Ahmadu identified himself clearly. Whatever the details of their meeting, Bakula treated Ahmadu harshly and sent him elsewhere, declaring that he would find no hospitality in Zango. Ahmadu had no alternative but to obey. However, within a few months Suleiman died at Zinder and the electors chose Ahmadu to succeed. On receiving a summons from Ahmadu, Bakula wisely fled once more to Fulani Daura. On learning of Bakula's flight, the new sultan consulted his council and was advised by Abba Gwoto to dismiss the ailing Yusufu on grounds of ill health and to reinstate Tafida. In this way, Abba Gwoto argued, Ahmadu could establish a new political balance at Zango between the Kaura and the chief which might enable him to recover for Zinder the control of Zango affairs that Suleiman had lost to Bakula. Yusufu had shown himself incapable of coping with his Kaura under the previous regime, but Tafida, having already had experience of Zinder and the Kaura as chief, might be able to do so. Ahmadu accepted this advice, summoned Yusufu to Zinder and dismissed him on grounds of ill health, and sent him to farm at Lantai, where he died. He then recalled Tafida, whom he reappointed as chief of Zango for a second *kudin sarauta* of 2,000,000 cowries. The office of Kaura was given to Malam, also called Mamman, Bakula's younger brother and Dan Kwaba. It seems likely that Malam was also appointed as Kaura at Zinder by the sultan; but he died three years later after a relatively uneventful tenure of office.

TAFIDA'S SECOND REGIN (1891-1904)

Changing Conditions of Office

During Malam's final illness Bakula made a last attempt to recover the Kaura title. From Fulani Daura, where he was staying, he sent large gifts of horses, slaves, and other valuables via the Sarkin Dawaki of Zinder to the Sultan Ahmadu Majerinji. These gifts expressed simultaneously his loyalty to Zinder and his interest in the coming appointment. Ahmadu accepted the prestations gladly and summoned Bakula to Zinder, arranging meanwhile that the Sarkin Dawaki of Zinder should advance various objections to Bakula's reinstatement shortly before his investiture. Thus, when Ahmadu had expressed his willingness to reinstate Bakula, the appointment was refused on the grounds that Bakula had assisted Suleiman in his accession war,

which had cost Zinder a thousand lives; that Bakula had also aided Mamman Kace in the struggle which ended at Rogogo, which was untrue; and that Bakula was an ally of Fulani Daura and thus an enemy of Zinder. By this charade, Ahmadu repaid Bakula handsomely for his earlier insults, while exhibiting him as a warning to other ambitious members of the Kaura lineage at Zango. Moreover, by leaving the Sarkin Dawaki to present Zinder's objections to Bakula's conduct, Ahmadu maintained that appearance of impartiality which was the ruler's best means of assuring the submission of powerful officials. Bakula's humiliation was witnessed by the Kaurawa of Zango, who had been summoned to Zinder on Malam's death for the new appointment. The title of Kaura was then given to Salihu, Malam's Dan Kwaba and younger brother. Salihu retained the office for the rest of Tafida's reign.

On his reappointment Tafida was required to furnish a new *kudin sarauta.* To meet this charge, he introduced to Zango a practice which Tanimu had instituted at Zinder when he recovered its throne in 1853. Essentially this was a demand for further payments of *kudin sarauta* from all who held office at Zango on Tafida's return. Such payments were thereafter referred to as *kudin wankan sarauta,* "money for washing (cleansing) the office." By levying these sums at Zinder in 1853, Tanimu had simultaneously impressed his power on its officials and obtained the wealth he needed to reward his supporters for their help in the recent conflict. Likewise, by levying *kudin wankan sarauta* at Zango, Tafida sought to raise contributions toward his heavy appointment fee and to demonstrate his supremacy as chief. As this was the first time in the history of Daura on which *kudin wankan sarauta* was levied, Tafida could claim no precedent to authorize it. His innovation accordingly derived its validity from the *iko* and status of chiefship. Those officials who demurred or delayed in meeting this request invited dismissal on the familiar ground of *renon iko,* and some were in fact dismissed as examples. Thus, by imposing this new and altogether unfamiliar levy on the Zango officials, Tafida, like Tanimu before him at Zinder, showed them where power lay; and perhaps because his action was unconstitutional, he thereby restored to the chiefship some of its lost political capacity and warned his subjects indirectly that the chief could act like the Kaura. Whether or not Tafida intended thus to enhance the political status of the chiefship by accentuating its political attributes, since the levy was unconstitutional, unprecedented, and undertaken without Zinder's knowledge, it derived its efficacy from the extraordinary residual powers of the chief. By manifesting these powers, it preserved and increased them.

Either then or very shortly after, Tafida began to demand payments of *kudin sarauta* from candidates for hereditary and other offices traditionally reserved for slaves. Like the *kudin wankan sarauta,* this innovation was unconstitutional and without precedent. Hitherto throne slaves had been recruited to office without *kudin sarauta,* since their persons and property were alike identified with the institution of chiefship. This identification had

been so close that only in a few cases were slave officials ever dismissed and then only for serious breaches of loyalty to the throne. Throne slaves were expected to pay the *kudin sarauta* for their offices by defending the chief in battle, if need be with their lives. It is true that in his first reign Tafida had transferred the office of Shentali to his free client, Garake, for a sizable sum and thereby ended the long slave tenure of that title, which began when Lukudi appointed Kakurma after Bacici had deserted to join Kitari at Magaria. Garake's appointment as Shentali thus had a precedent to legitimate it in Bacici's appointment by Lukudi; but when Tafida on his return began to demand *kudin sarauta* from slaves, thereby implicitly disassociating the chief from the throne, he asserted a power to alter the conditions of these relations and appointments which, whatever its strictly constitutional status, was manifestly political in its character and implications.

As might be expected, this innovation provoked initial resistance. The critical case concerned the appointment to the office of Bai Karama. Ever since Lukudi had installed Tsoho as Bai Karama at Acilafiya, and perhaps for some years before, this position had been hereditary within a lineage whose official status was that of slaves. Shortly before Tafida's return, on the death of Bai Karama Abdu in a skirmish at Fulani Daura, the office passed to his son, Salihu. Tafida, on coming to Zango, asked Salihu for *kudin sarauta.* Salihu refused to provide this on the ground that the demand was unconstitutional and without precedent. Tafida then dismissed him and gave the office to Nakada, a free Beriberi client of his Sarkin Yara Kwanyami. Nadaka held the office till his death in 1918, following which the title lapsed. This example had the desired effect. When the senior office of Sarkin Bai, which was also held by Salihu's kinsmen, fell vacant shortly afterward on the death of Umaru Tandi, the Sarkin Ruwa Killo promptly paid the *kudin sarauta* Tafida demanded to ensure his own promotion and to preserve his lineage rights to the office. Thereafter, whatever may have been their private opposition to the chief's demands for *kudin sarauta,* throne slaves recognized that unless they met his demands, they forfeited office. Thereafter Tafida encountered no open opposition on this score, although his innovation was widely resented as an abuse.

In his first reign Tafida had dismissed the Sarkin Pawa Gargarau and appointed Gargarau's father's brother's son Hayaki in his stead. We do not know the circumstances which led to Gargarau's dismissal; but this was the first occasion anyone recalls that a Sarkin Pawa had been dismissed. Not long afterward Yusufu dismissed Hayaki and replaced him by Tinkili, a younger brother of Gargarau. When Tafida returned, he first replaced Tinkili by Hayaki, then Hayaki by his brother Dandansha, then Dandansha by Gargarau's brother Ladsho, following which he appointed as Sarkin Pawa Kato of the Unguwan Sambawa, who had married one of his daughters. In short order Kato was replaced by Ladsho, then recovered the office and lost it again to Dandansha, who was succeeded by Hayaki.

This hectic series of appointments and dismissals nicely illustrates the

changed relations between the chiefship and subordinate offices in Tafida's second reign. The successive dismissals and reappointments to the title of Sarkin Pawa were made by Tafida to augment his income as necessary by securing additional bribes *(gaisuwa)* and payments of *kudin sarauta.* As one of the most lucrative appointments, the title of Sarkin Pawa carried a correspondingly high appointment fee of approximately one million cowries. Moreover, as the head of the local market and senior butcher, the Sarkin Pawa could be relied on to furnish this sum or its equivalent without distress and in a reasonable time. Having completed these payments, he could then be replaced by one of his kin or by wealthy butchers from other lineages, with consequent gains to the chief. Whether these butchers actively sought their reappointments or accepted them for fear of offending the chief, we cannot say. However, in 1906, when the British instructed Tafida's successor, Malam Musa, to move to Daura, Hayaki, who was then for the third time Sarkin Pawa, preferred to forfeit the office and remain in Zango rather than move with the court. It is said that Hayaki welcomed this opportunity to relieve himself of a title that had become as burdensome to its holders as it was profitable to the chief; and since this was the first occasion on which the butchers of Zango could escape their hereditary office, Hayaki's decision suggests that some of his kinsmen reappointed by Tafida may not have sought this honor themselves. As its holding lineage refused to leave Zango, at Daura Musa was forced to appoint a local butcher called Dan Namingi, since the city market needed an official head. Meanwhile, by remaining at Zango the butcher lineages that Sarkin Gwari, Lukudi, and Nuhu had successively ennobled forfeited all hereditary claims on the title and with it, their ambiguous place among the office nobility.

In like fashion Tafida dismissed the Sarkin Zango Ciluki and appointed Mijihajji in his place. Shortly afterward, Mijihajji was dismissed and replaced by Ciluki; and when the latter was dismissed for a second time, Tafida gave the office to Mato shortly before his death. The Magaji Bayamadi Ajere had been dismissed by Yusufu and replaced by Nakwabo with Zinder's support. Tafida dismissed Nakwabo and replaced him by Leko, who is said to have subsequently been made mad by medicine, thus requiring another appointment. Tafida also dismissed his Turaki Bazaye and Fada Babba Dogari, giving these offices to eligible slaves on receipt of *kudin sarauta.* These examples indicate how Tafida exploited the allocation of office to enhance his revenues and intensify his political control.

It is not certain whether Tafida retained all the *kudin sarauta* that he received from these appointments to slave and free offices or passed them in whole or part to his suzerain at Zinder. According to some statements, Tafida's demands for *kudin sarauta* from slaves and his numerous changes of officials were both ordered by Ahmadu Majerinji from Damagaram. According to others, the initiative for these particular developments lay with Tafida himself. It seems likely that these conflicting statements emphasize differing aspects of a complex and obscure situation. Ahmadu certainly

demanded increased revenues from Zango and sought to exercise a closer control of its official allocations than had any of his predecessors. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that he was directly responsible for Salihu's dismissal from the office of Bai Karama or for the successive dismissals and appointments to the offices of Sarkin Pawa or Sarkin Zango listed above. Ahmadu's interventions to redistribute Zango offices are well remembered, and on the evidence available they were restricted to the most senior political positions.

Not long after Salihu succeeded as Kaura, Ahmadu Majerinji ordered the dismissal of Galadima Jatau on the ground that as he did not belong to the lineage in which the office vested, he was ineligible to hold it. For some time before this, Jangwale, Galadima Masallaci's son by Ahmadu's mother's sister, had been pressing Ahmadu for the appointment. Tafida, who had won Jatau's loyalty, was so dismayed on receiving Ahmadu's letter directing him to appoint Jangwale that he is said to have secluded himself for four days before implementing the order. Dismissed, Jatau withdrew from the chiefdom accompanied by his son, the Dan Bawo Fari. Jangwale, who had previously held no office and owed his appointment solely to Ahmadu, nominated his younger brother Baki to the office of Dan Bawo soon after he himself succeeded as Galadima. Jangwale had already expended most of his wealth in canvassing the appointment at Zinder; and since the Kaura had acquired control over several of the Galadima's fiefs during Jatau's tenure, he was obliged to appeal to Ahmadu at Zinder for the resources he needed to sustain the office. After some delay Ahmadu gave his cousin fifty-seven slaves captured in a raid on Malikawa in Kano. The Galadima's office was then so weak and impoverished that the sultan of Zinder found it necessary to make this endowment.

At about the same time Ahmadu sent a message to Kaura Salihu directing him to dismiss his Dan Kwaba Ali, the son of Musa, and to replace him by Hamidu, the son of Audu Birgi, a wealthy member of the Baure branch of the Kaura lineage. Being himself too old for this appointment, Audu Birgi had canvassed the claims of his son Hamidu by substantial gifts to Ahmadu at Zinder. Hamidu's appointment was attractive to Ahmadu on two grounds. It allowed him to appropriate control of appointments to the senior subordinate staff of the Kauras at Zango, thereby subverting the Kaura's power. Second, as Dan Kwaba, Hamidu was Salihu's deputy and likely successor. Thus his appointment provided an opportunity for terminating the line of Zango Kauras founded by Tamila and promised to weaken the lineage and office simultaneously. Like Tafida on hearing of Jatau's dismissal, Kaura Salihu was bitterly upset by Ahmadu's directive, especially as he knew nothing of Hamidu's candidacy and held the Dan Kwaba Ali in high regard. However, like Tafida before him, Salihu had no alternative but obedience. Hamidu was appointed and Ali removed to his slave farm at Yardaji, where he lived until the French resuscitated the chiefdom of Magaria under Nababa some fourteen years later. Ali then went to Magaria to join Nababa and became the first Kaura of that chiefdom.

Ahmadu also intervened in appointments to the office of Alkalin Zango. This position had been traditionally reserved for the members of a learned lineage whose home was at Gazobi. By tradition also, the Alkali and the Limam had always been appointed without paying *kudin sarauta.* During Tafida's first reign, the Alkali Dan Rago had retired on grounds of old age and been succeeded by Malam Yusi, or Yusufu, who still held office during the early years of Tafida's second reign. For reasons unknown Ahmadu Majerinji ordered Tafida to dismiss Alkali Yusufu without specifying his successor. Tafida accordingly consulted Yusufu about a suitable successor and, on his advice, asked Ahmadu's permission to install Yusufu's sister's son, Ishaka. Ahmadu refused consent; and as he had dismissed the previous Alkali, his vassal, the chief of Zango, lacked the authority to appoint a new one. It is said that Ahmadu demanded *kudin sarauta* before any more Alkalis were appointed; but if so, Tafida either could or would not agree to this. Despite its powerlessness, the Alkali's office at Zango, for religious reasons, had always been preserved from such levies. It is possible that in formulating this novel demand, Ahmadu really sought to block Ishaka's appointment, since Ishaka was not by birth a member of the lineage of the Zango *alkalai,* although he had been adopted by the ex-Alkali Yusufu. In any event, for the next few years there was no Alkali at Zango; and Tafida was constrained to administer the *shari'a* on the advice of a visiting malam from Kance called Bature, who served as his legal assessor and adjudicated routine cases of debt, divorce, and inheritance. Being unrelated to the Alkali lineage of Daura, Malam Bature was also ineligible for the office and had no seat on the senior state council, although he exercised the other functions of the Alkali at Zango until Zinder's overrule came to an end. Even then, in the absence of a formally appointed Alkali, the administration of justice deteriorated further.

Zango, Zinder, and Kano

Ahmadu Majerinji had become chief of Zinder shortly before Rabeh devastated Bornu and overthrew the regime of the Shehus. Although he declared his loyalty to Kiyari, the last independent Shehu of Bornu, and sent him some cannons, rifles, and ammunition, Ahmadu made no further effort to assist his suzerain but seized the chances offered by Rabeh's invasion to conquer the nearby Bornu vassal states of Machina and Nguru, where the Galadima of Bornu was slain, and attacked Gumel but failed to take it. Throughout his reign Ahmadu also waged an offensive war against Kano, where Aliyu had become chief in 1894 after a bitter civil war. On these expeditions he would summon the Zango forces, which were commanded by Kaura Malam during the raids on Malikawa and Dambarta and by the Kaura Salihu and Tafida in later attacks on Katarawa and Damarugu in northern Kano. Like his predecessors, Ahmadu Majerinji had also to put down a

princely rebellion aimed at his throne;[66] but the Hausa of Zango were not involved in that struggle.

Not long afterward, in May 1898, a French military expedition under Captain Cazemajou arrived at Zinder en route for Lake Chad. On his council's advice, Ahmadu attacked the French force as it prepared to depart. Cazemajou and his interpreter, Olive, were killed. Most of the Senegalese troops who escorted them escaped and fought their way back to the French military post at Say on the Niger. Within a year Ahmadu had to face a much stronger French expedition under Captain Pallier, which inflicted a crushing defeat on his army at Termini, a day's march west of Zinder. Wounded in the battle, Ahmadu died at Rinji outside Zinder town; hence his *lakabi* (nickname), "Majerinji" (The One Who Went to Rinji).[67] His younger brother Ahmadu Dan Bassa was selected to succeed.

When the ruler of Kano learned of Ahmadu's defeat and death at the hands of the French, he collected his forces for a major assault on Zinder by way of Zango. Being forewarned, Tafida had good reason for concern about the state of the Zango defenses. The old wall that Ibram had built had long since crumbled away. Like his predecessors, Tafida asked for permission to repair it, but this was refused by Ahmadu Dan Bassa, who may have suspected his intentions in the coming conflict. Tafida then sent an urgent message to the sons of Lukudi's Sarkin Makera Dan Baba at Acilafiya, summoning them to Zango at once to prepare the weapons needed for the capital's defense. Although the then Sarkin Makera, Maiyaki, was of different lineage, Dan Baba's sons Sana'a and Mara nonetheless came to help Tafida's preparations. A stockade was soon built around Zango, encircled by a ditch of unusual width and depth. Thanks to this ditch, the Kano forces were unable to capture the town, which Tafida was left by Zinder to defend unaided. In planning this defense, Tafida relied on a war council composed of the Kaura, Galadima, Shentali Alhassan, Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Yara Kwanyami, Fada Babba Mazu, and Turaki Muhamman Madi. Thus, despite the long years of bitter rivalry between the preceding Kauras and chiefs, when the Fulani of Kano attacked and the Zango Hausa were compelled to defend themselves alone, they presented a united front.[68]

Sarkin Kano Aliyu's attack on Zango marked the end of an age. The French and British were already demarcating the boundaries between the territory of Niger and the protectorate of Nigeria. For another two or three years the territory around Zango, being remote, was only visited by French or British patrols engaged in tracing the new international boundary. Meanwhile, with few exceptions, the local chiefs and people were left to their own devices.[69]

During his hectic preparations for the defense of Zango, Tafida had called out the townsfolk for continuous corvée to dig the ditch that saved them all. Maiyaki, Sana'a, and Mara organized the blacksmiths to forge the tools and weapons for all to use. On successive days four men died of overwork while digging the ditch. Another died after being struck by the Sarkin Dogarai Sak-

wale, a throne slave, who mistook his exhaustion for malingering. Tafida had expressed perfunctory sympathies for the four preceding deaths, but on hearing that Sakwale had killed a man, he was obliged to refer the matter to his "alkali," Malam Bature. Bature ruled that Sarkin Dogarai should be made to pay 1,000,000 cowries as compensation or blood money. Under Muslim law this payment was due to the dead man's family and kin;[70] but as the Sarkin Dogarai was a throne slave and could not find this amount, the liability descended to Tafida. Following Bature's judgment, Tafida dismissed Sakwale as unfit to hold the office of Sarkin Dogarai. The Fada Babba then asked him to appoint his son Dan Bawo as Sarkin Dogarai, offering to pay the fine that Sakwale had incurred as *kudin sarauta.* Tafida agreed, installed Dan Bawo, took the 1,000,000 cowries from the Fada Babba, and presumably paid this sum to the dead man's kin. In any event, by this act the payment of fines was assimilated to the payment of *kudin sarauta.* Presumably Tafida accepted the Fada Babba's offer because he was personally liable to furnish the blood money due on behalf of his slave, the Sarkin Dogarai. Even so, this precedent was very unfortunate and invited repetition and abuse, which were not long in coming.

Some of the Kaura Salihu's *lawanai* had engaged in illegitimate practices more heavily and frequently than others, as the limits of their *iko* became progressively obscured with the deterioration of legal administration under Ahmadu Majerinji. The Sarkin Dawaki Kyamu, one of Mazawaje's sons, had become so notorious for his appropriations, which the uninformed regarded as theft *(sata)* and the more sophisticated as confiscation *(kwace),* that it was publicly rumored that Salihu had victimized him by medicine in order to exclude him from the Kaura's office. In due course this abuse of *iko* spread from the Kaura's titled subordinates to his personal clients. One of these, called Tsuntsu, who served Kaura as a menial, developed a great passion for goat meat, which he satisfied indiscriminately at the commoners' expense. When incontrovertible evidence of Tsuntsu's habits was presented to Salihu with claims for compensation, the Kaura undertook to provide it and summoned his client. After reciting the charge he levied a fine on Tsuntsu to meet the compensation. Then, to conserve his power, which he conceived in terms of *iko,* on receiving the fine he had levied, Salihu appointed Tsuntsu to the title of Jarman Kaura, thus employing Tafida's precedent as the basis for the appointment of a habitual thief by equating Tsuntsu's fine with his *kudin sarauta.* Whether Salihu retained the fine, however, we do not know.

Other incidents illustrate the slow but steady breakdown of social order at Zango during the final fifteen years of Zinder's rule. When Ahmadu Majerinji began his long series of attacks on Kano, the Hausa of Baure, who had long felt more sympathy with Kano than with Zinder, were acutely distressed when they were summoned as Zinder's vassals to join Ahmadu's armies in these raids. Tafida received proposals from Baure that both chiefdoms should transfer their allegiance to Kano and support the Fulani against Zinder in the war. It is said that Tafida refused this suggestion on the ground

that the Hausa of Zango could only preserve their title to Daura and their chance of restoration by maintaining their traditional hostility to the Fulani empire, to which Kano belonged. Without Zinder's assistance, Tafida could see no immediate prospect of recovering Daura; but perhaps fear of Ahmadu's power and ruthlessness was equally decisive in Tafida's calculations. Thus Zango and Baure remained divided throughout the century on basic issues of foreign policy.

During his second reign Tafida tried to weave closer ties with his Zinder overlords by giving them his daughters in marriage. A curious series of unions ensued. Ahmadu Majerinji first married Tafida's daughter Amina and then divorced her to marry her sister Kaltu. After divorcing Kaltu he remarried Amina and then died. These unions were all childless. His brother and successor, Ahmadu Dan Bassa, began with Amina and then married Kaltu, whom he also divorced. Again the unions were childless. It is said that these ladies of Zango delighted in mocking their chiefly spouses. On completing this cycle, they both returned to Zango. It seems probable that Tafida may have lost more sympathy by his daughters' conduct than he gained through their marriages with the Zinder chiefs.

In 1895 or 1896 the Yerima Loto, who was the younger brother of Muhamman Mai Gurdo, the Fulani emir of Daura, raised the flag of rebellion in an attempt to seize Mai Gurdo's throne. After withdrawing to Katsina, he reentered the emirate with a force and waylaid Mai Gurdo's Turaki and Sarkin Fada Akama at Buja on their way back to Daura city with the local tax. In the ensuing struggle, one of Mai Gurdo's sons was killed. Mai Gurdo then mobilized his army, and Loto fled to Damagaram, where Ahmadu Majerinji granted him permission to settle at Zango. Knowing that the Hausa of Zango wanted Daura for themselves, Mai Gurdo realized that Loto would receive very little support there. However, he decided to seek Loto's capture; and for this purpose he arranged with the Kauran Kurni to have him seized and sent to Daura. One morning the men of the Kauran Kurni arrived at Zango, went to Loto's compound, and in the effort to seize him shot and killed one of his men before Tafida could intervene to halt the fighting and rescue Loto. He then ordered the Kaura's men to return to Kurni. Shortly afterward, Ahmadu Majerinji sent a small column to raid eastern Daura by way of reprisal.[71] There is evidence that after the Sarkin Kano Aliyu had attacked Zango in 1900, Ahmadu Dan Bassa prepared to launch an assault on Daura in retaliation.[72] But this attack was never actually launched. To pacify their territories, the French and British prohibited further fighting and moved to enforce the prohibition. The long centuries in which chiefs had fought and raided as they pleased had now come to an end.

Arrival of the British and French

In several respects the years between 1900 and 1906 are the most eventful in Daura's history. With the French ratification of the Niger Convention in

June 1899, the way was clear for the establishment of the Colonie du Niger and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria shortly afterward. Proclamation of the British protectorate was delayed until January 1, 1900, to permit the expiration of the Royal Niger Company's charter and an orderly transfer of the company's administrative responsibilities and assets to Captain (later Lord) Lugard on behalf of the British Crown.[73] By then the French, despite the mutiny of Captain Voulet at Tasawa and the death of Colonel Klobb, had defeated Ahmadu Majerinji's forces in August 1899 and established an administrative post at Zinder before Lamy's expedition continued east toward Chad.[74] Thereafter the rulers of Zinder were obliged to observe the French peace; and the provisional delimitation of international boundaries was pushed ahead rapidly.[75]

This international boundary affected the various segments of Daura territory in several ways. First, it delimited their northern boundaries, since in this area it was initially intended that the international and chiefdom boundaries should coincide. Second, the Anglo-French boundary separated Fulani Daura, Zango, and Baure from Zinder. However, within a few years the initial boundary was radically altered, and this revision created further uncertainties about the nature and permanence of the new regime and the changes it involved. Since these boundary movements had profound effects on the chiefdom of Zango, we shall describe them briefly.[76]

The closing decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a scramble for Africa by European imperialist powers to consolidate their spheres of interest by establishing exclusive political control. In response to the German penetration in the Cameroons, the French occupation of Dahomey, and French penetration into the central Sudan, the British government eventually decided to establish its dominion over the territory that became Northern Nigeria. In 1893, notwithstanding earlier treaties by which the British had attached Borgu south of Sokoto to their sphere, the French had proclaimed their Protectorate of Dahomey and tried to absorb Borgu. A British mission under Lugard succeeded in persuading the chief of Nikki to align Borgu with Britain by a new treaty signed shortly before a French mission under Captain Decoeur arrived at Nikki. "Relations between England and France now became very strained."[77] To forestall hostilities, the two powers initiated protracted negotiations to delimit the boundaries between their future territories. Eventually this negotiation produced a document known as the Niger Convention, which outlined the international boundary of Northern Nigeria. Approved by Britain in June 1898 and signed by the French president a year later, the convention authorized Britain and France to "appoint commissioners to delimit the northern frontier of Northern Nigeria" by June 1901.[78] The details of this convention need not detain us except where the international boundary cut across Daura territory or affected local political and economic alignments. In this region the convention evidently sought to assign the chiefdom of Zinder to France and the Hausa and Fulani territories to Britain. Within two months of its ratification, the French had dispatched a second expedition to conquer Zinder.

Map 5. Lugard's "Sketch-Map" of Northern Nigeria, 1900-1901

In May 1901, before the British had occupied Northern Nigeria, Lugard urged that "in view . . . of the constant unrest among the tribes on that frontier . . . this delimitation should not be delayed, and the final and definite position of the frontier should be settled."[79] His "sketch map of Northern Nigeria" prepared in 1901 illustrates Lugard's interpretation of the boundary agreed by the Niger Convention.[80]

To the Hausa of Zango this original boundary line had two important implications, though these were not immediately evident. First, it freed Zango and Baure from continuing control by Damagaram. Second, since in this area the international boundary fell along 13°25′ north latitude, it transferred most of the former dominions of eighteenth-century Daura from Zinder and the Colonie du Niger to the British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which included Zango and Baure. Had the new boundary taken administrative effect immediately, it would have entailed the cessation of Zinder's authority over its former territories south of the line, even though most of this area had been partly or wholly incorporated into the Zinder state. To avoid disorder, these administrative changes were postponed until 1903-

1904, when the British established political control on their side of the line, following their conquest of Kano and Sokoto.

Throughout 1901 and 1902, while preparing for the campaigns against them, Lugard tried to avoid a direct conflict with Kano and Sokoto; but by November 1902 the boundary commissioners appointed under the Niger Convention had reached western Sokoto and were preparing to turn east along the northern frontier of the Nigerian protectorate. To ensure their safety and the rapid completion of their task, Lugard detached a force to escort them and moved swiftly against Kano and Sokoto. In February 1903, before the fighting was over, Lugard created the province of Kano as an administrative unit under Cargill as resident. Besides Kano, the new province then included the emirates of Katsina, Kazaure, Daura, Zango, and Baure. Cargill immediately sent one of his officers, Captain H. C. Phillips, to inform the chiefs at Zango, Daura, and Baure of the British occupation; to impress upon them Lugard's prohibitions of slave trading, raiding, and war; to inspect the territorial boundaries; and to make such administrative observations and arrangements as seemed necessary or relevant.

Phillips is still remembered at Daura by his nickname, "Maitumbi" (He with the Stomach). He arrived at Zango with a small but well-armed patrol. Having conferred with Tafida and his council, he set out to survey the boundary. He then found that, besides the villages which had previously been administered by Fulani Daura, Zango, or Baure, there were over six hundred settlements that lay between the previous boundaries of these chiefdoms and the international frontier, all of which continued to recognize the sultan of Zinder's rule.[81] To rectify this anomaly, he notified the French officer at Zinder that he was making other arrangements for the future administration of these settlements and thereby dissolved their relations with Zinder. Thus, only a few weeks before the Anglo-French boundary commission reached this area to review the line, Phillips transferred administrative responsibility for the numerous villages north of the recent Daura chiefdoms from France and Zinder to the new province of Kano. This created the problem of making suitable arrangements for the local administration of these villages. Phillips's superior, Cargill, who is remembered as "Maigunduma" because he introduced the present system of compact administrative districts after a wholesale reallocation *(gunduma)* of fiefs, decided to place the lot under the chief of Zango.

On learning that the Fulani chiefs of Gurdo and Tsatsumburum had formerly collected the cattle tax throughout this area for the sultan of Zinder, Phillips decided to replace them, with Cargill's approval, and instructed Tafida to appoint someone in charge of the *jangali* throughout the territory recently placed under his control. Tafida allotted this function to the Turaki Muhamman Madi, a brother of his senior throne slave, Sarkin Yara Kwanyami, and a descendant of Lukudi's Danko. It seems probable that initially the Turaki continued to rely on the *Sarakunan Fulani* of Gurdo and Tsatsumburum to collect the cattle tax and merely received the share that the

British had reserved for the chief. In collecting this share, the Turaki traveled with a military escort under the Sarkin Karma and Dan Bajida to assure safe transport of the tax. Phillips then suggested that other taxes should be collected in similar fashion; and thereafter, with British support, Tafida arranged for the two standard Zango taxes, *karan fari* and *karambaki,* to be collected annually by sending the Kaura, the Galadima, the Sarkin Yara, the Fada Babba, and the Sarkin Bai with a military escort under the Shentali and the Sarkin Karma to tour the country together. This tax-collecting mission was equipped with sufficient staff to ensure that all taxpayers in the villages en route would be notified and assembled in advance of their arrival. The various *masugari* on their route were held responsible for ensuring their accommodation and the prompt payment of tax. The Sarkin Karma and Shentali were responsible for transporting the tax to the Shamaki, who acted as state treasurer, while the Fada Babba had the police powers necessary to discipline defaulters.

Clearly, on their arrival at Zango the British did not have the least suspicion of the Kaura's predominance. To them, as the chief directly descended from the former Hausa rulers of Daura, Tafida was in fact as well as customary law the "natural leader" of those Daura Hausa who had maintained their independence from the Fulani during the preceding century. Baure's traditional sympathy with the Fulani of Kano, which was known to Cargill, represented a renunciation of their claims to the leadership of Hausa Daura against the local Fulani. In addition, Tafida could show by citing the Hausa history of the past century that the dynasty at Zango derived from Lukudi was the senior line, while the rulers of Baure were a junior separatist group. On these grounds, and through administrative necessity, it probably seemed appropriate to Cargill to "restore" to the Zango chief all communities other than Baure which had once formed part of the Hausa state and which had remained independent of Fulani rule by submitting to Zinder. Baure, having been so long at odds with Zango, was allowed to retain its independence; but Magaria, which had long since ceased to exist as a separate chiefdom, was placed under Tafida, and the Kacalla of Zinder who had formerly ruled it was expelled, like the Kaura of Kurni. It is unlikely that the chiefs of Zango and Baure again partitioned the Magaria settlements between themselves at this time, although traditions reported earlier attempts to partition Magaria during and after Masallaci's reign. Whether either or both these partitions succeeded remains obscure, but the attempts were probably made.

Having once assumed that Tafida ruled the territory of Zango as its unchallenged master and that his officials were all subordinate, the British authorities chose to ignore the fact—and it is likely that they knew it—that the Kaura of Zango had formerly administered about one-half of the chiefdom independently of the chief, although they did recognize the Kaura's seniority under the chief. At one stroke and by an inconceivable chain of accidents, the chief had recovered most of the authority and status his predecessors had lost, while the Kaura had lost the preeminence of his forerunners.

Such redistributions of authority presupposed radical shifts in the preceding distributions of power and illustrate how British preconceptions swung the balance in Tafida's favor. Nonetheless, initially none could foretell how relations among the chief, the Kaura, and the British might develop. Cargill's reliance on Phillips as the officer in charge of Zango affairs was perceived by the people of Zango as analogous to the sultan of Zinder's administration through the Sarkin Dawaki. On this formal parallel it at first seemed possible that by his traditional technique of clandestine reports, the Kaura could maintain his local power and recover his lost authority. Evidently this was how Kaura Salihu appraised the situation once its structure became clear.

It is not simple to reconstruct in detail the territorial allocation through which Tafida arranged for the routine administration of the large territory that had suddenly fallen into his hands, since within a few years this territorial organization was replaced by other changes and reorganizations based on different principles, and it is difficult to perceive the features of the earlier system through the details of those that superseded it. As far as my materials permit, and with the express recognition that these distributions are not only incomplete but also provisional, table 6 presents such information on Tafida's first territorial reorganization as I could glean by repeated inquiries.

Without dwelling too closely on the particulars tabulated below, we can discern the principles that underlay this pattern. These are easily summarized. As chief, Tafida retained the largest number of towns. For their administration he relied mainly on his Sarkin Yara and other throne slaves, such as the Shamaki, Turaki, and Sarkin Bai. Tafida placed most of the present district of Mai Aduwa under his Yerima Kudu and put the nearby towns formerly administered by Kauran Kurni under his Sarkin Yara Kwanyami. The Galadima's fiefs were scattered, some lying in the old Kurni district, others as far northeast as Buja. This northeastern area Tafida administered through the Sarkin Tafarki, Dan Maza, and Fada Babba. Perhaps because he needed reliable fiefholders, he allocated towns to the Bunturawa; to the Murka; to the Magajiya, Saraki, and Iya; to Magaji; and even to his Jekafada. He also removed from the Kaura some of the Galadima's towns that Bakula had acquired after Jatau's appointment. It seems also that Tafida transferred Dawambai from the Kaura to himself but placed it under the Jarmai Kallas and Shentali Alhassan for administration. Kaura Salihu was given no town north of Zango. Since most of his fiefs were clustered together about ten miles south of Zango in the center of the old chiefdom, Tafida took care to place all neighboring settlements reserved for the throne under his ablest official, the Sarkin Yara Kwanyami. In effect the Kaura suffered absolute as well as relative territorial losses. Whereas in 1900 he controlled half the chiefdom, he now held less territory than the Sarkin Yara or the Yerima. But the Galadima Jangwale, whose appointment Tafida resented, also fared rather less well than he may have expected, even though he recovered several old fiefs and received some new ones. Evidently Tafida

TABLE 6

Tafida's Allocation of Fiefs after First Boundary Demarcation*

Title	Fiefs
Jekafada	Wadi
Bunturawa	Harda
Magaji	Kurni, Rumji, Fuskin Bagar
Fada Babba	Lunkuyi, Karage
Dan Maza	Anguwan Dumau
Sarkin Tafarki	Lakirai, Gwamba, Dumaduma, Gwashelo, Kunkurai
Yerima	Insharuwa, Dan Mairam, Garba, Wasawa, Mai Magaria, Kudinjika, Dan Kindi, Tofakai, Maibagaruwa, U. Yakubu, Gwajogwajo, Maifaru, Muludu, Daba, U. Jibo, Jimfere, Utinga, Buduma, Galadimawa
Yerima (transferred by Musa to Turaki in 1906)	Dan Musa, Dagura, Dan Nasara, Kajangaras, Madaniya, U. Yahaya, Gwabron Maje, Jimo, Toga, Makerawa, Tsabu, Dan Yashe, Masallai, Bidina, Badage, U. Sharta, Jinfiri, Mekumame, Jinga, Anahir, Walla, Maigoribai, Dan Boko, Dan Dodo, Rafin Azbinawa
Turaki (1903-1906)	Tsiga
Sarkin Yara	Gierta, Gallo, Kwalma, Ajiyar Mallam, Kuluru, Launi, Kuluru (Romaza), Bumbum, Kakibumbum, Tinkum, Dambadada, Ajiyawa, Fantaika, Danchia, Kewaya, Mai Aduwa, Rindi, Dawambai, Insharuwa, Makerawa, Dadin Sarki, Dan Bartu, Dan Gaki, Bangaya
Galadima	Bakorami, Dundu, Dadin Kowa, Makierawa, Yumbu, Koza, Garage

Note: U. = Unguwan (Ward of, Hamlet of).
*Repeated names, such as Insharuwa or Makerawa, may indicate *tarayya,* fief transfers, or errors of recall or recording.

had no wish to strengthen either his Kaura Salihu or his Galadima Jangwale, neither of whom owed him their appointments or had sworn allegiance to him. He preferred instead to put his kinsmen, clients, and slaves over the new communities attached to Zango, thereby securing a preponderance of economic and political resources for the throne. To this end even titled princesses were pressed into service as fiefholders.

There is evidence that the Kaura Salihu had some difficulties with his senior *lawanai* who were also his kinsmen. Coming to the office when Ahmadu Majerinji appropriated the right to allocate these positions, Salihu had found it advisable to dismiss several of his senior subordinates in order to

TABLE 7

Sarkin Yara's Territorial Administration, 1903-1906

Jekada	Towns
Halidu, son of Sarkin Daura Nuhu	Kwalma, Rijiyar na Malam (Romaza)
Dan Gajo, a prince	Giertau, Gallo
Musa, son of S. D. Nuhu	Kuluru, Launi
Magajin Daura	Makerawa, Dadin Sarki
Mazawaje Dajinda, Lukudi's grandson	Bumbum, Kakibumbum
Ali, a prince	Dambadada, Ajiyawa
Jatau, son of S. D. Tafida	Tinkim
Yerima	Gara II
Baba dan Daga, a prince	Yanduna
Family of Maina Musa	Dargage, Ishiawa
M. Adamu, son of Maina Musa	Arusu
Musa, Husband of Tafida's sister	Fantaika
Waya, grandson of Lukudi	Kawarin Kyako

13 princes	20 towns
Idi Bulama, S. Yara's "brother"	Beciya
M. Sule, S. Yara's "brother"	Psaski
Mato, Free client of S. Yara	Danchia, *Fioni**
Gula Kwade, free client of S. Yara	Kwaya
Danbodo, free client of S. Yara	Mai Aduwa
Bazai, client of the chief, living in the palace	Dan Gaki
Shentalin Daura	Dawambai, Dasha
S. Dillalai	*Rindi**
S. Yara	Zango

Zango Wards and Ward Heads under S. Yara, 1900-1906

Ward	Official	Ward	Official
U. Dillalai	S. Dillalai	U. Saki	S. Makera
Kacakurawa	Samba'a	Tsohon Keffi	S. Noma
Tsohon Saki	S. Karma	Alkalawa	Alkali
Guyama	Guyama	U. Mahauta	S. Pawa
U. Sabuwa	A blacksmith of Gurdo	Yerimawa	Bunturawa
Mai-wawa	S. Zango	U. Sarkin Tafarki	S. Tafarki Ubandawaki
U. Kaura	S. Masu	U. Dandalin Dodo	Barde
Kofar Bai	S. Fada	Dandalin Kartau	Kunau (a trader)

*Slave estate.

TABLE 8

Territorial Administrations of the Yerima and Turaki at Zango, 1904-1906

	Jekadu (Intermediaries)	Towns
Yerima		
	Magaji	Maifaru, Tofakai, Maibagaruwa, Maiturmi
	Maina Musa I	Dan Kindi, Dan Dodo
	Maina Musa II	Galadimawa, Insharuwa, Daba
	Maina Halidu	Mai Magaria
	Aku (elder brother of Yerima)	Gwajogwajo
	Alfo (client of Yerima)	Muludu
Turaki		
	Mazawaje Dajinda (Lukudi's grandson)	Madaniya, U. Yakubu, U. Yahaya, Jimfere, Gwabron Maje, U. Jimo, Utinga, Tsiga
	Dashiru (client of Turaki)	Tuduma, Toga, Dagura, Kurdi Jika, Maikuname, Dan Nasara, Kajangaras
	Aiyaye (brother of Turaki)	U. Jibo
	M. Sule (younger brother of Turaki)	U. Sharta, Walla, Dan Musa

ensure control of his staff. The Sarkin Dawaki Kyamu mentioned above as a habitual thief had been replaced by Yusufu, the son of Mazawaje, whom Salihu had also dismissed, giving this position to his own son Abdu Kanengi. The office of Sarka moved for a while between Mato and Karumi, both kinsmen of Salihu; and the Gilu Ahmadu Badale, Malam's son, was also dismissed. However, when Zango was released from Zinder's control, Tafida, by refusing Salihu's request that the Dan Kwaba Hamidu, Audu Birgi's son, should be dismissed, attempted to ensure that Salihu should be the last of the line of Kauras descended from Tamila. Apparently, despite the British presence, Tafida felt unable to dismiss his Kaura.

His frequent dismissals of senior subordinates weakened the Kaura Salihu by dividing his staff on lines of kinship, clientage, and personal ambition. At the same time the Kaura had lost his political dominance in Zango through the determination of the British to deal only through the chief, to whom they restored the lost territories of Daura. The British had also indicated their

intention to examine and rationalize the local tax structure by eliminating most of its minor imposts, thereby reducing the official incomes of the Kaura's *lawanai.*

In 1903, when Tafida finally grasped the full implications of the fact that Zango's subordination to Zinder was over and perceived that the British looked to him, rather than the Kaura, for order and rule, he asserted his new independence symbolically by appointing Malam Ishaka to the office of Alkali. This was the appointment that Ahmadu Majerinji had forbidden years before. It was probably requested and certainly supported by the British, who expected every Muslim chiefdom to have a properly accredited *alkali* in charge of its judicial affairs. Like his predecessors, Ishaka was not asked to provide *kudin sarauta* and on appointment swore his loyalty to the *shari'a* instead of the chief. Thereafter Ishaka took his seat on the senior council of state. Malam Bature, who had for long discharged the routine functions of the Alkali, was retired to Kazaure with appropriate gifts and remained there till his death.

Although the Hausa did not then suspect it, Tafida's new territorial distribution was not to last long. Even before it had been fully developed, another Anglo-French boundary commission again traversed the area and traced a second, more restrictive line. However, for another two or three years, during which the allocations discussed above persisted, the chieftancy recovered much of the ground it had formerly lost, first to the Fulani, then to Zinder, and finally to the Kauras.

At this point it is appropriate to interrupt our chronicle of Zango affairs. Developments at Zango between 1903 and 1906 cannot be discussed usefully in isolation from those of Baure and Fulani Daura on its eastern and western borders. Accordingly, before relating these events, I shall outline briefly the political organization and histories of Baure and Fulani Daura. Following these accounts, we may return to trace the processes by which the Hausa of Daura were reunited and restored to their long-lost city.

5
Baure In The Late Nineteenth Century

We have already seen how the chiefdom of Baure came into being. Having failed to take Magaria, Tsoho, the son of Dan Shufini, established a new chiefdom at Baure and finally won recognition from Ibram of Zinder by becoming his vassal. Against the will of its rulers, Baure remained a vassal state of Zinder throughout the nineteenth century. In the summary account of Baure that follows, I try to describe its political organization during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the official structure was fully developed and its main political trends and processes had become institutionalized. Having given detailed accounts of eighteenth-century Daura and nineteenth-century Zango, I shall try merely to indicate how Baure paralleled or differed from Zango or Hausa Daura in its structure and development. Thus the summary concludes with a brief comparison of Zango and Baure as two contemporary systems.

Zinder and Baure

The chief of Baure styled himself "Sarkin Daura na [of] Baure" just as the Zango chief was called Sarkin Daura of Zango. During the nineteenth century seven men held the chiefship at Baure, including Tsoho and Abdu, who ruled in 1900. None of these chiefs ever died in office, and together they had a total of eleven reigns. Beginning with Tsoho, the first ten chiefs of Baure were all deposed by Zinder, the last two by the British. Four chiefs had two reigns each, namely, Habu, Jibo, Ali, and Zakari. After Tsoho's deposition the chiefship remained among his descendants; and until Zakari's first appointment, the title passed laterally among Tsoho's sons. With Zakari's appointment, rivalry for the succession was thrown open to princes of successive generations. Zakari was himself replaced by Muhamman Kalgaba, who was dismissed in less than a year for introducing too many immigrants from Gumel, most of whom were his mother's kin and their dependants. The chiefs of Zinder had no intention of allowing immigrants from Gumel to



Genealogy 5. The Baure Dynasty

subvert their domination of the Hausa state of Baure.[1] Kalgaba, who was not formally installed in office during his brief reign, was succeeded by Ali, his brother, following which the chiefship passed once more to Zakari, and then to Abdu, his brother.

The dynastic genealogy presented here indicates the relations between successive chiefs, the dates of their respective reigns, and those of their kin who received titles. In dating the reigns of Baure chiefs, however, I have expressed in years the reign-lengths memorized by senior members of the former dynasty to fit them in proportionally to the eighty-one Western years of Baure's existence, on the assumption that the Sarkin Gwari Abdu died in 1825. In doing so I have been guided by the dates of critical events at Zango and Zinder which provide benchmarks for Baure's history. Thus, while the order of succession and political development is firm, the dates assigned to reigns remain provisional. Nonetheless I have tabulated dates for the Baure reigns above, together with those at Zango, Fulani Daura, and Zinder. As we have seen, Tsoho's deposition took place at about the time that Ibram forced Lukudi to abdicate and appointed Nuhu as chief of the Yardaji segment of Daura Hausa. It is possible that these depositions followed the agreement by Tsoho and Lukudi to partition Masallaci's chiefdom at Magaria mentioned above. But Ibram, who had taken Masallaci under his protection and regarded Tsoho as his vassal, could reasonably be expected to object to the arrangement, and this may have been one of the grounds for his assault on Yardaji in 1845-1846 and for the double depositions of 1846-1847 which established firmly the dominance of Zinder over Baure and Zango alike.[2]

Since Zinder's dominance set the limiting conditions of political activity at Baure after Tsoho's dismissal, its form and content should be indicated. The sultans of Damagaram (Zinder) chose and appointed the Baure chiefs at Zinder and by 1870, its Kauras and Galadimas also. By 1890 the rulers of Zinder also controlled appointments to the senior Baure offices of Shentali, Fada Babba, and Sarkin Yara. For the chiefship they received a *kudin sarauta* of 2,000,000 cowries; for the offices of Kaura and Galadima, 1,000,000 apiece; for that of Shentali 500,000; and for the offices of Sarkin Yara and Fada Babba, 700,000 and 400,000, respectively. In all cases except the chiefship, these appointments carried a *yankai* equivalent to half of the *kudin sarauta* which was paid to the chief of Baure. But while the three senior appointments were normally conducted at Zinder, the Shentali, Fada Babba, and Sarkin Yara were usually installed at Baure in the presence of the Zinder *jekada,* who was responsible for delivering the *kudin sarauta* to his master. The Sarkin Baure received *kudin sarauta* for all other offices of the Baure state and distributed their *yankai* among his *fadawa.* There is no evidence that *kudin sarauta* was required for *yan Sarki* (princely) offices.

Only the sultan of Zinder could dismiss those whom he appointed. On their dismissal the property of these officials was sequestrated and removed to Zinder after payment of debts, the chief of Baure receiving nothing. Zin-

der administered the personal estate of the deposed Baure chiefs in the same way; and since none escaped dismissal, the chiefship was repeatedly denuded of the horses and slaves its successive holders strove to acquire as the essential means and symbols of power. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, as Zinder's demands for revenue increased, the tenure of those Baure offices that it controlled became correspondingly insecure.

Zinder's technique of control by appointment and dismissal had two direct effects. It stimulated the rapacity of Baure officials by depriving the senior offices of the resources they needed, thus emphasizing the responsibility of individual officials to accumulate the wealth they required for effective performance of their official roles. Second, by periodically depleting the Baure offices through the confiscations that followed dismissal, Zinder denied the officeholders and their kin secure enjoyment of the fruits of office, thereby alienating their sympathies and provoking widespread hostility at Baure to Damagaram and its works. The Zinder overlords duly converted this hostility into a source of further profit by charging particular officials with disloyalty.

In an effort to save as much as he could of his personal estate, the chief Zakari is said to have enumerated a list of debts which allowed him to keep "about forty" horses for himself and his family. Only by distributing their income widely or by the device of extensive indebtedness could senior officials at Baure seek to assure their families of a reasonable inheritance in the latter nineteenth century.

Initially—that is, during the first half of the last century—when an official died in office, his personal estate passed to his family *in toto.* From this estate the heir would normally pay his *kudin sarauta,* but this practice also changed under Zinder; and it seems likely that those Baure officials who owed their appointments to Zinder were subject to the same regulations as their Zango peers. The *dukiyar sarauta*—that is, the compound, farms, horse, riding gear, armor, spear, and other insignia of office—remained the property of the chief and state, whoever held the title. This equipment was always returned to the chief when an office changed hands.

Officials appointed by the Sarkin Baure were liable to have half their personal estates appropriated by the chief if they were dismissed, the remainder being distributed among their family. In administering such estates, an official's personal property was carefully distinguished from the wealth in slaves, farms, cattle, compounds, and horses endowed to his office.

As a vassal of Zinder, the Sarkin Baure could neither initiate attacks or raids nor refuse to mobilize and turn out the contingents required by Zinder. As we have seen, the first Sarkin Baure, Tsoho, owed his deposition to his independent military adventures. Thereafter the rulers of Baure lost their military freedom.

Like other vassals of Zinder, the chief of Baure was obliged to swear loyalty to his overlord, the sultan. In addition he was required to furnish an annual tribute of 2,000,000 cowries[3] and suffered various disabilities. Like his cousin at Zango, the chief of Baure was forbidden to build an earth wall

(birni) around his capital, which was therefore stockaded. He was also forbidden to carry out executions or mutilations ordained by the *shari'a* and had to refer these cases to Zinder for review and action.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Baure's *kofa* at the sultan's court was the Ciroma of Zinder, while the Turaki of Baure served as the *jekada.* It seems probable that the Turakin Baure owed his selection for this task to Zinder; and as Baure's *jekada,* he was given a place on its electoral council. In view of developments at Zango, it should cause no surprise that this official often reported the disaffection or disloyalty of Baure chiefs and secured their deposition and that he often exercised undue influence on the succession. At Zinder the stock accusation against Baure chiefs was that they were seeking to transfer their allegiance from Zinder to Kano. Since Kano and Zinder were often at war during the last quarter of the century and Baure, situated between them, was Zinder's vassal, the chiefs of Zinder were quick to depose any Sarkin Baure who was suspected of sympathy with Kano; and Habu, Jibo, Ali, and Zakari were each deposed twice on these grounds; but Muhamman Kalgaba was equally suspect because his immigrant maternal kin from Gumel were Fulani.

As mentioned above, during his second reign Tafida received an appeal from the chief of Baure, probably Abdu, to join him in transferring allegiance to Kano and avoiding its expected attack. Even before this Ali, the Sarkin Baure, had appealed to the chief of Zango to abandon the allegiance to Zinder. Around 1873, on hearing that Tanimu intended to summon him to Zinder for deposition and punishment on charges of disloyalty and sympathy with Kano, Tsoho's son Jibo set fire to Baure town and burned it down before escaping with his family to Kano. Later, in 1893, on his second deposition, Zakari also escaped to Kano, where the Emir Aliyu appointed him chief of Mahuta village and installed Zakari's son, the Murkan Baure Yekuwa as Ciroma of Mahuta. It is said that Zakari joined Aliyu in his attack on Zango at the end of the century. Jibo likewise is said to have made *cafka* (allegiance) to Sarkin Kano Abdullahi before being appointed to rule Baure a second time. This preference of Baure for Kano was based partly on its ethnic ties with the Hausa of Kano but mainly on the harshness with which the Kanuri of Zinder administered the vassal state. Since the Hausa at Baure no longer expected to recover Daura, apart from those ties of ethnicity, language, and culture which aligned them with Kano, the efforts of Baure chiefs to transfer their allegiance to Kano were probably based on a rational assessment of the alternatives available to them; but the rulers of Zinder anticipated these orientations and successfully frustrated their fulfillment.

Local Organization

The Ciroma and the Sarkin Bai of Zinder held certain natives of Baure as subjects of Zinder under their charge. By the *tarayya* institution the Ciroma's

subjects lived at Dan Mairam, and those of the Sarkin Bai, at Burdudu. Both groups were descended from Baure commoners who had formerly appealed to these officials to administer and protect them. Having inherited the privileges and obligations of this *tarayya* relation, these families were scattered in either village. The value of this institution to Zinder as a source of information on the affairs of the subject communities is obvious.

Within the Baure polity, *tarayya* was less common than the administration of individual villages by separate *sarautu.* At Unguwan Jibo, now known as Tudu, *tarayya* was instituted when some inhabitants asked the Sarkin Baure to place them under the Galadima on the ground that the fiefholder, Kaura, oppressed them. In several other cases the Baure chiefs also granted petitions from commoners who asked to be administered by officials other than those who held their communities in fief. Such requests for *tarayya* were approved by Ali, Zakari, Abdu, and Haliru; and according to local traditions, requests for relief from oppressive fiefholders provided the normal basis for local *tarayya.* In consequence, at Baure *tarayya* patrons collected the tax and grain tithes from the scattered subjects whose affairs they administered, including penalties, inheritance, military turnout, and corvée. Thus, if the people of a town were dispersed under different officials by *tarayya* relations, each official dealt with his own subjects through a local headman (*maigari,* pl. *masugari*), whom they selected. There might thus be several *masugari* within the same town. The *tarayya* patron could appoint such headmen without consulting the Sarkin Baure, and he could also dismiss them as he wished. The appointing official also retained most of the *kudin sarauta* paid by the candidate he appointed.

Masugari were required to report relevant local developments to their lord or his *jekada.* As at Zango, *masugari* and their villagers were expected to stay at the homes of their lord or his *jekada* when they visited the capital. In return, the agents of these officials were accommodated in the village at the homes of their respective *masugari.* When there was a dispute between the *tarayya* subjects of different officials, the matter was referred to their lords at the capital for settlement, who might then confer together and summon their local *masugari* to report on the affair. Within the village these *masugari* had limited initiatives as arbitrators and mediators in lesser disputes among their people and kin; but they mainly served as channels of communication between the lords and their people, relaying requests, complaints, orders, and summonses directly or through their *jekadu.* Whether he was in charge of a village or acted on behalf of his *tarayya* patron, a *maigari*'s role was the same.

Fiefholders collected the hoe tax and cattle tax from their fiefs. It is said that they tried to keep approximately one-half for themselves and transferred the rest to the chief. The numerous occupational taxes known locally as *mairam* were collected by other officials whom the Sarkin Baure appointed. At Baure the fiefholders collected the *zakka* (grain tithe) from their fiefs or scattered subjects, keeping one-half and giving the chief the rest.

Taxation and Tribute

The three principal taxes at Baure were *karo, jangali,* and *zakka.* At the end of the century, *karo,* the old Daura tax of *karan gona* or *karan fari,* was levied at the rate of 4,000 cowries per year on free married men. Slaves were exempt, and there are indications that malams, blacksmiths, long-distance traders *(fatake),* and Bush Fulani may also have been exempt. Cattle were taxed at the rate of 2,000 cowries per head each year, and *zakka* represented one-tenth of the grain harvested by each farmer annually. These were the only taxes collected by fiefholders or *tarayya* lords.

Local *fatake* (traveling traders) paid a tax of 5,000 cowries per annum to the Sarkin Tafarki for transfer to the chief. The Sarkin Tafarki, supported by the Sarkin Yara, levied caravan tolls of 3,000 cowries per camel load, 1,000 per ass, 500 per sheep, and 300 per goat on each occasion a caravan passed through the country. How this caravan toll was collected is described briefly below. Only at their sale were slaves the subject of tax. Then the seller and purchaser alike were each required to pay 5,000 cowries to the Sarkin Dillalai, chief of the commission agents, for transfer to the Sarkin Baure. The Sarkin Dawaki also collected a tax of 1,000 cowries from the vendor whenever a horse was sold. In addition, a tax of 1,000 cowries per annum was levied on all privately owned horses and collected by the Sarkin Dawaki. These taxable beasts were known as *dokin dinari* to signify that they had been purchased privately and did not belong to the chief or his officials.

No *karambaki* was levied at Baure during the last century; and *mairam* there simply denoted occupational taxes. It is not immediately apparent why Baure escaped the *karambaki* that Tanimu imposed on Zango after he dismissed Dan Aro and Mazawaje in 1877. Perhaps Baure's impoverishment and hostility dissuaded Tanimu from increasing its burden. Not long before Dan Aro's dismissal at Zango, Jibo had burned down the town of Baure on fleeing to Kano. Severely weakened by internal divisions and anxious to preserve its seniority to Baure, Zango may have had less capacity to resist Zinder's demands; but perhaps the sultan derived roughly equivalent revenues from the two states by virtue of the wider control he exercised over internal appointments at Baure. It is also possible that Zinder adjusted the forms and rates of revenue and modes of its collection to suit the differing political situations of its subordinates.[4]

At Baure skilled builders paid an annual tax of 1,000 cowries each to the Sarkin Gini (Chief Builder), who passed on the bulk of these receipts to the chief. A similar sum was levied on barber-doctors by the Sarkin Aska (Chief Barber-Doctor); on *maroka* (praise-singers) by Sankira; on *bori* dancers, witch doctors, and medicine men by the Magaji Bagwiwa; on tanners and leatherworkers by the Dan Maza; and on weavers, woodworkers, strawworkers and female hairdressers by Tarno. All blacksmiths were required to pay an annual tax of 1,000 cowries to the Sarkin Makera. In addition, all those who smelted iron ore *(tamma)* paid the Sarkin Makera a *mairam* of

4,000 cowries annually and had to turn in a *buya* (pig of iron) that weighed about eighty pounds as a *zakka,* or tithe, from each smelting. Cloth sellers and other commission agents each paid 1,000 cowries annually to the Sarkin Dillalai, while the Tarno or his subordinate, the Sarkin Marina, collected a tax of 2,000 cowries on each dye pit from its owners. Butchers became liable to tax whenever they attended market. The principal butchers who slaughtered animals paid the Sarkin Pawa 1,000 cowries for each beef killed, while their assistants and juniors who roasted meat for sale paid 200 cowries each. Likewise, sellers of sweetstuffs such as honey, *alewa,* or sugarcane paid 100 cowries to Sarka whenever they visited the market. Pot makers also had to pay 100 cowries apiece to the Dan Hungumi whenever they brought their wares to market. Drummers were taxed according to category and estimated income: the unskilled drummer in a small village paid 500 cowries per annum to the Sarkin Makada, while master drummers *(sarakunan makada)* and skilled buglers each paid 2,000 annually, the sums collected being turned over without deduction to the chief.

As in Zango, the Bai Karama collected an annual tax on nubile unmarried girls. At Baure this was levied on their fathers at 500 cowries per girl. The Sarkin Garka collected a tax of 1,000 cowries yearly on every fenced plot in or near a marsh; and the Bulkacima was responsible for reporting all new wells to the chief, who then levied an appropriate fee on the owner.

As at Daura and Zango, markets at Baure were liable to *agama* and to *dauke* levied by Ajiya, the prison warder, and the chief's courtiers. At Baure *agama* was the customary levy collected by the Sarkin Pawa during the Fast and paid for by the chief with a token horse or slave. *Dauke* denoted individual appropriation of market goods by officials or their agents in order either to ransom them to the vendors or others or to use them for their own purposes. In addition, the Ajiya and the Magajin Tambari had customary rights to levy foodstuffs for the prisoners and Fulani butter for the royal drums. As at Zango, the Lifidi had customary rights to levy cotton in the markets. These various appropriations were carried out in Baure town on such a scale that some time before 1890 the market ceased to meet there and was held about four or five miles away to escape these seizures.

Treasury arrangements at Baure were very similar to those of Hausa Daura. The chief's wealth in cowries, silver, cloths, and other portable media was stored in the *shamaki* section of the palace near the prison. Ajiya guarded both. The chief distributed grain to his nonterritorial officials from the *zakka* he received, the amounts allocated varying with the recipients' rank. Horses belonging to the throne were likewise distributed among officials and clients, who were thereby obliged to turn out whenever summoned by the chief for military or civil duties. Slaves played a minor part in the Baure administrative organization, perhaps because the throne failed to accumulate and hold a sufficiently large number to place much routine administration in their hands.

On data just cited, Baure tax rates were substantially lower than those of

Zango. There may be several reasons for this. First, as a matter of policy the Baure chiefs probably tried to keep their tax rates low in order to attract immigration from Zango, where public dissatisfaction increased steadily with increases in the tax burdens. Even within the chiefdom of Zango itself, the Kaura Bakula had pursued a similar policy under Tafida, Sule, and Yusufu to attract immigrants from other villages into his fiefs. Nonetheless, Bakula's successors doubled the annual tax on privately owned horses and set this at 2,500 cowries, whereas at Baure we hear of no upward movement of taxes after 1870, when Jibo destroyed the capital. As cash taxes were convertible by *rangwame* to payments in kind, the official rate was also subject to continuous manipulation by collectors and taxpayers. Nonetheless, it would seem that the incidence per head of tax contributions was considerably higher in the domains administered directly by the Zango chiefs than in those of their Kauras or the Sarkin Baure. Furthermore, besides avoiding significant increases in its tribute to Zinder, perhaps because of its consistently hostile and belligerent attitude, Baure probably exceeded Zango in population, if not in area. If so, the average incidence of contributions to the Zinder tribute in Baure was probably much lower than at Zango. Perhaps, as it claimed to be the senior successor state, Zango was obliged to render the larger tribute. However, the Baure administration differed from those of Hausa Daura and Zango in its marginal use of slave staff. This substantially reduced the revenue the chief required by freeing him of the expense of supporting large numbers of slaves whose main functions may have been to magnify the chiefship and overawe the common people. Moreover, besides this relative lack of slave officials, there were also fewer offices reserved for royals or other free persons at Baure than at Daura or Zango. Its officialdom was thus much smaller and simpler than those of Daura or Zango; and this reduction in the scale and complexity of the Baure officialdom gave its people corresponding economic relief without increasing their political power. Nonetheless, although greatly reduced by comparison with Zango, the Baure officialdom proved adequate to administer all its routine interests as a petty Hausa state.

Officialdom

In a description of the constitution and officialdom of Baure, it is convenient to begin with the territorial organization. The distribution of villages as fiefs among senior offices is listed in table 9 and represented on map 6 for those settlements to which my data refer. Internal evidence suggests that this territorial organization prevailed from the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Many of the communities in contemporary Baure had not yet been founded, while some settlements that then existed have since disappeared. However, though administrative details indicate that the territorial organization set out here replaced an earlier one, they do not reveal the direction of change.

TABLE 9

Fief Distribution at Baure, c. 1870-1900

Title	Fiefs
Bunturawa	Mai Mazari, Tumburum, Gorandawa, Kefin Kwenci, U. Gamji, Kaura, Mudiri, Kafin Sule, Rhuwe, Wanga, Maigida, Kagara, Ciciya, Dadin Sarki, Paski
Yerima	Dashi, Furtumi, Yalkiriya, Dorowa Goma, Kirowa, Dadin Kowa, Mazare, Agala, Dankum, Dan Tagurma, Galadimawa, Zode, Fusamnawa, Yan Masawa
Murka	Maikiliya, Burdudu, Tsaya Kikwana, Phaski
Kaura	Wankade, U. Jibo, Yantsai, Kawarindan Jaji, Kawarin Sallah, Dan Umar, Kyaukyawal Kuka, Acakwale, Sukulu, Dan Gagi, Kumbi, U. Rai, Kwararin Danko, Kwabo, Haruna Babba, Haruna ta Korau
Galadima	Sitawa, Shiriyau, Tsawani, Turaki, Kwashi, Garki, Bari, Balle, Tudu, Doshe, U. Sallau, Gwozawa, Badai, Kawailla, Dan Dogo, Kurtu, Taramnawa, Doki Halidu, Doki dan Habu, Sale, Kagara, Babban Mutum
Turaki	Malikawa
S. Fada	Baushi, U. Ciroma, Kakare, Toronkawa
Shentali	Yan Motu, Kwashi, U. Fari, Kurmi, U. Turaki
S. Yara	Tumfushi, Dangodi, Kyallas, Dole, Dogon Gamji, U. Adamu, Dafama, Dan Shagira, U. Maza, Maifaru

Fiefs attached to particular offices seem to have been distributed in two contrasting ways. Most of the fiefs attached to most offices were grouped in compact continuous areas; but in all cases the fiefholder also administered other fiefs scattered across the country. We cannot say whether the compact groupings replaced an earlier systematic or random dispersal of fiefs; but if this occurred, it was only partially successful. However, it is also possible that this dispersion of fiefs arose after an initial allocation of compact administrative districts as people moved to settle in new areas while remaining under their traditional lords. Closer examination of the map shows that despite superficial resemblances, this Baure fief distribution differs in many particulars from the territorial reorganization based on compact districts which the British introduced.

The western part of Baure chiefdom, which adjoined Zango and Kazaure, was administered by the Yerima, Bunturawa, and Murka, the three senior princes. The Kaura's fiefs lay mainly along the southern half of the caravan route through Baure from Zinder to Kano. The Galadima and Sarkin Yara

Map 6. The Chiefdom of Baure, 1870-1900

held most of the communities east of this trail. Baure town itself was divided into two approximately equal parts under the Galadima and Kaura, respectively. Unlike Zango, at Baure the chief does not seem to have held administrative rights over any communities. This suggests that his receipts from territorial and other officials were sufficient to support his expenses and thus that he exercised effective control over these officials. Of these the Galadima and the Kaura held the largest numbers of fiefs, followed by the Sarkin Yara, the Yerima, and the Bunturawa, while the Murka, Shentali, and Sarkin Fada held four or five each. The Turaki's village probably provided his essential requirements and enabled him to act as Baure's *jekada* to Damagaram.

In chart C I set out the structure of the officialdom as the rulers and people perceived it. By this I mean that the distribution of offices in the various categories of the chart, and the categories themselves, reproduce the designations and criteria that prevailed at Baure. The Baure officialdom differed structurally from those of Zango and Hausa Daura in three ways. First, at Baure the *lawanai* of *rukunai* were classified separately as *rawuna* (the turbaned ones) to distinguish them from the *fadawa* (courtiers), who were thus implicitly classified as *rawuna (lawanai)* of the chief. Second, Baure had more *rukunai* than Zango or Daura, and they were also more diverse in status and roles. Third, the Baure officialdom lacked a separate rank-order of throne slaves. As the chart indicates, the six titled slaves at Baure were distributed unequally among *rukunai, rawuna,* and *fadawa.* No titles were reserved for eunuchs, and it is said that the chiefs had none.

All slave offices at Baure were reserved for particular lineages; but whether this arrangement was adopted to forestall Zinder's appropriation of the few throne slaves we cannot say. The senior slave lineage held the titles of Sarkin Yara and Bai Karama, while four others held one each. As at Zango, the offices of Kaura and Galadima were reserved for members of the free lineages that had held these titles at Daura before the jihad. The Kauras and Galadimas of Baure were thus agnatic kin of their Zango peers. On this basis the Dan Kwaba Audu Birgi of Baure was able to seek an appointment as Dan Kwaba for his son Hamidu at Zango through the sultan of Zinder. With this exception, it seems that the Kaura and Galadima lineages of Baure maintained exclusive interests in their offices there and did not attempt to acquire parallel titles at Zango. The Zango and Baure segments of these two noble lineages were thus differentiated and contraposed by their identification with the two rival successor states. However, we need not attribute the long peace between Zango and Baure to the numerous relations of kinship and marriage which linked the officials of these two states. After 1847 Zinder prohibited fighting between them as a condition of their common subjugation; but as soon as Zinder's control was removed, Zango and Baure found occasions to express their hostility.

At Baure the Kaura's kinsmen held the subordinate offices of Dan Kwaba, Madaba, Sarkin Dawaki, Sarka, and Shentalin Kaura. Except for the last, at

CHART C

State Organization at Baure, c. 1875-1900

Chief	Rukunai and their staffs		Royals		Clerics	Courtiers	Craft officials
S A R K I	KAURA*	Shentali Sarka Dan Kwaba Madaba Gilu S. Dawaki S. Fada	Princes Murka (Magayaki?) Bunturawa Yerima	Haska Maina	Dan Sanwai* Magatakarda (Limam) (Alkali)	Tarno Barde Sarkin Fada Sarkin Karma Sarkin Jarmai Baushi Dan Barau	Magajin Tambari Magajin Turu Dan Tomo Sarkin Busa Sarkin Makada Sankira
	GALADIMA*	Dan Kumalo Dan Hungumi Dan Bawo Magayaki Yekuwa	Princesses Magajiya Iya Saraki			Dan Maza Sarkin Tafarki	Magaji Bagwiwa Sarkin Aska Sarkin Dillalai
	FADA BABBA	*Ajiya* *Dogari*				*Lifidi* Sarkin Zagi	Sarkin Pawa (Korama) Sarkin Makera
	TURAKI*	Sarkin Yaki				(Waziri)	Sarkin Lafiya Bulkacima
	*SHENTALI**	*Bai Karama*					
	*SARKIN YARA**	Ubandawaki Sarkin Fada					

LEGEND:
* = On electoral council.
Hereditary slave offices are italicized

Zango these offices were also reserved for Kaura's kin. At Baure the Gilu and the Sarkin Fada of Kaura were usually his free clients.

Of the Galadima's *lawanai* at Baure, only Yekuwa was not drawn from the Galadima's lineage. The traditional titles of Binoni and Matsai were missing from the *lawanai* of the Galadima of Baure, who also lacked a Sarkin Fada. However, as in Zango and prejihadic Daura, at Baure the princes were formally placed under the supervision of the Galadima.

Other hereditary offices reserved for free men at Baure include those of the Turaki and his assistant, the Sarkin Yaki, both of which were held by one lineage; the Sarkin Tafarki; Dan Barau and Dan Maza; Fada Babba, who commanded the royal slave police; and the Dan Sanwai, whose office at Baure lacked the subordinate titles it had at Zango. As at Zango and Hausa Daura, the Tarno's office was reserved for the son of a princess who was also a cross-cousin of the chief. No dismissals from this position are recalled.

Shigege offices reserved for free men at Baure include the Kaura's Sarkin Fada; the Galadima's Yekuwa; the Sarkin Fada and Ubandawaki of the Sarkin Yara; the Gilu; the chief's Magatakarda, or scribe; his Sarkin Fada; his Barde; his Sarkin Karma; and his Sarkin Jarmai. All these officials lived in their own family compounds. In addition, the titles of Sarkin Zagi and Baushi, equivalent to the Dan Bajida of Zango, were allotted to free men without lineage restriction. Both offices had quarters reserved for them in the chief's compound, although the Baushi, like the slave Lifidi, lived away from the capital.

All craft titles were reserved for free men; and most were probably filled from specific lineages. This was clearly the case with such titles as Magaji Bagwiwa, Magajin Turu, Magajin Tambari, Dan Tomo, and Sarkin Lafiya, which were closely attached to the throne. It is also likely that the Sarkin Makada, Sarkin Busa, Sarkin Makera, and Sarkin Pawa were similarly recruited. Concerning the Sarkin Dillalai, Sarkin Aska, and Bulkacima, we cannot be sure. At the end of the century some of these craft officials lived outside the capital in their private compounds. They were primarily responsible for collecting the various occupational taxes listed above and for organizing such work as the chief and other senior officials required.

After 1870 no appointments were made at Baure to the offices of Limam and Alkali. We cannot say definitely why such appointments ceased, though we can date the cessation of these offices to about 1873, when Jibo burned down Baure, following which the market was resited away from the town. Thereafter the Dan Sanwai, who had formerly served as the chief's Limam and deputy, performed the Limam's functions. For guidance in administering the *shari'a* after Jibo's reign, chiefs relied on advice from two or three local malams attached to their court as judicial assessors, but especially on that of their scribe, the Magatakarda, whose office may have been instituted when the judgeship fell vacant. We cannot say whether malams Kato and Abu, who served as Magatakarda successively for the rest of the century, were agnatic kin. Besides his role as *muhuti* (legal assessor), the scribe kept

TABLE 10

Status Structure of the Baure Officialdom

Status categories		Hereditary	Nonhereditary
Royals	Men	Bunturawa Yerima Murka Haska Maina	
	Women	Magajiya Iya Saraki	
		Tarno	
Free clients		Kaura Sarka Shentalin Kaura Dan Kwaba Madaba Sarkin Dawaki	Gilu Sarkin Fadan Kaura
		Galadima Dan Kumalo Dan Hungumi Dan Bawo Magayaki	Yekuwa Sarkin Fadan Sarkin Yara Ubandawakin Sarkin Yara
		Turaki Sarkin Yaki	Sarkin Fadan Sarki
		Dan Maza Sarkin Tafarki Dan Barau Fada Babba	Barde Sarkin Karma Sarkin Jarmai Sarkin Zagi
		Dan Sanwai	Baushi
Slaves		Sarkin Yara Bai Karama	
		Shentali Lifidi Ajiya Sarkin Dogarai	

Note: Holders of bracketed offices are kinsmen of the first-named. Thus, the five offices listed below Kaura are held by kinsmen of Kaura. This table omits craft officials.

records of the chief's tax receipts from various officials and helped in the apportionment of *zakka*. He also took care of the chief's correspondence with Zinder and other states; and as scribe, Malam Abu had a seat on the senior council of state, probably in place of the absent Alkali.

State Councils

At Baure the electoral council included the Kaura, Galadima, Dan Sanwai, Sarkin Yara, Shentali, and Turaki and met under Kaura's chairmanship. The Turaki owed his seat on this council to a special directive from Zinder that enjoined his attendance at its discussions in his capacity as the local *jekada* to Zinder. By this means Zinder sought to keep fully informed about the qualities and backing of rival candidates for the succession. Although he attended these electoral discussions, it seems likely that the Turaki did not take an active part in them. The other electors, being aware of the Turaki's role as Zinder's informant, may thus have tried to agree privately about the candidates before the formal session.

The political power of a subordinate official in these patrimonial chiefdoms had its fullest expression when he secured his superior's dismissal. By this test the critical power at Baure was held by the Kaura Gata in the first reigns of Habu and Jibo, then by the Sarkin Fada Masabka, and finally by the Turaki Inusa. All three relied mainly on hostile reports to Damagaram to secure the depositions of the chiefs they opposed. Thus, under Zinder the chiefs at Baure and Zango were repeatedly subverted by senior officials whose reports they were able neither to counter nor to prevent. In both states the chiefs were politically paralyzed by this treachery, which Zinder certainly fostered for its own ends but could not have cultivated on unsuitable soil. Nonetheless, while both chiefships were weakened by similar means, their development diverged as an expression of certain differences in the processes of their subversion. At Zango the Kaura exercised a virtual monopoly of the chiefs' depositions, despite some feeble attempts in this direction by later Galadimas. At Baure, however, the Sarkin Fada Masabka replaced the Kaura in this role before losing it to the Turaki. As an effect of the changing distribution of decisive political power at Baure, the chiefdom remained united; and its chief, as the preeminent target for intrigue, remained preeminent in local affairs. By contrast, at Zango, where the Kauras monopolized these powers of dismissal, they successively aggrandized their office to such an extent that Zinder, seeking an appropriate administrative expression for this changed situation, virtually split the state in two. Evidently the chiefdom and chiefship, if not the chief, were more secure when its officialdom contained several traitors of equivalent power and skill rather than one unchallengeable kingmaker.

In the latter nineteenth century the senior state council at Baure consisted of the chief, the Kaura, the Galadima, the Sarkin Yara, the Murka, the Yerima, the Shentali, the Magatakarda, and the Fada Babba, whose police guarded its meetings. This council differs most strikingly from those of Zango and traditional Daura by including two princes, the Yerima and Murka, and two slave *rukunai,* the Sarkin Yara and the Shentali, who were also electors. On the other hand, it did not include the Dan Sanwai, Limam, or Alkali, the two latter offices being vacant during the period to which this

account refers. The Dan Sanwai's absence from this political council indicates the reduced role of this office at Baure. The Magatakarda was the only councillor with some special knowledge of Islamic literature and law. The Turaki's exclusion is understandable in the light of his peculiar relation with Zinder and his subversive potential. Of the major territorial officials of Baure, only the Bunturawa and the Sarkin Fada had no seats on the council. Evidently, then, neither the relative rank nor the relative influence of differing offices is accurately reflected throughout this period by the size or numbers of their fiefs. For example, the Bunturawa had twice as many settlements as the Murka but nonetheless ranked below him; and despite the approximate equivalence of their respective fiefs, the slave Shentali held *rukuni* status, while the free Sarkin Fada ranked below the Fada Babba, the Tarno, and the Barde, none of whom had fiefs.

Some Official Roles

The Yerima's country seat was Dan Tagarma, while that of the Kaura was Wankade on the Zinder-Kano caravan route. The Yerima and the Kaura usually spent one or two months each year at these places, supervising their official farms, collecting tax, and administering their nearby fiefs. Such visits were usually made during the rainy season, when raids were rare. For the remainder of the year, they both lived at Baure.

During the dry season, when the caravan traffic was at its height, the Sarkin Yara resided at Tumfushi to help the Sarkin Tafarki police the route and collect the statutory tolls, by force if necessary, for transfer to the chief. The Sarkin Tafarki, a free hereditary official, although not one of the Sarkin Yara's *lawanai,* administered this caravan traffic under the Sarkin Yara's supervision and had to keep him informed of any irregular events.

The two principal *rukunai* at Baure were the Galadima and Kaura. Together they could dominate the electoral and senior state councils. Kaura was also the Baure war chief. Appointments to both these offices were made at Zinder, where successful candidates had to swear oaths of loyalty to the sultan. On returning to Baure, the new officials were greeted with gifts, music, and dancing; but no *tambari* were drummed at Baure on their installation. The Kaura and Galadima selected their own *lawanai,* mainly from their kin, for presentation to the chief, who installed them with robes and turbans but exacted no oath. Most *lawanai* of the Kaura and Galadima served as *jekadu* to particular fiefs, and several had state farms and compounds provided for them, as did their principals. As elsewhere, only the chief could dismiss those whom he had appointed.

As at Zango and Daura, Galadima was the formal head and *kofa* of all princes, titled or otherwise. At Baure the Kaura ranked nominally as the head of the courtiers *(fadawa).* In practice the Yerima and other senior princes of Baure had private access to the chief, but the Galadima presided

at their marriages, most of which were celebrated in his compound. The chief's sons celebrated their wedding feasts and rituals at the Yerima's compound, while the princesses held theirs in the compound of the Magajiya.

Of Kaura's *lawanai,* the Sarkin Dawaki and the Sarka collected the special taxes reported above. Of the Galadima's *lawanai,* only the Dan Hungumi had similar functions. The Galadima's Magayaki distributed kola nuts and other largesse on behalf of the chief. In addition, these officials served as *jekadu.*

The Fada Babba, a free hereditary *rukuni,* had no towns but supervised the Ajiya and *dogarai.* Ajiya, a slave, was the prison warder and guardian of the chief's treasure, which was stored at the palace in the *shamaki. Dogarai* were the chief's slave police, whose captain, the Sarkin Dogarai, was directed by the Fada Babba. They served as the palace guard, a corps of messengers, and public police.

Besides his roles as councillor and territorial administrator, the Shentali was a senior war captain. Although we lack specific information to this effect, it seems probable that he commanded the Lifidi, Sarkin Karma, and Sarkin Jarmai in battle, as his prototype at Daura had done. As Shentali had no titled *lawanai,* he probably administered his fiefs through untitled staff.

Sarkin Yara, a slave *rukuni,* had one slave among his *lawanai,* his kinsman, the Bai Karama. His subordinates, the Ubandawaki and Sarkin Fada, were free clients whom the Sarkin Yara selected and the chief appointed. In addition, although they were not his *lawanai,* Sarkin Yara supervised the work of Dan Maza and Sarkin Tafarki, supporting the latter's collection of caravan tolls with a small armed reserve, and receiving the Dan Maza's leather taxes on behalf of the chief. Bai Karama also transmitted his receipts from the tax on maidens to the Sarkin Yara for delivery to the chief. Probably the Bai Karama was the Sarkin Yara's likely successor. If so, this was one of the very few instances of official promotion possible at Baure.

The primary duty of the Sarkin Tafarki was the collection of *kudin fito* (caravan tolls) and of *kudin fatake,* the fees paid by local traveling merchants. Since Baure lacked the offices of Madugu and Sarkin Zango, the Sarkin Tafarki handled their administrative and tax-gathering functions as part of his own. Like Sarkin Yara, for six months each year he had his base at Tumfushi and patrolled the route to Wankade. In the rainy season he lived at Baure and attended the chief's court.

The Turaki's role has been indicated above. His assistant, the Sarkin Yaki, was his kinsman and likely successor, another of the rare promotional alignments at Baure.

Of the chief's *fadawa,* only the Sarkin Fada administered fiefs. Some fiefless *fadawa* who had separate compounds and worked as the chief's agents may have had official farms and slaves attached to their titles, with or without powers to appropriate certain commodities from the market. These men formed a minor council with which the chief met daily to discuss public and palace affairs and to deal with lesser issues. As at Zango, more serious decisions were reserved for the senior council of state, which was summoned at

the chief's request by Dan Tomo, who drummed the praise-songs of its members in order of precedence. Matters reserved for the senior council were probably similar to those administered by the senior councils of Hausa Daura and Zango, except that in the absence of an Alkali the chief settled cases by whipping or fines on the advice of his legal assessors and without recourse to the senior council unless political repercussions seemed likely. As at Zango, sentences of capital punishment and mutilation had to be referred to Zinder for review and action.

Despite his relatively low rank, the Sarkin Fada was the nominal *kofa* (door) between the chief and all other courtiers *(fadawa)*. Initially the Sarkin Fada at Baure was the chief's confidential messenger like the Jekafada of Zango; but after Abdu Bajimi, Masabka, who took office as Sarkin Fada under Habu between 1847 and 1855, used this position to acquire considerable power by reporting the malfeasance of Baure chiefs to Zinder and thus securing their deposition. It was probably at this period that the Sarkin Fada acquired territorial powers; but by the same process the office lost its original control of communications between the chief and his courtiers; and since it was this function which had enabled Masabka to aggrandize his power, with its loss the office of Sarkin Fada ceased to threaten the chiefship politically. Moreover, despite its enhanced wealth and administrative status, the rank of the title remained rather low.

Like the Sarkin Fada and Turaki, the Dan Barau, who served as a messenger, lived in his own compound. At Baure Dan Barau did not collect the grain tithe directly from farmers; but he may have done so from the various fiefholders who first collected it. Unlike the Tarno, who supported himself with shares of the taxes on weavers, woodworkers, and dyers, Dan Barau was heavily dependent on the chief's generosity, as was the Baushi, who commanded the Baure bowmen. Baushi normally lived at his home away from the capital but guarded the palace when the chief was absent in peacetime. The Bulkacima, Sarkin Makera, and other craft officials were not true courtiers *(fadawa)* and rarely attended the palace unless summoned by the chief. Several of these craft officials normally lived outside Baure town. However, even after the market was moved from the capital, the Sarkin Pawa and his assistant, the Korama, were drawn from Baure.

Apart from the Kaura and Shentali, the principal military officials of Baure were the Baushi, Sarkin Karma, Sarkin Jarmai, Barde, and Lifidi. All five titles were attached to the chief, the first four being reserved for free persons without lineage restrictions, while the last was held by the throne slave who commanded the chief's bodyguard in battle. Excluding the Barde and Baushi, it seems likely that all came under the Shentali's command during campaigns. All had the same functions as their counterparts at Daura and Zango. Lifidi also had rights to levy the cotton he needed for the suits worn by horses and riders of the heavy cavalry. As commander of the chief's bodyguard, although a slave, the Lifidi enjoyed great prestige and frequently lived away from the capital in peacetime.

Magaji Bagwiwa was Baure's equivalent of the Bayamadi at Zango. As

such, Bagwiwa levied an annual tax on all *bori* dancers and local vendors of magic or medicine for witchcraft. This he seems to have retained for his own use, as did Bayamadi at Zango and Daura. However, there was no Dan Baroka at Baure, and its first Sarkin Masu was a client whom the Kaura Ahmadu appointed when he took over Baure after the chiefdom had been abolished.

At Baure the Dan Sanwai served as the chief's deputy and palace *limam.* Originally he presided over the Idi prayers, and when the Limam's office remained vacant, he probably conducted the weekly services at the mosque as well. The Dan Sanwai administered all alms presented to malams in the capital or the rural areas by officials or commoners.

It is said that the Dan Sanwai of Baure was recruited from the traditional lineage that held this office in Hausa Daura. However, at Baure the Dan Sanwai's role was narrower and less strategic than at Zango or Daura. Unlike his peers at Daura and Zanga, the Dan Sanwai at Baure had no titled staff. The lack of these lesser malamships at Baure may indicate a corresponding absence of the lineages that held these titles; but we cannot say whether the reduced functions and status of the Dan Sanwai at Baure preceded or followed the refusal of eligible members of the lineages that held titles attached to that office to move to Baure as subordinates. At Baure the Dan Sanwai's functions were solely those of an official priesthood. As such, he had no seat on the senior council, no responsibility for treasury supervision, and he was not asked to handle the chief's confidential messages. Thus the office lost its secular political features; nonetheless, as the sole official priest after the Limamship fell vacant, the Dan Sanwai retained his seat on the electoral council.

Royal Titles

Of princely offices at Baure, the Yerima ranked first, followed by the Murka and Bunturawa in that order. During Baure's first half-century, the office of Murka provided it with most of its chiefs, while only one Yerima, Habu, achieved the throne. However, after 1873 no more Murkas became chiefs, and by the century's end the Yerima's office had taken the lead in the accession stakes. Throughout this period no chief was appointed directly from the Bunturawa title. These office histories reflect the early prominence of the Murka title. Tsoho had established the Baure chiefdom while holding that title, but whether he was appointed by the Sarkin Gwari Abdu, by his father, Dan Shufini, or at Magaria by his rival, Kitari, remains unknown. Evidently, during the first forty years of Baure, the Murka may have controlled more fiefs than the Yerima or Bunturawa. The Murka's early preeminence among princely ranks may thus explain the attachment of the Haska and Maiwa titles to it as *lawanai,* rather than to the Yerima or Bunturawa. By contrast, neither the Bunturawa nor Yerima had any titled royal lieutenants.

It seems clear that although the Yerima had precedence over other titled princes at Baure, his relation with Murka was one of rivalry. Perhaps this reflects the old eighteenth-century contraposition of Murka, whom Kaura supervised, with the Yerima, who "followed" the Galadima. As Murka's *lawanai,* the Haska and Maiwa had small chance of promotion.

Originally Tsoho appointed one of his sons, Wulau, as Magayaki, an office which had been traditionally reserved for princes at Daura but attached directly to the Galadima. However, after Wulau all Magayakis at Baure were drawn from the Galadima's lineage. Tsoho had also given the princely office of Magaji to Tafiyo, one of his sons; but after Tafiyo's death many years later, this position appears to have lapsed. Baure also lacked the royal titles of Sarkin Shanu and Samba'a, perhaps because the Sarkin Gwari Abdu had already transferred these titles to his Sarkin Pawa before the state was founded. Following the Sarkin Gwari Abdu's gesture, as related above, both offices were removed from the royal ranks; but at Baure they also had no place among the Sarkin Pawa's *lawanai.*

None of the offices reserved for princesses at Baure administered any fiefs, nor did their incumbents act as patrons in the local network of *tarayya* relations, although both Magajiya and Iya were highly valued by offenders as intercessors with the chief. For their intercession these ladies received useful gifts; but the chief was under no obligation to heed their advice. If he proceeded against their wishes, there was no action the Magajiya and the Iya could take to frustrate or overrule him. Thus Baure lacked the constitutional doctrine that authorized the Magajiya at Daura and Zango to depose the chief on the request of the Kaura and Galadima. It seems that Tsoho was led by the circumstances in which he established his chiefdom to favor a strong central office whose executive powers were not subject to the political restrictions of traditional Hausa Daura. With this objective, while appointing his sister Jeru as Iya, he left the Magajiya office vacant for most of his reign. Later, during the dominance of Kaura Lalu, his royal wife Atuwa became the first Magajiya of Baure. By then Tsoho had shown that the Magajiya's office was not indispensable to Baure and that the chiefdom could prosper and grow without it. Thereafter it was the Magajiya's principal role to preside over the rituals of royal kinswomen at first marriages and childbirths. The Iya probably supervised the female *bori* dancers and prostitutes at Baure as at Daura and Zango but held no other administrative role.

Political Development of Baure

In Baure constitutional theory, the chief's position was that of an autocrat. In practice his autocracy was limited by three conditions: first, by the vassalage which subordinated Baure to Zinder; second, by the chief's dependence on his senior staff, who undertook routine administration of the territory and together controlled more forces than the chief; third, by the chief's

heavy dependence on the dynasty's support for his authority and power. As we have seen, each of the three senior princes at Baure administered several fiefs. Together they probably controlled about one-third of the territory. By contrast, at Zango throughout the last century princes were denied authority and power by their exclusion from political administration. In this, Zango seems to have followed the pattern that prevailed at Daura in previous centuries. By thus neutralizing his dynastic rivals, these arrangements enhanced the chief's security in office; but as events at Zango under Zinder's rule revealed, the risks were considerable. By excluding other princes from active participation in the administration and political councils of the state, this organization concentrated decisive control over policy among the chief and his senior administrators. These senior officials fell into three categories: the senior throne slaves; the malams; and at Daura the two free *rukunai,* Galadima and Kaura. It is likely that in its earlier phases these *rukuni* offices had been filled at Daura by eunuchs of the chief's palace staff. Under such conditions the chief's predominance could be limited only by a doctrine of the Magajiya's ultimate powers of veto and deposition, or by the political alignments of senior throne slaves and territorial chiefs. In the normal case, the chief would thus dominate decisions of policy. However, once the offices of Kaura and Galadima had been appropriated to free descent groups, the chief soon lost independent control of critical appointments and dismissals. Members of his slave staff were then politically neutralized by the free *rukunai* and reduced to strictly executive roles, while the official malams, including the Alkali, lost whatever political initiatives they formerly had.

We may assume that Tsoho recognized these implications of the traditional constitution and that when he broke from Lukudi and Kitari to establish a state of his own, he tried to adapt positively to the exigencies of his situation by allocating major administrative and political resources to his sons, the Yerima, Murka, Haska, Magaji, and Bunturawa, thus reducing simultaneously his dependence on the Kaura and Galadima and the official malams, throne slaves, and *fadawa.* However, following Tsoho the later chiefs of Baure relied mainly on their two slave *rukunai,* the Sarkin Yara and Shentali, for the support they needed to check the princes and free *rukunai.* To dominate the state, these chiefs then had to regulate political relations between their three sets of fiefholders, their dynastic allies and rivals, the Galadima and Kaura, and the two slave *rukunai* to whom they had given seats on the electoral and senior councils. In this new system there was little place for Magajiya or the official malams.

However, Tsoho and his successors failed to control two critical processes —the development of political rivalry for the succession among titled princes and the manipulation of such rivalries by free officials in their attempts to have chiefs deposed and their competitors appointed. As these developments proceeded, the Sarkin Fada, as the chief's *jekada,* acquired important fiefs, thereby tipping the delicate political balance on which the chief's predominance had hitherto depended in favor of the free officials—Kaura, Gala-

dima, and Sarkin Fada. In an effort to redress this imbalance, the chief accordingly allotted further fiefs to the Yerima and Bunturawa.

Tsoho had evidently resented the Kaura Tamila's role at Yardaji and destroyed him at the first opportunity. It seems clear that he had no intention of allowing decisive power at Baure to fall into the hands of his Kaura or Galadima. However, by transferring major resources and functions to princely titles, he had invested these hitherto honorific offices with dynamic political roles and furnished their holders with the incentives and means for pursuit of dynastic rivalries. In consequence, after Zakari, no Murka escaped dismissal until Dan Barde died in office in Haliru's reign, shortly before the dissolution of Baure. During this period three Yerimas—Magwale, Danbore, and Makaho—were also dismissed. By contrast, during the first half of the century, after Tsagar no Kaura had died in office before Bature in Zakari's reign. Thereafter none was dismissed. Thus, as princely rivalries progressively eroded the tenure of princely offices, the positions of the free *rukunai* became correspondingly secure.

It seems likely, as the people of Baure maintain, that ambitious princes often initiated the action to depose the chief by inciting the Turaki or Sarkin Fada to send Zinder the necessary reports, whether true or false. Thus, the incompatibility of Tsoho's final situation as a vassal with his attempt to develop a strong central chiefship by concentrating administrative powers in the hands of princes and throne slaves is revealed by the princely rivalries that allowed the suzerain to plunder the throne's resources, to depose its occupants, and to remove them from office at will. In response to this situation, after 1870 the chiefs of Baure began to replace the kinsmen and clients their predecessors had appointed by their own trusted followers. This development, which increased official turnovers and internal rivalries, had its greatest impact on those princely offices to which the early chiefs of Baure had looked for decisive political support.

As mentioned above, many *sarautu* at Baure were held on hereditary grounds by free clients whose lineages had held these offices at Daura or Yekuwa under the Sarkin Gwari Abdu and Lukudi. In consequence, the official organization at Baure minimized promotions. Excluding dynastic titles and those reserved for the Kaura's and Galadima's kinsmen, few officials were eligible for promotion, since they were restricted to the rank reserved for their families by descent. In the absence of suitable candidates from the appropriate descent groups, only essential appointments were made.

Excluding the Sarkin Yaki and Magatakarda, the state organization at Baure contained no offices that lacked prototypes at Daura or equivalents at Zango. Moreover, in only two cases, Magaji Bagwiwa and Sarkin Aska, were the names of these two offices changed. At Zango and Daura alike, Dan Bajida and Baushi are alternative names for a single office, as are Haska and Gara.

Baure lacked many offices that were established at Daura before the jihad

and preserved at Zango. Of royals, these include the Gabsai, the Magajiya Karya, the Yar Kuntu, the Dan Gawa, and the Maidaki; of clerics, the Samba'a, Magajin Dan Sanwai, and Magajin Malam, or Mardandana; and of others, free or slave, the Magaji Dankakulema, the Barade, the Sarkin Bai, Kusheyi, Sarkin Diya, Binoni, Matsai, Guyama, Sarkin Ruwa, Hauni, Dakama, Madugu, Sarkin Shanu, Dan Baroka, Sarkin Masu, Makama, Dan Takora, and Sarkin Zango. At Baure the Dan Kurege's office had been attached to the Limam's before the latter position fell vacant after 1870. The title of Hauni had lapsed following Zinder's suspension of its functions. The Jekafadas of Zango and Daura were replaced by the Sarkin Fada at Baure, but most of the Daura occupational offices persisted with little change. The chiefdom of Baure differs most clearly from those of Hausa Daura and Zango in the ways in which its traditional elements were reorganized to constitute a quite different system of political relations, despite important continuities in its units and modes of administrative procedure.

6
Fulani Daura

Apart from a list of its emirs, with the lengths of their reigns, which Malam Ishaka, the Limam of Daura, provided, the only written references to the history of Fulani Daura that I have come across are some comments by Craig on King's "History of Hausaland (Daura)" in the Katsina Provincial Office.[1] Craig's list of Fulani emirs of Daura is less complete and accurate than that provided by the Limam, which is reproduced above in the general tables of reigns at Zinder, Baure, Zango, and Fulani Daura presented in chapter 4. Except for occasional remarks scattered in administrative histories or travelers' narratives, these are the only writings about Fulani Daura that I have found; and my inquiries yielded little information on the history or organization of the Fulani state before the reign of Mamman Bello (1837-1868), when its form and character were both well developed. For example, in retracing the history of Fulani Daura, I tried to list all individuals who had held the eighteen senior offices of state but soon found that Bello's reign was the earliest for which these details were reliable. Since we have no evidence that Muhamman Bello introduced new offices or made any significant changes in their functions or modes of allocation, his predecessors probably laid down the broad framework of the government that Bello directed; but this organization experienced significant change in later reigns. Thus the following account only attempts to describe Fulani Daura during its second half-century. Of Mamman Bello's early years we know very little.

Daura and Sokoto

According to tradition, on the Emir Muhamman Sani's death after a reign of eight months, Zubairu, who was one of Malam Ishi'aku's elder sons, set out for Sokoto to seek the chieftainship of Daura. The rulers of Sokoto sent him home, saying that they would appoint whomever the traditional electors of Fulani Daura thought fit; but returning to Daura, Zubairu announced that

Sokoto had made him chief. His brother Mamman Bello, who had expected to succeed, promptly went into hiding and circulated a rumor that he had fled. Bello's supporters then persuaded Zubairu to pursue him; and when Zubairu had left the city, Malam Adamu, with whom Bello had hidden, brought him forth to be crowned and installed in the palace. Failing to re-enter Daura, Zubairu settled at Yemadawa nearby and attacked the town for six months before withdrawing to Kano. Apparently Zubairu had ruled Fulani Daura for three months before Bello's accession, but not having been installed at Sokoto or Daura or selected by the traditional electors, he held no title and is often omitted from the lists of local Fulani emirs. Even if some details of this tale are inaccurate, the rivalry between Malam Ishi'aku's sons for the succession which it illustrates is equally significant and well attested. Following Ishi'aku's death, his brothers Yusufu (1830-1836) and Muhamman Sani (1836) succeeded. The throne then passed to Ishi'aku's son and remained with Mamman Bello's issue after his reign. The pattern of fraternal rivalry begun by Zubairu and Bello only ceased with the Fulani regime.

It is related that when Malam Ishi'aku entered Daura in 1806-1807, many of the leading Hausa who had remained in the capital took sanctuary in the Hausa mosque near the old marketplace until they were assured that no harm would befall their persons and property. It is also said that Malam Ishi'aku lost his temper when they were brought before him to surrender and was only prevented from selling them into slavery by his elder brother Duke and the military chiefs to whom he owed his victory. One of the commanders, Namoda, who later conquered parts of Zamfara and gave his name to its capital,[2] left some of his kinsmen, the Alibawa Fulani, in Daura to assist Ishi'aku. Another important segment of the conquering force to remain in Daura were the Fulani from Kwassara, called the Kwassarawa. Two other Fulani groups that had fought for Ishi'aku were led by Musa, a Fulani from Malle, and by Umaru Dallaji, who hailed from southern Katsina. Following the capture of Daura city, Malam Musa and his Mallawa kinsmen moved southward to Zaria, while Umaru Dallaji led the Katsina Fulani against Katsina. Daura may have been the first Hausa capital to fall to the Fulani during the jihad, as tradition relates, and its rulers accordingly claimed the privileges of seniority as the first Fulani emirs.

The Fulani author of the jihad, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, in a treatise completed in A.H. 1221 (A.D. 1806)[3] and in the *Kitāb al-farq,* a brief but incisive contrast of an ideal Muslim government and the governments of traditional Hausa states, specifically forbade his followers to adopt Hausa administrative forms and practices and condemned these as inconsistent with the law and spirit of Islam.

> Therefore do not follow their way in their government, and do not imitate them, not even in the titles of their king, such as Kukinnu and Galadima and Ubandawaki and Daji and Barga and Sarkin Yara. Address your chief emir as "Commander of the Believers," and the emir of each province as "Emir of Such-and-such a Province," and the emir of each place as "Emir of Such-and-such a Place," and the emir of each

village as "Emir of Such-and-such a Village," and him who has charge of God's statutory punishments as "Emir of the Statutory Punishments."[4]

These prohibitions conclude the Shehu's critical account of traditional Hausa practice. However, the Shehu died in 1817, and within ten years his successors and emirs abandoned his proscriptions. Intentionally or otherwise, they also restored many traditional practices of Hausa government which the Shehu had condemned as incompatible with Islam.

Tradition ascribes to Dabo, the second Fulani emir of Kano, the initiative for this restoration. On his appointment by Sultan Mamman Bello of Sokoto, Dabo had to suppress opposition among the Fulani of Kano, who at first refused to obey him as chief. It is related that when Sultan Bello ruled that Kazaure should remain independent of Kano, Dabo went into seclusion to consider his situation. "After Dabo came out of his seclusion, he sent a message to the Sultan Muhamman Bello saying that he was asking for permission to restore some of the institutions of the Habe [Hausa] rulers. He explained to the Sarkin Musulmi [Chief of the Believers] that if he did not do this, religion and law [*shari'a*] would both remain weak. The Sultan agreed to his advice."[5] By 1824, when Clapperton visited Kano, this restoration of Hausa titles and practices was fairly general throughout the eastern Fulani empire directly administered by Sokoto.[6] For a preliminary discussion of the context, conditions, and consequences of this Fulani revival of Hausa institutions, interested readers are referred elsewhere.[7] We are here only concerned with developments at Daura.

Malam Ishi'aku himself guided the selective restoration of Hausa political practices and forms by allocating traditional Hausa offices to his kinsmen, Fulani supporters, and slaves. For example, the Alibawa were given the office of Fada Babba; the Kwassarawa, that of Kaura. Malam Ishi'aku gave his mother's brother the title of Magajiya and placed him in charge of the village of Karkaku. Thereafter, until Altine's reign the Magajiya na Karkaku was the only Magajiya in Fulani Daura. Ishi'aku's descendants intermarried frequently with this Karkaku lineage, who were thus their cross-cousins, and it was the family of the Magajiya na Karkaku that supplied Fulani Daura with its Limams. The appointments made by Ishi'aku and his immediate successors, Yusufu and Muhamman, reconstituted the official organization of the Daura state in a distinctive pattern which local Fulani came to regard as appropriate and normatively binding. Later generations, noting differences between the earlier governments and those of their own day, regarded this early form as correct and traditional and thereby identified innovations *(kat-siro)*. However, unless otherwise noted, the original Fulani organization and its subsequent modifications are treated together below in discussing the developed Fulani state.

During Ishi'aku's reign, relations between Fulani Daura and the suzerain state of Sokoto underwent certain changes. In 1808-1809 the Tuareg chief Muhammadu Bakariyu of Agades visited the Shehu Usman at Gwandu or

Sifawa and became his disciple. On returning to Agades, Bakariyu sent messages to the nearby Tuareg advising them to do likewise. On Bakariyu's submission, the Shehu instructed his supporters to cease attacking the Kel Owi Tuareg, who were now their allies.[8] Ishi'aku, whose father, Isa, had been slain by the Tuareg, refused to obey, and it is said that he launched several raids against them from Fulani Daura. Ishi'aku's refusal to obey Shehu's orders attracted public notice and was duly reported to Shehu. According to local tradition, not long afterward the Shehu answered an inquiry by Ishi'aku concerning the length of the Fulani domination allotted by Allah with the remark that perhaps Daura would be the first state to fall when a hundred years had nearly passed. The tradition, which was current at Daura in the last century, may have reduced Fulani opposition to the Hausa restoration at Daura in 1906-1907, since this seemed to fulfill the Shehu's prophecy. However, the story was also interpreted to mean that despite his dismay at Ishi'aku's disobedience, the Shehu did not intend to employ secular sanctions against Ishi'aku but would leave Daura to the judgment of Allah. With one exception the Shehu's successors seem to have followed this precedent, and their passive or tolerant attitudes to Fulani Daura contrasted sharply with their active interest in the governments of other states, such as Kano, Katsina, and Zaria. The emirs of Daura were thus left to their own devices and very soon realized this. Though all emirs of Daura were appointed at Sokoto, throughout the last century the sultans only appointed those whom the electors of Daura had chosen, and whatever the provocation, they deposed none. Thus this emirate enjoyed an exceptionally high degree of internal autonomy by comparison with other Fulani states and provides a remarkable contrast with Zango and Baure, whose vassalage almost destroyed their integrity.

As part of Sultan Mamman Bello's imperial organization, the affairs of Fulani Daura were placed under the supervision of the Galadima of Sokoto, one of the sultan's five senior councillors. Thereafter communications between the sultan and Fulani Daura passed through the Galadima, who was authorized to administer its routine affairs without invoking the sultan. On his part the emir of Daura was empowered to tax his subjects as he pleased, to execute sentences of capital punishment or mutilation, to initiate campaigns against non-Fulani communities, and to distribute local offices of state as he saw fit. The Galadima of Sokoto appointed one of his kinsmen to handle his communications with Daura, while he himself concentrated on the large, adjacent emirate of Katsina, which he also supervised. Later Galadimas instructed some of their staff to remain in Daura city to keep them fully informed about local affairs; but initially the Galadima derived his information from the *jekada,* who visited Daura during the rainy season, and from the emir, who visited Sokoto annually after the harvest to pay his respects to the sultan.

At some point during Sultan Bello's reign, the Fulani emirs began to bring regular tributes to Sokoto on their annual visits; and after the reign of Sultan Abubakar Atiku (1837-1842), these imperial tributes were increased and sys-

tematized, Daura Hausa say that by the end of the century the Fulani emirate paid an annual tribute of 12,000,000 cowries to Sokoto in cash or kind equivalents; but at Sokoto I was told that Daura paid an annual tribute of four camels; ten slaves; ten *kyenkyendi,* or bales of fine robes and cloths; and one horse, which together cost less than a million cowries.[9] As the sultan's minister in charge of Daura, the Galadima of Sokoto normally received gifts equivalent to half the sultan's tribute; but the emir of Daura also had to make other disbursements to Sokoto on sundry occasions. Even so, it seems unlikely that the total contributions of the Fulani emirate exceeded two million cowries a year.

In 1859, when Ahmadu Atiku was appointed sultan, Mamman Bello, the Fulani emir of Daura, refused to visit Sokoto to greet Ahmadu and render homage. After waiting a year the sultan decided to attack Daura and humble Bello. For this purpose he summoned the nearby emirs to assemble their forces at Katsina. However, the sultan's attack on Daura was averted by the Galadima of Katsina, who undertook to bring Mamman Bello from Daura without fighting on the sultan's promise that he would do him no harm. As his cross-cousin, the Galadima of Katsina persuaded Mamman Bello to accompany him to Ahmadu at Katsina, where a reconciliation was effected, following which the assembled forces attacked Kandamka in northeastern Maradi instead of Daura. To my knowledge this is the only occasion on which any sultan of Sokoto adopted an aggressive attitude toward Fulani Daura.

A skeleton genealogy of the Kuninkawa dynasty of Fulani Daura is presented below. It includes few members of the royal lineage except title-holders and their immediate ascendants. The genealogy reveals a tendency for such minor royal titles as Haska, Sa'i, or Sarkin Rafi to be appropriated to collateral descent lines within the dynasty. Thus all Fulani Haskas descend from Tsoho, the first to hold this title; all Sa'is from Ibrahim; and the title of Maiwa seems to have been reserved for the sons of Malam Ishi'aku's brothers Muhamman and Yusufu. Another royal title, that of Yandaka, imported from Katsina, is absent from this genealogy altogether. It was probably reserved for a peripheral collateral line, as its description by Daura informants suggests. Senior royal titles such as Murka, Yerima, and Bunturawa were reserved by emirs for their brothers or sons. The first female Magajiya in the ruling line was Fatsuma, Muhamman Altine's daughter, whom he appointed. Altine's successor, Muhamman Mai Gurdo, dismissed Fatsuma from the title and appointed his brother Murnai instead, ignoring its female role as Mallam Ishi'aku had done before him.

In 1853 Henry Barth was advised at Zinder to avoid Fulani Daura where "the unscrupulous governor . . . [was] apparently more to be feared than the highway robbers in the border wilderness."[10] Despite his desire to visit Daura, Barth deemed it wise to keep away. At that time Mamman Bello ruled Fulani Daura; and although aware of his methods, Sokoto made no attempt to reform them.

As Mamman Bello aged, his two eldest sons, Muhamman Altine and



Genealogy 6. The Kuninkawa Dynasty of Fulani Daura

Muhamman Mai Gurdo, competed for the succession. To secure Altine's accession, Bello abdicated in his favor and removed himself from the palace to the compound at its rear reserved for the Sarkin Bai. Bello may have anticipated an early death when he sent his messenger to Sokoto to ask the sultan to permit his abdication; but Altine, whom he had appointed to rule pending the messenger's return with the sultan's reply, decided to ignore his existence, as did the entire population, officials and commoners alike, thus leaving Bello isolated. According to tradition, twenty days after he had left the palace, Bello died heartbroken at this treatment. Some weeks later the *jekada* returned from Sokoto and authorized Altine's succession, as Bello had requested. However Bello's stratagem only intensified the hostility between Muhamman Altine, the new emir, and his brother Mai Gurdo; and this rivalry accelerated the trend already established by Bello toward an unrestrained autocracy based on slave instruments. The final forms of this development are described below.

As mentioned above, Malam Ishi'aku had refused to use the old Hausa mosque and built another which still stands outside the palace forecourt. On taking over the city he also found various compounds endowed to Hausa offices. Some compounds remained with the offices to which they belonged —for example, those of the Galadima, Kaura, Sarkin Yara, Shentali, and Sarkin Bai—but the compound previously reserved for the Gara was given to Haska, and Ishi'aku or his successors built new compounds for the Yerima, Murka, Bunturawa, Sa'i, Tambari, Sarkin Fada, and Sarkin Tafarki. We do not know how the old Hausa compounds reserved for Sarkin Pawa, Sarkin Makada, Yerima, Alkali, Dan Sanwai, and Limam were distributed under Fulani rule. By Mamman Bello's death, the administration of Daura town had been placed under the Sarkin Bai, and it remained in his hands thereafter.

Territorial Organization

The Fulani system of territorial administration at Daura was extremely simple. Every settlement had its *maigari,* or head, who was responsible for local order and communications to a *hakimi* (fiefholder), who lived in the capital and administered the settlement as a fief through one of his staff whom he appointed as *kofa* (door) or *jekada* (intermediary) to the fief. *Tarayya* was thus excluded from this system, since each settlement had only one *maigari* and *hakimi.* By the end of the century a few settlements were divided between two or more fiefholders, although this was very rare.

Fiefholders collected the cattle tax and the poll tax known as *karo* or *kudin kasa* (land tax) in their fiefs, keeping about 40 percent and giving the remainder to the chief. Each fiefholder was responsible for the good order of his fief and as such had authority to regulate its affairs and settle local disputes, especially the critical issues of *iko*, obedience, disloyalty, fighting,

homicide, distributions of local office, and the collection of tax. Fiefholders would also call out the local levy as the emir directed. Disputes arising between subjects of different *hakimai* were brought before them at the capital for joint settlement. The *maigari* or the parties concerned were expected to report all offenses which traditionally entailed fines to the fiefholder, who would normally investigate such affairs through his *jekada* and might refer them to the Alkali's court or decide them himself. In the latter case, if he levied a fine, the fiefholder usually allowed his *jekada* to keep one-quarter and passed on one-third to the chief. If a culprit could not pay his fine, he might be placed in bondage to the fiefholder; or if the sum was large, he could be turned over to the chief for imprisonment, mutilation, or dispatch to Sokoto with the annual slave tribute.

When *hakimai* referred cases to the Alkali for decision, they reserved to themselves the right to collect any fines that ensued, handing over a small portion to the Alkali as commission *(ushira)* for his services. Besides adjudicating cases of violence referred to his court, the Alkali also administered suits of divorce, bastardy, inheritance, debt, and claims of damage to person or property. Political offenses lay outside his jurisdiction, being dealt with by the chief or *hakimi* whose authority they impugned. After the death of the Alkali Sani early in Mai Gurdo's reign, it seems unlikely that any Alkali had the power to intervene in cases of interest to senior officials, including the chief. Since the latter enjoyed unrestricted powers of mutilation and capital punishment, substantial departure from Muslim ideals of judicial administration probably occurred. After the death of Sani's son and successor, Alkali Awalu, in 1898, Mai Gurdo made no further appointments but administered the *shari'a* himself at the palace, advised by one or two malams. This development merely formalized the chiefly appropriation of judicial functions that had proceeded steadily during the previous fifteen years, beginning perhaps under Mamman Bello.

As far as my information goes, the allocation of fiefs among the senior offices that prevailed during Mai Gurdo's reign is set out in table 11. *Rumada*, or slave settlements attached to particular offices, are distinguished from *garuruwan sarauta,* or fiefs (towns of office) throughout the table. So far as I have been able to identify these settlements, their geographical dispersion is represented on the accompanying map (see map 7). It should be noted that several settlements listed as fiefs are missing from this map, some because they have ceased to exist, others because they have suffered recent changes of name or status, and some because they have since been absorbed in nearby units.

In the absence of demographic data, if we assume that most rural settlements did not vary greatly in size, the Fulani distribution identifies the Sarkin Yara and the Sarkin Bai as the two largest territorial chiefs, followed by the Kaura, Shentali, Galadima, Bunturawa, and Tarno. The map indicates a tendency for the various fiefs attached to each of these senior offices to cluster territorially; but even for the fiefs of the Sarkin Yara and Sarkin Bai,

TABLE 11

State Titles, Slave Estates, and Fiefs at Fulani Daura, c. 1880-1900

Title	Fiefs	Slave estates (*rumada*)
Haska	Gurjiya	Gurjiya
Yandaka	Shadamu	Shadamu
Yerima	Rade, Lemo	Tilla
Bunturawa	Dankarsani, Kaki mai wando, U. Tsamia, Gwadage	Tilla
Sa'i	Tambu	Tambu
Maiwa	Dawan Malam	Tilla
Murka	Tsabu, Kadiriyayi	Tilla
Sarkin Rafi	Buja, Danheri	
Magajiya na Karkaku	Karkaku	Karkaku
Alkali		Ganga
Limam		Goden
Kaura	Yakawada ta Kaura, Sadoji (T)	Kwassara
Galadima	Raude, Kawari, Kagara, Tsohon Birni	
Fada Babba	Gagir, Jabai	
Shentali	Shengyel, Kurci, Dagogo, Danyawa	
Sarkin Fulani	Sandamu (under S. Yara)	
Tambari	Maikomi, Tsauri	
Sarkin Bai	Daura city, Yakanoma, Kalansami, Jerdede, Bula, Bujare, Illala, Jeka, Mammani	
Tarno	Magiyawa, Jarkuka, Daneji	
Sarkin Yara	Sandamu, Yadagamu, Fago, Cadi, Lugu, Gumdum, Yan Manuwa, Yakawada (T), Gundu Lemu (T?), Kutanga Sha	
Makaman Tarno	Sadoji, Yakawada (T)	
Ubandawaki I	Madobi	
Ubandawaki II	Zari, Dangau	
Doroyi	Sharawa, Kayau, Gyerce	
Shamaki	Dan Yashi	
Rakiwa (Yekuwa)	Shabewa	

T = *Tarayya*

which most closely approximate modern models of compact territorial districts, this is by no means systematic.

The relatively small population of Fulani Daura is also obliquely indicated on the map by blank areas in which settlements have sprung up during this century. On its borders with Zango the Fulani territory was uninhabited,

Map 7. The Fulani Emirate of Daura, 1870-1900

except perhaps by nomads; and on the south adjoining Kazaure we also find very few fiefs. Relations between the Kuninkawa of Daura and the Yerimawa Fulani of Kazaure were rather brittle, and on occasion the Kazaure Fulani assisted Lukudi to escape his Kuninkawa foes. Mai Gurdo particularly disputed the Kazaure border and raided and harried their nearby settlements. To prevent open war between these vassals, the sultan of Sokoto sent a representative to adjudicate the dispute and impose peace, following which

Mai Gurdo's subjects may have felt secure in moving south. Allowing for these wastelands on its eastern and southern borders, perhaps only two-thirds of Fulani Daura was permanently settled during the nineteenth century, and that not very densely. It was known at Sokoto that the chiefs of Daura were losing their subjects by oppressive rule from the time of Mamman Bello at Daura; but no action was taken to stop this.[11]

Political Economy

The economic organization of the Fulani emirate was simpler and perhaps more "rational" than that of the Hausa state. Since the Fulani rulers made greater use of slave labor than their Hausa predecessors or counterparts, it is also possible that the slave ratio in the population of the Fulani emirate was considerably higher than in any of the three Hausa states. Fulani, who distinguished themselves from Hausa by race, culture, religion, and status, lacked the normal Hausa inhibitions against enslaving freeborn Hausa. At Daura the ruling Fulani relied primarily on slave cultivation of grain for their support; and the emir kept about two hundred slaves for tillage under a slave overseer called Gandu. During the rains these slaves cultivated the emir's grain farms, and in the dry season they cultivated the marsh. Besides producing their own household subsistence, they also provided a large portion of the grain and foodstuffs required by the palace. Thus the Fulani emir did not need to call out the people on corvée to till his farms, as the Hausa had done. In like fashion, titled princes such as the Yerima, Murka, and Maiwa derived their grain requirements from slave farms at Tilla. The offices of the Limam and the Alkali were also endowed with *rumada* at Goden and Ganga. The Kaura had his *rinji* at Kwassarawa; and several offices had *rumada* within their fiefs. Corvée ceased to be necessary for the economic support of local officialdom.[12]

At Daura the Fulani rulers levied *zakka,* the Islamic tithe, on locust bean (*parkia filicoidia;* Hausa *dorowa*) as well as on millet, guineacorn, and maize. The grain tithe was collected by the Turaki, a slave to whom fiefholders delivered the emir's share of the tithe from their fiefs. As in Hausa Daura, the emir distributed much of this grain among his kinsmen, officials, and malams. In addition there were standard taxes on cattle and on free adult males. In Fulani Daura the cattle tax was extremely light, namely, 200 cowries per cow, about one-tenth the rate in Zango. While the Fulani emir thus lightened the burden on his pastoral cousins to attract them from nearby territories to Daura to give him their support against external attack and internal revolt, his Hausa neighbors relied on onerous rates to keep the Fulani away. Undoubtedly such low tax rates must have attracted many Fulani from Hausa territory, but perhaps not as many as the emir had hoped. We do know that many pastoralists preferred to move to Zinder. One limiting factor was the incapacity of the land to graze many cattle even during the

rainy season. However in sharp contrast with the cattle tax, the poll tax, called *karo* or *kudin kasa* in Fulani Daura or *jizya* in Arabic, had a flat rate of 5,000 cowries per annum per married man, slaves, women, and children being exempt. Apart from officials, I learned of no other exemptions, although it is likely that malams individually or as a category may have been excused.

Besides these levies, the Sarkin Tafarki collected caravan tolls at rates of 350 cowries per load for every donkey, 3,000 for every camel, and 1,200 for every horse or mule. Besides administering the toll on Tuareg from Asben, few of whom visited Daura because of the hostility between these states, the Sarkin Zango also levied taxes of 350 cowries from every *fatake* (traveling trader) on arrival and departure. At Daura the numerous occupational taxes were known as *mairam*. Of these the taxes on blacksmiths, weavers, tailors, leatherworkers, tanners, sellers of clothing, and barber-doctors were collected annually, while others were levied in the markets on vendors of particular articles, such as honey (100 cowries per vendor) or *alewa*, a type of candy (120 cowries per vendor). Excise was levied when slaves were sold, and fenced marsh plots were taxed annually. The emir received one-tenth of the ore smelted by the local blacksmiths and could order local craftsmen to undertake production by corvée. Builders, buglers, praise-singers, and drummers were not taxed at fixed rates but paid *gaisuwa* (greetings) to the headmen of their crafts. No attempts were made to organize or tax the pagan magicians or members of the spirit-possession *(bori)* cult. All who cut wood in certain proscribed tracts of bush were liable to fines by the Sarkin Dawa, a slave official, and the customary levies of Fulani butter and cotton that were traditionally made by the Hausa Magajin Tambari and Lifidi persisted. The Sarkin Rafi collected an annual tax of 1,200 cowries from all owners of wells. The Sarkin Pawa conducted *agama* during the Fast; and the market suffered periodic visitations from slave officials.

By comparison with arrangements in the Hausa successor states, this Fulani tax schedule is simpler, shorter, and less onerous. It omits such harrassments as the tax on maidens or corvée obligations to cultivate official farms. It also omits taxes on privately owned horses, fees for opening wells, and market levies to feed prisoners. Since Hausa dyers had withdrawn en masse from Daura shortly after the Fulani conquest and had moved to Mai Aduwa, Zango, and Baure, there was little scope for a tax on dyers. Taxes on locust beans and poultry were the only new ones the Fulani introduced, and in general their rates of taxation were considerably lower than those at Zango. Nonetheless, at Fulani Daura barber-doctors paid 2,200 cowries per annum, as did tanners after the Kaura Bakula introduced the office of Dan Maza to Fulani Daura. At the capital the slave gatekeepers collected 20 cowries from all who entered the city.

Craig reports that Mai Gurdo "kept a large body of professional thieves whose job it was to raid any caravans of which they heard news,"[13] but this may be an unflattering description of the Sarkin Tafarki's patrols. However,

according to local tradition, at Mai Gurdo's direction several passing traders were thrown down a certain well at Aduwawa close by the farm of the Sarkin Pawa Dandanshi at Kalansami. It is possible that he systematically intercepted caravans en route to Gezawa or in nearby Maradi. The Fulani treatment of this caravan traffic seems to have grown worse since Barth passed by.

It is said that Mai Gurdo sold into slavery free families, whether Muslim or pagan, natives of Daura or of nearby states, as it pleased him; that he appropriated property that came up for subidivison on inheritance; and that he levied whatsoever he wished from the market, from his people's farms, their herds, or their homes. Since the agents in these predations were throne slaves, it is possible that he has been blamed for many abuses executed without his knowledge. However, as was customary, Mai Gurdo confiscated all the property of dismissed officials and was not above holding free women as slaves in his harem. It is said that when the Sarkin Kano Aliyu (1894-1903) learned that some of his subjects were held in this way by Mai Gurdo, he demanded their release, following which Mai Gurdo slew the lot.

Mai Gurdo is said to have had a harem of seventy women. Of these, some were selected as concubines and secluded with his wives in his private quarters. The remainder were housed near the rear of the palace in quarters his slaves and henchmen were free to visit as they wished. Mai Gurdo denied that the children of these women were his but took no action to suspend or disperse this palace brothel, although bastards are especially offensive to Islam. By such arrangements he attracted many wastrels and bullyboys to the palace, some of whom served as musketeers under slave captains, while others may have been licensed to practice highway brigandage. To support his large household, Mai Gurdo, like his father before him, needed more revenues in cash and kind than his income provided.

Categories of Office

As in the Hausa successor states, as Fulani Daura offices filled by members of lineages having hereditary rights in them are distinguished as *sarautun karda* from others which are allocated without restrictions of descent to any member of a given status category. These nonhereditary positions and their incumbents are described as *shigege* or *katsiro*. Members of lineages having hereditary rights to particular offices were classified as nobles by birth *(masu-sarauta na asali)* whereas *shigege* officials were only ennobled by their offices. As in Hausa states, hereditary offices took precedence over *shigege* ones of equivalent rank, and people of noble birth also had a higher status than mobile individuals of equivalent political rank. However, these general principles were qualified, first, by differences of personal status among royals, free men, and slaves and, second, by differences in the political significance of the offices themselves.

By hereditary offices the Fulani of Daura meant those that Malam Ishi'aku or his immediate successor, Yusufu, had allocated to particular lineages; and this classification persisted even after the office had been given to other persons, including those of different legal status. For example, the Kaura's office was originally allocated to the Kwassarawa and remained in their hands until Mai Gurdo appointed his free Fulani client, Dan Barnu. Dan Barnu was succeeded by Dan Bayere, a slave. Nonetheless, although Dan Barnu and Dan Bayere were *shigege* officials, their appointments did not alter the traditional classification of the Kaura office. In other cases the status of an office became progressively confused by successive allocations to individuals of widely different status. Thus Fulani Daura recruited its first Shentalis from a free Fulani lineage, which was thereby ennobled, establishing hereditary rights to the title. In the second half of his reign, Mamman Bello gave the office to his client Lawal, a free man of a different family. When Lawal fled on Mai Gurdo's accession, the office was given to Mijinladi, a slave. On Mijinladi's dismissal, another slave, Isa, was appointed; but we do not know whether Isa and Mijinladi were kin. As a result of these anomalous allocations, some informants classify the Shentali title as hereditary in a noble lineage, while others treat it as a free *shigege* office and still others as one reserved for slaves. The traditional classification which underlies these different descriptions thus provides a firm basis against which the radical redistributions of office under Mai Gurdo can be identified and assessed, as is attempted below.

In the Fulani constitutional model the following offices were reserved for free lineages: the Limam, Kaura, Fada Babba, Tambari, Lifidi, Sarkin Zango, Sarkin Pawa, Sarkin Makera, Sarkin Tamma, and Sarkin Aska. The title of Dan Maza, which Mai Gurdo instituted at Daura on Kaura Bakula's suggestion, was given to a Hausa lineage in the ward of tanners which already held the title of Lifidi. The Alkali's office had also been filled by a Hausa lineage until Muhamman Altine appointed Sani. Its status thereafter became obscure. The titles of Galadima, Sarkin Yara, Sarkin Karma, Sarkin Fada, Madugu, and Korama were traditionally free *shigege* offices; but Mai Gurdo appointed slaves to the positions of Galadima, Sarkin Yara, and Sarkin Fada.

Originally the following slave offices were hereditary: Sarkin Bai, Dogari, Ajiya, Garake, and Makama; but Muhamman Altine transferred the office of Sarkin Bai to Dan Kanyo, a *shigege* slave. Slave offices unrestricted by descent include those of Turaki, Kacalla, Doroyi, Shamaki, Sarkin Dawa, Sarkin Zaki, Sarkin Zagi, Tarno, Lifidi, Manzo, and the chief's two Ubandawakis. Princely offices are excluded from this classification, since with one exception their status was fixed. This exception is the title of Sarkin Rafi. Originally reserved for the descendants of Yerima Madaba, Malam Ishi'aku's son, after Habu, the third Sarkin Rafi of Daura, the office was given to slaves by Muhamman Mai Gurdo.

It will be noted that the title of Lifidi is listed twice in preceding para-

TABLE 12

Status Structure of Fulani Officialdom at Daura, 1875

Holder's status	Karda (hereditary offices)		Shigege (nonhereditary offices)	
Royal	Bunturawa	Maiwa		
	Yerima	Yandaka		
	Murka	Sa'i		
	Haska	Magajiya (f/m)*		
	Sarkin Rafi			
Free—nonroyal	Limam	Lifidi	Alkali	Madugu
	Kaura	Dan Maza	Galadima	Korama (f)
	Magajiya na Karkaku		S. Karma	S. Yara
	S. Fulani	Shentali	Fada Babba	
	Tambari			
	Magajin Tambari	Sarkin Zango		
	S. Busa	S. Pawa		
	S. Makada	S. Makera		
	Sankira	S. Tamma		
		S. Aska		
Slaves	S. Bai	Ajiya	Tarno	S. Fada
	S. Tafarki	Garake	Turaki	S. Dawa
	Sarka	Makama	Kacalla	S. Zaki
			Ubandawaki I	S. Zagi
	Dogarai		Ubandawaki II	Lifidi
			Doroyi	Manzo
			Shamaki	

NOTE:
(f) = female.
*Magajiya (f/m) = office traditionally held by females, allotted to a male during this period.

graphs—first as a free hereditary office and then as a *shigege* slave one. Incidental details suggest that this duplication may not be a simple effect of misinformation; but whether the office changed its status by transfer from free men to slaves, whether there were two offices having different functions but the same name, or whether the reported duplication has other causes, I cannot say. Accordingly, I shall describe both positions separately below, without speculating about their relationship. This anomalous procedure seems preferable to its alternatives, once the reader has been warned.

Princeships

Princely titles fall into two categories, those reserved for the sons of chiefs, past or present, and those allocated to princes whose fathers had not been chiefs and who were therefore ineligible for the succession. As expressed locally, the distinction lies between *yan sarki* (s. *dan sarki*), sons of a chief, who are eligible for the throne, and *jikokin sarki* (s. *jikan sarki*), grandsons or remoter descendants of chiefs, who are not. In Fulani Daura the four *yan sarki* titles were Yerima, Bunturawa, Murka, and Maiwa, while the titles of Sa'i, Haska, Yandaka, and Sarkin Rafi were traditionally allocated to *jikokin sarki.* Iya, Gabsai, and Maskome, the local equivalent of Saraki, were titles reserved for princesses. The Maidaki title was traditionally reserved for that wife of the chief who was the emir of Kano's daughter. The three titled princesses had neither authority nor administrative functions. Their *sarautu* were purely honorific, and their holders normally married into the royal lineage or local nobility. However, the Magajiya's office did not fit into this scheme. Under the first five Fulani emirs, the office remained vacant, despite the presence of the Magajiya na Karkaku mentioned above. The sixth emir, Muhamman Altine, appointed his daughter Fatsuma as Magajiya; but Altine's successor, Mai Gurdo, replaced Fatsuma by his brother Murnai, who was reigning when the state was abolished. Thus the Magajiya's office, which had been so central to Hausa Daura, remained vacant for the first sixty years of Fulani rule and insignificant thereafter. Perhaps its reinstitution by Muhamman Altine indicates a bid for popular support in his rivalry with Mai Gurdo.

From the history of appointments to the throne, it appears that in Fulani Daura the Yerima title was initially more important than its immediate rival, the Bunturawa. However, by the century's end the office of Bunturawa had eclipsed Yerima as the senior *dan sarki* title. Thus, while the Bunturawa was supported by three *lawanai* whom he nominated and the emir appointed, the Yerima was attended by one. Bunturawa's *lawanai* included the Barden Daura and the Yekuwa, who was attached in Hausa times to the Galadima. With the Ubandawaki (Master of Horse), these subordinates served as *jekadu* to the Bunturawa's various fiefs. The Yekuwa title was also endowed with a fief of its own at Shabewa. Unfortunately I failed to inquire about the

personal status of Barde and Yekuwa. It is also said that Mamman Bello, Muhamman Altine, and Muhamman Mai Gurdo all held the Yerima title before becoming chiefs; but I am unable to verify this from my list of Fulani Yerimas, which is incomplete. However, it may well be that despite his greater administrative responsibilities, the Bunturawa was less well placed than the Yerima for the succession. While the Yerima, Bunturawa, Murka, and Maiwa all had their official *rumada* (slave farms) at Tilla near Daura town, *jikokin sarki* had theirs elsewhere.

In Fulani Daura the Murka's office lacked its former military attributes. Besides administering two fiefs, Murka supervised the Sarkin Dillalai. The latter was a free *shigege* official who collected the state charge of 1,200 cowries when slaves were sold. *Dillalai* who sold cloth on commission paid their annual tax to the Sarkin Dinki but were also expected to present the Sarkin Dillalai with *gaisuwa.*

As the dynastic genealogy indicates, the Maiwa's office was successively held by sons of the former emirs Yusufu and Muhammam Sani. Although its holders were formally eligible by descent for the chiefship, their position was politically peripheral, since Ishi'aku's conquest gave his descendants prior claim. It is thus possible that when the title of Maiwa passed to the grandsons of Muhamman and Yusufu, it effectively moved from the *yan sarki* ranks to those of ineligible princes. Under Mai Gurdo, Maiwa administered Dawan Malam and had a state slave farm at Tilla.

The two senior titles reserved for *jikokin sarki* were Haska and Yandaka. The former is a synonym of Gara, while the latter is a *rukuni* title from Hausa Katsina which Malam Ishi'aku introduced at Daura. In theory the Haska title was usually given to the oldest surviving prince ineligible by descent for the throne. In fact the title was held first by Tsoho, the brother of Ishi'aku, and thereafter by his descendants; but it remains likely that the Haska was also selected on grounds of age. Being thus senior and ineligible for the throne, Haska was given a place on the electoral council that reviewed candidates and nominated the successor to the sultan of Sokoto through the Galadima, his minister for Daura. As no sultan ever overruled the council's nominee, in theory this body regulated the local succession. Reality was more complex, as we shall see.

In Fulani Daura, Yandaka was reputedly the leading warrior among the princes. As in other states, sons of emirs were normally forbidden to take an active part in fighting, probably to ensure their survival for future successions. At Daura the Yandaka was usually married to one of the chief's daughters. His military prowess entitled him to a place on the war council, and he sometimes performed the Haska's role as royal elector, being ineligible to succeed.

Like Yandaka, the title of Sa'i was a Fulani innovation. The Sa'is of Daura traced descent from Ibrahim, Ishi'aku's brother, who first held the title. Sa'i administered Tambu, a settlement with two communities of Hausa and Bugaje under separate headmen, which was also the site of his official

slave farm *(rinji).* At Daura the Sa'i did not administer the pastoral Fulani, unlike his namesake in Zaria.

A fourth office originally reserved for *jikokin sarki* at Fulani Daura was that of Sarkin Rafi; but since Mai Gurdo gave this title to slaves, it is discussed in that context below.

Throne Slaves

The Sarkin Bai was head of the throne slaves and had the largest number of fiefs under his charge. As shown in chart D, which represents the Fulani state organization, the Sarkin Bai controlled a staff of more than nine slave *lawanai,* of whom all but one were *shigege.* Mai Gurdo's Sarkin Bai, Dan Kanyo, was the younger brother of his subordinate, the Sarkin Tafarki. Although a slave, Dan Kanyo had married Mai Gurdo's younger sister. As head of the throne slaves, he sat on the electoral council and on the senior and lesser councils of state, and was represented by his master of horse (Ubandawakin Sarkin Bai) on the council of war. Finally, as the chief's senior slave official, the Sarkin Bai had undivided administrative control over the capital and was responsible for the security of its gates and walls.

The Sarkin Bai's *lawanai* consisted of the following offices:

1. The Sarka, who was usually his son and collected a fee of 120 cowries from all who sold *alewa* in the market on each occasion. Sarka also served as one of his father's confidential agents and advisers.
2. and 3. Two Ubandawakis (Masters of Horse), both of whom held office under Sarkin Bai together and were distinguished as Ubandawakin Sarkin Bai from two other slave Ubandawakis who were attached directly to the chief. His senior master of horse represented the Sarkin Bai on the war council, while both assisted him in administering the capital.
4. The Jekafada, the Sarkin Bai's *jekada* to his fiefs at Jeka, Bula, and Mammani.
5. Kukwima, who collected an annual tithe on local poultry, including turkeys and guinea hens, for the chief. The office and levy were both Fulani innovations.
6. Sarkin Tafarki, who collected caravan tolls within the boundaries of Fulani Daura at rates listed above. As Mai Gurdo's Sarkin Tafarki Sule was the elder brother of his Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo, whom Altine had appointed, perhaps Dan Kanyo later secured the junior office for his brother.
7. Sarkin Dinki, a slave, responsible for collecting the annual tax of 2,200 cowries from *dillalai* (brokers), tailors, and leatherworkers throughout the chiefdom.
8. Sarkin Zango (Head of the Way Station or Caravan Camp). It is said by the son of Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo's Sarkin Zango that this office was reserved for free men. If so, the Sarkin Zango was the only free subordinate of the Sarkin Bai. As mentioned above, Sarkin Zango arranged and supervised the accommodation of visiting Tuareg and all *fatake* who came to Daura, found brokers to handle their affairs, and collected the required fees from them.
9. Four *sarakunan kofa,* who presided over the four gates of the town. Everyone entering was required to pay a toll of twenty cowries. These gatekeepers were responsible for closing the town gates nightly or as directed by the Sarkin Bai.

The Turaki was the slave in charge of the chief's granaries. He also collected the chief's share of the Islamic grain tithe from the fiefholders who levied it on the people.

CHART D

State Organization of Fulani Daura, 1875

Chief	Free Officials	Royals	Throne slaves	Craft officials	Clerics
SARKI	KAURA *+≠ { Barde, Ubandawaki } GALADIMA *+≠ Shentali FADA BABBA Ø≠ Tambari Magajiya na Karkaku Sarkin Fulani Ø → Dan Kumalo Lifidi Sarkin Yara Ø → Ubandawaki Sarkin Karma	Bunturawa +Ø { Yekuwa, Ubandawaki, Barden Daura } Sarkin Rafi (j) Yerima Ø → Ubandawaki Sa'i * (j) Murka Haska *Ø (j) Maiwa (j) Yandaka Ø≠ (j) Magajiya (1) Iya (f) Gabsai (f) Maskome (f) Maidaki (f)	Sarkin Bai *+Ø { Sarka, S. Dawaki ≠, Ubandawaki I, Ubandawaki II, Jekafada, Kukwina, S. Tafarki, S. Dinki, S. Kofa } Tarno +≠ { Garake, Ubandawaki, Lifidi, Makama } Kacalla → Gerema Turaki Ubandawaki I Ubandawaki II Shamaki Sarkin Fada Dogarai Doroyi Ajiya Sarkin Dawa Sarkin Zagi Sarkin Zaki Manzo (Gandu)	Sarkin Pawa → Korama Sarkin Dillalai Sarkin Zango Sarkin Makera → S. Tamma Madugu Dan Maza Court musicians Sarkin Busa Sarkin Makada Sankira Magajin Tambari	Alkali Limamin Juma'a → Na'ibi (Magatakarda)

LEGEND:

*	Electors.	(f)	Female.
+	On senior council.	(1)	Ambiguous — see text.
≠	On war council.	( )	Not formally installed.
Ø	On lesser council.	(j)	*Jikan sarki* (grandson of an emir — not eligible to succeed).

The office of Sarkin Rafi, which had been previously reserved for *jikokin sarki,* was given by Mai Gurdo to his slave Abdu, who thus became responsible for the administration of Buja and Danheri, its fiefs. Sarkin Rafi Abdu also levied tithes on foodstuffs grown in marsh plots for use in the traditional stew *(miya)*—for example, onions, peppers, and other condiments.

Tarno was the second-ranking slave title and one of the most important offices of the state. Its original Hausa designation—son of a woman of the royal lineage—seems to have lapsed, and the office was reserved for slaves without descent restrictions. Tarno commanded the chief's detachment and had his battle station beside the chief. In peacetime he collected an annual tax from weavers throughout the chiefdom. Tarno had four slave *lawanai* and served as the *kofa* through which the Sarkin Yara communicated with the chief.

The Tarno's slave *lawanai* consisted of his Ubandawaki; the Lifidi, who captained the heavy cavalry grouped around the chief; the Garake—the Sarkin Garka of Daura—who collected 2,200 cowries annually for each fenced marsh plot and commanded a detachment of troops under the Tarno; and Makama, whose fiefs were Sadoji and part of Yakawada, one of the few instances of *tarayya* in Fulani Daura.

Sarkin Yara was the only free official whom the Tarno supervised; but he was very clearly not the Tarno's subordinate. The Sarkin Yara had control of more than nine fiefs, several of which were inhabited by Fulani only. He thus ranked as one of the senior territorial officials in Daura. Like the Yandaka and the Sarkin Bai, the Sarkin Yara, who was normally a Fulani, generally married one of the chief's daughters or younger sisters. His sole official assistant was his Ubandawaki; but it seems likely that the Sarkin Yara had other *jekadu* whose titles, if any, I failed to learn.

The chief had two slave Ubandawakis attached to him personally. Both were *shigege* officials of his own choice and served as *jekadu* and territorial administrators, one supervising the affairs of Madobi, while the other, who administered Zari and Dangau, reported to Mai Gurdo through an untitled prince called Iguda. In battle these Ubandawakis served with the Barade in the vanguard.

The Doroyi was another slave fiefholder in charge of Sharawa, Kayau, and Gyerce. He was also responsible for collecting the annual tithe of locust bean *(dorowa),* from which he takes his name, and reported to Muhamman Mai Gurdo through Isa Dogo, an untitled prince who served as his *kofa*.

The Kacalla was a slave who captained the chief's slave musketeers. This was a Beriberi title introduced at Daura by the Fulani, possibly at the suggestion of Tanimu when he visited Daura in 1852-1853, during the reign of Mamman Bello. As the chief's slave musketeers increased, they were grouped in two squads, one of which was placed under the Kacalla's subordinate, the Gerema. The Gerema's title was also of Kanuri provenience and was introduced to Daura by the Fulani. Since neither of these slave captains had independent incomes and both depended entirely on the chief for their subsistence, he was easily able to keep them under control.

The title of Shentali, originally reserved for free men, was given by Mai Gurdo to his slave Mijinladi. Until Mijinladi was appointed, the Shentali administered the towns of Shengyel, Kurci, Dagogo, and Danyawa; and he was usually married to one of the chief's sisters or daughters. On Mijinladi's appointment the office lost these fiefs, presumably to the throne, but received another at Kutanga in compensation and retained its military and political roles. Shentali commanded the chief's bodyguard in battle. He also had *tarayya* rights in Yakawada.

The Sarkin Zaki (Chief of Sweetness) collected 100 cowries from all who sold honey or honey products at local markets, whenever they did so. This seems to have been his sole administrative function.

The Sarkin Dawa, was the forest warden, a slave who fined all who cut wood in areas reserved for the chief.

The office of Shamaki took its name from that section of the palace where the chief stored his treasure. The Shamaki was sometimes admitted to the chief's personal quarters, unlike other throne slaves. Shamaki was responsible for the safekeeping of the chief's wealth in money, silver bars, anklets, and the like; the regalia of chieftainship and vacant offices; the state stores of clothing, turbans, robes, burnooses; war weapons, including swords, shields, muskets, gunpowder, suits of chain mail and quilted armor; and the chief's personal horses. The chief's reserves of grain and other staples were stored in another part of the palace and guarded by others.

Under the Fulani, the Dogari replaced the Hauni as the executioner, and the office of Hauni lapsed. However, the Ajiya remained in charge of the palace prisons, as before. It seems unlikely that Makama retained his ancient police role. Like the Shentali, Shamaki, Doroyi, and Kacalla, the Dogari and the Ajiya came under the chief's immediate direction; and the office of Fada Babba lost its former police functions.

The chief's slave messenger to Kano and Sokoto bore the title of Sarkin Fada. His messenger to Damagaram bore the title of Manzo (Messenger), another Fulani innovation based, according to Daura Hausa, on Sokoto models. The Sarkin Zagi, who cared for the chief's horse and escorted him on foot as he rode, completes the list of formally appointed throne slaves, most of whom lived in or immediately beside the palace. In addition, as mentioned above, the chief's slave farms were supervised by the Gandu, his overseer. As his role was confined to the chief's household, the Gandu was not formally appointed. In Fulani Daura, as in Zango and Baure, by tradition even the chiefs lacked eunuchs.

Free Officials

As in Hausa Daura, the Kaura's office ranked first of those traditionally reserved for free clients. Kaura commanded the emirate army and sat on its electoral, senior, and war councils, presiding over these in the chief's absence. He was usually of the Kwassarawa lineage and married to a

daughter of the emir. As *lawanai* the office had two subordinates, an Ubandawaki and a Barden Kaura. The latter was usually Kaura's son and likely successor. Despite the eminence of his title, the Kaura does not seem to have held many fiefs and probably subsisted mainly from his slave farm at Kwassarawa.

The other traditional *rukuni* office of Galadima was not hereditary but was normally given by the emir to a free client. However, Mai Gurdo gave this office, among others, to slaves. Like other senior officials, the Galadima usually married a daughter of the chief. Under Mamman Bello and Altine, the Galadima sat on the electoral council, the war council, and the lesser council of state, which met daily. Throughout these decades the Galadima administered the same set of fiefs. However, under the Fulani the Galadima and Kaura lost their numerous staffs, and the Galadima ceased to be responsible for the princes and their conduct, the Fulani emirs preferring to regulate dynastic affairs themselves.

In Fulani Daura the title of Fada Babba was traditionally reserved to a local branch of the Alibawa lineage whose leaders had played such a prominent part in the conquest. Fada Babba was a prominent military office with a seat on the war councils, but its ancient police functions were exercised in Fulani Daura by the chief. In recognition of the Alibawa role in the conquest, the chief always gave the Fada Babba one of his daughters or younger sisters in marriage; and besides attending the daily meetings of the lesser council, the Fada Babba administered two fiefs in northern Daura.

The title of Tambari was another Fulani innovation at Daura. Initially hereditary, under Mamman Bello this office was given to freedmen of Buzu stock without restrictions of descent. It is said that the Tambari was usually married to one of the Sarki's daughters and that he had charge of two small fiefs, probably old Tuareg serf villages.

The Lifidi was charged with the preparation and repair of the suits of quilted cotton armor required for the heavy cavalry. His office seems to have been hereditary. Lifidi could summon, as necessary, all tailors and leatherworkers throughout the emirate to prepare these suits by corvée, and he was also empowered to take what cotton he needed for this work from the local market. When the Kaura Bakula of Zango first fled to Daura to escape the wrath of Sarkin Zinder Tanimu, he observed that Fulani Daura lacked the office of Dan Maza and did not tax tanners. At his suggestion Mai Gurdo appointed a Dan Maza and instructed him to collect 2,200 cowries per annum from every tanner. As the Hausa lineage that held the title of Lifidi lived in the tanners' ward of the capital, the Dan Maza's office and functions were given to them.

Except for the Sarkin Karma, whose only function was to command an infantry squad in war or peace, the Sarkin Fulani of Sandamu is perhaps the only free title not yet described. This Sarkin Fulani, although a village chief of Sandamu supervised by the Sarkin Yara, had the Dan Kumalo as his *lawani*. In Hausa days the Dan Kumalo had been attached to the Galadima.

On his visits to the capital the Sarkin Fulani attended meetings of the lesser council, but most of the time he remained at his village.

Of occupational offices in Fulani Daura, only the Sarkin Pawa's requires further description. Besides administering the city market and levying fees for each beast slaughtered there, the Sarkin Pawa also collected twenty cowries from all who sold pots in the market on each market day. Under the pre-Fulani regime, this function had been performed by the Galadima's *lawani,* Dan Hungumi. In Fulani Daura a tithe of all grain sold in the market was also collected for presentation to the chief. This collection was actually undertaken by the Korama, who supervised the grain sellers and shared the Sarkin Pawa's obligation to furnish visiting traders with accommodation and food.

In the preceding outline of the Fulani system of occupational taxation, the roles of Madugu, Sarkin Makera, Sarkin Tamma, and Sarkin Aski have been sketched obliquely. Lacking authority to levy tax, the three court musicians, Sarkin Makada, Sarkin Busa, and Sankira, seem to have derived most of their incomes from officials and wealthy men whose praises they sang. The Magajin Tambari, whose drums were essential elements of the throne regalia, continued to collect Fulani butter in the market each Wednesday, as his predecessors had done before the jihad; but the Fulani court lacked the offices of Magajin Turu, Dakama, and Dan Tomo, which had figured so prominently in Hausa ceremonials.

There were only three clerical offices in Fulani Daura, those of the Alkali, Limam, and Na'ibi, the last being the Limam's deputy. The office of Dan Sanwai was discontinued, together with all its subordinate titles, even though some members of the traditional lineage remained at Daura.

Until Muhamman Altine's reign, Fulani Daura drew its Alkalis from a Hausa clerical lineage. Altine and Mai Gurdo altered this pattern; but after the death of Awalu in 1898 no further appointments were made to this office until 1906, when Murnai appointed Ali, a kinsman of the Fada Babba Labaran. From 1898 until he died, Mai Gurdo administered the law himself, with such advice from his Hausa scribe (Magatakarda) Muhamman Gata as he required.

Traditionally, Fulani Daura recruited its Limams from the family of the Magajiyas of Karkaku, whose status as cross-cousins of the emirs was highly privileged. However, from Mamman Bello's reign onward, relations between the emir and Limam steadily worsened. Eventually the Limam Jamau, the last of the Karkaku priests, left Daura to join the Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru I, who fled east from Sokoto after being defeated by the British in March 1903 and was finally killed at Burmi four months later.[14] Jamau's desertion allowed Mai Gurdo to transfer the Limam's office from the Karkaku lineage to his own; and he appointed Maude, a grandson of Malam Ishi'aku's brother Duke, as Limam. Although a malam, Maude's reputation as a scholar was not outstanding. However, he served as Daura's Limam until the regime ceased.

Fulani and Hausa States

Before a summary of the history of the closing decades of Fulani Daura, it is convenient to conclude our description of its organization by indicating some of the ways in which it differed from that of the preceding Hausa state. The Fulani retention of so many traditional Hausa offices in their government demonstrates that they sought to use the political institutions of Hausa Daura wherever these seemed appropriate to their own regime. But unlike the Hausa of Zango and Baure, the Fulani who conquered Daura did not feel obliged to maintain the form or the spirit of these prejihadic institutions. Fulani orientations to the preceding organization were probably governed by considerations of utility and convenience, insofar as Islamic norms or the sultan's complaisance allowed restoration. Accordingly, such offices as Magaji Bayamadi, Sarkin Lafiya, Dan Baroka, and Sarkin Masu, which were prominently identified with heathen beliefs and rituals, had no place in the Fulani state; and although the office of Iya persisted in nineteenth-century Daura, the Fulani abolished its association with the spirit possession *(bori)* cult. The title of Bai Karama lapsed, together with its ancient tax on unmarried maidens. Lacking the archaic regalia and traditions of the Hausa chieftaincy and having other bases of political legitimacy, the Fulani also dispensed with the offices of Magajin Turu, Dakama, and Dan Tomo.

The Fulani also dispensed with many other Hausa offices, including those titles formerly attached to the Kaura and Galadima. Of the Hausa Kaura's *lawanai,* the office of Sarka survived but was transferred to the Fulani slave Sarkin Bai, who reserved it for his close kinsman and chosen successor. Of the Hausa Galadima's *lawanai,* Yekuwa was transferred to the Fulani Bunturawa, and Dan Kumalo, to the Sarkin Fulani of Sandamu. The titles of Kusheyi, Dan Kwaba, Sarkin Dawaki, Madaba, Gilu, Dan Takora, Sarkin Diya, and Sarkin Fada, all of which were previously attached to the Hausa Kaura, lapsed entirely, as did the offices of Dan Hungumi, Dan Bawo, Magayaki, and Binoni, which had formerly followed the Galadima. However the right to tax pot sellers enjoyed by Dan Hungumi under the Hausa was transferred to the Sarkin Pawa as market head, while the title disappeared. In like fashion the Fulani made the slave Turaki responsible for collecting the grain tithe, a duty formerly performed by the Dan Barau, whose office also lapsed. As the new rulers had never been vassals of Bornu, the title of Magaji Dankakulema disappeared as well.

There was no Dan Bajida in Fulani Daura, perhaps because the Kushekawa bowmen and hunters remained outside the Fulani state. The Fulani likewise lacked a Sarkin Marina (Chief of Dyers), since local dyers fled en masse after the conquest. The Dan Sanwai and his attachments, Samba'a, Magajin Malam, Dan Kurege, and Mardandana, are also absent from the Fulani state but not merely because most members of the lineages that held these offices had emigrated, since similar emigrations did not bar Fulani appointments to other hereditary offices. The Fulani rulers apparently

decided not to restore the office of Dan Sanwai because it seemed inconsistent with their own organization and orientations. Initially Malam Ishi'aku, as the Shehu Usman's flagbearer and deputy, outranked all other local clerics in *baraka* and learning. There was thus no need for an official to advise the chief on Islamic practice in secular affairs. Moreover, given his political and military situation, the Fulani conqueror was probably wise in refusing to appoint an official deputy with the status, functions, and powers of the traditional Dan Sanwai. Thus, by terminating this office Malam Ishi'aku conserved and enhanced his power as chief.

Few offices traditionally attached to the title of Dan Sanwai survived the conquest at Daura. However, at least one of these titles, Samba'a, had been primarily concerned with the local salt trade, like the lapsed title of Barage, which had been directly attached to the Hausa chief. In Hausa times the Dan Sanwai had acted as the chief's trading agent, and in this capacity he had supervised the salt merchant Samba'a. Apparently the Fulani ruler preferred to conduct his trading activities through other channels; and following the conquest the salt trade soon ceased to receive administrative attention. Probably the Tuareg, on whom Daura depended for salt and other desert products, soon ceased to visit the country because of the hostile policies of its Kuninkawa rulers.

The disappearance from Fulani Daura of lesser offices traditionally attached to the title of Dan Sanwai is matched by the disappearance of the Yar Kuntu, Dan Gawa, and Magajiya Karya, *lawanai* of the Hausa Magajiya. As the Fulani kept the Magajiya's office vacant during their first sixty years at Daura, its dependent titles withered and disappeared. As the Muslim conqueror responsible to the Shehu and Mamman Bello for the Islamic government of Daura, Malam Ishi'aku rejected the Hausa institution of the Magajiya with its constitutional powers to veto and depose the chief. So did his successors. By doing so the Fulani emirs eliminated a local threat to their authority.

Of traditional princely titles, Magaji, Sarkin Shanu, and Samba'a were absent from Fulani Daura; and of Hausa slave titles, so were the Hauni, Guyama, Bai Karama, and Sarkin Ruwa. The Fulani title of Maskome is the Katsina equivalent of the traditional Saraki and was synonymous with Saraki in eighteenth-century Daura.

We cannot appreciate fully the various ways in which the Fulani modified those elements of the Hausa government that they restored merely by voting titular correspondences or differences in the two regimes. For example, although the Galadima's title remained unchanged under the Fulani, the office lost much of its former significance when the chief removed the titled princes from its control and appointed and dismissed them independently. Again, although the title of Tarno retained some of its earlier functions and privileges as well as its name, in Fulani Daura it was allocated to slaves rather than sons of princesses. As commander of the emir's division of the army, as supervisor of the Sarkin Yara and the direct superior of Garake, Lifidi, and

Makama, the office of Tarno became more important under the Fulani than before, perhaps after its transfer to the rank of throne slaves.

When a chief assumes the power to allocate at pleasure an office reserved by tradition for members of a particular lineage, then even if the powers, privileges, and duties of the office persist unchanged, it nonetheless undergoes a significant transformation, since its changed identification and altered mode of allocation automatically translates it from one category of offices to another, modifies its relations with all other units in the political system, and facilitates further transformations.

Apart from thus transforming offices by the abolition of old descent restrictions and the institutionalization of new ones, in reviving such Hausa offices as Sarka, Yekuwa, Fada Babba, and Sarkin Tafarki, the Fulani simultnaeously transferred them to people of different status. They also sometimes transferred functional roles from one traditional office to another, thus modifying their political positions and relations by redistributing their administrative authority, resources, and responsibilities. For example, before the jihad the Sarkin Yara had administered the capital and its craftsmen for the chief; but under the Fulani the Sarkin Bai administered the capital, and the Sarkin Yara lost control of craft officials. The Sarkin Dinki, a Fulani innovation, initially replaced the Dan Maza in charge of leatherworkers. When the latter title was revived, it was appropriately allocated to a family in the tanners' ward, since its scope was altered and restricted to tanners. Likewise, under the Fulani the office of Fada Babba lost its former police functions to the chief and its control of bush land to the new title of Sarkin Dawa. The Fulani also transformed princely offices by investing them with substantial fiefs and seats on state councils while removing them from the Galadima's control and revising their former alignments.

Besides transferring some offices to different status categories and revising the principles on which others were allocated as *shigege* or *karda,* the Fulani eliminated several Hausa offices, together with their roles—for instance, Dan Sanwai, Barage, and Dan Bajida. To some degree they redistributed administrative functions among the offices they institutionalized, thereby significantly altering the administrative roles of these units and their political relations with one another and the wider public. They eliminated some traditional functions from their government, while preserving the offices that had formerly discharged them. They introduced certain new functions and allocated these to new offices, such as those of Kacalla, Gerema, Doroyi, Kukwima, and Sarkin Dinki. They destroyed the constitutional monarchy, which the Magajiya's office had symbolized, the political neutralization of the princes had supported, and the dispersals of power among the Kaura, the Galadima, and the chief had entrenched; and they replaced this with an autocratic chieftainship whose routine administrative authority and functions were concentrated in an increasingly elaborate slave staff, through which the ruler pursued domination and exercised his power. The familistic character of the Fulani system is evident in the greatly

increased significance of princely titles at Daura under their rule. After the ruler and senior slaves, titled princes were probably the wealthiest and most powerful officials of state. The Kaura and Galadima, whose combined power had exceeded the chief's in the Hausa state, were now merely the most senior free officials and councillors.

As reconstituted, the Fulani system assumed that the chief would continue to control the senior slaves on whom his power depended. Its stability and persistence also required that princes should exercise restraint in their rivalry for the throne, while emirs should refrain from victimizing their opponents. However, its extreme centralization of authority encouraged throne slaves to abuse their privileged positions among the free population and eventually, as related below, to subvert the chieftainship. Simultaneously, this centralization also encouraged the ruler to treat any political competition by his kinsmen as a challenge to his authority, even when his actions had incited their disaffection. To maintain its balance, this slave-based autocracy presumed equally powerful external constraints, but unfortunately the sultans of Sokoto chose to leave their Kuninkawa emirs at Daura to their own devices, and the Galadimas of Sokoto, who were directly responsible for the supervision of local affairs, were either ineffective, unconcerned, or both. Only such privileged malams as the Limam dared to criticize the chief openly; but their appeals to Sokoto in the hour of need for intervention and reform had little effect.

State Councils

Under the later Fulani rulers the senior council of state included the Kaura, Bunturawa, Sarkin Bai, and Tarno, while the lesser council consisted of the Sarkin Bai, who presided in the emir's absence, the Bunturawa, Yerima, Galadima, Haska, Sarkin Yara, Yandaka, and Fada Babba. Thus, of four members in the senior council, two were throne slaves and one was a prince. Of eight regular members of the lesser council, four were princes. The Fulani war council consisted of the Kaura, Tarno, Fada Babba, Galadima, Yandaka, and one of Sarkin Bai's Ubandawakis. In theory, the electoral council consisted of the Kaura, Galadima, Sarkin Bai, Haska, and Sa'i, the two last being princes ineligible to succeed. However, it is said that Muhamman Altine was selected by the Kaura, the Yandaka, the Fada Babba, and the Sarkin Bai, while his successor, Muhamman Mai Gurdo, was chosen by the Kaura, Sa'i, and Yandaka in concert. Apparently the royal succession was decided by situationally variable distributions of interest and power among the senior territorial officials, rather than by deliberations within the electoral council. How Mai Gurdo's successors were elected is related below.

The most significant feature of these Fulani councils is the prominence of throne slaves and princes within them. As the chief's political instruments, the slaves were his most immediate rivals for power, while senior eligible

princes competed bitterly with one another for the throne. The Kaura and Galadima were the only noble officials whose positions were of comparable significance, but Mai Gurdo finally gave these offices to slaves. Shortly after this, he refused to fill the Alkali's office and administered the law himself through a "judicial council" composed of his scribe, some councillors, and some malams, thus abolishing the judiciary. By these measures Mai Gurdo simultaneously destroyed the last independent focuses of official power and placed the government of the state squarely in the hands of the senior throne slaves, thus completing Daura's conversion from a limited monarchy to a slave-staffed sultanism. Its historical context generated the forces behind this drive toward a more comprehensive and intensive autocracy but did not determine their development.

Politics of Fulani Daura

Apart from Zubairu's attempt to seize the chiefship, we have little information about the political development of Fulani Daura from its conquest until the closing years of Mamman Bello's reign. As far as we know, Zubairu's clash with Bello was the chiefdom's first experience of intradynastic violence. After a brief struggle, this incident ended with Zubairu's flight to Kano, where he remained till his death. Bello then welcomed Tanimu of Zinder in his revolt against Ibram and provided Tanimu with a fortress and valuable military support in his successful struggle. By this assistance Bello may have saved Daura for the Fulani, since the Fulani of Daura were freed from the fear of further Zinder attacks by Tanimu's victory.[15] Later in 1884, when the Daura Fulani assisted Suleiman in his successful struggle for the throne of Zinder, they renewed the alliance and prolonged their immunity from attack.[16] Finally, when Ahmadu Dan Bassa marched against them, the British and French intervened to pacify the region.[17] Thus, from 1853 onward, Fulani Daura escaped attack from Zinder, and its forces were generally engaged only in raiding Zango, Maradi or Kazaure, or in skirmishes with the Tuareg.

Evidently the explorer Barth was not entirely misled by his Zinder informants about the nature of Mamman Bello's administration at Daura. During the second half of Bello's reign, the country suffered severe drought in two successive rainy seasons. On such occasions it is customary for the adult male population of these Mohammedan communities to assemble at the Idi prayer ground outside the city walls under their emir and officials to pray for rain, led by their local Limam. At Fulani Daura, there being no Dan Sanwai, the Limamin Juma'a, Abdulkadiri, led the prayers. Abdulkadiri belonged to the lineage of Malam Ishi'aku's mother and was thus a cross-cousin of Mamman Bello. During the second year of drought, when his prayers seemed unavailing, Limam Abdulkadiri began to preach at the Idi ground that Allah had sent the drought to punish the Fulani because of Bello's

oppression and misrule and that the famine would continue until the emir altered his conduct. In this context the emir could do little to silence his Limam; and he could not dismiss Abdulkadiri. Bello's rage at these daily denunciations proved futile, and Abdulkadiri continued in office till his death in Altine's reign. Meanwhile Abdulkadiri supplemented his public criticism of Bello by discussing with free officials how to have him restrained or dismissed, and he also wrote frequently to Sokoto, beseeching the sultan to intervene. When the rains came to the emir's relief, they removed the daily occasion for the Limam's critical sermon; but whether Abdulkadiri's preaching moved Bello to mend his ways, we do not know.

During Bello's decline, his elder sons, Muhamman Altine and Muhamman Mai Gurdo, pursued a bitter rivalry for the succession by soliciting with gifts the support of other officials, princely, client, or slave, and by seeking to discredit one another with the emir and public alike. The two princes had different mothers and held the senior princely titles. Favoring the elder, Altine, Bello turned over his palace and power to him shortly before his death. In due course Sokoto approved Bello's abdication and confirmed Altine as chief. Shortly afterward, when the throne slaves had destroyed his farms, cattle, and homestead, Mai Gurdo quit Daura and fled to Kanda in the territory of Zango, perhaps under the protection of Zinder. There he remained until he learned that Altine was near his end, when he returned in secret to his slave farm at Gara, two or three miles from Daura town. Shortly afterward, Altine died and Mai Gurdo was offered the chiefship, as his malams had foretold. He succeeded in 1876, shortly before Tanimu dismissed Dan Aro and the Kaura Mazawaje of Zango at Zinder.

Altine had appointed his sons, Namusa and Cedi, as Bunturawa and Yerima. As Murka he had also appointed Mai Gurdo's son Dilla; but on his succession Mai Gurdo first replaced Namusa as Bunturawa by his son Muhamman and then expelled Namusa from the country altogether. Not long afterward the Yerima Cedi was dismissed, ostensibly because he had conspired with the Limam and certain free officials to have Mai Gurdo deposed so that he should succeed. As Yerima, Mai Gurdo appointed his younger brother Loto. Mai Gurdo then denied that the Murka Dilla, whom Altine had appointed, was his son and proclaimed him a bastard. Dilla took the hint and promptly fled to Gumel, following which Mai Gurdo appointed another son, Dabo, in his place.

As occasion arose, Mai Gurdo transferred important offices to his loyal supporters. When the Shentali Lawal fled to Damagaram shortly after Mai Gurdo's succession, he transferred this free office to his slave Mijinladi, together with one of his daughters. Later, when Mai Gurdo dismissed Mijinladi, he appointed another slave, Isa, and gave him his daughter Ture as wife. On the Kaura Muhamman's death, Mai Gurdo first gave the title to Gauza, a *shigege* individual, then to Barde, Gauza's son, and then to Dan Barnu, none of whom, though free, had any claim to the office since they were not Kwassarawa. On the death of the Sarkin Yara Yahaya, another free

man whom Altine had appointed, Mai Gurdo gave the office to his throne slave Hungurmi, along with one of his daughters. Mai Yaka, Altine's Fada Babba, he dismissed and replaced by Balmurna.

Mai Gurdo allowed the slave Dan Kanyo, whom Altine had appointed, to retain his office as Sarkin Bai and gave him one of his younger sisters as a wife. By this marriage Dan Kanyo duly had a daughter called Maiye who was courted by her cousins Sogiji and the Bunturawa Muhamman, Mai Gurdo's sons. Dan Kanyo may have disliked Sogiji personally, but he also needed the Bunturawa's support in the councils of state. He therefore gave his daughter in marriage to the Bunturawa Muhamman. The Bunturawa and the Sarkin Bai were the only officials, apart from the emir, who participated in both the senior and the lesser councils of state. The Sarkin Bai also had a prominent role in the electoral council. The Bunturawa Muhamman appreciated his father-in-law's electoral power and accordingly gave him the support he needed in council. Since Mai Gurdo had chosen the Bunturawa as his heir, he regarded this alliance with favor; and looking to the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo to secure Muhamman's succession, he accordingly heeded their counsel. In this way the Sarkin Bai gradually came to dominate the councils of state, his principal critics and opponents being such free officials as the Kaura and Galadima. As the senior throne slave, Dan Kanyo encouraged Mai Gurdo to transfer these free offices to royal slaves.

Unfortunately we cannot set the main events of Mai Gurdo's later years in chronological order. It is said that after the Yerima Loto had held office for fifteen to twenty years he revolted, together with another prince, Jatau. Loto fled first to Katsina, and then, in need of funds, he waylaid the Turaki and the Sarkin Fada Atama at Buja while they were conveying the taxes to Daura. In the fighting that followed one of Mai Gurdo's sons was slain. Loto escaped Mai Gurdo's pursuit by fleeing first to Damagaram and thence to Zango. We have already related how Mai Gurdo vainly sought his capture through the Kauran Kurni; but shortly after the first international boundary had been laid down, Mai Gurdo's men seized one of Loto's sons when



Diagram C. Kuninkawa Marriages with the Sarkin Bai's Family, 1880-1900

Ahmadu of Zinder attacked Daura. By way of revenge for the death of his son, Mai Gurdo is said to have had Loto's son's limbs amputated and left him to bleed to death in the palace forecourt.

Between 1891 and 1898 the Limam Jamau, who had succeeded Abdulkadiri, launched a withering attack on Mai Gurdo at the Sallah prayer ground during one of the Idi festivals. In this sermon *(wa'azi)* Jamau condemned Mai Gurdo as a criminal and tyrant who would destroy the state and the people unless he was immediately removed from office. It is said that Mai Gurdo was only dissuaded from ordering the Limam's death by the arguments of his Haska and other senior kin that the sultan of Sokoto could not overlook such a crime. Mai Gurdo's close friend, the Sultan Umaru, died at Kaura Namoda in 1891; but during the reign of Umaru's successor, Sultan Abdurrahman (1891-1902), developments in Kano, Kontagora, Sokoto, and elsewhere had led Mai Gurdo to feel secure against the sultan's reproof.[18] He renewed his raids on the nearby emirate of Kazaure, and when the sultan demanded an explanation, he claimed that he was conducting a jihad.

Knowing that the free officials wanted him deposed, Mai Gurdo replaced them by slaves as occasion arose. It was in this context that the offices of Kaura and Galadima were finally transferred to slaves selected by Dan Kanyo. Dan Bayere became the first slave Kaura, Mai Wasa, the first slave Galadima. When the Alkali Awalu died in 1898, Mai Gurdo decided to keep the office vacant. The Bunturawa Muhamman also died at this time, following which Mai Gurdo appointed Sogiji, Muhamman's rival in love, to succeed. Sogiji immediately resumed his courtship of Maiye, Muhamman's widow; but throughout Maiye's period of mourning, Dan Kanyo refused to accept Sogiji's suit. The Bunturawa's frustration was finally brought to his father's notice. Declaring that Dan Kanyo was merely his slave, Mai Gurdo overruled his objections and gave Maiye to Sogiji as wife. Dan Kanyo made no further effort to prevent the marriage; but shortly afterward, since the new Bunturawa opposed him in council and sought to undermine his power, he withdrew from both councils and ceased to visit the palace except on Fridays, the Muslim Sabbath, when he punctiliously paid his respects to the chief.

There is no evidence that Dan Kanyo was removed from the council by Mai Gurdo or that he excused his withdrawal on such grounds as age or ill health. We do not know the precise circumstances that preceded this change. However, Dan Kanyo's withdrawal indirectly asserted his power and challenged Bunturawa Sogiji to secure his dismissal. As Sarkin Bai, besides his numerous fiefs and other executive responsibilities, Dan Kanyo administered the capital and its people. The Kaura, the Galadima, the Tarno, and the Sarkin Yara, who were then all throne slaves, owed their offices to the Sarkin Bai. Mai Gurdo and his Bunturawa found that despite Dan Kanyo's absence, they could make little headway against him in either council. They dared not challenge his power directly by dismissing him from office for fear of the unforeseen repercussions this might provoke among the throne slaves; and

since the Sarkin Bai no longer came to council, he could hardly be dismissed from that. Thus, by withdrawing from council the Sarkin Bai simultaneously protected his influence from erosion by the Bunturawa and augmented his own power. His position was almost beyond Mai Gurdo's reach.

So long as Dan Barnu was Kaura, he could overrule and thwart the Sarkin Bai in council whenever he wished, since he was confident of Mai Gurdo's support. Moreover, resenting the close alliance of his brother the Bunturawa Muhamman and the Sarkin Bai, Sogiji had thrown his weight behind Dan Barnu, hoping thereby to assure his own promotion. To remove the free Kaura, the Sarkin Bai accordingly appealed to two local malams, Jalalu and Rufa'i, for ritual assistance. When the Kaura Dan Barnu set out with Mai Gurdo on his annual visit of homage to the Sultan Abdurrahman of Sokoto, the Sarkin Bai, as usual, remained behind in charge of the emirate until the chief returned. On one occasion it was widely rumored that Dan Kanyo had paid the malams 2,000,000 cowries to ensure by their spells and prayers that Dan Barnu should not return. The affair was well known, and when the Kaura died before returning, Dan Kanyo's reputation for magic was firmly established. Mai Gurdo and his sons, Muhamman and Sogiji, learned this story and duly feared to risk Dan Barnu's fate. By securing the Kaura's office for the slave Dan Bayere, whom he controlled, the Sarkin Bai thus eliminated this possible source of opposition and at the same time assured his dominance in both councils, even if his ally, the Bunturawa Muhamman, should fail to support him.

To illustrate his preeminence, Dan Kanyo obtained a place on the chief's informal judicial council for his son and chosen successor, the Sarka. By this means he kept himself informed on the activities of the judicial council and exerted his influence indirectly in the cases that interested him. After Muhamman's death, Mai Gurdo and Sogiji found that they could rarely secure from these councils any decision to which the Sarkin Bai was opposed. On his part, Dan Kanyo made no attempt to display his power publicly by positive action. The chief and crown prince were structurally checkmated. Mai Gurdo was old, and the British and French were then actively seeking to establish their rule throughout the region.

Between January and March 1903 the British conquered Kano and Sokoto, and the Sultan Attahiru I fled east accompanied by hordes of followers before he was overtaken and killed at Burmi. Dan Kanyo may have recognized that military power now lay with the British and that the old order of autocratic chiefs under the sultans of Sokoto was near its end. He may thus have anticipated further changes after Mai Gurdo's death. In any event, although he kept away from the palace, he used his power indirectly but effectively to regulate council decisions and bided his time. The final chapter of the history of Fulani Daura belongs in the following account of the events that led to the reunification of Daura under its old Hausa dynasty.

7
Restoration and Reunion

TAFIDA'S LAST YEARS

Baure and Zango

For the first ten years of their rule, the British were keenly concerned to ensure the security and good order of the territory of Daura, since the old caravan routes from Zinder to Kano crossed the country and its people were inevitably involved in the recent wars between these two states. While some were vassals of Zinder, others had supported Kano directly or by virtue of their common allegiances to Sokoto. The international boundary in this area also needed revision. South of the border, the territory was divided among three turbulent and mutually hostile chiefdoms, two of which, the Hausa vassals of Zinder, had suffered much at their suzerain's hands, while the third, Fulani Daura, had suffered at the hands of its chiefs. Given these political divisions and alignments, the British were anxious that political relations among Zango, Zinder, and Daura should not set them at odds with the French, on whose goodwill their administration of these northern areas depended.

By comparison with Kano and Katsina, the three Daura chiefdoms were petty states indeed, and their economic and military insignificance contrasted sharply with the political and administrative problems that they presented. By incorporating into the chiefdom of Zango the districts of southern Zinder which fell to them under the original boundary demarcation, the British had indicated their preferences for larger units of local administration and for Zango as against Fulani Daura or Baure. Thus the territorial transfer simultaneously extended the chiefdom of Zango and raised its status above its rivals. Since several towns claimed by Baure, such as Sitawa, Kagara, the abandoned site of Magaria, Unguwan Tinkim, Jengi, and Gidan Arko, were also transferred to Zango at this time, their allocation to Zango was duly resented at Baure, where the traditional rivalry with Zango rapidly hardened into defiance under an increasing sense of threat.

The British officer H. C. Phillips ("Maitumbi") had advised Tafida, the chief of Zango, to place one of his trusted men in charge of the collection of the Zango cattle tax. Tafida gave this task to the Turaki Muhamman Madi, a younger brother of his Sarkin Yara Kwanyami and a grandson of Lukudi's Sarkin Yara Danko. During the dry season of 1903-1904, Turaki Madi set out with an escort of horsemen to visit the pastoral Fulani at their camps and collect the cattle tax. Buglers and other court musicians accompanied the Turaki to announce his presence and mission by sounding his praise-songs together with those of the chief. According to custom, the Fulani were then obliged to present themselves to the chief's representative and remain in his presence until permitted to go.

While on tour, the Turaki and his troop passed close by the old site of Dan Mairam, near Bacebace, an area which the rulers of Baure regarded as part of their chiefdom. On approaching Dan Mairam, the Turaki's buglers routinely announced his presence with fanfares, praise-songs and drumming; but Dan Mairam was the home of Ali, a son of Tsoho and former chief of Baure, who had settled there after his second deposition in 1893. On hearing the praise-songs of Tafida and the Turaki, Ali seems to have believed that an attack was imminent and left the village on horseback. Some of the Turaki's men followed after to persuade him to return and greet the Turaki. The sight of these pursuers confirmed Ali's fears, and when they approached him he drew his sword to defend himself. In the confusion someone fired a musket, and Ali was killed. It was now the Turaki's turn to fear an attack from Dan Mairam or the chief of Baure.

Withdrawing to Zango territory, he ordered his buglers to blow the call that summoned all horsemen in earshot to arm and assemble at once. In this way the Turaki quickly mobilized a sufficiently large force of cavalry to discourage a surprise attack and safeguard the taxes he had collected. He then retraced his route along the boundary between Baure and Zango near Dan Mairam to make a show of strength and see whether the people of Baure dared to attack. En route the Turaki's men heard the Baure war bugles and drums only a few minutes before they faced a cavalry charge. In the fighting that followed, it is said that sixty-seven Baure men were killed and seventeen from Zango. The Turaki at once returned to Zango with the tax he had collected and reported the incident to Tafida. Although Tafida exonerated him fully, the townsfolk of Zango and certain officials gave the Turaki no peace.

The British had clearly prohibited local fighting and proclaimed their intention to punish those who engaged in it. Such whispers and rumors as came to his ears convinced Muhamman Madi that he was in danger, despite Tafida's complaisance. Fearing that his enemies would send misleading reports to the resident at Kano, the Turaki persuaded a gatekeeper to let him out of the town before dawn one morning and rode as fast as he could to Kano. There he reported to Mr. Bailey, the acting resident, and related his version of the events at Dan Mairam. It is said that the resident declared that he found no fault with the Turaki's conduct on the Baure border but that Muhamman Madi should not have left Zango without Tafida's knowledge

and authority. From the resident Madi went to greet the emir of Kano, Abbas, to whom also he recited his tale of Dan Mairam and was again assured that his conduct had been blameless. Madi then returned to Zango, where Tafida again exonerated him and pointed out that in fighting his Baure attackers he was merely defending the Zango cattle tax. The Turaki excused himself for fleeing to Kano to appeal to the resident on the ground that he feared misleading reports from Baure and his local enemies. Tafida informed the resident of the Turaki's return and said that as far as he was concerned, the matter was closed and that he made no demands or complaints against Baure. Apparently the Sarkin Baure Abdu took the opposite view, since the Turaki's force had initiated the affair by killing his predecessor Ali and had inflicted heavy losses on Baure. Abdu's hostility and demands for reparation, including the punishment of the Turaki, persuaded the British that to forestall further fighting between the Hausa chiefdoms, they should either abolish one or subordinate it to the other as a vassal state. These seemed the only feasible alternatives, and of the two the British preferred to place Baure under Zango as the simpler solution.

In April 1904 the French and British governments signed a new convention which modified the northern frontier of Nigeria in favor of France.[1] Although the new boundary had still to be settled, the British recognized that this would soon reduce the chiefdom of Zango to its former size by restoring its recently acquired territories to Niger and the French. Anticipating this, the provincial administration at Kano reconsidered the situation of the Daura states and decided that Baure should be placed under Zango as a vassal state.

This decision may have been influenced by several factors. For example, the British desired to compensate Tafida for the heavy territorial losses he stood to suffer under the coming boundary revision. The British also preferred larger units of local administration as more economic and serviceable. In their view Zango was the senior successor state of Hausa Daura; and its ruling lineage, the senior and legitimate branch of that dynasty. Finally, Maitumbi and other British officers were personally sympathetic to Tafida, whose relief at the termination of his vassalage to Zinder made him understandably appreciative of, and responsive to, British intentions and rule. By contrast, the Sarkin Baure Abdu, observing British preferences for his rivals at Zango, correctly regarded them with apprehension and reserve.

The Sarkin Baure Abdu learned that the British intended to incorporate Baure into the chiefdom of Zango as a vassal state in the rainy season of 1904. When he discussed this proposal with the Baure princes and officials, they rejected it strongly. Not long after this discussion, Maitumbi, who was then still in charge of Daura affairs, sent to summon Abdu to Zango. Following their announcement of Baure's subordination to Zango, administrative protocol required the Sarkin Baure to present himself, whenever summoned, to the British officers in the company of his immediate superior, Tafida of Zango. Maitumbi, then at Dargage, had informed Abdu accordingly. However, heeding the advice of his councillors, who rejected any

action that indicated acceptance of Baure's subordination to Zango, Abdu went directly to Maitumbi, despite the warnings of his friend, the Dan Kwaba of Zango, that the British would interpret this action as a defiance of their authority. Maitumbi promptly sent the Sarkin Baure Abdu to Tafida at Zango under a police escort. Having explained to Abdu that the British administration would only deal with subordinate chiefs through their superiors, he is said to have instructed Tafida to appoint someone of his own family to rule over Baure. At Zango Tafida apparently tried to persuade Abdu to accept the new order of things so that he might be restored; but Abdu refused to accept Baure's subordination to Zango as the condition of his own restoration. Given the vehement rejection of vassalage by the Baure officials, it is indeed doubtful whether he could have ruled there under the conditions Maitumbi laid down.

In any event, Abdu was not deposed formally because he chose to ignore Tafida and tried to deal with the British directly. Under the law that forbade slave raiding and slave dealing,[2] he was accused of having sold a free woman and her newborn infant into slavery. Apparently Maitumbi had summoned Abdu to Zango in order to investigate the charge in Tafida's presence. By refusing to observe their instructions, Abdu had thus challenged the authority of the British administration and rejected Tafida's. It could be argued that he had also frustrated Maitumbi's investigation. It is uncertain whether Abdu had in fact committed the offense with which he was charged, but on his dismissal he was required to give Tafida all the articles he had received on his appointment, the insignia of chiefship, and was placed under house arrest at Zango. To succeed Abdu, Tafida selected Haliru, who was a younger son of Tsoho and a man of a retiring disposition who had devoted himself to religious studies for several years. Haliru was obliged to administer Baure as Zango's vassal; and on his formal installation at Zango he swore the familiar oath of vassalage, taken from Zinder—"Whatever you say, if I do not obey it, *billahi allazi illā illāha illāhua.*" As became a vassal, Haliru paid a handsome *kudin sarauta* for his appointment and received in return the robes, turbans, and burnoose *(alkyabba)* of office; a caparisoned horse; and a sword. Haliru returned to Baure as chief shortly before Tafida died.

MUSA (1904-1911)

End of Baure

On Tafida's death the Kaura Salihu of Zango independently attempted to decide the succession at Zango in an attempt to recover the power his office had lost with the abolition of Zinder's suzerainty. If this was his hope, Salihu was mistaken, since it was essentially Zinder's overlordship that had enabled his predecessors to regulate the Zango succession. Without this external support Salihu found the local opposition of princes, malams, and

officials too much for him. After much argument the senior council of state decided that the succession would remain with Nuhu's descendants but found themselves unable to agree on a particular prince.

Determined to choose their chief without external direction, the electors accepted the advice of the three electoral malams, the Limam, Alkali, and Dan Sanwai, that the eligible princes should draw lots. The drums were beaten, the public summoned, and the princes set before the assembly at the palace. Nuhu's surviving sons were then called out in order of age to take a piece of folded paper from a calabash. With one exception, all these pieces were blank; that exception, which represented the choice of Allah, appropriately fell to Musa, himself a malam and by repute the first member of the Hausa dynasty who could recite the Koran from memory. Musa's selection thus validated the method of drawing lots which the electoral malams had first suggested to end an earlier electoral deadlock between the Kaura Salihu and the Galadima Jangwale. The British, although informed of Tafida's death, knew nothing about this election until it was over, since the electors and officials feared that their new overlords might do as Zinder had done and leave the decision to the Kaura. Despite contrary advice, Musa wisely refused to proceed with the installation until the British had given their consent. These signs of Musa's good faith and good sense commended him to the British officials, who promptly confirmed the election and authorized his installation. Musa thus became chief at the time that new succession procedures were adopted under the malams' guidance.

On Musa's accession, the Sarkin Baure Haliru was recalled to Zango to renew the oath of vassalage he had made at his own appointment, and he remained at Zango for the week of Musa's seclusion. By then H. R. Palmer had replaced H. C. Phillips ("Maitumbi") as the British officer in charge of Daura affairs, which he administered from the Divisional Headquarters outside the walls of Katsina city, nearly fifty miles away. Shortly after he had returned to Baure, Palmer summoned Haliru to accompany Malam Musa, the new Sarkin Zango, to Daura town for a meeting with him. It is said that Palmer wished to inform the three Daura chiefs about the nature of the new scheme of territorial organization the British intended to introduce and that he also wanted to meet the two Hausa chiefs and persuade them to cooperate.

This was perhaps the third occasion in as many months that the Sarkin Baure Haliru had been required to leave his capital and attend his suzerain at Zango. Hitherto he had merely been summoned for his own or Musa's installation. On this occasion, however, he was required to accompany Musa into Daura town, which was then still under Fulani rule. The princes and officials of Baure may be forgiven if, recalling the habits of the Sarkin Zinder Tanimu, they suspected Maitumbi's successor, whom they did not know, of plotting to remove their chief or to place Baure and Zango together under the Fulani emir of Daura, Mai Gurdo.

With such fears the Yeriman Baure Mai Kaho, Haliru's elder brother,

pressed him not to go. Mai Kaho's advice was strongly supported by most of the courtiers and officials at Baure. However, remembering his predecessor's punishment, Haliru saw that he had no alternative. Mai Kaho and the courtiers then demanded that Haliru should avoid Zango on his way to Daura; and at some stage in the discussion Mai Kaho, having apparently prepared a secret entrance into the palace, threatened to occupy the palace and seize the throne if Haliru left Baure at all. Haliru set out nonetheless but went directly to Palmer at Daura, arriving there shortly before Malam Musa, who had awaited him at Zango. During the conference Haliru and Musa were on friendly terms; and when it was over, Palmer sent them to Zango to settle their differences. At Zango when Haliru prepared to set out for Baure, Musa presented him with a robe, turban, and burnoose; a new horse with its riding gear; and the troop of royal buglers and drummers to escort him. At Baure Haliru was heavily criticized by Mai Kaho and others for accepting Musa's gifts. The Yerima and courtiers urged that Musa's gifts were "medicated" with magic to harm Haliru and argued that as a malam, Musa could prepare such charms and spells at will. To remove the threat or taint of evil, they urged Haliru to burn Musa's gifts. Beset by the assertions and fears of his courtiers, Haliru seems to have lost his nerve and begun to fear that Musa intended to poison or destroy him. It is not certain that he actually burned all Musa's gifts, though this seems probable; but the state of tension, fear, and readiness to "revolt" *(tawaye)* at Baure was soon reported to Musa and Palmer. The latter at once summoned forty African soldiers under two British officers to meet him at Yanduna and ordered Haliru and Musa to attend him there. On arriving at Yanduna, Haliru was dismissed, and Palmer and Musa considered who to place in charge of Baure.

The Magayakin Baure was selected and summoned; but having learned that he would succeed Haliru, he assured Musa that as soon as he was appointed he intended to start collecting taxes from all those towns claimed by Baure that Maitumbi had placed under Zango. Most of the disputed towns lay in old Magaria and were soon transferred to the French colony of Niger; but with this warning Palmer and Musa agreed that the Magayaki was hardly suitable for the Baure appointment. Haliru's restoration was then mooted. He was still at Baure under house arrest, but the Kaura of Baure, Gulumbiya, persuaded Haliru that the British intended to seize him and banish him from Baure. Haliru accordingly fled, first to Kano and then to Sitawa in French territory, five miles beyond the Baure boundary. On learning of his flight, Palmer and Musa moved to Baure with their military escort and summoned the people to choose a ruler with whom they would settle down as loyal vassals of Zango under British overrule. Though their intentions were apparently straightforward and reasonable, this selection did not occur.

At Zango the Kaura Salihu had not resigned himself to Musa's appointment and his own loss of power. For some time he had been sending reports against Musa to Palmer, as he had formerly reported against Tafida to the

two Ahmadus of Zinder, Majerinji and Dan Bassa. Since British administrative officers were forbidden to take notice of such underhand allegations, Palmer appeared to ignore them; but later, when the pattern of Salihu's intrigues became clear, he told Musa about them. At this stage, however, Palmer said nothing, and Musa apparently did not suspect his Kaura's intrigues. To Salihu, on the other hand, the impasse that followed Haliru's deposition at Baure offered various possibilities of subverting Musa and strengthening himself. It is said that Salihu bribed the Kauran Baure Gulumbiya with gifts of horses, money, and clothes to ensure that the Baure townsfolk would reject Palmer's demand that they should accept vassalage to Zango and elect a chief. Thus, when Palmer and Musa called for nominations in the public assembly, there was a general uproar and refusal to follow the chief of Zango. Palmer seems to have noticed that the princes and officials of Baure were leaders of this tumult. Calling the meeting to order, he warned the Baure dynasty that if they were recalcitrant, he would remove them en masse to Muniya, a rocky, uninhabited area in western Katsina. Someone replied that he "could also take them to Lahira [Paradise]." Musa then ordered the *turu* and *tambari* of Baure to be brought from the palace. After some delay this was done, and Palmer announced that he wanted to meet all the Baure princes at the same place next morning. Expecting to recover their independence from Zango and to have one of them chosen as chief, the Baure princes all assembled as directed, following which Palmer placed them under arrest and sent for their womenfolk, slaves, and property. He then dispatched the entire lineage under armed escort to Muniya in Katsina, having already sent the *tambari* and other regalia of the Baure chiefship to Zango.[3]

Following this, Palmer and Musa proceeded to the border of Kazaure and Zango, which was then in dispute. In association with Kazaure representatives, the boundary was set along a line that ran from Furtumi to Yanduna and Unguwan Adamu by way of Ciciya and Riske. It was at this time that Palmer discovered the *tarayya* system of administration of Yanduna. On his instructions Musa abolished this entirely and placed the town under its senior resident, the Maguzawa Sarkin Lafiya of Zango, while the emir of Kazaure accordingly lost his former rights in the village.

To ensure peace and good order at Baure, Musa decided to place a garrison of Zango warriors and bowmen in the town. For this purpose he summoned the Sarkin Gabas Lasan, who was then the *maigari* of Mai Aduwa, the Kusheka Dan Cirro of Kurni, and the Galadima of Yelwa, Gamaguri, and instructed them to take all their kin, followers, and slaves to Baure, where they would occupy the empty compounds and farms of the former dynasty. All three leaders had large lineages of hunters and bowmen. Together they provided a sufficiently large force to overawe the dissidents of Baure and maintain the peace. Meanwhile Musa left the Kauran Baure Gulumbiya and local Baure officials in charge of the Baure administration and restricted the Sarkin Gabas, Galadiman Yelwa, and the Kusheka to garrison duties.

Five months after the Baure chiefdom had been thus dissolved and a Zango garrison stationed there, the Fulani chiefdom of Daura was also abolished; and Musa left Zango to rule the reunited emirate from its ancient capital. To explain these developments, we must now describe the course of events in the Fulani state.

THE FALL OF FULANI DAURA

Sogiji and the Sarkin Bai

At Fulani Daura the political situation described in chapter 6 persisted with little change until Mai Gurdo's death in 1906. By then the British were reasonably familiar with Mai Gurdo's record and administrative habits. They were probably not so well informed about those of the Sarkin Bai, whose retirement from the state councils had reduced the opportunities for British officers to observe him closely. In Mai Gurdo's last years the conflict between the Bunturawa Sogiji and the Sarkin Bai continued unchanged. The Sarkin Bai could usually thwart the Bunturawa's proposals through his representatives on the various councils, and although he was the senior candidate for the throne, Sogiji recognized that Dan Kanyo opposed his succession and began to fear that he would frustrate this also.

Following Kuninkawa practice, the senior officials were summoned immediately on Mai Gurdo's death, and he was buried at once south of Malam Ishi'aku's tomb inside the palace. Present at the burial were the Sarkin Bai; Kaura Dan Bayere; the Galadima Mai Wasa; the Tarno Galle; the Shamaki Adam; the Ubandawaki Dundu; the Garake Kola; the Bunturawa Sogiji; and Mai Gurdo's Magatakarda, the Hausa Gata, who probably recited the Islamic prayers. Of these nine, the Bunturawa and the Magatakarda were the only free persons.

Immediately after Mai Gurdo's interment, the Sarkin Bai returned to his home, while the other officials lingered around the grave. After Dan Kanyo had gone, Sogiji turned to the others and asked, "Ina shawara?" [What do you suggest that we do?] Declaring that the Sarkin Bai wished to rule the country and intended to select the next emir himself for his own ends, Sogiji emphasized the urgency of the situation and the need for prompt action to frustrate Dan Kanyo's designs. In response the six slave officials present decided to appoint Sogiji immediately as chief. Dan Kanyo's clients, the Kaura, Galadima, and Tarno, accordingly deserted him to elect Sogiji, whose appointment by the British they probably assumed to be certain. In thus transferring their allegiance, it seems likely that these officials were primarily concerned to protect and improve their positions by supporting the Bunturawa, whose succession and victory in his long struggle with the Sarkin Bai now seemed imminent; and having thus approved Sogiji's claim to the chiefship, with hardly a pause these six slaves instructed the Magajin Tam-

bari to drum the impending installation while the Shamaki Adam assembled the regalia and necessary gear from the palace. Following Fulani custom, the enthronement took place by the ancient tamarind tree within the palace forecourt; but from eyewitness accounts it seems to have concluded even before the townsfolk had assembled, despite the fanfares, drumming, and praise-singing.

From his compound behind the palace, the Sarkin Bai heard the music and acclamation. On asking what was afoot, he learned that Sogiji had just been installed as chief, and he commented, "A banza su ke yi." [That is nonsense.] He at once wrote to H. R. Palmer, who was then at Katsina, that Sogiji had seized the throne. My information on these events comes from the ex-Magaji Na'inkali, who then served the Sarkin Bai as a messenger and played a prominent part in these events. Na'inkali gave his account in the presence of several Daura nobles, the ex-Waziri Alhassan, the ex-Galadima Salihu, Alhaji Adamu, and the Sarkin Fada of Daura Adamu, who were already familiar with these events in outline but not in detail.

According to Na'inkali, Dan Kanyo directed him to prepare his horse and take his message at once to Mr. Palmer. Na'inkali left Daura even while Sogiji was celebrating his accession. Thus, when Sogiji wrote to inform Mr. Palmer of his installation on the following day, the latter had already received the Sarkin Bai's account. Palmer at once prepared a report for his superior, the resident Kano; and providing Na'inkali with fresh horses, he sent him with this posthaste to Kano. At the same time Palmer sent his confidential agent, Malam Bawa, to Daura with instructions to check Dan Kanyo's report.

Malam Bawa, a Hausa, found the case much as Dan Kanyo had stated; but he then discussed the matter with Sogiji, who offered him a bribe of ten cows, ten of the most expensive robes, and a 1,000,000 cowries to secure Palmer's assent. Together these items probably had a value of about one and a half million cowries, equivalent to the traditional *kudin sarauta* for the Fulani chiefship. Bawa appeared to accept the bribe and had it conveyed to Yanduna, inside the Zango-Kazaure border, where he met Palmer seventeen days later. By then the resident Kano had placed a troop of forty Hausa soldiers under European officers at Palmer's disposal. Palmer arranged to meet this force at Yanduna, which was their point of entry into the Katsina Division of Kano Province, and instructed Malam Bawa to report to him there.

At Yanduna Bawa confirmed Dan Kanyo's account of Sogiji's installation and showed Palmer the bribe Sogiji had given him. Palmer saw that he had to remove Sogiji and appoint a successor. He was then informed that the ex-Bunturawa Musa, Muhamman Altine's son, whom Mai Gurdo had driven out of Daura, was living in nearby Kazaure, together with Dan Iyau, a senior member of the old Kwassarawa lineage which had furnished the Fulani Kauras of Daura until Mai Gurdo's reign. Palmer instructed Dan Iyau and the former Bunturawa Musa to accompany him to Daura; and it is said that he intended to put Musa in Sogiji's place.

Before leaving Yanduna, Palmer sent a courier to inform Sogiji that he would visit Daura on the following day and told his troops to meet him there. Sogiji and his courtiers came out to greet Palmer at the southern gate of the city, dressed in finery and military gear. Escorted by this entourage, Palmer entered the town and went to the official Rest House near the Kusugu well. There he found the infantry platoon waiting. Palmer then told Sogiji he had come to dismiss him. Since Sogiji had seized the throne in contempt of British authority and traditional electoral processes, the administration refused to legalize his usurpation. Palmer indicated that if Sogiji and his supporters offered resistance, his troops would retaliate; but the crowd showed no inclination to fight. Palmer then instructed Sogiji and the six slave officials who had "appointed" him to dismount one by one and enter the Rest House, where they were placed under guard. Before dismissing the people, he directed them to reassemble on the morrow, when he would select a new chief in consultation with them. Sogiji had reigned for nineteen days, little less than Zubairu, and fell in strangely similar circumstances.

Murnai and the Sarkin Bai

At Daura the return of Altine's son, the ex-Bunturawa Musa, was soon widely known, and it was rumored that night that Palmer intended to appoint Musa as emir on the following day. The Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo heard the rumor, disliked the idea, and decided to prevent it. He sent Na'inkali to call Palmer's agent, Malam Bawa, and the three then took counsel about the situation. As a fee for his services Malam Bawa demanded ten cows in calf valued at 100,000 cowries each and ten pairs of silver anklets *(kwandaye)* valued at 200,000 cowries a pair, giving a total of 3,000,000. Dan Kanyo sent his messenger Na'inkali into the palace *shamaki* with orders to bring three cases of silver anklets, each containing five pairs, the surplus being shared by the Sarkin Bai and his messenger unequally. After Malam Bawa was shown the valuables and cattle, the three proceeded to discuss how they might prevent Palmer from appointing Musa as chief and instead secure the succession for Dan Kanyo's nominee, Mai Gurdo's younger brother, the Magajiya Murnai.

Bawa suggested that Na'inkali should take advantage of Palmer's public request for advice on the election and say that the townsfolk would riot if Musa was chosen, since he was a well-known oppressor and would prove a tyrannical chief. Bawa anticipated that when he visited the Rest House some time later, Palmer would ask him to investigate Na'inkali's report, and he would then confirm it. Events fulfilled these expectations, and Bawa duly confirmed that Musa was unsuitable. He advised Palmer that under the circumstances the only acceptable way to decide the succession at this stage of the proceedings was to assemble the people and to ask them one by one whom they would like as chief. When Palmer agreed, Bawa returned to con-

clude his arrangements with the Sarkin Bai and Na'inkali, and together they decided to fix the election in favor of Magajiya Murnai. To this end the Sarkin Bai, who administered the palace during interregnums and the emir's absences, instructed Na'inkali to remove 150 robes of various quality from the clothing stores in the *shamaki.* While Na'inkali did so, the Sarkin Bai compiled a list of fifty-five influential commoners from the various wards of the town who were certain to comply with him. Reserving 40 robes for himself and Na'inkali, the Sarkin Bai sent Na'inkali to distribute the other 110, 2 to each of these fifty-five men, with instructions that they should demand the appointment of Murnai on the following day when Palmer canvassed popular opinion at the Kusugu well.

The election was effectively fixed. On the next day, when Palmer asked for expressions of popular choice, he received an overwhelming demand for the Magajiya Murnai from the assembled commoners. Palmer quickly decided to check this demand by asking the electors and senior princes their views and first called on the Haska Daguya. As Daguya spoke strongly in favor of the former Bunturawa Musa, Na'inkali astutely sensed that the Magajiya Murnai's chances hung in the balance and launched a bitter attack on Daguya's character, condemning him before the assembly as one oppressive prince who would support another. To substantiate his accusations, Na'inkali informed Palmer that the Haska's fief, Gurjiya, which lay immediately southeast of the town, had been abandoned by its inhabitants because they were treated so badly. Whether Gurjiya was then deserted, and if so for what reasons, we do not know; but the Haska evidently lost his patience at this public abuse from a man of such low status and proceeded to reply in a similar mode. In doing so, the Haska forfeited some of Palmer's confidence and good opinion, thus enabling Bawa to turn the issue by reminding Palmer that he had already consulted the people, as he had promised to do. There was thus no need, Bawa argued, for Palmer to canvass the opinions of senior officials. The Magajiya Murnai was accordingly called to swear the usual oath of appointment, which included an undertaking that he would not break the trust *(ci amana)* conferred on him by the British administration. Palmer then required Murnai to confer the title of Kaura on the Kwassarawa Dan Iyau, its previous holder, the slave Kaura Dan Bayere, having been dismissed and arrested the day before. He then withdrew to Katsina, accompanied by Malam Bawa, leaving the Magajiya Murnai in charge of Daura.

Despite his high birth and his title, the Magajiya Murnai had held no administrative office before his accession. In replacing Fatsuma by Murnai as Magajiya, Mai Gurdo had slyly indicated his contempt for the latter. Thus revived, the Magajiya title remained honorific and had no fiefs. Being poor and politically marginal, Murnai accordingly had no clients or following on whom he could depend if he wished to rule independently of the Sarkin Bai. Moreover, having no experience of administrative responsibility, he found his role as chief perplexing. For Dan Kanyo, who had recently lost his experi-

enced agents, the Kaura, the Galadima, the Shamaki, the Tarno, and the Garake in Palmer's swoop, Murnai's record as a political cipher may have been his principal asset. In addition, like the Bunturawas Sogiji and Musa, Murnai had also married a daughter of the Sarkin Bai. Dan Kanyo accordingly held the upper hand both as Murnai's father-in-law and as an experienced and powerful official without whose guidance, information, and support the emir could do nothing. To rule Daura through Murnai without hindrance, Dan Kanyo accordingly had Murnai appoint him as Waziri (Vizier), a title hitherto unknown at Daura, though familiar in the Sokoto empire, where it outranked all others under the sultan. As Waziri, following Islamic models, Dan Kanyo was formally responsible for the administration of the entire emirate, including the fiefs placed under Dan Iyau, the new Kwassarawa Kaura. The appointment thus legitimated his authority as executive head of the state. Nevertheless, Dan Kanyo kept away from the state councils and had his son, the Sarka, appointed in his place. Thereby he simultaneously preserved his unaccountability and his influence on council decisions.

Murnai soon learned how he had been selected, perhaps from Na'inkali himself; and regretting his dependence on the Sarkin Bai, he sought advice and support from Na'inkali, the Sarkin Yara Hungurmi, an Arab called Wulla, and one or two others. Reconsidering his situation, Murnai perceived that the Sarka's primary function on the state councils was to represent his father's interests and to keep Dan Kanyo informed about Murnai's situation and plans. Murnai recognized that the Sarka could not be removed so long as Dan Kanyo retained power. He therefore sought for ways to replace Dan Kanyo by the Sarkin Yara and planned to give Na'inkali the office of Sarkin Tafarki, which he had requested. Meanwhile, Murnai treated the Sarka politely but kept him at arm's length.

As Waziri, Dan Kanyo controlled the treasury as well as the territorial administration. He was thus more indispensable than ever and took care to avoid any action which the British regarded as a serious offense. However, as Murnai's father-in-law, Dan Kanyo avoided the palace, ostensibly observing the norms that estranged fathers from sons-in-law. Instead of going to greet Murnai, Dan Kanyo remained at home; and although the rules of rank forbade the chief to come to greet his chief slave and wife's father, whenever he received letters or memoranda from Palmer at Katsina or the resident at Kano, Murnai would take the unopened letters to Dan Kanyo himself, and he followed Dan Kanyo's instructions in his replies. Meanwhile, he pondered how to replace Dan Kanyo by Hungurmi.

About four months after his accession Murnai became overconfident and began to treat the Sarka in a haughty manner. Thus warned, the Sarka observed the chief discreetly. He soon discovered Murnai's advisers and plans and reported these to his father. Dan Kanyo decided to strike first and sent off a letter to Katsina, informing Palmer that Murnai was incapable and unfit to rule, since he always brought the administration's letters unopened

for him to read, discuss, and draft the reply. While this report suggested to the British that Murnai was illiterate, it also meant that Murnai regularly betrayed the confidence they had placed in him, since he did not keep their communications secret. Coming from the vizier of Daura, the charge was serious. Palmer reported the matter to his superior, the resident Kano, and asked for instructions. He was directed to dismiss Murnai for *ci amana* (breach of trust). He then visited Daura, called on the emir, and told him of his dismissal, with full explanations. In response to appeals, he told Murnai that he would place him in charge of Sandamu, where the chiefship was vacant and due for conversion into a district headship shortly. For his move to Sandamu, Palmer directed Murnai to take ten servants, ten robes, ten horses, and ten of his seventy wives and concubines and to send the others back to their homes. Before returning to Katsina to consider the problem of Murnai's successor, Palmer formally placed the Waziri Dan Kanyo in charge of the emirate. According to Na'inkali, before leaving for Sandamu, Murnai told Dan Kanyo to take whatever he wished from the palace; but if Murnai did so, this was without Palmer's knowledge or authority.

To secure his control of the emirate, Dan Kanyo decided to square accounts with his former agent, Na'inkali, who had recently plotted his downfall. Na'inkali had attached himself to Murnai in the hope of an appointment as Sarkin Tafarki, but when Murnai invited him to move to Sandamu, he excused himself neatly on the grounds that he was attached to the throne, not to its holder, and could not leave the former to follow the latter. This argument allusively reflects Na'inkali's status as a throne slave. On his side, recalling Na'inkali's role in Murnai's election, Dan Kanyo probably regarded his presence as a threat. After appointing Ali, the brother of the Fada Babba Labaran, to the office of Alkali, which had then been vacant for nearly eight years, Dan Kanyo charged Na'inkali with *kin umurci* (refusal to obey orders) and sent him to the Alkali for trial, evidently in the expectation that Na'inkali would be sent to prison. The political character of the charge is clear from the circumstances to which it referred. Once, when Dan Kanyo had ordered N'inkali to saddle his horse and take a message to Katsina, Na'inkali had refused to use his own horse and asked for one of the 120 that were attached to the throne, protesting that he might injure his own horse on the ride and should be provided with one by the state for use in its service. This is Na'inkali's account of the affair, but when the Alkali offered him the oath he refused to swear to the truth of his evidence. The Alkali accordingly fined him 200,000 cowries as the alternative to prison. Presumably Na'inkali had anticipated some such treatment, for he promptly paid the fine and rode to Katsina on his own horse to report the matter to Palmer. Repeating the charges that he had formerly leveled against the ex-Bunturawa Musa, Na'inkali says he told Palmer that Dan Kanyo was ruling Daura tyrannically and that the townsfolk were ripe for a riot unless something was done. In the discussion that followed he suggested that Palmer should send his agent, Malam Bawa, to administer Daura until a new emir was chosen and replace

the Sarkin Bai, who would simultaneously lose the office and title of vizier. This is Na'inkali's version of the conversation; but whether true or not, this was what Palmer did. Na'inkali and Malam Bawa returned to Daura together as its rulers. Dan Kanyo had lost control of the emirate in the way he had won it; he could do nothing to displace the new rulers.

Bawa and Na'inkali then considered the problem of selecting a new emir, apparently without consulting any of the traditional electors of Daura. Asked by Bawa whom he thought best, Na'inkali nominated Maina Goto, an inconspicuous prince whom he felt he could manipulate. Na'inkali says he nominated Goto without receiving or expecting a bribe. Having considered this suggestion for some days, Bawa then went to visit Malam Musa at Zango and offered to arrange his appointment at Daura for an appropriate fee, which was phrased as *kudin sarauta.* Musa could hardly refuse such a gift from Allah. Having completed the transaction, Bawa returned to Daura and sent Na'inkali to Palmer with a letter saying that the Fulani dynasty was quite played out and had no one competent to administer the emirate. On this ground Bawa advised that the only reasonable course was to transfer Malam Musa, the Hausa Sarkin Daura, from Zango to Daura, appoint him as chief, and so reunite the remaining territories his ancestors had ruled.

THE RESTORATION

Conference at Bici

Dan Kanyo had previously told Palmer that the Fulani dynasty was degenerate and no longer kept the Muslim Fast. On receiving Bawa's assessment and advice, Palmer added his own comments and referred the matter to his senior, the resident at Kano. When he received provisional approval for the changes proposed, he summoned Musa to Bici in Kano, where they spent a week together discussing the possibility of Musa's appointment at Daura and the various problems that would then arise. Palmer took great care on this occasion to brief Musa thoroughly and also to study his character. He seems to have made it clear that should the Hausa restoration fail through Musa's incompetence, vindictiveness, or lack of good faith, Daura's future would be imperiled. He therefore stressed the need for Musa to reconcile the officials and former dynasty of Fulani Daura to his rule and instructed him to retain all who had held office under Murnai until they died or committed some serious offense that clearly merited dismissal.

At Bici Palmer and Musa also discussed the details of a new territorial organization by which the reconstituted emirate would be subdivided into thirteen compact administrative districts under resident heads, while Baure would be preserved as a unit without division in view of its history and recent experience. Palmer told Musa that the last Fulani emir, Murnai, would administer the Sandamu District with his old title of Magajiya. He also

instructed Musa to reserve appropriate districts for such senior Fulani officials as the Bunturawa Yakubu, Murnai's son; the Kaura Dan Iyau; the Haska Daguya; and the Galadima Lawal, Dan Kanyo's younger brother, who had replaced Mai Wasa after Sogiji's arrest. He may also have acquainted Musa with the power of the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo, who had resumed this title after losing the vizierate; but Musa was already familiar with Dan Kanyo's reputation, since the Sarkin Bai was by then commonly known as the Kaura Mazawaje of Fulani Daura, having removed its last two emirs in quick succession by secret reports to the British as Mazawaje had done through Zinder. Since neither Zango nor Baure had ever known Fulani rule, it was agreed that those district heads who were recruited from Fulani Daura would be given charge of districts within their former chiefdom. Thus the territories of Zango and Mai Aduwa which remained to Zango after the 1904 Anglo-French convention were available for Musa to allocate to his Hausa officials. However, given Dan Kanyo's reputation, Musa decided to place Daura town under someone else and to put the Sarkin Bai in charge of Maigoribai, northwest of the city in Mai Aduwa, a district which had hitherto escaped Fulani rule.

By 1906 the protectorate government was engaged in rationalizing the territorial systems and tax structure of the emirates. Fighting, slave raiding, and the public sale of slaves had by then been suppressed, thus enabling the British to proceed with the major tasks of administrative reorganization. The abolition of the ancient system of territorial administration by which absentee lords governed their scattered fiefs through ill-supervised *jekadu,* whose arbitrary orders few peasants dared contest, ranked high in the British scheme of priorities for reform. In place of the traditional arrangements, the British proposed to establish a simpler system in which authority and accountability were clearly identified to facilitate the supervision of the rural administration. This was one of their chief objectives in creating compact territorial districts whose resident heads would then be directly responsible to the emir for their administration. These new district heads were expected to support the constituted Muslim courts by dispatching litigants and offenders to the Alkali, except for land cases, which were reserved for them to settle. As the emir's deputies, they would also supervise the annual returns of population and tax, including cattle tax *(jangali),* and maintain peace and good order in their districts. They would also supervise the selection of village heads for recommendation to the emir, who would formally appoint those he approved. Under this new territorial organization, these village heads would be directly responsible for the peace and good order of their villages and would have to report any unusual or disturbing events to the district head. They were also required to collect a local tax, *karo* or *kudin kasa,* in which the British tried to combine the traditional grain tithe and capitation and land taxes. Until they were superseded by the government's new metal currency, cowries were accepted in payment of tax; but the conversion of cash dues into kind equivalents by *rangwame,* which had been such a fer-

tile source of abuse under the traditional regime, was prohibited. By 1911 taxation at Daura averaged about three shillings and sixpence per farm, of which the *kudin kasa* represented two shillings and *zakka* the rest. In addition, marsh plots *(garake)* were taxed at one shilling each irrespective of size and cattle at one shilling and sixpence per head.[4] Excluding cattle tax, these revenues were divided among the government, the emir, and the district and village heads as follows: the government received 50 percent, the emir 25 percent, the district head 15 percent, and the village head 10 percent of the intake from each local unit. Since village heads did not collect the cattle tax, they received no portion thereof, these revenues being divided among the government, the emir, the district head, and the Fulani headmen who collected the tax from the pastoralists.[5]

The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 did not resolve all the intricate boundary issues that reflected the tortuous political alignments of communities in this region during the preceding century. Only in 1907 was Daura's section of the northern frontier of Kano Province finally settled, to the relief of the provincial administration, which expressed the hope that "the final settlement will at length terminate the troublesome state of uncertainty on the frontier that has hitherto existed."[6] Under this boundary revision, Daura lost territory at Tumfafi east of Zango, together with Kwabo and the area from Yekuwa and Dambadada to Dan Mairam near Bacebace, which Musa had allotted to his brother the Yerima Musa at Zango. In this labile territorial situation the districts recently instituted by Palmer and Musa were clearly provisional and likely to change. But in addition the British intended to reduce the number of districts by amalgamation over the next few years, until they had developed units of an optimal size for efficient administration by local chiefs. In this process the number of districts at Daura was steadily reduced from thirteen to five in twenty years.

Whether Palmer informed Musa at Bici about these aspects of the district organization, we do not know; but his decisions to preserve Baure undivided and retain senior officials of the Fulani state, coupled with the replacement of fiefs by compact districts, meant that most of Musa's staff would lose their administrative rights and incomes under these territorial and tax reforms. Further, until they committed offenses that merited dismissal, those officials of the Fulani state whom Musa was obliged to retain or appoint as district and village heads were privileged and protected by the divisional administration. For example, since no territorial reallocations could be made at their expense without British approval, they could only proceed in the areas administered by Musa's kin and followers from Zango. Such a situation was likely to weaken the allegiance of Musa's supporters and to generate dissatisfaction and intrigues, and perhaps Musa perceived this.

At Bici Palmer also informed Musa of the procedure that would be followed if Sir William Wallace, the High Commissioner, approved the resident's recommendation that the Hausa should be restored at Daura, as duly happened. The administration then summoned the emirs of Katsina,

Kazaure, and Zango, together with Magajiya Murnai from Fulani Daura, to a meeting at Dutse in northeastern Katsina, where Malam Musa was proclaimed the rightful emir of Daura, and Magajiya Murnai was appointed as district head of Sandamu with the title of Sarkin Fulani. At the same time the appointments of new emirs of Kazaure and Katsina were formally confirmed.[7]

Upheavals of 1906-1907

The year 1906 was especially critical for Northern Nigeria and the French territories of Niger that adjoined Daura. It was then that the Mahdist revolt at Satiru near Sokoto gave the British their first local defeat in battle. In two months a British force had destroyed Satiru. Daura and the chiefdoms nearby were also shaken by a succession of unprecedented events. When Ahmadu Dan Bassa's reign came to an end in 1906, the French administration abolished the sultanate of Zinder and placed French officials directly in charge of its dominions. In November of that year the emir of Katsina, Yero, a descendant of its Fulani conqueror, Umaru Dallaji, was also dismissed from office after a reign of twenty-two months; and the Durbi of Katsina, Muhammadu Dikko, from a different lineage, was appointed as emir. It was this Dikko whose appointment the British confirmed at Dutse when they restored the Hausa to Daura. Thus, within a few months two adjacent Fulani dynasties founded by the Shehu's flagbearers lost their chieftaincies, and one of the emirates established by the jihad ceased to exist, as did Damagaram in Niger.[8] At the same time the Boundary Commission was redrawing the local frontiers, and large numbers of dissatisfied people, uncertain of its future locus and implications, were moving across the boundary in either direction.[9]

It is important to recognize the profoundly unsettling character of these events, particularly the abolition of the chiefdoms of Zinder and Fulani Daura, but also the replacement of the Fulani dynasty in Katsina by the appointment of an emir whose lineage did not even have exclusive hereditary rights to the office of Durbi, from which he ascended the throne. Following in quick succession, these unprecedented and startling events encouraged ambitious men of indifferent status or lineage to seek thrones for themselves by subverting their emirs through reports to the British. Whereas the traditional inviolability of hereditary chiefship had compelled the Kaura Mazawaje and the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo to restrict their ambitions to the acquisition of sufficient power to control the selection and deposition of chiefs, Dikko's appointment at Katsina and Musa's transfer to Daura encouraged ambitious men of any lineage, status, or ethnic group to seek thrones for themselves. Thus Dikko and Musa independently assumed their new offices in troubled times.

Fortunately for Musa, by 1906 the Kaura Salihu had already spent his power and was no longer a serious threat. On succeeding his brother Malam

in 1894 during Tafida's second reign, Salihu had modeled himself after his formidable predecessors, Mazawaje and Bakula; and so long as Zango remained a vassal of Zinder, Tafida was obliged to retain Salihu's goodwill in order to preserve his throne against the reports and stratagems that had destroyed his predecessors. Salihu continued to report Tafida's misdemeanors through the eunuchs of Ahmadu Majerinji; but either Ahmadu, busy on wider fronts, did not regard these charges as sufficiently grave to warrant punishment, or Tafida was able to counter them by manipulating his affinal links with Ahmadu and compensatory gifts. At Zango Salihu had publicized his claim to parity with Tafida when he appointed his client Tsuntsu as Jarman Kaura and pocketed the fine he had levied on Tsuntsu for theft shortly after Tafida had treated the 1,000,000 cowries levied on his Sarkin Dogarai Sakwal for manslaughter as *kudin sarauta.*

We have seen that when the first international boundary released Tafida from Zinder and extended his territory, he reduced Salihu's power by distributing most of these accessions to his supporters and kin and few, if any, to the Kaura. Salihu soon recognized that with Zango's detachment from Zinder he had lost his normal means of removing the chief and began to take an interest in Baure, which was then becoming a vassal of Zango. In thwarting Musa's appeal to his Baure kinsmen to elect a chief to succeed Haliru, Salihu hoped to take charge of Baure. Regarding himself as the peer of the Zango chiefs, Salihu may have anticipated that he would be given Baure if its dynasty could not provide a chief. Though Musa knew nothing of Salihu's part in this affair until sometime after his return to Zango, by sending the Kusheka, the Galadiman Yelwa, and the Sarkin Gabas Lasan to garrison Baure, he implicitly rejected Salihu's claims for that appointment; and when he learned how the Baure election had been arranged, Musa dismissed the Kaura Gulumbiya of Baure and began to consider how to remove Salihu. Meanwhile, having failed to secure Baure, Salihu began to seek Musa's dismissal by sending secret reports to Palmer through his Hausa staff.

Convinced by his own immunity despite Gulumbiya's dismissal that he was too strong for Musa to challenge, Salihu adopted the tactics of the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo at Daura and ceased to attend the palace, even for council meetings. He administered his fiefs as he pleased and in due course, without informing Musa, sent one of his staff to install a village chief at Yan Boro, a town to the east of Baure which Tafida had allocated to him after the first boundary demarcation. As *kudin sarauta,* Salihu collected fifteen cows from the successful candidate; and when Musa heard about this and sent to ask for his share, it is said that Salihu replied, "When you were appointed chief you gave us nothing. Why should I hand you anything now?" Musa then summoned Salihu, who refused at first to visit the palace but finally went. Musa then dismissed Salihu for refusal to obey orders *(kin umurci)* and placed him under house arrest with an armed guard. He then appointed the Dan Kwaba of Baure, Audu Birgi, as Kaura of Zango. Audu Birgi belonged to the Baure branch of the traditional Kaura lineage, and his son Hamidu had already held the office of Dan Kwaba at Zango.

After a few days Salihu escaped from his house at Zango and rode south to the resident at Kano to complain of his treatment by Musa. Without explicitly seeking reappointment, he tried to have Musa dismissed on charges of tyranny and false imprisonment. As usual in such situations, he employed as his advocate one of the resident's confidential agents, a Tripolitanian Arab called Hamid, and paid handsomely for Hamid's aid. Whether Musa also had his own agent on the resident's staff is not quite clear, but he soon learned of Salihu's intrigue; and when the resident summoned him to investigate the charge, Musa was advised that to avoid his own dismissal, he should reappoint Salihu if the resident required this.

On setting out for Kano, Musa accordingly took Audu Birgi, the new Kaura, along with him; and when the resident asked Musa if he would forgive Salihu and restore him to office, Musa promptly complied. The resident complimented him on his good sense, following which Musa and Salihu set off home with Audu Birgi and their escort. On the road north Salihu objected when the buglers played praise-songs for two Kauras, Audu Birgi and himself. Since there was only one Kaura at Zango, Salihu asked why they played two sets of praise-songs. Musa halted the cavalcade and reappointed Audu Birgi as Dan Kwaba of Baure on the spot. A few miles further on, when Salihu's advocate, Hamid, wishing to return to Kano, asked Salihu for his fee, the cavalcade halted again. Since Salihu could not pay Hamid at once for his help with the resident, Musa volunteered to do so and thus brought the Kaura Salihu to Zango partly compromised.

At Bici, during the discussions that preceded his transfer to Daura, Palmer seems to have told Musa of Salihu's secret reports. Accordingly, on returning to Zango, Musa initiated a quiet investigation of the Kaura's activities. He soon learned that Salihu had recently sold a slave girl for 100,000 cowries; and as the British punished this offense severely, the charge was at once reported to Palmer. Salihu was found guilty, and Musa was left to decide his punishment. He was promptly dismissed and sent to live at Bawo north of Zango, following which Musa summoned Audu Birgi for reappointment. However, Audu Birgi demurred on grounds of age and asked if Musa would appoint his son Hamidu, the Dan Kwaba of Zango, in his place. Thus Hamidu succeeded Salihu as Kauran Zango.

In thus dismissing Salihu before moving to Daura, Musa had taken an essential step toward eliminating a dangerous rival and reducing intrigue among his own staff. Perhaps he anticipated that all would not be easy when he moved to Daura; but in dismissing Salihu, Musa also proved himself the first chief of Zango to turn the tables on his Kaura; and in referring the charge against Salihu to the British for their information and advice, he had discovered the way to deal with other disaffected officials. The new schemes of district administration and tax collection, which were instituted after his transfer to Daura, soon provided Musa with other opportunities for ridding himself of unwanted personnel. Nonetheless, since he looked mainly to the traditional centers of opposition and subversion among the princes and senior fiefholding offices, Musa failed to identify several new contestants for

his throne whose ambitions had just been stirred by Dikko's succession in Katsina. These men included his trusted slave, the Turaki Muhamman Madi; the Fulani throne slave, Na'inkali of Daura; and Richmond Palmer's confidential Hausa agent, Malam Bawa, to whom Musa owed his restoration. Musa can be excused for failing to suspect that these men would seek to wrest the throne from him, since all were equally ineligible for the chiefship on traditional grounds of descent.

Having abolished the chiefdom of Zinder, the French sought to replace its highly centralized scheme of territorial administration by new structures better fitted to serve their needs. After inspecting the British pattern of indirect administration through native authorities and traditional institutions at Kano,[10] the *Commandant du Cercle* at Zinder decided to set up a number of minor chiefdoms in the southern territory which had recently been transferred to the Cercle by the final boundary revision; and since the inhabitants of this area were mostly Hausa of the Daura diaspora, he decided to follow the British experiment by placing these communities under Hausa chiefs. The commandant accordingly sent to ask Musa for one of his sons who could be placed in charge of the Daura territories north of the new border.[11] Musa wisely resisted this tempting offer, recognizing that the British might regard its acceptance as a sign of his disaffection and disloyalty, but also perhaps because he feared that the French might treat his son as a hostage after the fashion of Zinder and use him as a lever against Daura and Zango. Instead Musa put forward the name of his Shentali Alhassan, the son of Garake, who could not even claim the Shentali title at Zango by right of descent, as a senior Hausa chief whom the French could consider for the new post. The commandant at Zinder accepted this proposal and installed Alhassan as "traditional" head of a new chiefdom that was centered at Dawambai and stretched eastward to the old Magaria border to include the Hausa villages recently transferred to France.

Alhassan's appointment, which took place at about the time of Dikko's accession in Katsina, seemed to demonstrate that under the French and British rulers alike, any talented official with sufficient political skill and support could become chief, whatever his personal status and descent. But within a few years the French, finding Alhassan unsatisfactory on various grounds, deposed him and abolished the chiefdom of Dawambai. Evidently parvenu chiefs and chiefdoms were equally expendable to the colonial administrations.

The French had better luck with Muhamman Nababa, a son of the last Sarkin Magaria Masallaci, whom they reinstalled at Magaria when they reconstituted the defunct state at the same time that they created the new chiefdom of Dawambai. This event attracted several dissident officials from Baure, such as the Madaba, the Galadima Jibo, the Sarkin Dawaki, and certain others who emigrated to Magaria. From Zango also the former Dan Kwaba Ali went to join Muhamman Nababa as Kauran Magaria. By virtue of its history and Nababa's descent, the new state had a better foundation and readier acceptance among the people than Alhassan's chiefdom

at Dawambai. Nababa was thus able to reconstitute the political structure of Magaria by recruiting officials from descent groups that held traditional interests in particular titles, whether at Baure, Zango, or in ancient Magaria.

Following so quickly after the abolition of Baure, the creation of a new chiefdom at Dawambai and the revival of the defunct Magaria state could not fail to increase the people's uncertainty about the future of traditional units and structures of government. Unless we appreciate the fundamental place of hereditary office and status differences in the organization and perpetuation of these traditional states, we cannot understand how profoundly unsettling these European political experiments were to the people involved.

The traditional societies of this region had long been distinguished by their identification with the different dynasties from which they drew chiefs; but in 1906-1907 the French and the British showed equal disrespect for the established dynasties of this area and removed or replaced them, with or without abolishing their chiefdoms, at will. Simultaneously the new European rulers appeared completely indifferent to the rules of descent that regulated the traditional structures of official allocation. The events of 1906 seemed to offer glittering rewards to enterprising individuals who lacked hereditary claims to chiefly office and at the same time to threaten with eviction those who held such rights. Within eighteen months the traditional chiefdoms and dynasties of Zinder, Fulani Daura, and Baure were overthrown and abolished; new dynasties were established at Katsina and Dawambai; and a chiefdom that had long ceased to exist was resurrected at Magaria. Although the French and British did not intend to discredit traditional forms and principles of political structure, their actions in these chiefdoms had most disturbing effects. In Daura and adjacent chiefdoms, the European innovations of 1906-1907 were widely understood to mean that traditional dynasties had no indissoluble or unconditional rights to rule and that traditional political units had no necessary or inviolable rights of existence. At this period, although the two European powers had shown that they wished to administer the local people through the chiefdoms familiar to them, they had also shown—by abolishing some and creating others, by amalgamations, dynastic evictions, and other means—that they regarded native chiefdoms as means rather than ends of political organization, even though they evidently valued the chiefdom as a political form more highly than the traditional dynasties, arrangements, and boundaries with which such units were identified. In effect, the French and British seemed to look upon chiefs and chiefdoms as subordinate administrative institutions whose future depended directly on their instrumental values for colonial government. Abolition of the Zinder sultanate, for long the dominant polity of this region, gave these new orientations their most dramatic expression. Such measures invalidated the axioms from which chiefs, dynasties, and chiefdoms alike had derived their traditional security; but they also convinced many able officials of indifferent status, descent, and rank that under European rule they could aspire to the highest political positions.

Mechanics of Restoration

Musa's difficulties began with the announcement that he would move from Zango to Daura to rule the reunited residues of the ancient Hausa state. This meant that the Hausa court would move with Musa from Zango to Daura; but despite their recurrent prayers to Allah for this opportunity, several officials now felt disinclined to do so. The Sarkin Pawa Hayaki, his Sarkin Shanu, Samba'a, the Dan Kurege, and the descendants of Dan Sanwai's Magajin Kacakuri all demurred at the thought of migration. These families had put down roots in Zango and held important economic interests which they would lose by emigration. In addition, Hayaki and his kin had been roughly treated by Musa's predecessor and decided to take this chance of forfeiting their title. The Magaji Dankakulema and one or two other occupational officials also elected to remain at Zango. Having no alternative, Musa allowed those who wished to remain and set out for Daura accompanied by the great majority of the Zango officials.

During the negotiations that preceded Musa's return to Daura, Malam Bawa, Palmer's agent who was then administering the emirate, recommended Muhamman Na'inkali to Musa as an energetic and reliable assistant. Apparently, Bawa, who had already expressed an interest in becoming emir of Daura, wanted Musa to take Na'inkali into his confidence so that the latter could furnish reports which would allow him to engineer Musa's dismissal and thus, perhaps, to take charge of the chiefdom himself. Recognizing his debt to Bawa and his continuing need for the agent's good offices, Musa accordingly appointed Na'inkali to the new title of Magajin Gari, which Na'inkali had selected for himself, and put him in charge of Daura town in place of the Sarkin Bai, who was dispatched to Maigoribai. It is said that Bawa had asked Palmer to install him as chief shortly after he had been sent to replace Dan Kanyo as the *wakil* (deputy) in charge of Fulani Daura. However, it seems unlikely that Bawa would have been so inept, unless he was already convinced by Dikko's accession at Katsina that the British were eager to transfer chiefdoms to able and trusted men, whatever their status.

On moving into the palace at Daura, Musa discovered that several items of the regalia of the Fulani chiefship were missing. These included the flag which the Shehu dan Fodio had given to Malam Ishi'aku, the saddle that the sultans of Sokoto had given their emirs at Daura, three state swords reserved for chiefly ceremonial, and a number of muskets. Musa did not then discover the extent to which the state hoards of silver and clothing had been depleted by Na'inkali and the Sarkin Bai; but recognizing the political significance of the missing Fulani regalia, he asked his Turaki Muhamman Madi to locate it and to find out how it had been removed. Madi was successful in recovering the swords and saddle, which had been buried in the earth not far from the palace. He failed to find the Shehu's flag but learned that these other items had been removed from the palace *shamaki* by Musa's Sarkin Dogari Dan Bawo, the son of Tafida's Fada Babba, with the help of

Musa's Shamaki, a son of Musa Jinjiri. Musa accordingly dismissed both culprits and appointed his Sarkin Karma Alulu as Sarkin Dogari, an unusual promotion which shows how the traditional allocations of subordinate office were already beginning to change. As Shamaki, Musa then appointed a trusted slave who served as one of his closest confidential advisers.

There were at this time and for some years two sets of officials in Daura, those who had formerly served the Fulani emirs and those who had held office under Musa at Zango. Several officials in these two sets bore identical titles; and at Baure there was yet a third series of titles, some of which retained administrative functions, while others did not, and yet others had become vacant through the emigration of their holders to Magaria in Niger or to Muniya in Katsina. However, these *sarautun Baure* were sharply segregated from the two sets of *sarautun Daura,* the Hausa and the Fulani, and so were the problems that they presented. To complicate the picture, as an effect of the British pacification, many traditional offices had already lost their former functions, while others soon became redundant under the new schemes of territorial and fiscal organization that Musa instituted immediately on moving to Daura. We have seen that while the Fulani state had lacked many of the offices established at Zango, it contained a number that had no Zango equivalents. Where offices were not duplicated, the first issue was whether their holders would be recognized by the British administration or the new emir; a second was whether the holders of other titles which persisted while lacking administrative recognition and content would remain satisfied despite their loss of status, incomes, and function under the new regime.

The problems of integrating the two official staffs were most acute. Anticipating this, Palmer had ordered Musa to retain the senior nonroyal Fulani officials in their administrative posts until they died or committed some serious offense. In effect this meant that whenever duplication occurred, the holders of senior nonroyal Fulani titles had precedence over their Hausa peers. On the other hand, despite disestablishment of the Fulani dynasty, royal offices were not reserved entirely for the Hausa, since when such titles were duplicated, Musa had to retain the Fulani holders in office. However, Musa could replace Fulani officials of subordinate rank by Hausa who held identical titles, except that Fulani officials already recognized by the British could not be dismissed without British approval. Musa could thus supersede all Fulani titleholders whom the British had not recognized as officials of the Fulani state by Hausa who held identical or differing titles at Zango. He was also free to allocate unfamiliar functions as he pleased, and by this means he could partially compensate some traditional offices which had lost their former resources and duties. He could also create new titles for established offices, as in the case of Magajin Gari, and he could duplicate established titles, as the Fulani had duplicated the title of Ubandawaki. An early example of such duplication was the princely title of Magaji, whose first holder, Adamu, having lost his fiefs at Kurni, Rumji, and Bassar under the final

boundary settlement, resumed his original attachment to the Yerima as a *jekada,* while a second title of Magaji was created for Danduna, a son of Yerima Jirro, who supervised the market at Daura until a new Sarkin Pawa was appointed when Hayaki's continued absence demonstrated his determination to remain at Zango.

When the Hausa returned to Daura, Musa had two Kauras, the Fulani Dan Iyau and Hamidu; two Galadimas, Dan Kanyo's younger brother Lawal and Jangwale, who had served Tafida at Zango; two Limams, Maude of the Kuninkawa dynasty and Abu from Zango; two Alkalis, Ali, whom Waziri Dan Kanyo had appointed at Daura, and Ishaka from Zango; two Sarkin Bais, Dan Kanyo and Kilu from Zango; two Turakis, Bazai, the Fulani incumbent, who then lived in the palace, and Muhamman Madi, who shortly replaced him; two Fada Babbas, Labaran of the Alibawa Fulani and Mu'azu from Zango; but these were not the only duplicates. In such cases either Musa followed Palmer's instructions and retained the Fulani titleholders, such as the Limam, Alkali, and Fada Babba, in their previous offices, or he placed them in charge of the new districts, as was done with the Kaura Dan Iyau, the Galadima Lawal, the Haska Daguya, the Fulani Bunturawa Yakubu, and the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo.

Fulani titles that were vacant on Musa's move to Daura fell into desuetude and were replaced by their Zango equivalents. Thus the vacant offices of those slaves who had been dismissed for their part in Sogiji's appointment were filled by Musa's Sarkin Yara Kwanyami, his Garake Kola, his Tarno Mato, his new Shamaki, and others. The Fulani slave office of Ubandawaki, which had become vacant when Dundu was removed for his part in Sogiji's election, was never formally filled, but during the next few years this role passed to Ishi'aku, who had formerly served as the Ubandawakin Fatake under the Madugu of Zango and who increasingly won Musa's confidence and respect. Finally, when he perceived the political risks that he ran by leaving the capital under the undivided control of his Magajin Gari Na'inkali, Musa subdivided it into three equal areas, which he placed under his Jekafada Kyado, Ubandawaki Ishi'aku, and Turaki Muhamman Madi. In this way the title of Ubandawakin Fatake, to which Ishi'aku had originally been appointed, gradually and without formal conversion became the Ubandawakin Daura, or simply Ubandawaki, by losing its original qualification.

Musa did not dismiss from office those titleholders who chose to remain at Zango, even when he found it necessary to appoint someone else to their office, as was done, for example, in the case of the Sarkin Pawa. These absentee officials were allowed to retain their titles until they died, as were other superfluous officials such as the *lawanai* of the Hausa Kaura and Galadima. Nor did changes of occupation deprive these men of their titles. In some cases, Hausa officials who found themselves redundant sought their living in trade. Unless they had been formally dismissed by the chief—who alone had the authority to remove them from office—they retained their titles and were thus addressed. Likewise those titles which were not absorbed

in the new Native Administration (N.A.) and hence lost their former functions continued to persist so long as their holders lived or were replaced by new appointments. Only when no appointment was made over several years to a vacant title did it gradually lapse, and then only after a protracted vacancy or explicit sign by the chief that he did not intend to activate the office. When the holders of traditional titles that had lost their former functions were given new tasks, their personal status and the status of their offices were both affected by the nature of these tasks; but the relation was ambiguous and its effect obscure. In some cases the traditional office retained the new task permanently; in others the association of office and task was very short-lived; and in both their relation was highly conditional.

In the rapid and radical political changes of 1906-1907, official roles appeared impermanent and liable to abolition, subdivision, expansion, or combination as the obscure organizational interests of the British required. Even those traditional functions that survived intact were sometimes transferred from one title to another as political and other situational factors seemed to warrant. Thus, the traditional connections between an office and its administrative function became contingent and provisional, and for this reason, among others, no firm distinction was easily drawn between active and inactive offices on functional grounds.

In this fluid situation the connection between an officeholder and his official role was equally contingent and provisional. Since many offices which had lost their traditional roles were given different tasks under a more exacting supervision, many officeholders who proved unsuitable had to be replaced. In several cases these experiments ended in the imprisonment of officials for embezzlement or other actions of which the British disapproved; but unless the chief had appointed these individuals to the title and a specific set of administrative roles simultaneously, they frequently retained their titles on losing their functions, with or without imprisonment. Several cases that illustrate this distinction are mentioned below without comment, but perhaps one should be cited here to clarify the point.

When Musa instituted the new system of territorial districts, the former Galadima of Fulani Daura, Lawal, a slave, was put in charge of Rade, south of Daura city, while the Galadima Jangwale of Zango was directed to assist Musa's Dan Barau Ali, also of Zango, who was given charge of another district with headquarters at Danyawa. Since he could not simultaneously install both Galadimas as district heads without controverting the spirit of Palmer's directions, Musa put Jangwale to assist Dan Barau until the Galadima Lawal was removed. When Ali lost his new district headship, he still retained the title of Dan Barau, since it had not hitherto carried any territorial duties. Even before this, Musa had appointed Jangwale's Dan Bawo Baki to administer the Hausa half of Tambu, while leaving the Fulani Sa'is Aminde and Laminu successively in charge of the Bugaje segment. Since the Fulani state had lacked a DanBawo, without breaching Palmer's orders Musa could appoint his Dan Bawo Baki, Jangwale's younger brother, to

administer one half of Tambu. In a few months Musa had to dismiss Baki for tax embezzlement and other misconduct, but again the loss of this function did not affect his tenure of the Dan Bawo title. Baki only lost this title when he fled to join his brother Jangwale at Magaria some time later, thereby allowing a new Galadima, Abubakar, the son of Jinjiri, who had succeeded Lawal, to obtain the vacant office for his kinsman Jibo. From these and subsequent examples it will be clear that during the rapid and various political and administrative changes of 1906 to 1910, the traditionally stable associations of title, office, and role became unsettled and obscure, as did the conditions that regulated their tenure. In consequence, these indeterminate and shifting relations required skilful handling to avoid compounding inconsistencies which could compromise the continuity of its basic units, the offices, and throw the official structure into confusion. In avoiding these dangers, despite several blunders, Musa's administration was remarkably successful.

The Hausa Galadima Jangwale evidently felt that Musa wanted to diminish his status for personal reasons. He objected vigorously to his new role as Dan Barau's assistant at Danyawa, interpreting it in traditional terms as that of a *lawani* or subordinate *jekada.* It seems probable that Musa intended to appoint Jangwale to the district headship of Rade as soon as he could conveniently dismiss the slave Galadima Lawal on some charge that Palmer would approve; but Jangwale did not see that by assisting Dan Barau he was strengthening his claim to succeed Lawal when Musa could remove him. Preoccupied with traditional rankings, Jangwale refused to work under Dan Barau and demanded that Musa should put him in charge of the Danyawa District with Dan Barau as his assistant. For reasons already given, Musa could not do this. Jangwale then fled to join Nababa at Magaria, thus leaving Musa with Dan Kanyo's brother Lawal as his only Galadima. Shortly afterward Jangwale's brother, the Dan Bawo Baki, followed him to Magaria. Both fled within ten months of Musa's move to Daura, and neither returned.

Developments in the Districts

Under the final boundary settlement Musa's brother, the Yerima Musa Kudu, had lost his former fiefs to the French, who placed them under the ex-Shentali Hassan. Since Palmer had ruled that the Fulani Bunturawa, Haska, and Magajiya Murnai should retain their titles and be given districts, the only royal titles left for Musa's kin were those of Yerima, Murka, and Magaji. As these three princes would all lose the fiefs they had administered at Zango by moving to Daura, Musa and Palmer agreed to compensate them with some of the new districts. Without this, the Fulani princes whose rule had just been overthrown would enjoy as district heads a higher political status than their Hausa equivalents. Musa reserved Zango and its environs

for his son, the Murka Abdurrahman. His Yerima was put at Kwangwalam in charge of the narrow strip of territory containing ten settlements which lay just outside the northern limits of the former Fulani emirate. North of Kwangwalam lay the extensive district of Mai Aduwa with about thirty "towns," which Musa put under his slave, the Turaki Muhamman Madi. At this time Madi's duties included supervision of the caravan routes that passed through this area and the collection of the traditional caravan tolls, which had not yet been abolished. Between Kwangwalam and Mai Aduwa and the Katsina border lay a long, narrow district with its headquarters at Maigoribai, which Musa placed under the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo. Although most of the Maigoribai District lay outside the former limits of Fulani Daura, its southwestern sector included some old Fulani towns. Of the three adjoining districts, although Kwangwalam was by far the smallest, its head, the Yerima, held the highest rank. If political significance was measured by the size and importance of the territories they ruled, the Turaki outranked the Sarkin Bai and both the Yerima, thus reversing the traditional rank-order of these offices.

This situation had persisted for nearly two years when Musa learned that the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo had installed a new village head at Shengyel in the Maigoribai District without his permission. It appears that Dan Kanyo had pocketed all the *kudin sarauta* for this transaction. Throughout the preceding months, the Sarkin Bai had been seeking Musa's removal by secret reports relayed through Bawa to Palmer. Having his own designs on the chiefship, Malam Bawa at Katsina had used these reports to discredit Dan Kanyo while demonstrating his own reliability and impartiality. After Musa had learned of Dan Kanyo's subversive conduct, Na'inkali informed him of the appointment at Shengyel. Musa promptly reported the matter to Palmer, who was still at Katsina, and Palmer advised him to dismiss the Sarkin Bai. Either Musa or Palmer also banished Dan Kanyo to Katsina city, where Palmer could keep an eye on him; but after a while Dan Kanyo's activities at Katsina persuaded Palmer to move him farther west, where he would have less influence.

On learning that he would shortly be sent to Sokoto Province, Dan Kanyo wrote to Palmer requesting that his possessions at Daura should be assembled and sent on to him. He enumerated among his estate twenty slaves, twenty-three horses, thirty-five cows, ten pairs of *kwandaye* (silver anklets), thirty-seven boxes of robes, and 3,000,000 cowries in bundles *(keso)* of 20,000 each. Palmer sent a copy of the list to Musa for action; and Musa asked his Magajin Gari Na'inkali to investigate the matter. Na'inkali found that Dan Kanyo had not exaggerated his wealth but strenuously rejected Dan Kanyo's demand for its return. With a covering letter from Musa, Na'inkali rode to see Palmer at Katsina, determined to square accounts with his former master, the ex-Sarkin Bai. In Dan Kanyo's presence Na'inkali denounced him to Palmer as a thief who had looted the royal storehouse of treasure after Murnai's deposition, when the Sarkin Bai had charge of the

TABLE 13

The Gunduma (District Organization) of 1906-1907 and Its Development in Musa's Reign

Districts, 1906	1st DH's title	Name	Status	Developments to 1911	Situation in 1911
1. Daura	Magajin Gari	Na'inkale	Fulani throne slave	Promoted Waziri. Then imprisoned 1907-1908. Replaced by S. Yara Kwanyami, who fled in 1910-1911	Extant, little boundary change
2. Zango	Murka	Abdur-rahman	Hausa prince, M. Musa's son	Placed at Sandamu, 1910, then promoted Waziri at Daura, 1910-1911. Replaced at Zango by Turaki Madi for 3 months—then by Shentali Sinsilla	Extant, little boundary change
3. Baure	Sarkin Gabas	Lasan	Hausa commoner	Fled 1908. Replaced at Baure by Hausa Kaura Hamidu	Extant, little boundary change
4. Yanduna	Sarkin Yara	Kwany-ami	Hausa throne slave	Transferred to Daura, 1907-1908. Replaced by Marusa Lasan, formerly S. Gabas at Baure, on his return from Niger	Extant, little boundary change
5. Sandamu	Sarkin Fulani	Murnai	Last Fulani emir of Daura, deposed 1906, formerly Magajiya	Died 1910. Replaced for 2 months by Murka Abdurrahman, next by S. Fulani Danladi (later Kaura). District expanded by absorption of Kwassarawa	Extant, expanded
6. Kwassar-awa	Kaura	Dan Iyau	Fulani throne slave	Died 1910. Title transferred to the Hausa Kaura Hamidu, and district abolished, incorporated in Sandamu	Abolished
7. Rade	Galadima	Lawal	Fulani throne slave	Replaced 1911 by Hausa Galadima Abubakar for 2 months, then by Galadima Ibrahim. District expanded by absorption of Rijiyar Tsamiya and Tsukanawa, 1909-1910	Extant, expanded

TABLE 13 (Continued)

Districts, 1906	1st DH's title	Name	Status	Developments to 1911	Situation in 1911
8. Danyawa	Dan Barau	Musa	Hausa commoner	District abolished and absorbed in Mai Aduwa on Dan Barau's death, c. 1909	Abolished
9. Mai Aduwa	Turaki	Madi	Hausa throne slave, brother of S. Yara Kwanyami	Promoted to Zango, 1910. Fled 3 months later. Replaced at Mai Aduwa by Yerima Musa. District expanded by absorption of Kwangwalam and Maigoribai.	Extant
10. Kwan-walam	Yerima	Musa Kuda	Hausa prince	District abolished and incorporated in Mai Aduwa, 1910, on Yerima's transfer	Abolished
11. Tsukan-awa	Haska	Daguya	Fulani prince	Died 1910. District abolished and incorporated in Rade	Abolished
12. Maigor-ibai	Sarkin Bai	Dan Kanyo	Hausa throne slave	Exiled in 1907. District abolished and incorporated in Mai Aduwa	Abolished
13. Rijiyar Tsamiya	Bunturawa	Yakubu	Fulani prince	Died 1909-1910. District abolished and incorporated in Rade	Abolished

palace, the capital, and the state. Na'inkali said nothing of the depredations which had preceded Murnai's election as chief, nor did he reveal his role in that affair. Palmer accordingly remained ignorant of the early collaboration among Dan Kanyo and Na'inkali and his trusted adviser, Malam Bawa. If Dan Kanyo attempted to incriminate his accuser and Bawa in his own defense, he evidently failed, for he received nothing from his former estate when he moved to Sokoto Province shortly after.

Dan Kanyo's demand for his former estate is of more than passing interest, since it suggests that chiefs had already lost their traditional powers to confiscate the property of dismissed officials. Though Dan Kanyo finally received none of the wealth he had claimed, he lost this neither because he was a throne slave nor because he had been dismissed from office, but because he was accused of having stolen these articles from the throne in the first place. Thus, in retaining Dan Kanyo's possessions, the throne was simply recovering property it had lost by theft. By contrast, under the ancient regime, both as a throne slave and as a dismissed official, Dan Kanyo would have lost all he possessed on forfeiting his office. When giving Dan Kanyo's daughter Maiye to Sogiji against her father's wish, Mai Gurdo had commented that the Sarkin Bai was merely a slave whose possessions and family belonged to the throne. This nicely illustrates the traditional relation; but under the British, the emirs had lost their traditional rights to all or part of the property of their officials, free or slave, whether these died in office or were dismissed. This was merely one of a number of interconnected changes by which the traditional regime was progressively transformed into a bureaucratically qualified government charged with an increasingly diverse and continuous set of specific administrative functions.

Dan Kanyo's dismissal enabled Palmer and Musa to abolish the awkward Maigoribai District by amalgamating it with its neighbors. In Daura, as elsewhere, the British had established the new form of territorial organization with a larger number of districts than was needed for efficient administration in order to reduce the resistance of emirs and traditional officials to the system. The greater the number of district headships at an emir's disposal, the smaller the number of high-ranking personnel who would fail to receive a district. But, as these initial appointments were terminated by dismissal or death, the British sought to reduce the number of the original districts while increasing their size by amalgamating them with other units, with or without subdivision. In this way they first instituted the new system of district administration and then increased the average size of the districts to increase their economy and efficiency. At Daura the dismissal of Sarkin Bai allowed this process of modification to proceed in the area of Maigoribai.

Musa was also keen to abolish Maigoribai, as he wished to increase the area under his brother, the Yerima, in order to eliminate those anomalous inversions of rank and administrative importance exhibited by the Yerima and Turaki titles. At Musa's request Palmer sent one of his administrative aides to survey the districts north of Daura town, including Danyawa District under Dan Barau, which lay due west of Daura. This survey was also de-

signed to provide an accurate map of the area so that Musa and Palmer could assess its present and optimal administrative arrangements with reasonable confidence. At that time Musa planned to transfer the Maigoribai and Danyawa districts to the Yerima to give him a unit at least as large as that under the Turaki Madi's control. He began by withdrawing Dan Barau Ali from Danyawa and attached this and Maigoribai to Kwangwalam, where his brother Musa lived. As the survey proceeded to Mai Aduwa, the Turaki Madi became convinced that Musa intended to reduce his district by transferring some of its southern towns to the Yerima at Kwangwalam. Muhamman Madi was also at that time in some difficulty with the caravan tolls *(kudin fito)*, which his clerk, Malam Danko, is said to have mishandled. Whether the Turaki imagined that the district reorganization then under way was designed to punish him for his failure to keep a proper check on the caravan tolls, we cannot say; but he clearly resented the possibility of losing part of his district to the Yerima next door. Gathering together his family and liquid wealth, Madi fled north into French territory. This gave Musa and Palmer the chance to amalgamate the entire area north and west of Daura town into a single district, which was placed under the Yerima, who then moved from Kwangwalam to Mai Aduwa. Reconstituted in this form, the Mai Aduwa District was second only to Baure in size among all the divisions of Daura, and its boundaries remained unaltered until my visit in 1959.

The Turaki's elder brother, Musa's trusted administrator, the Sarkin Yara Kwanyami, was then in charge of Yanduna District. Through Kwanyami, Madi learned that Musa had no designs on his former district and that the emir was surprised and distressed at his flight. Through Kwanyami, Madi excused his flight to Musa on the ground that he had feared he would be punished for the caravan tolls which his clerk had purloined. Musa, who was then having considerable difficulty with Na'inkali, asked Kwanyami to persuade Madi to return. The Turaki was only too glad to do so, and for the next year or two he lived inside the palace and administered a third of the city, which was then partitioned between the Turaki, the Jekafada Kyade, and Ubandawaki Ishaku.

Shortly after moving from Zango to Daura, Musa had directed the Kusheka Dan Ciroma and the Galadiman Yelwa to withdraw their supporters from Baure. Since the final boundary settlement of 1906-1907 transferred Kurni and Yelwa, from which the Kusheka and Galadima had come, to the French, Musa was obliged to send these village chiefs and their families to Niger. This depleted his garrison at Baure of most of its men and left the Sarkin Gabas Lasan of Mai Aduwa in sole command. Thereafter the Sarkin Gabas Lasan, who remained responsible for local peace and order but had no hand in the administration of Baure, became increasingly disturbed by his isolation. As a temporary measure Musa had placed the local administration in the hands of the remaining Baure officials, but he now directed the Sarkin Gabas to supervise them, even though, as a village head, Lasan lacked both the rank and adequate knowledge of traditional and British administrative practice and was probably illiterate. In this situation the Sarkin Gabas

felt increasingly vulnerable to investigations by the British, to subversive intrigues, and to attacks from the Baure folk. Perceiving his fears, the Baure officials proceeded to play upon them with tales of what the British would do to him when they finally came to investigate the affairs of Baure. These lurid fantasies finally unsettled Lasan, who decamped to French territory in 1909, although he had committed no offense as far as we know. Musa then sent the Kaura Hamidu to take charge of Baure.

Having succeeded Salihu as Kaura at Zango after the integration of Zango and Daura, where the Fulani Dan Iyau was Kaura, Hamidu had resumed his former title of Dan Kwaba, although he was still publicly addressed by Zango people as "Kaura." Musa instructed Hamidu to take with him to Baure all the traditional *lawanai* of the Zango Kauras—the Sarkin Masu, the Gilu, the Dan Takora, the Sarka, the Sarkin Dawaki, the Madaba, and others. He directed Hamidu to administer Baure entirely through this immigrant staff and to exclude all Baure officials from any administrative roles above the level of village head. Thus, having first broken the Kaura Salihu's power and relieved the chiefship of that menace, Musa could employ the elaborate organization which Bakula and his successors had developed to administer the remoter third of his chiefdom, while ruling the remainder himself. This initiated another phase in the historic political relations between the Hausa chiefs and their Kauras. Under Hamidu's exclusive administration the native officials of Baure lost their resources and power. Several duly moved north to join Nababa at Magaria, while those who remained behind held empty titles that withered and lapsed on their deaths.

Musa and Na'inkali

By 1907 the British Administration of Northern Nigeria had developed a model of local government which they found especially appropriate to the emirates on Islamic and administrative grounds alike. Governor Girouard's report for that year described this system as already in operation.

> The main underlying policy in the government of Northern Nigeria has been that of governing through the native rulers, under the guidance of British Residents.... The rule in the Mohammedan States is based on a real system of Government by an Emir and Council, the usual office holders being:—(1) the Waziri or Vizier—the general business man of the Emir. (2) The Ma'aji or Treasurer. Accounts are kept more or less accurately. (3) The Alkali or Chief Justice. The results of this office can be seen from the Judicial Returns.
>
> Several other offices have become obsolete, such as the Serkin Bai or Master of Slaves, the Serkin Yaki or Commander-in-Chief, etc. There also existed a large number of redundant offices which we have gradually sought to abolish.[12]

At Daura the vizierate had been introduced when the last Fulani emir, Murnai, promoted Dan Kanyo from the office of Sarkin Bai. When Murnai was deposed, Dan Kanyo ceased to be vizier and the position became vacant.

On Musa's arrival in Daura, tentative steps were taken to separate the office of treasurer from that of the palace storekeeper with the introduction of the new title of Mutawalli, which was made responsible for receiving court fees, fines, and handling the state finances. As the first Mutawalli of Daura Musa had appointed Abubakar, the son of Jinjiri, a former Galadima of Zango. At that time the Fulani Alkali Ali, the elder brother of Fada Babba Labaran, presided over the emirate's only formally constituted court.

When Musa had been a year at Daura, the Alibawa Fada Babba Labaran died, and the office fell vacant. The Magajin Gari Na'inkali, who then administered Daura city, asked Musa to make him Fada Babba. Since no individual is allowed to hold two titles simultaneously under Daura political practice, on his appointment as Fada Babba, Na'inkali ceased to be Magajin Gari. However, he still retained control of the capital and as Fada Babba was now in charge of the police. It was in this capacity that Na'inkali visited Katsina and charged Sarkin Bai with theft of throne property.

Following his successful defense of Musa's rights to retain Dan Kanyo's estate, Na'inkali asked Musa to make him Waziri. After Na'inkali's recent demonstration of "loyalty" Musa may have felt that it would be churlish to refuse. He accordingly promoted Na'inkali from the office of Fada Babba to that of Waziri, as he had earlier promoted him from the office of Magajin Gari, on each occasion at Na'inkali's request and presumably for appropriate gifts.

As a malam, Musa's conception of the vizierate was based on Islamic histories and political writings, but these guides were not appropriate to the type of vizierate which the British administration wished to institute and develop. As the emir's "general man of business," the vizier (Waziri) had executive responsibility and control for all routine administrative activities within the chiefdom and handled most of its correspondence with the British provincial staff. Until such time as Native Treasuries were properly developed, the Waziri also acted as treasurer and had responsibility for population returns and public records, the police, the capital, public works, and so on. This was the position Dan Kanyo had held and Na'inkali desired. As his senior central executive, the Waziri was also the chief's main councillor and channel of communication with district heads as well as with the British administration; and having effective control of the capital, the state revenues, and the police, Na'inkali held the fate of the emir as well as the chiefdom's affairs in his hands. Finally, despite the fact that Palmer's assistant, Malam Bawa, now looked forward to Malam Musa's fall and his own appointment as emir, Na'inkali's power was no less firmly based than that of Dan Kanyo a few years before. Shortly after Na'inkali's promotion, the ex-emir, Magajiya Murnai, fled to avoid imprisonment on a charge of tax embezzlement. Na'inkali then undertook to administer the district of Sandamu through Abubakar (Danladi), a former messenger whom Musa appointed as Sarkin Fulani under Na'inkali's direct supervision. Thus, besides ruling the capital, Na'inkali acquired indirect control of an equally

valuable and strategic district, which by this absentee administration once more reverted to the status of a fief.

At this stage of his career, when his power was near its height, Na'inkali began to indulge in systematic appropriation and thefts inside the capital and elsewhere. Whether this was merely a regression to the traditional patterns of displaying power by its tyrannical use or whether it was simply an expression of Na'inkali's personal character, we cannot say. However, it is possible that by these deliberate and repeated appropriations Na'inkali hoped simultaneously to publicize and increase his power, to enrich himself, to inculcate fear, to incriminate Musa, and to provoke him to some rash act. Besides removing the property of private individuals, Na'inkali also appropriated certain property that belonged to the throne. Presumably Mai Gurdo, Dan Kanyo, and the Kauras Bakula and Salihu of Zango provided his prototypes. The articles his henchmen appropriated were disposed of in the markets of Katsina, Kazaure, Kano, Zinder, and Maradi through his confidant, the commission agent Nakofa. These depredations were carried out by young men, some free and some slave, who had been habituated to brigandage under Mai Gurdo and now gravitated to Na'inkali. By recruiting these wastrels *(yan iska),* the new Waziri built up a sufficiently large gang of toughs and bullyboys to overawe the general public. Being in charge simultaneously of the state police and prisons, which had been moved outside the palace, Na'inkali had no difficulty in coordinating his police activities with the operations of his brigands.

By the middle of 1908 Na'inkali's conduct had become common talk; and Musa's complaisance, a public scandal. Suspicions that Na'inkali's depredations were made at the emir's behest or with his connivance circulated. From rumors afloat in Katsina, the British suspected that all was not well at Daura, but lacking precise information, they were unable to act. Confined to the palace, as is usual for emirs, and obliged to rely on the reports of his Waziri and chief councillor, Musa was perhaps no better informed about the actual state of affairs in the capital. One of his brothers, also called Musa, first brought the matter to his notice; and when no action was taken, this prince, suspecting Musa's connivance, let Musa know that he and several officials and members of the royal family intended to withdraw from Daura to Kazaure unless Musa stopped Na'inkali's abuses. Musa was thus forced to act without having firm evidence. He at once reported the matter to Richmond Palmer at Katsina; and, probably at Malam Bawa's request, Palmer sent him to investigate and *"shirya"* (reconcile) the emir and his Waziri. Na'inkali denied the charges and exculpated himself, while Musa refrained from revealing the names of his informants and failed to provide conclusive evidence. Bawa accepted Na'inkali's statement and overruled Musa's objections. In reporting his findings to Palmer, Bawa also relayed a demand from Na'inkali that the emir should be required to dismiss twenty-two members of his official and personal staff whom Na'inkali charged with making these malicious accusations. Of these twenty-two persons, I can identify only fif-

teen. These include the Sarkin Dawaki Jinjiri; the Dan Maza Tilada; the Sarkin Dogari Alulu, who had succeeded Dan Bawo; the three Jekafadas, Kyado, Farefare, and Nakowa; the Shamaki; the Jarmai Kunne; the Sarkin Garka, the Fada Babba Mu'azu, whom Musa had reappointed to replace Labaran on Na'inkali's promotion as Waziri; Altine; Iyaye; Dan Magaria; Dan Daga, a prince and confidant of Musa's; Kalali; and a certain Malam Sule.

Recognizing that the situation was serious, Palmer summoned Musa and Na'inkali to meet him at Yanduna. There, lacking firm evidence, Musa was again humiliated and obliged to concede Na'inkali's demands at a peacemaking session in Palmer's presence. My informants, who included Musa's son, the ex-Waziri Alhassan, explained his acquiescence by his personal gratitude to Palmer for restoring the Hausa to Daura and reuniting the kingdom. They argued that although he objected to dismissing these twenty-two individuals, Musa agreed to do so on Palmer's insistence in order to avoid embarrassing them both before Na'inkali and Malam Bawa. However, it is more realistic to suppose that Musa conceded Na'inkali's unprecedented demands because he feared that he would lose his throne and thus forfeit finally the Hausa restoration if he opposed them obstinately. Whether Musa feared dismissal because he thought Na'inkali might implicate him in the recent scandals, or because Malam Bawa could reveal the means by which he had secured the Fulani throne, or because he feared that Palmer would regard him as obstructive and devious, we cannot say. Probably he decided to submit in order to retain the throne and so gain time for a second encounter; but it is also likely that both Bawa and Na'inkali knew that Musa would have to agree to almost any demand they made in that context, given his situation, and that they accordingly organized this "peacemaking" conference to employ Palmer as a lever to break Musa's resistance and power.

On returning from Yanduna, Musa dismissed the twenty-two men Na'inkali had proscribed. All twenty-two were required to leave the capital, and several left the chiefdom also. This exodus, which publicized Na'inkali's victory and Musa's weakness, further discredited the chief by suggesting that these dismissals were Na'inkali's price for silence about Musa's role in the recent villainies. Memories of the Kauras Mazawaje and Bakula disturbed the town. Na'inkali now pursued his former practices even more openly, since he thought that he had scattered his enemies and held the chief as well as the public in fear; but this new tide of depredations quickly convinced many that Musa had no part in their oppression. For a second time Musa's brother and namesake, who had first complained against Na'inkali, protested and threatened to leave for Kazaure if Musa did not dismiss his Waziri. The Jekafada Kyado having been dismissed, Musa subdivided the city into two equal halves, which he placed under his Turaki Madi, who still lived in the palace, and the former Ubandawakin Fatake Ishi'aku, instructing them secretly to investigate and report the misdeeds of Na'inkali or his followers.

At this point Musa's drummers and court musicians, acting independently, began to parade about the town in the early morning, before the dawn prayers *(asubahi),* when the people were still inside their compounds, singing satirical songs they had composed to honor Na'inkali and his thefts. As *maroka* (praise-singers) the musicians thus exercised their privilege or license as public spokesmen;[13] but they also relied on the power of their patron to protect them. These taunting songs, rich in innuendo and insinuation, soon became popular hits and hurt Na'inkali where he was most vulnerable. For some weeks he bore this mounting tide of ridicule and contempt without finding a suitable answer. Musa, who could hear these songs, was also uneasy, foreseeing that he was likely to be held responsible and accused of slandering the vizier.

The situation was duly reported to Palmer, and Malam Bawa returned to Daura once again to "reconcile" the emir and Waziri. Once again Musa's statements were overruled, and Bawa gave Na'inkali a clean bill of health. By way of reconciliation he required that Musa should apologize to his Waziri. But bearing his brother's threats in mind, Musa decided to visit Palmer himself and to request a private audience with him in order to make his complaints. Palmer was then at Yanduna. His agent, Bawa, learning of Musa's decision, hurried ahead to tell his tale first and so prepare Palmer suitably for Musa's visit. It was essential for Bawa that Musa should not have the chance to see Palmer alone. At Yanduna Palmer and Bawa once more obliged Musa to agree to retain his Waziri Na'inkali despite all that had passed; but when Na'inkali arrived, he demanded that Musa should dismiss his five musicians, the Sarkin Busa, Yeriman Busa, Sarkin Makada, Yeriman Makada, and Sankira, for mocking and slandering his name with their recent compositions. Since Musa denied responsibility for these musical assaults, he could not effectively oppose Na'inkali's demand that he dismiss the praise-singers for slander and *renon sarauta* (contempt of office). He was therefore again constrained to submit to Na'inkali's demands on Palmer's recommendation.

Musa had thus far failed to see Palmer privately, but with this aim in mind, he persuaded Palmer to return with him to Daura, where he hoped to arrange a private discussion. On their way back Palmer and Musa were riding ahead, followed by Bawa and Na'inkali, when Musa recognized one of his horses in the possession of a passerby and stopped the man to find out how he had got it. As the troop halted, Bawa and Na'inkali drew abreast of Palmer and Musa. The horseman informed Musa that he had bought the beast from the commission agent Nakofa at the Kusada market in Katsina emirate. On further inquiry he revealed that Nakofa had sold the beast for Na'inkali, the Wazirin Daura. Musa turned to Palmer, who had heard the conversation, and the horseman was obliged to repeat his story in full. Malam Bawa, who was riding at Palmer's side, perceived that Na'inkali was doomed and to protect himself began to comment on the deviousness *(munafunci)* of his friend, the Waziri. Palmer quickly realized that Musa's allega-

tions probably contained a good deal of substance and that they could easily be checked by questioning Nakofa, the broker. Na'inkali also perceived that the game was up; and before the company reached Daura he had fled to Katsina, where he was captured, charged, tried, and sent to jail for fourteen years on various charges, including robbery.

Having given thanks to Allah for this narrow escape, Musa summoned his Sarkin Yara Kwanyami from Yanduna and installed him as Waziri in charge of the capital and all Na'inkali's former functions, except that Sandamu once more ceased to be a fief and was administered by its resident head, like other districts. To replace Kwanyami at Yanduna, Musa appointed the former Sarkin Gabas Lasan, who had returned from Niger to Daura, to the Katsina title of Marusa, which Lasan requested with his new appointment. To replace Danladi, who had governed Sandamu as Na'inkali's subordinate, Musa sent his son, the Murka Abdurrahman, who had formerly ruled over Zango. To replace Abdurrahman at Zango he selected the Turaki Madi, Kwanyami's brother. At about this time Dan Kanyo's brother, the Galadima Lawal, was dismissed for embezzling tax, and his district at Rade was given to the former Mutawalli Abubakar (Garba), who as a member of the traditional Hausa lineage of Galadimas was also given the title.

When the Fulani Kaura Dan Iyau died shortly afterward, his district and title passed to his eldest son, Murnai, who rapidly fell into disgrace over missing money, following which the Kwassarawa District was abolished and absorbed into Sandamu, Hamidu at Baure was formally reappointed as Kauran Daura, and the Kwassarawa lineage of Daura Fulani lost all future rights to the office.

Within a few months the Haska Daguya, who administered a small district at Tsukanawa, and the Magajiya Murnai's son, Bunturawa Yakubu, both died in office; their districts were abolished by amalgamation with Rade under the Galadima Abubakar. Thus, by 1910 the thirteen districts of Daura had been reduced to seven.

During the months that followed Na'inkali's flight, many of the twenty-two retainers and officials whom Musa had dismissed under pressure from Na'inkali, Bawa, and Palmer returned to Daura to their kin, their homes, and friends. When Musa's Sarkin Dawaki, Jinjiri, went to Kagare, he restored his slave and friend Shamaki to that office. His kinsman Dan Daga rejoined his informal council, which then included Dan Daga and Limbiya, two princes descended from Lukudi; the Jarmai Kurnai, who also returned; the Shamaki; and the Shentali Baru, who had replaced Alhassan on the latter's move to Dawambai in French territory. Since the drummers and musicians were necessary for court organization and ceremonial, Musa took back the *kayan sarauta* from the musicians he had had to dismiss and appointed others to replace them. But although Musa housed and supported them within or outside the palace, he did not reinstate the Sarkin Garka, Fada Babba, Dan Maza, and Jekafadas on their return, nor did he require their holders to return the *kayan sarauta* they had received on appointment. By thus refusing

to accept the horses and other gear with which these officials had been equipped, Musa publicly indicated that they had been illegitimately dismissed under duress and despite his desire to retain them. At the same time and by the same procedure, Musa indicated that there would be no further appointments to these offices, which accordingly lapsed, having become redundant under the changed conditions of 1910. Following the removal of Na'inkali and the Fada Babba Mu'azu, Musa now created a new title of Sarkin Doka (Chief of Law [Enforcement]) to replace the ancient title of Fada Babba, through which the Fulani emirs had administered the prisons and police. As Sarkin Doka, he appointed the former Sarkin Dogarai Alulu, who had also returned to Daura after Na'inkali's flight. By this act Musa terminated the traditional titles of Fada Babba and Sarkin Dogarai and gave Alulu a new title and office which the provincial administration formally recognized.

Presumably, by demanding that Musa should dismiss his trusted courtiers, slaves, and kinsmen, Na'inkali had hoped to force him into a stubborn refusal, which would allow him to discredit Musa with Palmer and to secure his deposition. Evidently Musa perceived this; and by sacrificing his closest aides, he saved his throne, and perhaps the emirate also, for his dynasty. Musa may well have resisted these demands had they been made by some other British officer, but he was not emotionally free to oppose Palmer, to whom he owed so much; and undoubtedly his meekness saved him. When Palmer finally collected the evidence on Na'inkali's depredations, Musa's loyalty and forbearance were established beyond any doubt. The turmoils of the Hausa restoration were almost over; its major crises were past.

The Turaki Madi had, however, misinterpreted Musa's solicitude and forbearance for him as evidence of his own indispensability and his power. He had also witnessed Na'inkali's swift rise to power and Musa's recent perils. He nourished ambitions to succeed where Na'inkali had failed. Within three months of Madi's appointment as district head of Zango, Musa received reports from the people of Gurdo that the Turaki had made them pay double the tax officially required of them. Musa summoned the Turaki to Daura to discuss the matter. During their interview the Turaki seems to have lost his self-control and proceeded to pour scorn on Musa, daring him to do as he wished and asserting that Musa was only chief through his support. Musa perceived that the Turaki regarded himself as a second Dikko, and having a ready-made opportunity, he decided to forestall further trouble by dismissing him at once. The Turaki was placed under house arrest in Daura, and Musa sent the Tarno Mato to Zango as deputy *(wakil)* on the understanding that he would appoint Mato to govern Zango if Palmer, who was still at Katsina, approved Madi's dismissal. Although Tarno was told to keep this information private, he failed to do so. Musa therefore replaced him by the Shentali Tsuntsu. Meanwhile the Turaki decided to flee once more and sent messages to his brother, the Waziri Kwanyami, urging Kwanyami to join him and quit Daura at once. Shortly after Madi fled, Kwanyami followed suit,

going first to Kanda in Kano and then north to Maradi. Musa imposed a curfew on the capital until the crisis had passed and summoned his son, the Murka Abdurrahman, from Sandamu to take over the Waziri's office. A new Turaki, Adamu, had been quickly appointed to signify that Madi would not be restored, should he seek to return; and when Adamu was reappointed as Sarkin Fulanin Sandamu to fill the vacancy created by Abdurrahman's promotion to the vizierate, Musa appointed another Turaki, Jibji, to administer half the capital, an office that he filled for the next twenty years.

Shortly after these events in November 1910, H. R. Palmer was promoted and transferred from Katsina to act as resident at Kano. Following his departure a succession of transient officials handled Daura's affairs from the Provincial Headquarters in Katsina. But before Palmer moved to Kano, he had instituted the first modern Native Treasury in Northern Nigeria at Katsina. At Daura he had arranged that the Mutawalli Dahiru, the son of Limam Abu, who had been Magatakarda, would prepare accounts of the emirate's revenues that separated tax receipts, judicial and other local incomes, and that the district heads and some senior members of the central staff would be placed on monthly salaries. The emir was likewise given a regular salary and an establishment allowance for the support of his office, from which he paid the Waziri as his personal agent in charge of routine affairs. Thus, when Palmer left Katsina for Kano, the emir's private and public purse, his private and public roles, and his authority and responsibilities had been clearly distinguished; and the basis for an increasingly "rational" bureaucratic administration had been laid. Under Palmer's guidance Daura had made important political and administrative advances following the Hausa restoration and reunification. Despite much misunderstanding, some weakness, and several trying incidents, the experiment had been carried forward with success, largely because of Musa's integrity and confidence in Palmer's good faith and Palmer's outstanding energy and concern.

Shortly after Palmer left Katsina for Kano, Musa died, having reigned for seven years by our reckoning or seven years and five months by the Islamic calendar; the last five years of his reign were at Daura.

ABDURRAHMAN (1911-1966)

Early Administration

On Musa's death, the senior elector, Kaura Hamidu, came from Baure to Daura and summoned the Galadima Abubakar, the Shentali Tsuntsu, the Marusa Lasan, the Sarkin Fulani Adamu, and Dan Sanwai Muhamman. When they had discussed the succession, the Kaura sent to call the Limam and the Fulani Alkali Aliyu and awaited the arrival of Mr. Holness, an administrative officer from Katsina. Holness took the opinions of these councillors privately, consulting each in turn in order of rank. Presumably

he adopted this unusual procedure to ensure that no single elector dominated the council's decision, but in consequence all were ignorant of one another's choices. Only Holness could know what each had said to him. Having concluded these interviews, he informed his superiors and sought the government's approval for the succession of the Waziri Abdurrahman, Musa's eldest son. Holness then withdrew to Divisional Headquarters at Katsina to await the government's reply, leaving the Dan Sanwai Muhamman nominally in charge of Daura as Hausa tradition prescribed, while the Waziri Abdurrahman continued to administer the chiefdom's affairs. After a brief delay, news arrived that the government had approved Abdurrahman's election, and the new chief was duly installed.

Abdurrahman was twenty-three years old on his succession in 1911. As Murka he had been in charge first of Zango town and more recently of the Sandamu District. Following this he had served as vizier long enough to understand British procedures and the central administration. In brief, he combined the youth and the experience which the country then required in its chief. But few who witnessed his ceremonial installation could have foreseen that Abdurrahman would rule Daura for half a century.

Abdurrahman's long reign from 1911 until 1966 provided Daura with its first long period of peace since the jihad of 1805, and its very uneventfulness is perhaps the most revealing expression of the chiefdom's stability throughout this period. Abdurrahman succeeded his father without a hitch, partly because the British were determined to eliminate opportunities for intrigue, partly because he was so clearly the outstanding candidate; and throughout his reign, unlike Tafida and Musa, he was never in serious danger of losing his throne to any rivals, princely or other, his father having eliminated the latter one by one. With the fall of the Turaki Madi, the long series of overpowerful and overambitious officials came to an end; and the Kauras Tamila, Mazawaje, Bakula, and Salihu, the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo, and the Waziri Muhamman Na'inkali ceased to provide ambitious men with appropriate models of political conduct. A new order had taken shape after numerous false starts, alarms, and diversions. The old Hausa state with its oligarchic government had been integrated with the patrimonial autocracy of Fulani Daura, and having survived severe threats to its integrity, the chiefship could now provide an appropriate constitutional base for a new patrimonial regime in which bureaucratic elements would increase steadily. Popular consensus was taken for granted, and having blundered in that way already, the British did not intend to consult the people's wishes; but their assumption that the commoners most desired peace, stability, good order, and relief from oppression was undoubtedly sound. Insofar as the new regime secured these values, it increasingly attracted the people's allegiance on instrumental grounds as well as sentiment and tradition.

Having vacated the vizierate on his succession, Abdurrahman decided to confer it on the Galadima Abubakar, the district head of Rade, whose previous experience as Mutawalli made him the most suitable person to handle

the new accounting procedures introduced by the British. To succeed Abubakar as Galadima, Abdurrahman then appointed Ibrahim, the son of the former Galadiman Baure Muhamman, who was sent to Rade as district head. Shortly after this the Sarkin Fulani was replaced at Sandamu by his predecessor, Danladi, who had married one of Abdurrahman's sisters.

In 1911 the earliest assessment reports I have traced at Daura were made by two British officers in Rade and Mai Aduwa. At Mai Aduwa the average incidence of taxation was then 3s.6d. per adult male; at Rade, 3s.11½d. In addition weavers, tailors, tanners, butchers, blacksmiths, barbers, and other craftsmen were still liable to what were called *al'adu,* or "customary" taxes. The government received 50 percent of the land tax; the emir, 25 percent; the district head, 15 percent, and the village head, who was immediately responsible for its collection, 10 percent. In 1911 and 1912 the emirate was assessed for a total tax income of £2,430 11s. on an average rate of 3s.6d. per adult taxpayer.[14] Although the British had officially replaced *zakka* and other traditional prestations by a single annual tax, district heads still collected some of these discontinued imposts as late as 1920, together with the standard tax.

The nature of this annual tax was further obscured by its differing modes of derivation and distribution. To assess the taxable capacity of rural communities, the Divisional officers estimated the values of the average annual outputs of farms of different types in representative communities of the districts selected for survey. They then estimated the gross annual agricultural income of these units by multiplying these figures by the number of farms of various types within the areas under assessment. The total agricultural income of the district was then subdivided by the number of able-bodied adult males registered as taxpayers, and the average per caput was was calculated as 10 percent of the average agricultural income, this being equivalent to the Muslim tithe. Thus, although the units of assessment were farms, the units of payment were individual men, and the average incidence of tax was calculated by divisional officers on a per caput basis. Separate calculations were made for the *al'adu* (occupational) taxes, *jangali,* and the like. In explaining the basis of their assessments to the emir and his district heads, Miller-Stirling and Liddard pointed out how much revenue could be expected on current population returns if the tax averaged 3s.6d. per adult male. They then left the district and village heads to regulate the actual incidence of individual assessments according to known differences of wealth. Apparently this was not seriously attempted, and the average rate was levied generally, irrespective of individual differences of wealth. One effect of this relatively heavy rate, which approximated 10 percent of the annual average farm income and, as administered, fell indifferently on poor and rich, was to stimulate considerable emigration from the emirate to Kano and Gumel, where the Daura peasants appropriately named their new villages *Uku-dasisi* (Three-Shillings-and-Sixpence).

To what degree the district heads' demand for traditional prestations contributed to this emigration, we cannot guess; but when district heads were

placed on regular salaries, their relations to their districts, the emir, and their British supervisors underwent important changes which several failed to perceive. The old notion of office *(sarauta)* with its indeterminate *iko* over a given sphere of activity, population, or territory was no longer appropriate. Under increasingly bureaucratic administrative procedures, district chiefs, who saw themselves as *rukunai,* were now required to conduct their administrations within the framework of impersonal rules and to live on their salaries or other legitimate incomes. Whereas they had formerly been lords, subject only to the orders of their superiors and the intrigues of their peers, they now had to conduct themselves like civil servants and officials; to divest themselves of arbitrary personal power; and, in administering the affairs of their districts, to act within their capacities and proscriptions, solely as representatives of the emir and his Native Administration.

Several district heads failed to make this transition successfully. The salaries that replaced their shares of district tax were generally lower than the amounts they had formerly received; and since district heads were prohibited from levying *zakka* and corvée under the new regime, they were sorely tempted to supplement their legitimate income by excessive tax collection, by concealing part of the population from which they collected tax, by understating the sums they had gathered, by appropriating portions thereof, and by other irregular means. Such adaptations to their changed situation were not peculiar to the Daura district heads but general throughout the northern emirates at this time, since all were subject to uniform rules, requirements, and restraints. In Daura, as elsewhere, the exposure and suppression of the traditional practices they had thus made illegal became a primary task of the British administration, and this inevitably led to numerous dismissals from office, which furnish indices of the changes under way. Under British supervision the traditional rulers, and especially the new order of district heads, found themselves subject to a new ruling body which attempted to exercise a more rigorous supervision of their fiscal and administrative activities than their predecessors had ever known. The traditional rulers were now situated between those whom they ruled and continued to exploit and the British administration, which sought to scrutinize their tax administration rather closely. As dismissals increased, mainly on charges of tax embezzlement, the new order of district heads gradually learned to adapt the traditional pursuit of *iko,* aggrandizement, and intrigue to the new administrative procedures and requirements imposed by the British. The new conditions of office made treasurers, viziers, and district chiefs particularly vulnerable; and although many applications of *iko* were still rewarding, unauthorized appropriations of land tax or other budgeted emirate revenues carried heavy risks.

Merely to list a few of the ruined careers that accompanied these adjustments will indicate their duration, character, and scope. The Shentali Tsuntsu lost the district headship of Zango over a missing £230 of tax. In 1916 the Kaura Hamidu fled to Niger to avoid imprisonment for a missing £300. His successor as Kaura at Baure, Danladi, who was promoted from Sandamu,

soon fled to Arko in Niger over a missing £355. The Galadima Ibrahim, who had succeeded Abubakar at Rade, was sent to prison for three months in 1917 for levying a fine on one of his "subjects" who had begotten a bastard. Traditionally, Ibrahim's action might have been lauded for its Islamic fervor; and few would have questioned his right to impose and pocket the fine. The girl's kinsmen may well have regarded its imposition as their lord's duty. But under the new regime, Ibrahim was specifically charged with exceeding his executive powers and arrogating to himself judicial functions reserved to the Alkali. Ibrahim's successor at Rade was his kinsman, the former Waziri Abubakar; and after Abubakar's death, Abdurrahman gave the office of Galadima to his cross-cousin Salihu. Two years later he abolished the district of Rade by incorporating it into Sandamu. Salihu then moved to Mai Aduwa as district head but was replaced there in 1939 by the Galadima Ahmadu for some breach of official regulations.

The Mutawalli Malam Dahiru, who was responsible for the emirate's tax accounts and for transferring the government's share to the Divisional Headquarters at Katsina, fled to Kazaure in 1916 when £100 was found missing. Responsibility for the emirate's tax accounts and payments to the government was then removed from the Mutawalli, and Abdurrahman was warned that his emirate was likely to lose control of its own finances if its officials continued their embezzlement and peculation. At that date, when the total annual revenue from the land tax *(haraji)* was still only about £2,500, substantial embezzlement could hardly escape notice. Abdurrahman discussed this disturbing situation with his younger brother Alhassan, who had hitherto pursued their father's occupation as a malam. Like Abdurrahman, Alhassan dreaded the prospect that Daura's revenues and disbursements might be administered from Katsina, since he feared that this loss of local autonomy might lead to others, until Daura became a virtual vassal state of Fulani Katsina. The risk of losing their autonomy and direct relations with the British staff revived memories of Zinder at Daura. To forestall these developments, Alhassan asked his brother to appoint him as Waziri and was placed in charge of the central administration with responsibility for revenues and outpayments, the district heads being directed to send him their accounts and taxes directly. As Waziri, Alhassan also administered the capital and its immediate environs. In two years he had raised the emirate's revenues from £2,500 to £3,810 without any increase in the per caput incidence of tax. Clearly the district heads had indulged in substantial and consistent underreporting of taxable males whose tax they gathered and retained.

Yet even while the nature and conditions of territorial office changed radically, several district chiefs discharged their duties either without giving offense to warrant dismissal or without being discovered. Thus, in 1926, for example, the former Sarkin Gabas Lasan, who had been given Yanduna District with the title of Marusa, died in office. In 1922 Lasan had asked the Sarki Abdurrahman to give him the vacant title of Sarkin Bai. Abdurrahman had obliged, and the Marusa title, which Lasan had introduced from Kat-

sina, lapsed locally. On Lasan's death Abdurrahman appointed Ibrahim, Lasan's son, to the title of Sarkin Bai with responsibilities for Yanduna, thereby rewarding Lasan's long and honorable career by conferring his office on his son and thus endowing his issue with hereditary rights to the title. Within a year, following the death of the district chief at Sandamu, the Sarkin Bai Ibrahim was sent there from Yanduna, and the Galadima Salihu left Rade for Mai Aduwa. The Yanduna District was then absorbed into Zango; and the Rade District, into Sandamu. This completed the series of changes by which the thirteen districts established at Daura in 1907 were gradually reduced to their present five. Like his father, Lasan, the Sarkin Bai Ibrahim acquitted himself honorably in his office until he was retired with a pension on grounds of age twenty years later.

Abdurrahman's father's brother, the Yerima Musa, died in office at Mai Aduwa in 1922 and was succeeded in his title and district by his son Idi. Idi had long served his father as Wazirin Yerima at Mai Aduwa; but in traditional terms he was not formally eligible for the Yerima title, since his father had not held the throne. Nonetheless, Idi was the last person to hold the title of Yerima in Daura. In 1926 he was dismissed from office following an outbreak of violence at Tasawa due north of Mai Aduwa in the French colony of Niger, during which some French administrative personnel lost their lives. In the ensuing inquiries the charge was made that the rebels of Tasawa had received encouragement and assistance from district chiefs in the adjoining British territories. Although the supporting evidence was questionable, the British Administration of Northern Nigeria decided to remove from office most of those whom the French suspected of fomenting or supporting the outbreak. The Yerima Idi was thus dismissed, and Abdurrahman sent his Sarkin Fada Adamu to administer Mai Aduwa as a *wakil,* or deputy. After six months under the Wakili Adamu, Mai Aduwa District was given to the Galadima Salihu and remained with him till 1939, when he was dismissed, following which the Galadimaship and the district were given to Ahmadu.

Recovery and Growth

Between 1916 and 1926 all the Fulani whom Musa had retained in office on coming to Daura had been eliminated by death or dismissal. Thereafter all senior executive offices of state were held by Hausa, official priesthoods and judgeships as well as the royal titles and district headships. By a policy of attrition, Musa and Abdurrahman had removed all important offices from the Fulani on administratively impeccable grounds one after the other, thus denying the Fulani any occasion for rallying together against them; and as the Fulani were removed, their offices were allocated to Hausa princes or clients as the chief thought best. The principal considerations that guided these chiefly appointments were the loyalty, lineage, status, administrative competence, and experience of the candidates and the entrenchment and gradual extension of dynastic and chiefly power.

Abdurrahman's unusually long tenure of the chiefship has proved decisive in the latter respect by permitting him to puruse a consistent policy over a period of time sufficient to achieve his ends without losing public support. When the Kaura Hamidu fled to Niger in 1916 to avoid arrest for tax defalcation, Abdurrahman appointed Danladi as Kaura and district head of Baure, although his only claim to the office of Kaura was Abdurrahman's favor. Being of different lineage, Danladi was the first Hausa Kaura since Kalifa's reign who was not descended from Audu Masaki. When Danladi followed Hamidu in flight a few years later, Abdurrahman appointed his Sarkin Fulani Alhassan, then in charge of Sandamu, as Kaura to administer Baure. Alhassan's lineage differed from those of Danladi and the hereditary Kauras. Following Danladi, Alhassan's appointment signified that the descendants of Audu Masaki had lost their right to the office of Kaura and therewith their former status as official nobility. By these steps Abdurrahman had eliminated his major rivals from office and power and freed the chieftaincy of a long-standing threat; but when Alhassan died in office at Baure in 1945-1946, Abdurrahman refused to appoint Alhassan's son and deputy, the Dan Kwaba Nuhu, who was determined to succeed, and sent instead his eldest son, the Bunturawa Umaru, to administer Baure. Excluded from office at Baure, the Dan Kwaba Nuhu was allowed to retain his empty title when he turned to the groundnut trade in nearby Niger to make his living. Following Alhassan's death, no further appointments were made to the Kaura title, since the princes to whom alone it was offered refused to accept it on various grounds. The office accordingly lapsed for several years shortly after it passed from the lineage that had traditionally held it.[15]

In like fashion, Abdurrahman eliminated the new lineage of Sarkin Bais which the Sarkin Gabas Lasan had founded. When Lasan's son Ibrahim was retired from Sandamu, Abdurrahman's grandson, the Wambai Bashar, the eldest son of his own first son, Bunturawa Umaru, was then given the district, with the novel title of Wambai, at his own request. At Zango the Shentali Tsuntsu was replaced by Abdurrahman's brother, the Murka Adamu, who died in 1955 and was succeeded in the title and district by his son Sani, although the title of Murka had traditionally been reserved for the sons of Daura chiefs. At Rade, following the death of the Galadima Abubakar (Garba), Abdurrahman had appointed his cognatic kinsman Salihu to the Galadima title, although Salihu did not belong to the traditional Galadima lineage. On Salihu's dismissal in 1939, this title reverted to its traditional holders with Ahmadu's appointment, and in 1959 it was the only district headship not held by princes. The only other high-ranking offices that then remained to the lineages that traditionally filled them were the clerical ranks of the Limam, Alkali, and Dan Sanwai. Thus, by 1959 Abdurrahman had appropriated all senior executive offices of the central and district administrations for the dynasty, and especially for his immediate kin. In consequence, when I visited Daura the dynasty enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in the political and administrative organizations of the state; and as head of both units, Abdurrahman's preeminence was assured.

Paradoxically, such changes were more easily effected at higher levels of the officialdom than at its base in the rural areas. In 1911 Miller-Stirling discovered that the Fulani head of Sandamu village, Yeli, controlled about one-third of the district independently of the district head. At that date Yeli administered the affairs and received the taxes of the Fulani communities at Dukuduku, Cadi, Yadagamu, Daka, Fago, Yakawada, and Dutarga, as well as the Hausa village of Toka, Lukudi's ancient capital. Evidently the British had merely superimposed the new Sandamu District organization on the old Fulani fief of Sandamu, which provided its basis and core. Yeli had thus preserved the integrity of the former fief by retaining control while remitting the statutory taxes to the resident district head. When Miller-Stirling's report on these arrangements reached the High Commissioner in Kaduna, the chief secretary of Northern Nigeria remarked that "the villages should be told that they should follow the District Head direct."[16] Clearly it would be necessary to convince Yeli on this score by political means.

By 1920 Daura emirate contained approximately two hundred settlements of varied size, each of which was treated as a distinct unit for tax collection and other routine administrative functions. An attempt was then made to group nearby settlements into larger units called village areas, each of which was placed under its senior local headman, whose status was duly raised to that of village-area chief (Sarkin Gari), while the heads of other settlements in the area were classified as ward heads *(Masu-unguwa).* This proposal had two objectives. First, it promised to reduce the costs of tax collection and thus to increase the amounts received by the government and the central administration of the emirate by eliminating most of the petty collectors together with the tax commissions they had received. Second, the reorganization promised to reduce the work of the district head and his staff by transferring most of the communication tasks at village level from district headquarters to the new village-area chiefs. By 1922 this experiment was recognized as a failure, partly because of rivalries among the regrouped villages and partly because of the illiteracy of their headmen. The new village areas were therefore dissolved, and the district organizations returned to their initial situation. Following this failure, the territorial system persisted for another decade with only two levels of local organization, despite its evident inefficiency and expense. Village headmen could not be placed on salaries until the rural settlements were grouped in economic units that warranted salaried chiefs; but when the first attempt to institute this regrouping failed in 1922, district heads were directed to reduce the tax commissions received by their *masugari* from 10 to 5 percent in order to increase the share received by the central administration and to discourage the *masugari.*

By 1924 the total revenues collected at Daura approximated £8,000 per annum. Of this the protectorate government still received half, while the emirate received 45 percent for its administration. This income was distributed among the chief and his officials as follows: the emir, £1,000 per annum; the Mutawalli, £60; the Alkali at Daura, £72; the Alkali at Baure, whose office and

court were instituted in 1922, £36; the Mufti (Alkali's assistant) at Daura, £30; the Mufti at Baure, £18; the Sarkin Doka Alulu, £30; the Yari (Chief Warder, formerly Ajiya), £24; six prison warders, £18 each; six native police for the rural districts, £12 each; the Waziri Alhassan £200; the Kaura of Baure, £200; the Sarkin Fulani (District Head) of Sandamu, £120; the Galadima of Rade, £120; the Sarkin Bai Lasan at Yanduna, £120; the Yerima at Mai Aduwa, £168. This list of all salaried members of the official establishment illustrates the complex relations of personal status, title, official rank, official functions, and reward that prevailed at Daura in 1924. It also illustrates the use of official salaries to express differential political status.

Daura town and district then contained about five thousand people, the total population of the emirate being about eighty thousand. In 1917 the protectorate government opened its first elementary school at Daura with three teachers and twenty boys; in 1924, the school had four teachers and thirty-two boys. The Public Works Department had established a local workshop at Daura with a salaried carpenter, blacksmith, and leatherworker. While European education had barely begun, Islamic education flourished. Between 1922 and 1924 the number of traditional Koranic schools in the chiefdom increased from 319 to 371; and their pupils, from 1,785 to 2,019. During these years the more advanced Muslim schools, in which Arabic, theology, and law were taught, increased from thirty-seven to fifty-seven; and their pupils, most of whom were adult men, from 221 to 334.[17] While most of these Koranic schools were located in Fulani settlements, a growing number were supported by Hausa communities. Thus pacification promoted a significant expansion of Islamic education at Daura.

Reassessments carried out by D. J. Sheridan and others between 1923 and 1927 estimated the gross annual income of the emirate's population at about £140,000, of which about £71,000 represented the costs of local subsistence. From the net annual income of £69,000, about £8,000 was then collected as tax at an average incidence of 7s.4d. per adult male. Sheridan noticed that residents at the capital were taxed lightly by comparison with those living in other areas, and in 1927 these rates were equalized. However, similar inequalities prevailed among and within rural communities of the same and different districts. Thus, in five villages at Sandamu, namely, Sandamu, Yakawada, Fago, Cadi, and Toka, tax averaged 3s. per man, whereas throughout the rest of the district the rate averaged 7s.6d. Evidently, despite British attempts to dissolve it, the Fulani village chiefs of Sandamu had managed to preserve at least one-half of their former fief and had secured preferential treatment for it from the local district head.

At this period each of the emirate's four main markets, at Daura, Zango, Mai Aduwa, and Kanda, met only once a week, as did the lesser markets that flourished between them. While the emirate contained only about two hundred separate settlements in 1920, in 1923 there were 270, and in 1926, 304.[18] Evidently population growth was accompanied by the fragmentation of some local communities and the establishment of many new ones.

Map 8. The Emirate of Daura in 1954, Showing Districts and Village Areas

Administrative Developments, 1922-1934

From 1922 to 1925 the judicial organization of the emirate was redesigned when a new Muslim court was established at Baure. The court of the Alkalin Daura at the capital was simultaneously empowered to hear appeals and referrals from the Baure court, which it also supervised; and the emir's judicial council was formally reconstituted as the senior local court with authority to adjudicate appeals and referrals from the court of the Alkalin Daura as well as all issues involving claims to land and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, which were reserved to the emir and his executive. In 1923 the emir's judicial council included his brother the Waziri Alhassan; the Chief Alkali Yusufu; the Limamin Daura Yahaya; and two legal assessors, Muhamman, the son of Altine's Alkali Sani, and Muhamman Dan Gata, Mai Gurdo's Hausa scribe.

In the prevailing context, although most of the issues brought before the judicial council for decision had no political significance, it was also required to adjudicate charges against local officials. Tax embezzlement and other financial defalcations were the most frequent and serious "political" offenses; but in these matters the divisional administration, which usually discovered the offense by means of audits and assessment surveys, also held the initiative and pressed for action through the emir and Waziri. Once the evidence was at hand and the charge established under Muslim law and British regulations alike, the appropriate legal decision sometimes remained uncertain; and British pressure did not exclude doubt about the form of administrative action appropriate in all cases. Under these conditions the emir's judicial council operated as a technical body while deliberating the legal aspects of those administrative cases presented to it, but when formulating judgment, it had inevitably to consider political interests of various sorts, so that its reputation for impartial administration of justice remained ambiguous.

The traditional regime had endowed certain offices with permanent compounds and other property. The Fulani and Hausa had both upheld this institution, although they allotted compounds to different offices. On his restoration, Malam Musa had therefore redistributed the official compounds of the Fulani state as best he could to express traditional Hausa ideas of rank and precedence. Since Musa's reallocations are illustrated on the map of the capital, they need not be itemized. We are only concerned at this point with his provision for the Limam. On Musa's return to Daura this office and its compound were occupied by the Fulani Limam Maude of the Kuninkawa dynasty. Musa accordingly subdivided the official compound which the Fulani emirs had reserved for the Tambari and gave its eastern half, which faced the palace, to his Limam Abdulkarim of Zango, who thereafter served as Musa's private priest, while Maude retained the official priesthood and its compound. When Maude died sometime later, Abdulkarim's son Umaru succeeded as Limam of Daura but continued to live in his father's compound, which thus became the official compound of the Daura Limams.

When Umaru died in Abdurrahman's reign and his brother Ishi'aku was appointed as Limam, Abdurrahman instructed Ishi'aku to live in Umaru's compound. However, Umaru's heirs and family objected and refused to vacate the building, claiming that Umaru had spent £300 to repair and enlarge the compound and that the chief should undertake to repay this sum if he proposed to remove them.

The matter came before the emir's judicial council while Alhassan was Waziri at about the same time that an Alkali in Bauchi emirate also claimed his official residence as personal property on similar grounds of personal outlay for repair and improvement. It was therefore necessary to resolve the issues raised by individual and lineage occupation of official compounds which were by custom and law the property of the chiefdoms concerned but which, following the abolition of traditional corvée, were now maintained by the personal expenditures of their occupants, whose tenures of office, formerly hereditary, were now uncertain. Such individual expenditures could only be recovered from the states to which the compounds belonged if these states decided to retain the compounds as state property. At Daura, following discussion with his judicial council, Abdurrahman instructed the Limam Ishi'aku to move into the compound the Fulani emirs had reserved for their Sarkin Fada. This event initiated further adaptations of the traditional institution of official compounds at Daura to contemporary conditions. Today, while most local officials continue to live in their own homes after appointment, the Native Administration maintains as state property those compounds it has retained for certain offices. Thus the ancient distinction between offices endowed with state compounds and those without has been preserved at Daura with appropriate adaptations. That part of the Tambari's compound which was occupied by Limam Umaru during his tenure of office was left to Umaru's family; and when the Fulani Tambari died, the chief instructed the Mutawalli Idi to reside there, thus discontinuing the Fulani title of Tambari.

From 1923 to 1933 the Native Administration of Daura expanded in size, complexity, and scope as the Regional Government increased the duties and number of its staff. During these years the British Administration of Northern Nigeria introduced a variety of technical functions and offices to the central administrations of the Muslim emirates; and as technical departments developed, their operations were extended to the district organization. In consequence, besides their traditional concerns with the administration of law, the police, and treasury, the emirates were increasingly charged with responsibilities for supervising and promoting local agriculture, education, sanitation, and health through dispensaries and various medical projects; the conservation or development of forests; and cattle raising. Some time later the development and maintenance of adequate water supplies was added to this list. As these various functions were successively instituted on departmental bases in the adjoining emirate of Katsina, surveys of Daura's requirements and possibilities were undertaken by British staff in association with

Katsina officials, who were frequently seconded from Katsina to Daura to initiate these developments. As Daura people learned to use the Roman script which the British employed to write Hausa, they were trained at Katsina or Kano in the skills required to staff and develop these new departments. Over the years a number of technical departments having representatives in each rural district was developed under officials whose titles and roles had no antecedents in the traditional polity, although they could be loosely regarded as a modern equivalent of the occupational and technical offices of the old Hausa state.

Abdurrahman's decision to leave Umaru's heirs in occupation of the compound formerly reserved for his Limam was made in this context of administrative expansion and with due regard to the problems of accommodation and emirate expenditure that then arose. Since the British administration required native technical staff to move among districts, hoping thereby to depersonalize and improve their role-performances, the emirate was obliged to provide them with adequate accommodation. In consequence the state undertook to build and maintain a number of compounds at each district headquarters for its mobile technical staff and to provide them with means of transport. These compounds, horses, and bicycles remained the property of the state, which provided for their upkeep by allowances or through its Department of Works. Following a survey of state compounds at the capital, similar policies were applied there also. In this way, traditional practice with regard to the provision of official compounds was modified and adapted to the new situation to preserve its substance despite changes of reference and form. It was in this context that Abdurrahman accepted the Waziri's suggestion that since the title had lapsed, the Kaura's official compound should be destroyed rather than allocated to another office and that the site should be used as the slaughter place to serve the city market. These changes signalized the emir's decision to appoint no further Kauras at Daura and thus temporarily terminated the title.

When the Turaki Jibji died around 1931, Abdurrahman gave this title to his second son, Muhamman, and placed him in charge of Daura town, which was thus removed from the Waziri's direct administration. The Ubandawaki, who had supervised one half of the city while Jibji supervised the other, was placed under Muhamman, who reported to the Waziri and the emir on different topics. The Waziri's clerical duties had by then increased in consequence of the expanded activities of the central administration. He was still directly responsible for preparing the annual accounts of the chiefdom, for handling its tax receipts and outpayments, and in addition he now had to prepare and supervise the expenditure and estimates for these new departments. Under these conditions Alhassan was glad to be relieved of the routine administration of Daura town, while he retained his role as district head of the capital and its environs.

In 1931, when the emirate's revenue totaled £13,300, of which £3,500 represented the cattle tax *(jangali),* the Native Administration received £9,300,

or 70 percent of the total. The chiefdom's financial situation had improved remarkably since 1916. By 1931 the emirate had accumulated a financial reserve of some £15,000, one-third of which was banked at Katsina.[19] In 1934 Daura was transferred from Kano to Katsina, which was then established as a new province in an attempt to reorganize provincial administrations on more economic lines.[20] Whatever their significance at the regional level, these provincial changes had little impact on affairs at Daura, which had remained under the supervision of the Divisional Office at Katsina throughout; and from 1934 to 1958, Katsina and Daura were administered together as a single province.

Dynastic Politics

Between 1931 and 1937 the economic and political development of Northern Nigeria was temporarily halted by the economic crisis of 1929-1932 and its effect on the British economy. Throughout this period the Northern Nigerian government lacked the funds to introduce any major new schemes of economic development; and as the local economic situation worsened through the loss of overseas markets for such northern export crops as groundnuts, hides, cotton, and shea nuts, it became increasingly difficult to maintain earlier rates of taxation and thus to sustain the former level of administrative activities. Shortly after the regional economy had recovered from this slump and begun to expand, the Second World War began; and for the next few years Northern Nigeria, although having ready markets for all it could export, experienced shortages of imported goods as well as of European staff. Thus between 1931 and 1946 the economic and administrative development of Daura underwent little change as a result of successive upheavals in the Western world with which it was linked.

The period from 1934 to 1953 also witnessed a resurgence of political rivalry within the dynasty after nearly a century. Abdurrahman's policy of appointing his kinsmen to most of the important offices of state had proceeded smoothly during the first half of his long reign; but as he aged, his sons and grandsons matured and began to compete among themselves for the superior posts and especially for those which seemed to offer the greatest prospects of election to the throne. The development of these dynastic rivalries was perhaps inevitable, given Abdurrahman's appropriation of executive offices for members of his family. As Abdurrahman had long since eliminated all rival centers of power, the dynasty now controlled all significant resources within the emirate and dominated its administration, with the result that titleholding princes were now the only persons equipped to hold or compete for senior political office.

At Zango, following the death of the Murka Adamu, his title and district headship had passed to his son Sani; however, as Adamu had never been chief, despite the title, Sani was ineligible for succession to the throne. The

Yerima Idi, who administered Mai Aduwa until he lost office in 1926-1927, had occupied a similar position. Thus, when Abdurrahman entered the second half of his reign, apart from his issue, only his brother, the Waziri Alhassan, was eligible by birth and experience to succeed him.

In 1945-1946, following the death of Kaura Alhassan, Abdurrahman sent his eldest son, the Bunturawa Umaru, who had formerly served as messenger to the British administrators in Katsina, to Baure as district head. Umaru's eldest son, Bashar, then worked as Magatakarda in the central office under the Waziri Alhassan, while Umaru's younger brother, Muhamman, held the slave title Turaki and administered Daura town. Like Bashar, the Turaki Muhamman was directly responsible to the Waziri Alhassan. Abdurrahman's third son, Zakari, at this time served as his personal Magatakarda (Scribe). Another able prince whose prominence increased steadily was Bukari, the son of Abdurrahman's father, Musa, by a slave girl who had been given to him as part payment of the *kudin sarauta* by the Sarkin Busa shortly before Musa's death, despite the British proscription of slave dealing. Bukari and the Vizier Alhassan were thus the only collaterals likely to offer Abdurrahman's issue serious competition when the succession arose. Of the two, Alhassan was almost as old as Abdurrahman, but Bukari, though genealogically of their generation, was probably no older than Abdurrahman's senior sons.

At some point between 1945 and 1951, and most probably in 1949-1951, Bashar, the eldest son of Bunturawa Umaru, asked his grandfather Abdurrahman to appoint him as Turaki although the title was then held by Bashar's father's brother Muhamman. The Waziri Alhassan, Bashar's father's father's brother, objected to this request very strongly, since it entailed the removal of Muhamman, Bashar's uncle, from the office of Turaki in order that the younger man could have it. Alhassan may also have objected to Bashar's appointment as one of his territorial aides in charge of the capital. The Waziri, as Bashar's granduncle *(kaka),* told him frankly what he thought of this request. Bashar insisted nonetheless, and Abdurrahman reappointed Muhamman to the title of Sarkin Yara, which had remained vacant since Kwanyami's flight and was traditionally linked by agnatic kinship with the office of Turaki but ranked above it. Abdurrahman then made Bashar Turaki and placed him in charge of half of Daura town under the Sarkin Yara. The Waziri Alhassan regarded these appointments as a breach of kinship norms and made no effort to hide his sentiments.

In 1951 Alhassan was dismissed from the office of Waziri that he had held so long and honorably, and the Bunturawa Umaru was recalled from Baure to take charge of the capital and the central administration. A Ma'aji (Treasurer) was also appointed to replace the Mutawalli (Accountant) and given responsibility for the emirate's accounts and funds. In effect the Waziri's former role was thus split into two, its financial duties being transferred to the Ma'aji, while its executive control of the technical departments and the territorial administration passed to Umaru.

On returning to the capital in this capacity, Umaru abandoned his former title of Bunturawa and was reappointed as Magajin Gari (Heir of the Town), a title which had remained vacant at Daura since Na'inkali first held it in 1907. Abdurrahman then appointed his third son, Zakari, as Bunturawa in succession to Umaru and offered his younger brother Bukari, the son of Musa, the district of Baure. Bukari recognized that by removing himself from the capital he ran considerable political risks but accepted the offer gladly. However, when offered the titles of Kaura or Yerima he refused them both, the former because it was not a royal office and had been discredited by Salihu and his predecessors, the latter because few who held it ever became chief. Bukari thus took the opportunity to inform Abdurrahman obliquely that he was personally interested in the succession. On being asked to select a title for himself, he chose that of Madawaki, which in Zaria and Kano is equivalent to Kaura. As Madawaki, Bukari proceeded to Baure, which he administered for the next few years.

Following this, the Sarkin Bai Ibrahim, who administered Sandamu District, was retired, ostensibly on grounds of age; and the Turaki Bashar was given the new title of Wambai, another innovation from Zaria and Kano, before proceeding to Sandamu as district head. Throughout this period the Bunturawa Zakari had continued to serve the emir as scribe and confidential adviser. Bashar justified his selection of the Wambai title before moving to Sandamu by pointing out that this was a princely office at Kano and Zaria. However, at Daura, where it was previously unknown, Wambai is generally regarded as a modified or foreign form of the local title of Sarkin Bai; and Bashar's motive in selecting it was accordingly regarded locally as an assertion of precedence over his uncle, the Sarkin Yara Muhamman.

In 1951, when Abdurrahman celebrated his fortieth year as Sarkin Daura, invitations were extended to several emirs in Nigeria and adjoining Niger to attend or send representatives to the public festivities at Daura. These invitations neatly illustrated some prominent continuities and changes in the external political context of the old Hausa chiefdom. Besides invitations to the Fulani sultan of Sokoto, the Sarkin Kano, Sarkin Katsina, Sarkin Kazaure, and Sarkin Hadeija, others went to the Sarkin Gumel in Nigeria, the chief of the revived state of Damagaram in Niger, the Sarkin Magaria, Sarkin Kworgum, the Sarkin Kance, and the Sarkin Tsatsumburum, not all of whom had historic links with Daura.

Electors and Councils

Following Waziri Alhassan's dismissal and the appointment of his former assistant as Ma'aji, the average rate of tax was increased by 3s., thus lifting the emirate's local revenue from £31,000 to £39,000, of which only £4,000 now went to the Regional Government.[21] In consequence, in 1951-1952 the chiefdom's local revenues exceeded its ordinary expenditure by £2,500. By

then thirty village areas had been constituted under salaried village heads, each assisted by a salaried scribe. Having shaken off the effects of the Great Depression and the Second World War, the chiefdom was ready to undertake new tasks as the Northern Region advanced toward internal autonomy and the Nigerian Federation moved toward independence.

In December 1951, after nearly fifty years of British rule, the principle of elective representation was introduced to Northern Nigeria. Through a hierarchy of electoral colleges arranged in tiers from villages and districts upward to emirates and provinces, delegates were selected for a Regional House of Representatives. Shortly afterward Nigeria was reconstituted as a federation of three internally autonomous regions. The government of the Northern Region came increasingly under the control of the Northern People's Congress, which had emerged as the dominant political party of the region in the elections of 1951. From 1951 until 1966 the Northern People's Congress continued to provide the Regional Government in Northern Nigeria. From 1953 until 1957 its leader, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, C.B.E., who in October 1954 became the first premier of Northern Nigeria, assumed ministerial responsibility for community development and local government. Following criticisms leveled at the Native Administrations of the Muslim emirates by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and others in 1950, the government of Northern Nigeria undertook the necessary inquiries and remodeled the Native Authorities to increase their efficiency, accountability, and popular support, thus equipping them to adapt to certain transformations of their political context that were then unfolding.

Following the introduction of electoral representation at the regional and federal level in 1951, its institutionalization in the government of individual emirates could not be long delayed; but as we have seen, popular representation had had no place in the traditional government of Daura; and in this respect Daura was fully representative of northern emirates. In such Fulani states as Zaria, emirs had ruled autocratically through an informal council of kinsmen, slaves, and loyal senior clients, to whom they delegated inquiries or turned for advice as they judged fit. In other emirates, such as Daura, the ruler was in theory bound by a traditional council, whose composition and powers varied widely. However, the Native Authority Law (no. 40 of 1933) designated every emir as a solitary autocrat, the "sole Native Authority," who the Regional Government assumed would administer his chiefdom without an official council.[22] In practice, emirs continued to govern through councils where these were traditional features of the emirate's constitution and executive; but even then, as "sole Native Authority," an emir could overrule his council and pursue the policies he wished. At Daura, for example, Abdurrahman had routinely discussed important affairs with a senior or "inner" council, which included the Waziri, the Alkali, the Magatakarda, the Dan Sanwai, and one or two others. This council provided no institutional channel through which popular sentiments or desires could find politi-

cal expression. At the district level of organization, the same pattern was repeated in miniature, the district head consulting with his immediate *fadawa* (courtiers) on political matters and with the village heads or technical staff of the Native Administration on executive acts. Although formally responsible to the vizier for district affairs, the district head was fully accountable to the emir alone, while the latter was responsible only to his British supervisors. Ideas of popular accountability and representation were equally alien and inimical to this system of government.

To introduce the electoral principle into these northern chiefdoms without unsettling their political foundations and without undermining the authority of the chief and his representatives was no simple matter. The Regional Government attempted to do this by pursuing a policy of gradual change at two levels, at the emirate centers and in their district organizations. Under a new Native Authority Law (no. 4 of 1954), which repealed the status of "sole Native Authority," chiefs were required to govern their territories through executive councils, subject to supervision by the Regional Government. At the same time an attempt was made to establish a hierarchy of popular councils which could also serve as electoral colleges within each emirate. At the lowest level of administrative organization, the adult male residents of a village area elected delegates to discuss its local affairs, especially educational and economic matters, with the village head. This village council in turn elected some of its members to represent the village in a district council which met several times a year at the district headquarters to discuss these and other developments in the district as a whole. All village heads were ex officio members of the district council, over which the district head presided and which his administrative and technical staff were required to attend. To complete the hierarchy, every emirate was obliged to institute an "outer council," to which each district sent three delegates, one chosen by the district head, one by all its village heads together, and the third by the popular representatives on the district council. The Regional Government required each emir and his "inner," or executive, council to convene the outer council twice yearly for two or three days at a time to review their work, plans, and difficulties and generate discussion. District representatives on the outer council could be called on to inform the meeting of the progress of developments initiated in their districts or to consider proposals affecting the emirate as a whole.

Within the inner council, which was also called the N.A. (Native Authority) Council, the Regional Government urged that "ministerial" responsibilities should be distinguished and allocated to particular members, one of whom would then be in charge of education, another of law and police, a third of communications, and the like. It was expected that councillors having these departmental portfolios would lead discussions of the outer council on their particular subjects. They would also supervise and direct the activities of the departments under their care and report to the emir and the N.A. Council. Clearly these proposals were designed to strengthen the capacities

of the Native Authorities to formulate and pursue new goals, to generate public confidence and support, and to provide the people with positive leadership during the coming period of change. By institutionalizing the electoral principle within the Muslim emirates as a conciliar hierarchy whose members' electoral rights varied with their political statuses, the Regional Government also sought to introduce elements of popular representation and accountability to these authoritarian polities in ways that would enhance their stability and adaptability while increasing their scope and modifying the prevailing authority structure gradually in the direction of a modern constitutional monarchy.

In 1953 the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, accordingly visited Daura to meet with Abdurrahman and his council to explain how the Regional Government proposed to modify and expand the Native Authority structure and to select and appoint a development officer for Daura who would then be directly responsible to him as Minister of Local Government for setting up and supervising the work of these local councils. The new structure had been instituted in Katsina emirate in the preceding year, where it was said to have worked very well. At Daura the emir and council were already acquainted with the general scheme; and when the Sardauna was satisfied that they understood and accepted it, he proceeded with the immediate task of selecting someone from the assembly to guide these innovations. Senior members of the Native Administration were asked to volunteer for the task, and it is said that the Turaki Bashar did so. Since he was then rather young and inexperienced, his offer was rejected, and the Sardauna again asked for volunteers. At this stage the Madawaki Bukari, then district head of Baure, said that he was willing to undertake the task, and his offer was accepted. With the emir's approval, the Madawaki ceased to be district head of Baure and took up his new duties as development officer for Daura, with a seat on the Native Authority Council and with "ministerial" responsibilities for organizing and supervising all local elections, development schemes, local education, and the use of District Council Funds (DCF).

On Bukari's appointment as development officer for Daura, he retained the Madawaki title but moved to the capital. Bearing the new title of Wambai, Bashar succeeded his uncle as district head of Baure. Abdurrahman's third son, the Bunturawa Zakari, then moved to Sandamu as district head to take Bashar's place. The rivalry between the Madawaki Bukari, the emir's brother, and the Magajin Gari Umaru and his son, the Wambai Bashar, was thus deepened and publicized as the primary political cleavage within the dynasty and Native Administration. During my visit to Daura, when the Wambai Bashar was absent in Britain on an administrative course, this rivalry was still a dominant interest of local politics.

As development officer directly responsible to, and in communication with, the Minister for Community Development and Local Government at Kaduna, the Madawaki Bukari occupied a highly strategic position. Being able and energetic, he could usually ensure that directions from the Regional

Government were implemented smoothly; and as development officer responsible for fair elections, he enjoyed popular support as the guardian of the new popular rights. However, the emir's issue already controlled three of the chiefdom's five districts, namely, Baure, Sandamu, and the capital, as well as some technical departments, such as Public Works and Dispensaries. The Madawaki also found Abdurrahman's issue too deeply entrenched in the senior levels of the Native Administration to be easily outmaneuvered.

Development of Daura, 1953-1958

An important feature of the political development of Northern Nigeria between 1950 and 1966 was the growth of parties and party politics. Northern parties emerged during the campaigns that preceded the first popular elections of December 1951. In Muslim areas of the Northern Region, the two principal parties to develop then were the Northern People's Congress (NPC, or *Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa*) under the leadership of the Sardauna of Sokoto, and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), under the leadership of Malam Aminu of Kano. These two parties differed most sharply in their attitudes to the traditional regimes of chiefly rule as the British had preserved and modified them. The Northern People's Congress sought to modernize Native Administrations by increasing their functions and by introducing limited elements of popular representation and accountability. The Northern Elements Progressive Union criticized these Native Administrations (N.A.'s) as authoritarian, repressive, corrupt, inefficient, and equally indifferent to the needs of their people and the times. NEPU accordingly advocated a drastic reduction of chiefly authority by its subordination to emirate parliaments which would be based on undiluted adult suffrage, including votes for women, and authorized to choose and displace elected members of the Native Authority Council. By contrast, NPC policies aimed to preserve and strengthen the political structure of the emirates by substituting the form for the substance of popular representation, while subordinating their educational, economic, and political development to the Regional Government at Kaduna.[23]

From 1951 to 1960 only the NPC and NEPU contested elections at Daura as parties. The NPC has always been victorious by large majorities at the local polls. Thus, in December 1958 at a local election held in the Sarkin Yara's half of Daura town, the NEPU candidate received 24 votes, while the two NPC candidates received 164 and 142, respectively. In this, as in other local elections, the votes cast were only a fraction of the electorate. Even though women lacked the vote, the response was disturbingly small. This may have indicated popular indifference to these local elections or public disinclination to participate in political party alignments. In the election just cited, which is quite representative, both successful candidates were members of the Native Authority staff, one being a forest warden (Malamin Daji)

and the other a teacher of Arabic at the local school. By contrast, the defeated NEPU candidate had no official status. At Daura supporters of the Native Administration voted solidly for the NPC and its candidates. Judging by its performance at the polls, NEPU was so weak locally that it merely served to consolidate support for the Native Administration and the NPC against itself and any others who demanded popular control of local government; but while those who supported the Native Authority system voted freely, we cannot guess how many of those who would have liked to see the system liberalized cared to do so.

During the last week of November 1958, the Native Authority granted permission for NEPU to hold a public meeting in Daura town. Two days later the principal speaker, a Daura man about thirty years old, was sentenced by the local Alkali to six months in prison for abusing the emir and the Native Authority. A supporting speaker, aged about twenty, was fined fifteen guineas, then about forty-four dollars (U.S.), for demanding Abdurrahman's resignation on grounds of age and attitude. To save his son from prison, the young man's father paid the fine. Present and former titleholders criticized the Alkali's decisions for undue leniency. Evidently the system of popular councils introduced in 1953-1954 had as yet had little effect on traditional concepts and patterns of political relations between the rulers and the ruled; and since NEPU supporters exposed themselves to hostility and possible reprisals from those in power, NEPU's dismal defeats in Daura perhaps did not indicate the overwhelming public support of the present regime that its opponents claimed.

My observations in 1958 indicated equally widespread apathy and acceptance of Abdurrahman's government. The reasons for this combination are not far to seek. Public apathy expressed as *biyayya* (obedience) is the Hausa criterion of a successful regime. Since 1911 the Hausa emirate has been free from external threats and internal subversion, while its affairs have been routinized and administered by predictable procedures. Arbitrary exercises of *iko* have steadily diminished. District heads have learned to avoid dismissal for tax embezzlement, and the central administration has steadily improved its performance while expanding its public services. As against a total revenue of £36,500 in 1952-1953, emirate revenues in 1955-1956 and in 1957-1958 were estimated at £54,000 and £78,000, respectively. Much of this increased revenue was available for local capital development, either as grants to district councils or by direct expenditures of the central administration. To illustrate the growth and complexity of these modern budgets and their development between 1953 and 1958, I attach a summary estimate of revenues and expenditures for the years 1953-1954 and 1957-1958, respectively (see table 14). Whereas in 1953-1954 capital investments accounted for just under £4,000, in 1957-1958 they exceeded £10,000. In 1953-1954, £420 was reserved for allocations to the newly established district councils; four years later, £2,267, or 4 percent of the ordinary expenditure, was earmarked for this purpose. Between 1954 and 1958 the sums spent on recurrent work

TABLE 14

Daura Native Administration Accounts, 1953-1954 – 1957-1958

A. Summary of Revenue

	1953-1954	1957-1958
1. General tax *(haraji)*	£23,920	£44,556
2. Cattle tax *(jangali)*	6,705	12,025
3. Native courts	2,400	4,000
4. Interest on investments	360	360
5. Miscellaneous	1,515	3,450
1-5. Local revenue	34,900	64,391
6. Grants, etc., from Regional Funds	5,347	6,650
7. Grants, etc., from other sources	615	825
1-7. Ordinary revenue	40,862	71,866
8. Commercial undertakings	870	2,610
9. Grants – capital works	284	3,750
Total revenue	42,016	78,226
Total reserve funds	45,653	66,525
Distribution of Taxes:		
(1) To Daura N.A. *Haraji*	23,920	44,556
(1) To Daura N.A. *Jangali*	6,705	12,025
Total	30,625	56,581
(2) To Regional Government *Haraji*	3,500	4,740
(2) To Regional Government *Jangali*	745	1,325
Total	4,245	6,065

B. Summary of Expenditure

	1953-1954		1957-1958	
	Total	Personal emoluments	Total	Personal emoluments
1. Central administration	£2,344	£2,344	£3,678	£3,678
2. District administration	2,441	2,441	2,275	2,275
3. Village administration	1,700	1,700	2,265	2,265
4. Judicial administration	830	810	1,192	1,182
5. Treasury	456	416	724	594
6. Police	2,944	2,629	3,867	3,327
7. Prisons	1,325	690	1,744	834
8. Miscellaneous	1,599	39	4,115	45
9. Works recurrent	6,766	671	13,865	1,296
10. Veterinary	715	465	1,500	870
11. Education	3,840	2,577	7,511	5,650
12. Survey	156	156	278	198
13. Medical & health	4,049	1,569	5,442	2,292
14. Agriculture	1,344	1,069	1,823	1,503
15. Forestry	1,943	908	2,925	1,395
16. Pensions, etc.	305	---	410	---
17. District Council Funds	420	--	2,267	---
1-17. Ordinary expenditure	33,177	18,484	55,881	27,404
18. Commercial undertakings	750	---	2,300	---
19. Works extraordinary	3,212	---	7,850	---
Total expenditure	37,139	18,484	66,031	27,404

SOURCE: Figures taken from *Native Administration Estimates, Katsina Province 1953-4* (pp. 1-3) and *1957-8* (pp. 1-3) (Kaduna. Government Printer).

doubled, although proportionate allocations on this account only increased from 20.4 percent to 24.8 percent. Similarly, in 1957-1958 emirate expenditures on education were £7,500, as against £3,840 four years earlier; but the share of ordinary expenditures on this head only rose from 11.6 percent to 13.5 percent. In 1953-1954, 55 percent of the emirate's ordinary expenditure took the form of personal emoluments to its administrative staff; in 1957-1958 the equivalent ratio was 49 percent. Between 1954 and 1958 local revenue from *haraji,* the general tax which has superseded the traditional *karo, kudin kasa,* or *karan fari,* almost doubled, rising from £23,900 to £44,500. As against £6,700 estimated for the cattle tax in 1953-1954, £12,000 was estimated four years later. Taxation had risen sharply during this period, and in 1958 *haraji* at Daura averaged approximately 25s. per able-bodied man. This steep rise in the rate of taxation accompanied equivalent increases in the emirate's taxable capacity, which was associated with upward movements in the world market for the prices of North Nigerian exports, cotton, groundnuts, hides, and skins. However modest in absolute terms the increased allocations from these expanded revenues to capital investments and public services may seem, they are significant features of these modern budgets. Under the traditional regime, the rulers usually appropriated for their own use any surplus revenue beyond that required to purchase armor or repair the mosque, city walls, markets, and palaces, so that in pre-British times virtually all the revenues of these Hausa and Fulani emirates were disbursed in personal emoluments for the rulers, their official staff and unofficial retainers. By contrast, although Daura officials received substantial salary increases between 1953 and 1957, the ratio of annual expenditure devoted to personal emoluments fell to less than one-half of the budget.

Without depreciating the possible long-term significance of these modern trends, it should be stressed that neither party politics, nor the conciliar pyramid, nor increases in taxation, local revenues, expenditure, prosperity, and literacy rates materially affected the traditional patterns of authority and deference that ordered the relations of Daura's rulers and people. Since NEPU remained marginal in Daura, the NPC dominated the local councils; but its representation was monopolized by members of the Native Authority staff, whose alignments in support of the Madawaki or the Magajin Gari were governed by considerations of lineage, affinity, clientage, rivalry, personal calculations, and the interests of office, rather than by the goals and policies of the Regional Government.

The considerable expansion of the Daura Native Administration in the numbers of its staff and the scope of its activities during the 1950s was paralleled by corresponding expansions in the numbers of new offices and departments. However, the principles that regulated the distribution of these new administrative roles were not very different from those which had traditionally governed political appointments. Since 1917 sons of the ruling elite, which then included senior throne slaves, have enjoyed a disproportionate share of the limited educational facilities available at Daura or nearby Kat-

sina. They have accordingly provided most of the educationally qualified candidates for the new technical and administrative positions. Hence, while the recruitment of such staff members has not been restricted to the traditional ruling stratum, they have in fact received most of the new departmental headships.

In 1958 the Wakilin Gona in charge of the local Department of Agriculture was Abdulkadir, a grandson of Musa; the Wakilin Daji in charge of forestry was Haruna, a Hausa commoner from Kagara. The Wazirin Ayyuka in charge of public works was Sa'idu, the son of Abdurrahman's son, the Magajin Gari Umaru; the Malamin Rijiya, responsible for construction and maintenance of public wells, was Salisu, the son of Murka Adamu, formerly district head at Zango. The chief of police (Sarkin Yandoka) was Adamu, the son of Danmotsi, one of Musa's slaves. The Malamin Tsabta in charge of local sanitation was Mamman, the son of the former Mutawalli Idi. The Malamin Asibiti in charge of local dispensaries, health surveys, and facilities was Leko, the emir's son. The head of the emirate veterinary department was Muhamman, the son of the former Alkali Yusufu. The native treasurer was Musa, the son of Hauni Iliyasu and grandson of a former Sarkin Tafarki. The Yari in charge of local prisons was Muhamman, the son of Musa's Dan Sanwai Muhamman. Of these ten new departmental headships, eight were held by sons of former officials and one by the son of a throne slave.

These departmental headships were also differentiated by rank in traditional style. Only the Yari, the Sarkin Yandoka, the Ma'aji, and the Wazirin Ayyuka were formally appointed by the emir with turban and robe on receiving office. These four positions were thus distinguished as *sarautu* from the remaining six, whose holders were designated *wakilai* (deputies) or *malamai* (supervisors) and not by distinctive titles. On their appointments the Yari, the Sarkin Yandoka, and the Ma'aji were required to take the traditional oath of allegiance to the emir; but this rite was omitted when the title of Wazirin Ayyuka was first conferred in 1957 on the acting head of the Native Department of Works. In practice the Yari, the Wazirin Ayyuka, the Sarkin Yandoka, and the Ma'aji exercise undivided authority and responsibility over their departments, whereas the various *malamai* and *wakilai* in charge of agriculture, sanitation, and the like are supervised and directed by the Magajin Gari and the Madawaki, the two senior "ministerial" members of the emir's council. Designations as *malamai* and *wakilai* are thus reserved for those departmental heads who lack full executive status. Those offices that confer executive *iko* receive distinctive titles *(sarautu)* and investiture by the appropriate traditional ceremonies.

In 1958 the inner council, or Native Authority, consisted of the emir, the Limam, the Dan Sanwai, the Ma'aji, the Magajin Gari, and the Madawaki. The Alkali had finally lost his traditional place on the emir's council, having had to handle a heavier load of court work following the establishment of a third Muslim court at Mai Aduwa in 1955. The inner council met at least

once a week and usually more often. At the end of each month the council also held a session for two or three days, which the Galadima Ahmadu and the Wakilin Daji Haruna attended. In 1958 Daura was represented by the Wakilin Daji Haruna in the Federal House of Assembly at Lagos and by the Wambai Bashar in the Northern House of Assembly at Kaduna. As emir, Abdurrahman sat with the Northern House of Chiefs. The senior district head, Galadima Ahmadu, and Daura's federal spokesman, the Wakilin Daji, were required to attend the emir's council whenever important issues came up for discussion. On council the Madawaki was responsible to the Regional Government for the local development program and especially for supervising disbursements of regional funds. The Wazirin Ayyuka had executive responsibilities for all construction entailed by these programs, while the Madawaki inspected the work on behalf of the Regional Government.

Daura Officialdom in 1958

We may now conclude our account of Daura's political history by summarizing its official organization in 1958, as depicted in chart E. Role descriptions are necessary only for those positions not yet discussed. Titled subordinate staff of senior officials are represented as *lawanai,* since this was how public opinion and the authority structure defined such positions. Those traditional titles that remained vacant in 1958 and seemed then to have lapsed are absent from the chart.

With one exception, all Daura *hakimai* (district heads) in 1958 were princes, three being the emir's issue. The Galadima's two senior *lawanai* were his Waziri and Dan Kumalo, the former a son of the Galadima Abubakar, whom Galadima Ahmadu, lacking offspring, had adopted, and the latter a grandson of the *shigege* Galadima Jatau, whose appointment the Kaura Bakula had engineered. The Galadima Ahmadu assigned his Dan Kumalo Alto responsibility for tax collection throughout Mai Aduwa District, while placing the Waziri in charge of all other matters. As Galadima, he still discharged his traditional duties of supervising the first marriages of the emir's issue. Since the Kaura's office remained vacant, the Galadima probably ranked as head of the electoral council and the highest nondynastic office of the state. Hence his presence was required when council discussed major issues.

The title of Magajin Gari was introduced to Daura by Na'inkali. In 1958 its holder presided over the administration of the capital and home district, in which the central offices of the Native Administration are sited. As senior *lawanai* the Magaji had his brother, the Sarkin Yara, and also the Ubandawaki, each of whom administered half of the capital. The Magajin Mazoji and the Magajin Suduje were the two senior village chiefs in the Daura Home District. The Magajin Gari Umaru, as the emir's first son and possible successor, had a leading role in the emir's inner council.

CHART E

State Organization of Daura, 1958

Territorial Chiefs (District Heads)		Departmental Heads, etc.	Clerics	Courtiers
Royal	Nonroyal			
Magajin Gari*	Galadima≠	Madawaki*	Limam*	Dan Bajida
(i/c) Daura	(i/c Mai Aduwa)	(Malamin Makaranta)	(Na'ibi)	Ubandawakin Shamaki
(S. Yara)	(Dan Kumalo)	(Malamin Elementare)	Dan Sanwai*	Sarkin Fada
(Ubandawaki)	(Waziri)	Ma'aji*	Babban Alkali	Sarkin Zaqi
Murka		Yari	(Magatakarda)	Sarkin Shara
(i/c Zango)		Wazirin Ayyuka	(Danwanka)	Throne Musicians
(Maiwa)		(Sarkin Tafarki)	Alkalin Baure	Magajin Turu
(S. Fada)		(Malamin Rijiya)	(Hauni)	Magajin Tambari
(Waziri)		(Magajin Gini)	Alkalin Mai Aduwa	Dan Tomo
Wambai		Wakilin Daji=	(Sarkin Takarda)	Dakama (f)
(i/c Baure)		(Sarkin Tashar)		Sarkin Busa
(Wakili)		(4 Malamai Daji)		Sarkin Makada
(S. Fada)		(4 Sarakunan Dawa)		Sankira
Bunturawa		Wakilin Gona		Princesses
(i/c Sandamu)		(4 Malamai Gona)		Magajiya
(Waziri)		Malamin Tsabta		(Dan Gawa)
(S. Fulanin Sandamu)		Malamin Asibiti		(Yar Kuntu)
		Malamin Dabobi		Iya
		Sarkin Yandoka		Saraki
		(Wakili)		(Gabsai)
		(Saji)		Maidaki
				Craft Heads
				Sarkin Pawa
				(Korama [f])
				Sarkin Makera
				Magajin Aska
				Sarkin Shanu

LEGEND:
* Councillor.
≠ Often absent.
(f) Female.
(S. Yara, Ubandawaki) = Lawanai.

The Murka Sani, who administered Zango District, had three *lawanai,* one of whom, a great-grandson of that Yerima Mai Nasara who swore loyalty to Lukudi, was head of Zango town, while the others were kin and clients of Sani, who supervised villages. In 1958 the Murka title was held by a *jikan sarki* who was ineligible to succeed; and the Maiwa office was attached to it.

In 1957-1958, although district head of Baure and Daura's elected representative to the Northern House of Assembly, the Wambai Bashar was absent in Britain on an administrative course. During his absence, Baure was administered by his *wakili* (deputy), assisted by his Sarkin Fada.

The Bunturawa Zakari administered Sandamu district with one titled subordinate, the Waziri, who served as his senior clerk.

In 1958 the rural administration of Daura was based on thirty village areas under chiefs whose salaries ranged between £45 and £72 per annum, according to their populations and traditional status. Each village head was assisted by a salaried scribe who took care of administrative correspondence and records, compiled local population and tax returns, prepared receipts, and kept the village ledgers. These scribes were paid about £2 10s. (then about seven dollars [U.S.]) per month. Despite their indispensability and the remarkable improvements in their rewards and recognition, village heads were still regarded by district heads and senior N.A. officials as passive functionnaires, or *masugari,* rather than chiefs, since they lacked independent authority *(iko).* However significant to their village areas and the Regional Government, these village heads formed no part of the ruling stratum at Daura. The rulers did not recognize their offices as necessary parts of the regulative order. They are therefore excluded from the chart of the state officialdom.

Of traditional malamships, the office of Limam has survived with least change. In 1958 the Limam sat on the emir's judicial and administrative councils, and it was expected that he would take part in the electoral council at the coming succession. The office of Dan Sanwai had lost all its traditional *lawanai* and most of its former functions. However, in 1958 the Dan Sanwai served on the emir's judicial council, thus acquiring a new function to compensate for those the office had lost and to provide it with salary appropriate for maintenance and support. However, the Dan Sanwai still served as the Limamin Idi at the two major Muslim festivals, performed his traditional role as palace imam, and retained his place on the emir's council. He was still regarded as one of the traditional electors. During the emir's absences at meetings of the Northern House of Chiefs at Kaduna, the Dan Sanwai still served as his ceremonial deputy, and the office remained hereditary in its traditional lineage. As before, the Dan Sanwai presided over the emir's distribution of alms to malams at the capital.

The old office of Alkali, which formerly lacked *lawanai,* is now known as the Babban (or Chief) Alkali. Its holder nominated qualified candidates for the emir to appoint as Alkalis at the new courts at Baure and Mai Aduwa.

The Babban Alkali at Daura also had two untitled assistants, a scribe *(magatakarda)* who kept his court records, and a *danwanka,* who supervised the ritual ablutions of litigants or witnesses before they took the Koranic oath. Formerly this oath was sworn in the local mosque, the Alkali being absent; but nowadays he watches the swearing himself. The junior Alkali at Mai Aduwa also had a Sarkin Takarda (Chief of Paper—or Scribe) to assist him; while at Baure the title of Hauni, formerly borne by the executioner at Hausa Daura, was attached to the Alkali.

The roster of titles reserved at Zango for women of the royal dynasty remained unchanged together with their roles, except that in 1958 the Magajiya Karya title was vacant and Iya had lost her traditional *lawanai,* the Sarkin Masu and Dan Baroka, who specialized, respectively, in witchcraft and magic. The old title of Magaji Bayamadi, formerly attached to the chief and reserved for descendants of the legendary Karbagari was also vacant and may perhaps have lapsed. These omissions from its recent table of offices may indicate an increased awareness at Daura of the need to observe the formal requirements of Islam more closely. The jihad and subsequent wars had failed to effect such changes; but modern conditions have achieved this by bringing the Daura Hausa into extensive and continuous contact with Fulani Muslims from the emirates of Katsina and Kano.

The chart includes the new nonterritorial organs of government, only some of which have the status of true *sarauta,* as a separate order under its most senior member, the Madawaki. The history, nature, and status of these offices have been discussed elliptically above. In general, each department of the N.A. has a representative in each of the administrative districts of the chiefdom. District representatives of these N.A. departments are normally addressed as "Malam" in charge of some particular sphere of action, such as farming, sanitation, or education. Thus the Malamin Daji controls the Native Authority bush reserves within his district, each of which has a resident Sarkin Dawa (Forest Warden), who reports trespasses to the Malamin Daji and carries out approved conservation and reforestation projects. The rules that regulate such technical activities are made by the Native Authority with the approval of the provincial administration and generally replicate rules that have proved successful elsewhere. District representatives of the various departments are required to see that these N.A. bylaws and regulations are locally observed. They are also required to promote public support for new developments in their work.

Besides responsibility for organizing and supervising all local elections, the Madawaki administers the local elementary schools and a new Senior Primary School. In 1958, although there was a primary school in each district of Daura, the literacy rate remained extremely low, especially in the Roman script, which has been adopted for modern Hausa use. As we have seen, in 1958 the Madawaki's title and role were both only five years old at Daura, and their future remained uncertain.

As treasurer the Ma'aji Malam Musa, the son of Hauni Iliyasu, adminis-

tered all emirate funds and was responsible for keeping detailed accounts of all receipts and expenditures. His staff had no titles and were described as *akawu* (clerks) or *ma'aikata* (employees) of the N.A. As treasurer, Ma'aji had a permanent place on the emir's council. Historically the present office of Ma'aji can be regarded as an evolutionary combination and development of roles formerly discharged by the Dan Sanwai, Shamaki, and Mutuwalli. In much the same way the prison warder, Yari, is a modern successor of the old Ajiya and has eleven warders under him, some of whom supervise the prisons attached to the Alkali's courts at Mai Aduwa and Baure. Nowadays in lieu of the traditional *al'adu* which the Ajiya enjoyed, prisoners are clothed and fed at the state's expense from earmarked allocations.

In 1958 the new office of Wazirin Ayyuka in charge of N.A. public works supervised the Sarkin Tafarki, who administered work on local roads and highways, and the Malamin Rijiya—Bulkacima's successor—who had charge of the siting and construction of new wells throughout the chiefdom. Another titled subordinate on whom the Wazirin Ayyuka could call as needed for particular jobs was the Magajin Gini (Chief of Builders), the modern equivalent of the old Sarkin Gini. However, as the Magajin Gini's office was not recognized by the provincial administration as part of the Daura establishment, it carried no regular salary. In 1958 Daura still depended on the much larger and better equipped Public Works Department of Katsina emirate for mechanical and electrical installations and repairs. Finally, the Wazirin Ayyuka also supervised another "unestablished" official, namely, the Sarkin Tashar (Station), or Malamin Tashar, as he was often called, who administered the Native Administration truck parks and collected the fees prescribed for their use. Since the town had no garages, the Sarkin Tashar reported engine trouble to the Wazirin Ayyuka, who would then send an N.A. mechanic to repair the vehicle, the fees charged being payable to the Daura N.A. The Sarkin Tashar is clearly a modern transformation of the old Sarkin Zango.

The organization by which the Wakilin Daji supervised forestry, the Wakilin Gona supervised agriculture, the Malamin Tsabta supervised sanitation, the Malamin Asibiti supervised health services, and the Malamin Dabobi supervised veterinary services has been sketched obliquely above.[24] Until 1958 the headships of these five departments were not recognized at Daura as equivalents of traditional *sarautu,* since they were all subject to the Ma'aji for financial supervision, to the Madawaki for guidance on new programs, and to the various district heads for executive support. Nonetheless, excluding the offices of Madawaki and Ma'aji, new departmental headships are treated as units of identical status by the provincial administration.

Until the new position of Malamin Tsabta (Sanitary Superintendent) was introduced, public sanitation at the capital was the responsibility of the Sarkin Shara (Chief of Sweeping), a menial title introduced at British behest. As these titles imply, while the Sarkin Shara was only employed to sweep the streets, markets, and public places, the Malamin Tsabta does none of these

things but inspects private and public premises. In 1958 the old Sarkin Shara, having retired, lived at the palace and served the emir as an occasional messenger.

In 1958 the emirate had a police force of forty-one men under the Sarkin Yandoka, who was assisted by a Wakilin Doka and a Saji (Sergeant). Each district headquarters had one or two constables attached to it at the disposal of the district head. Individuals arrested at his direction were placed in the care of the local Yari (Warder) until called to trial by the Alkali.

Of the traditional occupational offices, only the titles of Sarkin Pawa, Korama, Sarkin Shanu, Sarkin Makera, and Magajin Aska persisted at Daura in 1958. The Sarkin Pawa still supervised the city market; maintained order therein; collected the monthly market dues; and through his assistant, the Sarkin Shanu, directed butchers bringing cattle for slaughter to the sanitary superintendent, the slaughter yard, and the veterinary malam for inspection and license. Through his Sarkin Shanu, the Sarkin Pawa also supervised the proper preparation of hides and skins, which were tanned near his compound. Although originally he received an official salary for these services, the Sarkin Pawa was subsequently "disestablished" by the provincial administration and now draws no stipend.

Of other surviving occupational offices in the modern context, the most important is that of Magajin Gini, which besides its traditional responsibilities for the emir's palace, the mosque, official compounds, and other public buildings, is now called on as required by the Wazirin Ayyuka to help with new constructions. The Sarkin Lafiya survives as village head of Yanduna and retains his role as ritual head of the local Maguzawa. The traditional titles of Sarkin Noma and Sarkin Gabas, which the Sarkin Lafiya of old bestowed, also persist with little change of substance or status.

As *fadawa* in 1958 the chief retained the Dan Bajida, the Sarkin Fada, and the Sarkin Zagi. Following separation of the public treasury from the chief's private purse, his personal reserves of clothing, valuables, grain, and the like were placed in the care of the Ubandawakin Shamaki, a new role whose title indicates its derivation from the office of Shamaki, which had lapsed by 1958. Like the Sarkin Zagi and the ex-Sarkin Shara, the Ubandawakin Shamaki then lived in the palace, while the Dan Bajida, who commanded the palace guard, and the Sarkin Fada, the chief's usher and messenger, lived elsewhere. In addition the chief retained the traditional troupe of throne musicians, the Dan Tomo, Dakama, Magajin Turu, and Magajin Tambari, who preserved their ancient dynastic and ritual roles, while the Sarkin Busa, Sarkin Makada, and Sankira continued to serve as secular court musicians.

Of traditional offices of Hausa Daura, by 1958 the following were vacant or had lapsed: the title of Kaura and all its *lawanai*—Madaba, Kusheyi, Sarka, Dan Kwaba, Sarkin Dawaki, Sarkin Fada, Sarkin Diya, Gilu, and Dan Takora; most of the offices traditionally attached as *lawanai* to the Galadima title—namely, Dan Hungumi, Binoni, Matsai, Magayaki, Yekuwa, Dan Bawo, and Sarkin Fada; the old princely offices of Yerima,

Haska, and perhaps the Samba'a; but of female titles, only the Magajiya Karya; of slave titles, the Sarkin Bai, the Sarkin Ruwa, the Bai Karama, and other *lawanai* of Sarkin Bai; the Fada Babba, Makama, Shentali, Guyama, Jekafada, Dan Maza, Sarkin Garka, Sarkin Lifidi and Sarkin Jarmai had also lapsed. As indicated above, the title of Sarkin Dogarai has gradually evolved into that of Sarkin Yandoka; the Ajiya, into Yari; and the office of Hauni has been attached to that of the Alkalin Baure. The traditional offices of the Sarkin Yara and the Turaki have now been appropriated by the dynasty. Of the ancient clerical order, the titles of Magajin Malam, Samba'a, Mardandana, and Dan Kurege, which were formerly attached to the Dan Sanwai, have now disappeared. Of the traditional *fadawa* order, the titles of Dan Barau, Magaji Dankakulema, Barage, Barde, and Sarkin Karma had lapsed by 1958. Of the occupational order, this was also true of the Madugu, Sarkin Dillalai, Sarkin Marina, Magaji Bayamadi, Dan Baroka, and Sarkin Masu offices. The old Bulkacima is recognizably the prototype of the modern Malamin Rijiya; the traditional Shamaki survives in his successor, the Ubandawakin Shamaki; the Sarkin Gini, in the Magajin Gini; while the Sarkin Tafarki has changed his role without changing his title. Part of the Dan Maza's role is now performed by the Sarkin Pawa'a *lawani,* Sarkin Shanu.

Of titles established at Daura in 1958, the office of Magajin Gari has its local prototype in that of Magaji; but several *lawanai* and titled *wakilai* and *wazirai* are clearly innovations, as are the titles of Wambai, Madawaki, and Ma'aji. With the exceptions already mentioned, all new departmental offices represent innovations, as do such titles as Sarkin Shara, Ubandawakin Shamaki, and Sarkin Tashar. The modern office of Ubandawaki has prototypes that hark back beyond the Fulani regime and the eighteenth century.

Traditional offices which have undergone significant changes of status, despite their persistence, include the princely titles of Murka and Maiwa, Magaji and Bunturawa. The roles of the Limam, Babban Alkali, Dan Sanwai, Hauni, and Sarkin Lafiya have also changed. So, too—but most profoundly—has the role of the emir.

Some Reservations

We have now completed our ethnographic and historical account of the affairs of Daura. In preceding chapters I have tried to trace the main course of the chiefdom's development through the mass of concrete particulars in which these movements found their form and impetus. I have tried to see how the traditional forms, substance, and spirit of the old Hausa polity persisted and changed over time by inquiring how this ancient model affected the different regimes that replaced it at different times and places. Undoubtedly this record contains many errors and omissions, but perhaps these are together only a small part of the whole. Readers will note that on principle I have refused to simplify the data, to exclude awkward information, or to

accept interpretations simply because they happened to be convenient. The errors in this account represent the limitations of available knowledge and technique rather than those of good faith in my colleagues at Daura, but these errors, uncertainties, and gaps should not be overemphasized. They do not invalidate the preceding account or destroy its utility as a record of Daura.

Throughout the fieldwork and analysis I have tried to develop as comprehensive, detailed, and accurate an account of Daura's traditional organization and historical experience as possible, because of their theoretical significance and their inherent interest and to preserve an adequate record. None would deny that this tiny emirate has experienced a most remarkable series of political upheavals and transformations during the past one hundred and sixty years. Any analysis of these developments presumes their recovery and comprehensive recitation, but to yield its true significance, such a historical account presupposes an equally systematic and comprehensive account of the traditional procedures and structures through which the people were organized as a society and a state. In short, while ethnography without history is misleading, history without adequate ethnography loses its meanings—for those who experienced it and also for social science.

8
Analysis

PRELIMINARIES

The Course Ahead

We set out to seek invariant relations within the processes of political development and change related above. To this end I shall first apply the methods employed in the analysis of political change at Zaria in order to test the three generalizations derived from that study.[1] Then I shall reanalyze the history of Daura to determine whether it reveals any uniformities in the changing conditions of its corporate organization. We may then compare the results of these two analyses to see whether they converge or diverge, whether they support or contradict each other, and whether they may be combined to yield further insight into the processes and conditions of political change.

To pursue these inquiries economically, I shall discuss the history of Daura during the nineteenth century before reviewing developments after the British arrived. I do so for the following reasons: first, the Anglo-French pacification and boundary adjustments, followed by the abolition, creation, revival, and amalgamation of chiefdoms, so radically restructured the political context of the native states as to terminate the previous political era; and second, the British intrusion was followed rapidly by the removal of Zango from vassalage to Zinder, by the abolition of the vassalage of Fulani Daura to the sultan of Sokoto, and then by the abolition of two of the three surviving Daura states, thereby fundamentally transforming the preceding political map of this region. Such transformations illustrate radical differences in the conditions and character of political life before and under colonialism in this area. It is therefore appropriate that my discussion of the two periods should reflect these differences.

In reviewing the precolonial history of Daura, however, I face several problems. My information is unevenly distributed among the three nineteenth-century states of Zango, Baure, and Fulani Daura and also between

the first and second half of the nineteenth century. We know little of Fulani Daura before the reign of Mai Gurdo; and for Baure, despite a longer time span, the data are equally thin. The political ethnography of both these states is substantially fuller than the historical record. Nonetheless, for the limited time spans and processes to which they refer, these historical data may allow us to test such conclusions as we can derive from the experience of Zango, at least negatively. I propose, then, to examine the history of Zango from 1800 to 1906 in some detail before proceeding to analyze developments in this century. Moreover, having discussed the development of Zango, I shall test, where possible, the conclusions it yields against the known histories of Baure and Fulani Daura as best I can. We may then submit these tentative conclusions to a further test provided by developments at Daura in this century, before and after the Hausa restoration.

This procedure omits any discussion of the prejihadic history of the Hausa state, about which we know far less than of its ethnography; but it assumes the comparability of Baure, Zango, and Fulani Daura, all of which derived historically from the prejihadic state. However, since these successor states differed significantly in their situations, experiences, and regimes, it is advisable first to ask whether they can be validly regarded as variants of a common form and whether we may regard their several histories as equivalent for purposes of analysis. To facilitate their comparison, I shall include relevant data on their common prejihadic parent; but the comparison rests on an implicit assumption that insofar as these polities, however divergent, share a common basic structure, their separate developments will also reflect the influence of any conditions which uniformly regulate the processes of change in these states. My chief goal is thus to seek out such uniformities in the processes of structural change and to test or, if possible, develop the generalizations made about such processes on the basis of developments at Zaria. Before proceeding I shall inquire whether the several Daura states are variants of a common form, of which the Zaria regimes were also examples.

Precolonial Daura States

To facilitate rapid and systematic comparison of these states, I tabulate the distribution of certain structural features below, indicating their differential intensities, where known, as well as their presence or absence and any uncertainties or ambiguities in the data. Of thirty-one features itemized in table 15, the first seven are the formal categories employed to analyze the successive forms of Zaria state from 1804 to 1950.[2] In order to demonstrate relations of logical priority, each of these seven categories must assume all its antecedents in the order presented in the table. Together these seven categories provide the simplest general description of the type of state illustrated by the successive regimes at Zaria, as well as Daura and its successor states. However, being purely formal, these categories are linked by relations of logical

priority or presupposition on the one hand and by succession and dependence on the other. Of the seven principles, the first and most general, namely, status differentiation, applies equally to units within particular status systems and to the systems themselves, regarded as units in wider fields of comparable structures. For example, such chiefdoms as Baure, Zango, and Fulani Daura were differentiated and ranked as status units; and as the record shows, a given chiefdom sometimes experienced radical status transformations in the course of history through defeat, conquest, or other forms of subjugation. In short, besides distinguishing the components of status systems, the condition of status differentiation applies also to such systems themselves as units articulated provisionally or empirically vis-à-vis one another.

The second notable feature of these seven fundamental categories is the specificity of the last six, all of which refer only to offices as units of government or public regulation. However, as we have seen,[3] office is only one of several corporate forms that together regulate the public affairs of human collectivities. In the analysis of governmental changes at Zaria, offices were treated as the only governmental units whose articulations defined the political structure. In this sense, governmental change was identified by changes in the relationships of various offices, themselves regarded as efficient units of the political and administrative subsystems. The formalism and narrowness of this approach has been properly criticized;[4] and although these conceptions were probably sufficient for the analysis of political change at Zaria, it is desirable to extend the original scheme to include all corporate forms as agencies of public regulation. This extension should enable us to see whether and to what degree structural changes in the conditions and articulations of the inclusive corporate organization correspond with changes in the conditions and articulation of the official system. The reanalysis of Zango's history in the chapter that follows attempts to explore these possibilities while extending the analytic scheme to include all politically relevant forms of corporation.

Besides these seven basic structural features, the four Daura states exhibited the following common characteristics: vassalage and tributary relations to some superordinate state (items 8 and 9 in table 15); territorial administration through fiefs (13); state councils to deliberate policy, to conduct war, and to regulate the succession (15 to 18); and distinctions between hereditary and nonhereditary offices (23). In all four states some titles were reserved for women of royal descent (20), though these differed in number and significance. It is evident that the features listed as items 13, 15 to 18, 20, and 21 in table 15 illustrate the more general features 3, 5, and 6 above. Likewise, itmes 8 to 12 specify the differential statuses of these chiefdoms as instances of the most general principle, status differentiation. Items 13 to 22 similarly differentiate the various offices of these states by investing distinctive combinations of principles 2 to 7 with appropriate contents. By contrast, the several states differ significantly in the features tabulated as items 10 to 12, 14,

TABLE 15

Some Features of State Organization in Prejihadic Daura, Fulani Daura, Baure, and Zango

Structural features	Hausa Daura c. 1800	Fulani Daura 1870+	Baure 1870+	Zango 1850+
1. Status differentiation	+	+	+	+
2. Offices differentiated as perpetual statuses	+	+	+	+
3. Offices differentiated by status requirements	+	+	+	+
4. Chiefship as the most senior office	+	+	+	+
5. Rank organization of offices	+	+	+	+
6. Role differentiation of offices	+	+	+	+
7. Promotions restricted to offices with identical status requirements	+	+	+	+
8. Superordinate state	Bornu	Sokoto	Zinder	Zinder
9. Payment of annual and other tribute	+	+	+	+
10. Power to wage war, build fortifications	+	+	-	-
11. Power to impose capital sentences	+	+	-	-
12. Power to alter taxation	+	+	+	post — 1884 = ½
13. Territorial administration by fiefs	+	+	+	+
14. Territorial administration by *tarayya*	+	-	+	+
15. Electoral council	+	+	+	+
16. Senior state council	+	+	+	+
17. Junior state council	+	+	+	+
18. War council	+	+	+	+
19. Princely titles honorific (H) or executive (E)	H	E	E	H
20. Titles for royal women	+	+½	+	+
21. Titled (royal) magicians	+	-	+	+
22. Titled (ritual) throne musicians	+	-	+	+
23. Distinction between hereditary & other offices	+	+	+	+
24. Magajiya may overrule the chief	+	-	-	+
25. Chief administers through slave staffs	-	+	½	-
26. Oligarchic control (0), Autocracy (A)	0	A	?	?
27. Subversion by free officials prominent	-	-	+	+

TABLE 15 (Continued)

Structural features	Hausa Daura c. 1800	Fulani Daura 1870+	Baure 1870+	Zango 1850+
28. Sources of opposition to chief	Senior council	-	Kaura, S. Fada, Turaki	Kaura
29. Patrimonialization	-	+	½	-
30. Subdivision of state	-	-	-	1877+
31. Emphasis on constitutionalism	+	-	-	+

19, 20-22, and 24 to 29. Thus, the first seven principles listed in table 15 subsume all central features common to these states. In consequence these seven principles together simultaneously furnish an adequate minimum description of the type of government illustrated by these Daura states and align their basic structural conditions in a common order of logical priority and succession. While these commonalities reflect the historical derivation of the three successor states from a common parent, they also indicate the substantial failure of the Fulani to constitute a new political order consistent with the reformist proclamations and injunctions of their leader, the Shehu Usman.[5]

It will be noticed that the third feature listed in table 15 distinguishes criteria that governed eligibility to differing offices in these regimes. Such criteria are themselves subsumed by the second principle, which defines offices as distinct, perpetual statuses. However, besides criteria of eligibility for particular offices, this second principle subsumes all status conditions that serve to differentiate offices from one another and thus includes the full range of rights, obligations, resources, privileges, and liabilities that together define the status of an office and its relations with other governmental units at any moment. Accordingly, any changes in the rights, resources, obligations, liabilities, or privileges of a particular office will indicate either corresponding changes in its status and relations to other governmental units or changes in the status of the system as a whole vis-à-vis some external unit of equivalent order. It is necessary, then, to recognize that the particular conditions which differentiate offices as concrete political entities vary in kind and in their significance for the relations and capacities of these units.

Table 15 also reveals significant differences among these Daura states. These differences may be classified either as intrinsic to each polity or as extrinsic and incidental to their relations of vassalage. For example, as direct consequences of domination by Zinder, the chiefs of Zango and Baure progressively lost their military autonomy, their freedom to fortify local settlements, their rights to order executions or mutilations in their own courts, and so on. By contrast, although subordinate to Bornu and to Sokoto, the

chiefs of Daura before and after the jihad routinely enjoyed these powers. Such differing autonomies illustrate differences in the status and relations of these chiefdoms and their rulers in their differing contexts of vassalage. Likewise, as indirect results of their subordination to Zinder, the chiefs of Zango and Baure were repeatedly exposed to subversion by their senior free officials; and after 1877 the state of Zango was virtually subdivided between its Kaura and chief. By contrast neither the prejihadic Hausa state nor the Fulani emirate was exposed to such endogenous subversion, despite their vassal status. Evidently, then, Zinder exercised a more intensive and onerous supervision over Zango and Baure than either Bornu or Sokoto exercised over Hausa and Fulani Daura. How far such intensive and continuous intervention by the suzerain was fostered or obstructed by the differing political organizations of these states, we shall determine later on.

Items 20 to 22 in table 15 indicate certain features that distinguish Fulani Daura from the Hausa states as direct expressions of its Muslim Fulani origin. The elimination of titular throne magicians was clearly prescribed by the Shehu's jihadic commitments; but the reduction of titles for royal women and the abrogation of the Magajiya's institutional role also reflect specifically Fulani orientations. Zango and Baure retained the official magicians and palace musicians they had inherited from their parent state; but at Baure also the Magajiya lost her constitutional role when the founder of that state, Tsoho, left her office vacant for a period sufficient to free his chiefship finally from its control. Thus, only in Zango and Hausa Daura could the Magajiya formally overrule or depose the chief, and only in Zango and Daura before the jihad were constitutional restraints on the authority and power of the chief institutionalized by effective council procedures and upheld by political doctrines as ideals. By contrast, at Baure and Fulani Daura the chief's power was restrained only by executive dependence on his senior officials, by dynastic rivalries and interests in the succession, and by risks of the suzerain's intervention. At Fulani Daura, where the suzerain avoided intervention, this enabled strong emirs such as Mamman Bello and Mai Gurdo to rule as autocrats; but at Baure, where chiefs were repeatedly deposed on charges launched by free officials, often at the suggestion of their dynastic rivals, autocracy was restricted in its scope and duration. Nonetheless, neither Baure nor Fulani Daura upheld those ideals of limited monarchy which Zango preserved as an essential feature of the traditional constitution of its parent state.

As a consequence of such ideological and material restraints on their chiefs, decisive power in prejihadic Daura and Zango lay formally with an oligarchy of senior free and slave officials, of whom the most prominent were the Kaura, Galadima, Dan Sanwai, Sarkin Bai, Shentali, Fada Babba, and Sarkin Yara. Of these, the Kaura and Galadima enjoyed preeminence in status, resources, authority, and power. Together they could dominate the state councils and administration, the army, the capital, and the electoral council. They could accordingly restrain the chief's desire to appoint or dis-

miss men holding public office. While the Kaura commanded the army, the Galadima supervised the dynasty and mediated relations between the princes and the chief. Together these senior councillors could oblige the Magajiya to suspend the chief's decisions and decrees or even to depose him in extreme circumstances. However, no instances of a chief's deposition at Daura before the jihad are firmly established, although the king list suggests that several early chiefs, Yabau (14), Ada Inda (24), and Kamu (36), may have lost their thrones in this way.[6] Yet even if we do not interpret this lack of prehihadic depositions at Daura as evidence of the council's political predominance, its constitutional ideals and doctrines identify the traditional regime as explicitly oligarchic. Its chiefs succeeded in turn as trustees for the dynasty, whose political estate was administered by the Kaura and Galadima and protected by the Magajiya acting on their advice.

As constituted by Tsoho, Baure contrasts sharply with this model. There, without a Magajiya, the chief was constitutionally and empirically an autocrat, free to appoint or to dismiss officials without the assent of his senior council or fear of the Magajiya's intervention. In practice the power of Baure chiefs was effectively limited by the abilities of free officials to secure their deposition by Zinder on charges of disloyalty which were often laid against them at the instigation of dynastic rivals. Thus, at Baure chiefly aspirations to autocratic rule rendered the tenure of chiefship insecure. Such chiefly claims to arbitrary power were perceived as illegitimate repudiations of the prejihadic Daura constitution and restrained by equally illegitimate conduct from officials and princes.

At Zango, however, those ideological commitments to uphold the prejihadic constitution that enabled the Kaura and Galadima to restrain the chief's autonomy did not ensure security for the chief. As at Baure, so at Zango, all chiefs after Nuhu were deposed by the sultans of Zinder. However, as far as we know, at Zango these depositions owed very little to princely aspirations and rivalry. All were initiated and engineered by the Kauras Mazawaje and Bakula, who thereby aggrandized their office and power while subverting and threatening to destroy the chiefship. Indeed, in comparison with parallel developments under the autocratic regime at Baure, Tanimu's reorganization of Zango in 1877, which virtually split that chiefdom in two, clearly reveals the greater vulnerability of the chiefdom dedicated to limited monarchy. Nonetheless, we should not attribute the insecurity of either chieftaincy under Zinder's rule solely to its constitutional regimes, since the more extreme disruptions experienced by Zango merely reflect the monopoly of Zinder's ear which its Kauras enjoyed as against the multiple competing sources of subversion at Baure.

In contrast with Zango and Baure, Fulani Daura exhibits an autocracy unrestrained either by oligarchic control or by extrasystemic interventions of the suzerain. The oligarchs of Fulani Daura, the Kwassarawa, Alibawa, and other Fulani lineages whose privileges flowed from their participation in the jihad and from M. Ishi'aku's settlement thereafter, depended for preserva-

tion of their estates on an effective centralization of Fulani authority and resources by the emirs for deployment against the subjugated majority. This situation enabled different emirs to concentrate territorial jurisdiction in their own hands and to appropriate resources for princes and throne slaves, with the result that their successors increasingly relied on the latter as their primary political and administrative instruments in contexts of dynastic conflict. This situation finally induced Mai Gurdo to transfer the offices of Sarkin Rafi, Shentali, Kaura, Sarkin Yara, and Galadima, hitherto all reserved for Fulani descent-groups and free men of noble status, to the custody of throne slaves. He could then suspend the office of Alkali by leaving this vacant on the death of Awulu in 1898 and so complete the conversion of the patrimonial chieftaincy initiated by M. Ishi'aku into a full-fledged sultanism based on the wholesale expropriation of officeholding lineages.[7]

By thus expanding the role of throne slaves in public administration, Mai Gurdo exalted his own power and neutralized his dynastic opponents. The Yerima Loto's revolt which followed was swiftly suppressed. As autocrat, Mai Gurdo controlled the dynasty, palace staff, and the Fulani nobility alike; but by thus inflating the administrative roles of throne slaves while disassociating himself from the nobles and the dynasty, he inadvertently transformed the slave administration into a political force capable of threatening and ultimately of destroying the chiefship and the state by removing them from all restraints except the personal power of the chief. Mai Gurdo thus converted the familistic patrimonial regime he had inherited from Mamman Bello into an undiluted but unstable sultanism, though he probably assumed that he had firmly institutionalized the power appropriated by this transformation and thus guaranteed an unchallengeable future for the chiefship. However, by his sheer success he had stripped that institution of effective allies and safeguards against the senior throne slaves who now administered the state and controlled the bulk of its political resources. Given his overwhelming personal power, Mai Gurdo encountered no direct challenge from these slave officials during his lifetime; nonetheless, his senior slave, the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo, ceased to attend the council with impunity once the Kaura's office had passed to slaves. The signs of future trouble were plain for all to see. In creating his slave-based sultanism, Mai Gurdo had finally destabilized the chiefship by destroying those essential institutional supports which had previously served to restrain it.

Thus, despite their common basic form, these four states differed significantly in their political organization and character. As far as we know, prejihadic Daura was a stable constitutional monarchy, traditionalistic in its orientations and procedures. The Hausa at Zango endeavored to preserve the form and details of this traditional regime, the more so as their order foundered; but under Zinder's rule, this oligarchic regime allowed the Kauras first to sabotage and then to subordinate the chieftaincy by invoking the sultan's power until the state was finally split between Kaura and chief. Thus Zango most nearly experienced paralysis and dissolution as a state. By

contrast, at Baure, despite the insecurity and deposition of chiefs through local subversion, the regime retained its autocratic character and integrity. At Fulani Daura, on the other hand, Mai Gurdo converted the old patrimonial regime into an absolute monarchy by transferring the few remaining important free offices to throne slaves whose persons and fortunes he controlled at will. Thus, although these four states illustrate a common form of polity, they differ significantly in their properties, character, and organizations. One, prejihadic Daura, illustrates a monarchy limited by oligarchic institutions enshrined in its constitution and history. A second, Zango, which upheld this constitutional ideal, stood so long and perilously on the edge of dissolution that some may well ask whether its state remained intact after Tanimu's reorganization of 1877. Baure, the third, was an imperfect patrimonial autocracy in which subversion restrained or removed the chiefs. Finally, at Fulani Daura, Mai Gurdo transformed the institutional authority of the chieftaincy into a purely personal, arbitrary, and isolated power by measures that destroyed those traditional supports of the office implicit in its preexisting constitutional restraints. Thus, the basic formal features shared by these states did not exclude radically different organizations of authority and power within them. Neither did the common formal bases of these regimes obstruct their divergent and substantial transformations by internal or external forces or by variable mixtures of both. Initiated as a patriarchal regime, the Fulani emirate moved steadily toward sultanism under the momentum of dynastic competitions and conflicts generated entirely within and by its organization. Conversely, although initiated as a patrimonial autocracy, Baure swung like a pendulum between chiefly absolutism and chiefly subversion as the suzerain's power was mobilized by local officials and princes threatened by the increasing power of successive chiefs. Finally, Lukudi's community, committed by their desire for restoration to uphold the constitution of prejihadic Daura, experienced progressive and cumulative processes of segmentation until their state was virtually rent in twain. Nonetheless, that the conversions and transformations of political organization experienced by these states were not sufficient to alter their common foundations is shown by the fact that the first seven principles listed in table 15, which together describe the general form of these polities, hold for each equally and at all points of its development. For example, in 1806 and in 1906 alike, the Fulani regime was based on status differentiation, on unique, perpetual offices that were distributed among diverse status groups and differentiated by rank, by role, and by their promotional alignments. The same observation holds for Baure and Zango at all points in their histories, as well as for the parent Hausa state. Accordingly, those changes of political organization and character that these units experienced during the processes just reviewed illustrated realignments and redistributions of status, power, authority, and resources which are all equally consistent with persistence of the common basic framework defined by the first seven principles of table 15. To rephrase the point rather differently, the diverse sequences of change

experienced by these states assumed the continued validity of these seven formal categories as the framework for a political order whose direction, preservation, or modification provided the primary motives and goals of political contest at the same time that their progressively divergent structures and contexts generated and canalized political strife and promoted their progressive transformations. Accordingly, while these several states are variants of a common political form and thus equally subject to the logical requisites and entailments of the principles that constituted them, the remarkable differences in their character and development noted above oblige us to investigate the relationships between the changing content and persisting structures of these polities with special care.

Before proceeding further, however, we should perhaps consider whether Zango did indeed survive Tanimu's reorganization of 1877 as a single political unit organized on the seven principles listed above and was thus governed by their logical relations, for only if this is so can we treat Zango from 1877 to 1903 as a unit of the same order as Baure and Fulani Daura in the following analysis.

Political Status of Zango

Although the issue seems obvious, it needs precise formulation. Initially we might ask, was Zango a single unit or system after Tanimu's reorganization of 1877? This neutral phrasing raises the further question, what kind of unit or system do we have in mind—state, government, polity, or some other? Much needless and analytically trivial argument sometimes surrounds the concept of the state. Empirically, however, this notion has three alternative referents: first, it might denote a collectivity organized as an autonomous, centralized unit under its own representatives and institutions, that is to say, its government; second, it might denote an autonomous or discrete government as an integrated orderly complex of procedures, institutions, and personnel, distinct from the collectivity it regulates; third, the concept may denote certain ideas about the collectivity, regime, or both together held by some individual, segment, or stratum within or outside the unit.

These ambiguities are compounded by definitions of some authors that stress sovereignty as the decisive characteristic of states. However, the criteria of sovereignty thus invoked are neither obvious nor clear. Max Weber, who seeks to specify the decisive criteria of sovereignty clearly but narrowly, defines the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims a *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."[8] This would suggest that political communities subject to occupation by victorious enemies following their defeat in war—for example, the Axis powers in 1945—thereby lose their existence as states, as would all colonial or other types of externally controlled polities. In Weber's formula, however, de facto jurisdiction is not the ultimate test of sovereignty; rather this consists

in the legitimate right to employ force within a territory.[9] Precisely how we may objectively assess and determine such claims of legitimacy, Weber fails to indicate;[10] and in the absence of such decisive criteria, we are obliged to restrict his concept of the state to those territorial units in which the de jure and de facto governments enjoy sufficiently general obedience for us to assume corresponding public support for their claims to legitimacy. Unfortunately such usage would deny that many political units which enjoy popular and legal recognition as states merit this status; and as Durkheim long ago observed, it would also exclude centrally organized nomadic societies that uphold effective legitimate rulers on the grounds that they lack firm territorial boundaries.[11] Such exceptions indicate that "*monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the state nor a universal test of sovereignty.

This conclusion confronts us squarely with the task of specifying other criteria of sovereignty or the state. Since any unit that exercises centralized control over a delimited collectivity must possess corresponding autonomy and legal authority, then without attempting to enumerate the various affairs that units of differing scale, range, and kind might regulate in their differing collectivities, we may substitute for the obscure but absolute conception of sovereignty the empirical notion of an autonomy which, however variable, must always be sufficient to ensure independent central regulation of those collective affairs reserved for government in states of differing scope and situation. On this criterion states may be defined either as aggregates endowed with autonomous central agencies that regulate public affairs, or more narrowly as the central regulative institutions of such collectivities. Thus, in the wider sense the state is a centralized collectivity whose autonomy and resources will vary with the type and range of affairs it is expected to regulate. In the narrower sense the state is identified with the central institutions that regulate the collective affairs of a discrete and internally autonomous public. The scope and range of affairs subject to such central regulation will vary situationally and historically in any unit as an effect of endogenous and exogenous circumstances. However, all that is required to constitute a state are, first, the existence of a central authority recognized as discrete and supreme and, second, the capacity of that central authority to regulate autonomously those collective affairs reserved at any given period for it.

This conception of the state corresponds closely with the definition of the polity given earlier, particularly in its dual reference and criteria. There we defined the polity as alternatively denoting "the social unit to which a political system relates" and "in its narrower meaning . . . the political system or government as a discrete continuous system of regulatory activities."[12] However, states are not the only type of polities; and in uncentralized or acephalous regimes, "as a formally distinctive system of governmental activities and relations, the polity is coextensive with the society it incorporates and delimits."[13] Thus "in one sense, the term denotes a distinctive form of political organization; in another it refers to the society of which this is the politi-

cal form.''[14] Except that states are distinguished from other polities by their central institutions, the two conceptions are very similar. Accordingly we may rephrase the original question to ask whether it is meaningful to describe Zango after 1877 as a single polity or state, despite Tanimu's radical reorganization. The problem then becomes whether Tanimu did divide the original polity in two or whether the chiefship retained its senior status at Zango after 1877. Alternatively, did the Kaura administer a separate state under Tanimu's dispensation, or was he merely endowed with due autonomy vis-à-vis the chief to administer one-half of the Zango state? More formally and precisely, perhaps, we may ask whether the autonomous jurisdiction with which Tanimu endowed Bakula did not divide the Zango state into two separate chiefdoms as effectively as the princely secessions had established Magaria and Baure.

The relevant data having already been reported, we need only consider here their significance for the immediate issue, namely, whether after 1877 Zango became one state or two. Briefly, our data indicate the persistence of the state as a single political unit, despite its perilous condition with duplicate and competing officialdoms, jurisdictions, tax policies, and the like. Notwithstanding these profound divisions, the following evidence nonetheless indicates the persistence of Zango as a single polity or state: (1) the Kaura still commanded the Zango military forces by traditional right of office; (2) the Kaura still sat as head of the senior state council of Zango under the traditional constitution; (3) he was still the senior elector by right of office; (4) although Tanimu received the *kudin sarauta* on appointing Bakula as Kaura, Tafida received the *yankai,* thus signifying Tanimu's recognition of Tafida's position as the Kaura's immediate superior and chief of Zango; (5) by securing the deposition of Sule in 1886, Bakula demonstrated his participation in the state of Zango and his recognition of the seniority of its chief. Likewise, by securing the appointment of Galadima Jatau in return for various fiefs, Bakula demonstrated the strategic advantages of his ambiguous position within the Zango state. In similar fashion Suleiman, the sultan of Zinder, illustrated his perception of the unity of Zango in 1866 when he dismissed its chief, Sule, and appointed Yusufu on Bakula's advice. These chiefs themselves exhibited their awareness of the unity of the state in their dealings with Bakula, with other local officials, with Zinder, and with such polities as Kazaure and Baure. Thus, notwithstanding division of its territory, treasury, taxation, tributary arrangements, jurisdiction, and executive powers between the Kaura and the chief after the reorganization of 1877, the sultans and officials of Zinder, the chiefs and Kauras of Zango, and their officials and subjects alike regarded the chiefdom as a continuing unit and oriented their conduct accordingly.

Yet even if we accept this conclusion, we should ask whether the persisting unit represents a state in the same sense as the prejihadic chiefdom or contemporary Baure and Fulani Daura. By 1877 the chiefs of Zango had lost military and diplomatic freedom, together with the rights to order capital

punishment and mutilation in their own courts; thereafter their successors suffered further losses of juridical integrity as the suzerains freely levied fines on local officials and citizens; and when the populace began to settle in Fulani Daura to avoid injustice and oppressive taxation, Tanimu authorized Mai Gurdo to enslave them directly and without the consent of their chief. Again, in 1877 Tanimu removed all resident Beriberi and pastoral Fulani at Zango from the jurisdiction of its officials and chief by attaching them to Zinder. Given these severe inroads on its autonomy, we should therefore ask whether Zango remained a state after 1877 or became a polity of some other kind. That there were many cardinal differences between the chiefdom of Sule and Yusufu and its prejihadic antecedent, none will deny; the question remains whether Zango after 1877 should be regarded as a state like Daura before the jihad. Yet if Zango remained a unit under its hereditary chiefs despite Tanimu's reforms, we can hardly deny its statehood, notwithstanding its juridical division and restricted autonomy. Undoubtedly in this situation Zango's autonomy was so reduced and divided that despite its persistent form as a centralized polity, its integrity and viability as a state were seriously in question. However, if despite the manifest persistence of the seven basic conditions that define all four chiefdoms as variants of a common form, Zango ceased to exhibit the characteristics of a state following Tanimu's intervention in 1877 and became a unit of some other kind, then we should recognize that these seven principles are not specific to states but may also describe other polities of differing type.

The present problem of the status of Zango after 1877 is only one form of the more general question that recurs throughout its history—namely, what are the irreducible and sufficient characteristics of a state? As already observed, sovereignty is certainly not one of these conditions. Although Bornu's vassal, eighteenth-century Daura was clearly a state, though no more sovereign than any colonial states of recent history. Conversely the "sovereignty" of localized segments in acephalous polities certainly does not convert them into states. Yet if sovereignty is not essential to statehood, neither are the seven criteria that together define these Daura chiefdoms. Many states lack hereditary chiefship; many others do not reserve public office for particular status groups or lineages. Such conditions serve to distinguish the type of regime these chiefdoms represent from polities of differing base, irrespective of the question of their statehood. Moreover, the seven criteria that define these Daura chiefdoms are equally applicable to sovereign and nonsovereign polities on the one hand and to oligarchic, patrimonial, or autocratic regimes on the other. As regards the character, scope, and autonomy of such regimes, these predicates are thoroughly unspecific, since the set of seven principles are purely formal.

To indicate the diverse autonomy and scope of these Daura chiefdoms and so to explore the question of Zango's status after 1877, I tabulate our information on their regulatory action under fourteen headings in table 16. This table shows that the Hausa and Fulani chiefdoms of Daura enjoyed much

TABLE 16

Differences in the Conditions of Vassalage of the Four Daura States

Conditions of vassalage	Suzerains				
	Bornu	Sokoto	Zinder	Zinder	
	Hausa Daura c. 1800	Fulani Daura 1870+	Baure 1870	Zango 1850-1876	Zango 1877-1900
1. Effective local choice of chiefs	+	+	-	-	-
2. Effective local choice of Kauras	+	+	+	+	-
3. Effective local choice of Galadimas	+	+	+	+	-
4. Effective local choice of other senior officials	+	+	+	+	1/2
5. Chiefs deposed (a) locally; (b) by suzerain	a	neither	b	b	b
6. Chiefs can dismiss senior officials	+	+	+	all but one	2/3
7. Chiefs can levy troops	+	+	-	1/2	-
8. Chiefs can wage war	+	+	-	-	-
9. Chiefs can build town walls	+	+	-	-	-
10. Chiefs can order execution, mutilation	+	+	-	-	-
11. Chiefs free to alter local taxation	+	+	+	+	1/2
12. Tributary payments low and fixed	+	+	+	?	-
13. Jurisdiction over all residents	+	+	-	+	-
14. Chiefs free to levy cattle tax	+	+	+	+	-

greater autonomy under their suzerains at Bornu and Sokoto than did Baure and Zango under Zinder. The table also shows how badly Zango fared after 1877 by comparison with its junior, Baure. Nonetheless the table obliquely indicates the wide variety of public affairs that remained under local regula-

tion at Zango after that date. These included appointments to most local offices; tax schedules and collection; collection and distribution of *zakka;* administration of the treasury; control of land; adjudication of major and minor suits; the regulation of commerce, including markets and the caravan trade; control of population movements; building and repair of stockades and manufacture and stockpiling of weapons; clandestine diplomacy; transfers of office between lineages and status groups; the creation of new offices and suspension of old ones; transfers of fiefs among officials and the like. Thus, despite the severe restrictions imposed on Baure and Zango, their governments continued to regulate a considerable number of essential interests for their staffs and subjects. The state at Zango accordingly preserved its unity after 1877 despite the depredations of Zinder, since states cannot be defined in terms of their functions or ends;[15] and Zango retained considerable autonomy in certain categories of internal affairs despite the disabilities imposed by Tanimu. In this respect table 16 shows how states of an essentially common type may differ significantly in their autonomy and scope as well as in their extent and population or in their character as oligarchic, autocratic, or mixed regimes. If states are identified by such features as unity, discreteness, centralization, and legitimacy, and if empirical variations in their autonomy and scope are taken into account, then as a discrete political unit under its hereditary chief, Zango remained a state after 1877, however tenuously, since its government continued to regulate those affairs which were essential for the unity, discreteness, and order of the local community.

Problem of Political Continuity

Of equal interest and significance is another question, namely, whether we can correctly regard the state that was ultimately located at Zango as derived directly and continuously from the prejihadic Hausa state. This question also subsumes the derivation of Baure, since Dan Shufini's secession followed after Lukudi's accession on the death of Sarkin Gwari Abdu. However, since the continuity of the Hausa state during the reigns of Abdurrahman and Lukudi presents the critical issues, we may discuss this problem solely with reference to their reigns and regimes. It will be evident that questions about the continuity of the Hausa state in these two reigns involve the preceding issue of the essential attributes of a state in another form.

According to the Daura Chronicle, after his defeat the Sarkin Gwari Abdu withdrew to Kworgum, where he spent six months, and moved thence to Kance, Damagaram, and Miria, to which he returned after vainly visiting Nguru to seek help from Bornu. For nine years the Sarkin Gwari remained at Miria before moving to Kalgo, where he spent the next four years; he then went to Sallewa ta Kuykuyo, where he lived for six and a half years before moving to Yekuwa, where "he collected his kingdom together, all but the city of Daura."[16] Thus, according to this record, from 1807 to 1825 the Sar-

kin Gwari lived as a chief without a chiefdom outside his lost dominions. May we say then that the Hausa state continued throughout this period, or must we say that it ceased to exist while the Sarkin Gwari remained in exile?

It seems probable that before or after Abdu's withdrawal from Kworgum and Kance, M. Ishi'aka and his Fulani allies overran most of the chiefdom and overawed its inhabitants. The contingents led by Namoda and M. Musa may have withdrawn to other theaters of war shortly after the victory at Daura, leaving Ishi'aka and the local Fulani masters of the Hausa state. According to tradition, Sarkin Gwari made three attempts to retake the city, of which the first was perhaps in 1809. Unsuccessful in these endeavors, he nonetheless reestablished his dominion over the sparsely populated eastern districts of his former chiefdom. Thus we have to ask whether the Hausa state continued to exist during Sarkin Gwari's prolonged absence at Miria and Kalgo. Precisely the same question applies whenever the government of a country defeated in war withdraws beyond the victor's reach and continues or prepares to resume the conflict, as, for example, the governments of Norway, Poland, Holland, and Belgium did during World War II. When the territory and people of a defeated state are subject to foreign rule while its legitimate government continues the conflict from some secure refuge, does the defeated state survive as a political and legal entity, or should we regard it as nonexistent? Western experience on both sides of the battle lines in World War II indicates that such refugee governments were treated by their allies and by their enemies as active elements of their respective states, since political and military programs were positively oriented by both sides toward them. However, two conditions which appear to be decisive in such situations require notice. First, the refugee government must have held the status of a legitimate regime before its evacuation;[17] second, despite its evacuation, the government must possess all the essential components and resources for an effective and continuing operation as the legitimate representative of its defeated people. To this end such refugee governments require the organization, personnel, orientations, resources, and capacities without which they cannot engage effectively in diplomatic and other foreign relations or prosecute war to recover their lost domains or communicate with their former subjects effectively; and for these purposes, among others, such governments require the capital or credit to uphold their status and to finance their various undertakings.

On the evidence of his successive attempts to recapture Daura and his ultimate, though partial, success in establishing a capital at Yekuwa, the Sarkin Gwari fulfilled these requisites of an effective refugee government during his exile. His frequent assaults on the Fulani state amply indicate his capacity to mobilize and direct an army and thus to sustain, finance, and mobilize the essential orientations and activities of an effective government in absentia. To these ends the Sarkin Gwari must have retained the recognition of his allies, his enemies, his officials, and a substantial proportion of his former subjects as the sole legitimate head of the defeated Hausa state. Under these

conditions it seems undeniable that the Sarkin Gwari did manage to preserve and represent the Hausa state by maintaining an effective and autonomous government during his exile. By contrast, the defeated princes of Kano who withdrew northward after the death of Alwali at Burumburum in 1807 and who finally settled at Maradi rapidly lost the capacity to operate as an effective refugee government; and in 1959, when I visited their descendant, the pretender Abubakar, at Maradun near Maradi, he was not simply a chief without a chiefdom, a government, or a court, but a chief without a following or officials.

The contrasted fortunes of the Sarkin Gwari and these Kano princes neatly illustrates the fundamental difference between an effective government in exile and the lot of an ineffective and discredited pretender. Yet if we concede that at least insofar as his military, financial, diplomatic, and administrative activities are concerned, the Sarkin Gwari did maintain an effective government in part or all of a prolonged exile and that he was finally able to reestablish the Hausa state before he died, can we then deny that the state persisted as a legal and political entity during this interval, despite the incorporation of its territory and population in the Fulani emirate and the prolonged physical separation of its officials and chief from their realm? To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with the preceding argument. Yet to admit persistence of the Hausa state during the Sarkin Gwari's exile implicitly distinguishes a legitimate and effective government as the first and ultimate feature of a state, even when that government is removed from its people and territory by conditions that appear to exclude its return. The effectiveness of a refugee government must then be shown by its capacity to retain the allegiance of its erstwhile subjects, particularly by promoting their emigration or revolt on its behalf; to pursue the conflict by alliances and military action; to recover part or all of its former dominions; and thus either to reassert its former status or to constitute a new successor state, as the defeated Hausa governments of Katsina and Gobir did at Maradi and Tsibiri after the jihad.

Until evicted governments establish their control over discrete populations and territories, though they may claim to represent and to preserve their original states, such representation remains imperfect and partial to the degree that these governments neither exercise their former jurisdiction nor regulate the set of affairs that were formerly subject to them. Nonetheless, by demonstrating their political capacities, such governments manifest the continuity of the states they represent and of which they are the ultimate and irreplaceable cores. Any government that maintains its political capacities in such adverse circumstances demonstrates simultaneously the conditions of allegiance, communication, organization, and control which together identify it as an autonomous juridical unit. Thus, though we know very little indeed about the Sarkin Gwari's exile, it is evident from his successive attacks on Daura, his movements, and his final recovery of Yekuwa that he succeeded well in maintaining a sufficiently large body of kinsmen, tradi-

tional officeholding lineages, clients, and slaves to staff the essential organs of his traditional state; and by thus preserving its constitutional forms, he preserved its tradition and its government as an integrated and viable unit. In this way the regime reconstituted at Yekuwa derived directly from that lost at Daura twenty years before, since it never ceased to exist during the interval.

Similar problems surround the existence of the Hausa state during Lukudi's reign following the fall of Yardaji, the installation of Kyenkyere at Kudukudu by Tamila, and Lukudi's successive withdrawals to Toka, Kawari, Sandamu, and Acilafiya in the emirate of Kazaure, and thence to Toka, where he submitted to Ibram and reigned for five years after Nuhu's appointment. Ibram's successful attack on Yardaji scattered the fragile regime that Lukudi had salvaged and nourished following the secession of Dan Shufini, Kitari, and Tsoho to Dan Mairam, Magaria, and Baure, respectively. Harrassed by Ibram and Tanimu, Lukudi was forced to flee west and southward beyond the borders of his former chiefdom into the territories of his Fulani foes at Kazaure and Katsina. Nonetheless, despite its physical dissolution under Ibram's blows, the Hausa state survived in the person and following of Lukudi; and as long as he refused to submit to Ibram, although defeated and subject to attacks by Zinder, his community remained formally autonomous and independent. Perceiving this, Ibram accordingly renewed his attacks again and again, giving Lukudi little peace until he finally submitted and symbolically accepted the overlordship of Zinder by sending his son Nuhu for Ibram to install as chief of the defeated community. On this evidence also it appears that the successor state survived the territorial dislocations that followed its conquest by Zinder no less clearly than the Hausa state had survived its original conquest by the Fulani.

Accordingly, the history of Daura illustrates that the sole and indispensable constituent of a state is an effective government recognized by its subjects or former subjects, its allies, its enemies, and its members as their supreme legitimate authority, whether in fact that government is resident within the territory and population it claims to administer or located elsewhere after defeat and expulsion. The secessions of Dan Shufini and Tsoho from Yekuwa to Dan Mairam and Magaria undoubtedly weakened Lukudi's chiefdom and effectively established two new states; but in no way did such desertions deny the existence or validity of the older state. On the other hand, with the eviction of its dynasty from Baure to Muniyo in Katsina by H. R. Palmer, and the occupation of Baure town by a garrison from Zango with the support of British troops, the state of Baure terminated no less clearly than did the Fulani emirate of Daura following the demotion of the Magajiya Murnai from Daura to Sandamu, the transfer of Malam Musa and his Hausa officials from Zango to Daura, and the incorporation of the chiefdoms of Zango, Baure, and Daura to form the Hausa emirate that exists today.

Thus the details of Daura's history since the Fulani conquest of 1804 help

and require us to clarify our ideas of the essential nature and characteristics of states, the relations of sovereignty and autonomy, and the role of centralized government in asserting and maintaining the identity and continuity of states, together with the conditions and contexts in which they may validly do so.

THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM

Variations and Development

Despite remarkable differences in the scope of their autonomous jurisdictions, the four Daura polities were thus units of a similar status and type for which the term *state* seems quite appropriate. Moreover, despite remarkable differences in their political character and organization, they all shared a common set of basic forms and exhibited similar structures. All four chiefdoms were internally and externally differentiated structures or units of status. In all, offices were the principal governmental units distinguished from one another as unique, perpetual positions, each possessing its own distinctive rank, title, material and social resources, traditions, rights, privileges, obligations, and relations to other units in the system. In all four chiefdoms, offices were also distinguished by their roles, promotional alignments, and differential distribution among specific lineages and local status groups. Of these offices the chiefship was senior in all four states, although by no means was it the most powerful at Zango. In the four states the chiefs were elected by electoral councils from the senior members of a royal patrilineage. In addition they shared a similar framework of territorial administration through fiefs in which taxes, supplies, labor, and military forces were levied. All rendered tribute to some superior state; and all were formally Islamic and had official Muslim courts, though by the end of the nineteenth century these courts were vacant in Baure, Zango, and at Fulani Daura. In these chiefdoms the chief was expected to formulate policy in consultation with a hierarchy of councils. All entrusted the conduct of their military affairs to a specialized war council; in all the chief and his senior officials administered the chiefdom from a central capital which contained the palace, court, treasury, armory, prisons, state compounds for senior offices, the mosque, Muslim court, Idi prayer grounds, and major markets of the state. In all these states offices were distinguished as *karda* or *shigege* by the presence or absence of lineage restrictions on their allocation. In all, the senior officers *(rukunai)* administered their duties through staffs of titled *lawanai* (assistants) recruited from their kinsmen, clients, and slaves. In all, certain categories of craftsmen were organized and administered through titled craft heads who were authorized to levy certain traditional imposts and, in some cases, taxes. In all four states officials could only be dismissed by those who appointed them initially or in certain circumstances by the latter's immediate

superior. In all these states no individual could simultaneously hold two or more offices, and groupings of office in promotional series were restricted by their dispersal among differing lineages and social categories. In all four states the chief, as hereditary ruler, levied fees on the appointment of free secular officials and, except in Baure, had rights to portions of the estates of his official subordinates.[18] In all, the prerogatives and duties of office were conceived and exercised as manifestations of *iko,* a capacity in which relations of power and authority were fused within limits set by constitutional doctrine, prevailing distributions of influence, and customary precedent. In all, senior officers were remunerated by state endowments and through a prebendal distribution of fiefs, while junior officials depended on benefices and gifts from their superiors and on unofficial income from commoners. In all four states the chief maintained an elaborate staff of throne slaves, some of whom exercised public authority as state officials, while others served within the palace precincts.

This catalog of some important common features of these Daura chiefdoms illustrates certain aspects of the content or substance of the offices that furnished the basic units of their governments and obliquely indicates how these units articulated with one another and with the wider community by differentiations of rank, role, eligibility, *iko*, remuneration, and the like. Such substantive aspects of office are not merely congruent with the seven basic principles that together define the form of these states; they are in varying degrees of immediacy and directness either implicit in particular principles or entailed by their combination. We must therefore inquire how the underlying similarity of structure is related to the diversity of political organization and process in these four states, given those differences reported above that distinguish the oligarchically controlled constitutional monarchy of prejihadic Daura, the autocratic sultanism of the Fulani emirate under Mai Gurdo, the unstable autocracy of Baure, and the politically divided regime of Zango.

Such differences reflect differing distributions of power among the chief and senior officials, including at Daura the Magajiya, at Zango the Kaura, at Baure the Turaki and the Sarkin Fada, and at Fulani Daura the Limam and the Sarkin Bai. Our data show that the autocratic chiefs of Fulani Daura and Baure attempted with differing success to elude or dissolve those traditional councils that framed policy and regulated the appointments, transfers, or dismissals of senior officials. By contrast, in prejihadic Daura the senior council could, if necessary, restrain the chief by invoking the Magajiya's veto; and at Zango, where these conventions persisted, as senior councillor, senior elector, head of the army, and the largest fiefholder, the Kaura was able with impunity to exploit his position under Zinder's rule so to discredit and weaken the chief that the territory was ultimately divided between them. Thus, differences in the political regimes of these four chiefdoms centered on distributions of power between the chief and his senior officials. Differences in the intensity of their external supervision cannot account for the dif-

fering experiences of Zango and Baure on the one hand or the Hausa and Fulani states of Daura on the other. Rather, the Fulani and Hausa chiefdoms of Daura enjoyed greater autonomy by excluding internal subversion. At Fulani Daura this reflected the chief's autocratic control; but in the prejihadic Hausa state the relations of council and chief, dynasty and oligarchs, mediated through the Magajiya, excluded occasions and opportunities for internal subversion. Moreover, at Zango and Baure official dissidence was initially generated by the unconstitutional actions and unsuccessful policies of chiefs, at Baure especially by the policy of patrimonial centralism and at Zango by the bitter feud of the Kauras and their chiefs which dated from the murder of Dan Shufini and the fine imposed on Tamila by Lukudi in reparation. There the Kaura's preeminence in the councils and administration of the state provided him with ample opportunities to outmaneuver, neutralize, and subvert the chief, and so secure his replacement by others of his choice.

Despite such differences in the political positions of their chiefs, princes, and senior officials, the four states exhibited similar disjunctions in jural and political rights between their ruling elites—senior officials, their slave and free staffs and kinsmen—and the commoners whom they ruled. Each of these chiefdoms incorporated some ethnic categories differentially within the state by excluding them from political office and/or by burdening them with extra disabilities. In Daura before the jihad this was the status of the Maguzawa, the Bugaje, and perhaps of the pastoral and settled Fulani also. After the jihad the Fulani administered Maguzawa, Bugaje, and the defeated Hausa similarly. At Zango, Maguzawa and Bugaje and until 1877 the local Fulani were incorporated thus; but at Baure these three ethnic stocks continued throughout to share a common status as noncitizens.

Further, in all four states the privileges of the *masu-sarauta* (office nobility) and their retainers separated them sharply from the commoners *(talakawa)* of the dominant ethnic stock, whether Fulani or Hausa, despite the inevitable gradients of privilege and *iko* that differentiated senior and junior ranks within the officialdom. Thus, while the political organizations of ruling elites in these four states differed in their ideological commitments to, and their arrangements for, effective consultation in the formulation of policy and the distribution of office, all systematically excluded commoners from participation in these affairs as a direct expression of their subject status. In addition, as we have seen, the officialdoms of these four states were based on common structural principles with which their differing political and administrative arrangements were necessarily consistent.

Substance and Structure

To investigate the limits within which the structures and substance of these basically similar governments may vary without presupposing or entailing fundamental alterations in their common forms, it is necessary to revise and

refine those conceptions of structure and substance that guided the analysis of governmental change at Zaria. There these concepts were defined and distinguished operationally as follows:

> When we speak of the form of a system of government, we therefore refer to the arrangement and interrelations of its political and administrative structures. Changes in governmental form thus involve changes in the structure and relation of these political and administrative sub-systems....
>
> The substantive aspect of any unit of a governmental system consists in its governmental activities and functions; but the formal aspect of such a unit consists in its relations to other units of the political and administrative sub-systems of the government. In short, the structural continuity of the governmental system is equivalent to the continuity of these relations between its various parts.[19]

Despite allusions to change, these conceptions are explicitly synchronic and were designed to facilitate the analysis of governmental systems at particular points in time. To analyze changing political regimes at Zaria within a common frame of reference, the seven basic principles that underlay its successive systems of government were isolated and listed in their order of logical priority;[20] and since the differing regimes of Zaria all shared these common features, their continuity of form was distinguished from their substantive differences and developments. Thus, I argued, "these categories and their relations are purely formal.... The persistence of these formal categories does not exclude changes of their content within the systems under study.... Such variations of content are all consistent with the persistence of the general forms distinguished above."[21]

This combination of persisting forms and changing contents in the governments of Zaria over 150 years validated the set of seven categories that constituted the frame of reference for the comparative analysis of these governments and the processes by which they changed. For, as already mentioned, the seven categories that together define the form of government illustrated by these regimes were themselves abstracted by their comparison. Thus the persistence of these forms throughout the period is no less certain than the changes in contents and character of the regimes themselves. Given the persistence of these forms, however, such changes could only represent changes in the contents that expressed them; and as the persisting forms conceived as categories were aligned by relations of logical priority and succession, it was argued that changes of content could only develop "by a sequence which repeats the order of logical relations holding among the categories themselves. Moreover, the revision of any single category in such a system presupposes certain changes in the content of the categories which precede it. In consequence, the order in which categories change will be identical with that in which the system as a whole undergoes revision."[22]

It will be noticed that these persisting categories or principles were distinguished as forms from their changing contents, from the structures of the systems they underlay, and from the substance of these synchronic systems.

Thus at least three concepts were devised to facilitate the analysis of political change at Zaria—namely, form, structure, and substance or content. Unfortunately in various passages these terms are sometimes treated as synonyms despite their differing reference.[23] An attempt to resolve these ambiguities and formulate their relations yielded the following statement:

> The passage from a synchronic to a diachronic analysis of government involves one especially important transposition, the logical basis of which is explained below. By this transposition, the formal categories of the synchronic system become the substantive categories of the diachronic process and of diachronic analysis. Thus in our analysis of government as a synchronic system the primary formal categories are the political and administrative systems, while the substantive categories consist of governmental activities and tasks. But in the analysis of governmental change at Zaria, these political and administrative structures form the content of the system which undergoes change, and the structure of the diachronic process is the fixed order of logically necessary relations which regulates the change of constitutive forms.
>
> We have already seen that the content of a system changes by relations which are simultaneous, reciprocal, and transitive, whereas changes of form do not. In the processes of formal change a fixed and necessary order is fundamental; but simultaneity and explicitly functional relations are equally fundamental in the development of substantive change. It is partly for this reason that the formal categories of synchronic systems become the substantive categories of diachronic processes. Since the content of any synchronic system is organised functionally, explicit functional relations will govern the substantive change which occurs in that system.[24]

This proposition that structural change proceeds in a "fixed order of logically necessary relations" is the first of the two fundamental conclusions of the study of Zaria that we now seek to test. The proposition that substantive change always proceeds in simultaneous reciprocal and transitive relations was advanced as its logical complement. They may thus be tested simultaneously. At Zaria "all the substantive changes which developed . . . under the Fulani involved redefinitions and redistributions of power and authority within the governmental system. Thus . . . any change in the specific administrative and political relations of office is equivalent to a change in the structure of the governmental system. [And by the preceding transposition] they are accordingly changes in the substance of the system."[25]

It seems appropriate to reexamine and reformulate the concepts and relations of structure, substance, content, and form more precisely before proceeding. It is evident that the seven persisting principles which together defined and constituted the officialdoms of these changing Zaria governments described their *latent* structure or underlying form. The offices themselves and their manifold relations expressed these underlying forms concretely as the articulation of a finite set of corporate units, each distinguished by its status, definitive attributes, and relations with other units. Thus each of the changing regimes of Zaria is a concrete expression of the common set of latent principles. Such concrete official structures, however, are not the only manifestation of these latent forms. The *concrete* structures themselves display analytically distinct components of authority and power which find

expression in administrative and political activities and relations. Some regimes confine the administrative and political subsystems entirely within their officialdoms, while others do not. In either case such specifically administrative and political units and relations form *analytic structures* that also express the implications of the latent forms. Accordingly we should distinguish the *latent structure* of principles or categories that together constitute the governmental order and differentiate its perduring component from the concrete and analytic structures that manifest it. At the present level of analysis, the *concrete structure* of a polity consists of corporate units and relations that express these latent principles most directly and immediately.[26] The analytic structure emerges when analytic conceptions of power and authority, politics and administration, are applied to the observable relations and activities of these units in order to distinguish their specifically administrative and political forms. Thus, if the concrete structure manifests the substance of the latent principles, the analytic structure stands in a similar relation to the concrete, since the particular distribution of political and administrative activities that define it illustrates the operation and articulation of these concrete units. Thus, whereas the latent structure consists of formal categories or principles, the concrete structure consists of membership units and their institutional relations, while the analytic structure consists of the political and administrative relations and activities of these concrete units.

The concrete structure of corporate units and relations accordingly mediates between the manifest analytic structure and the latent structure of categorical forms. In a sense the concrete structure gives substantive expression to the latent forms in much the same way that the analytic structure gives substantive expression to the concrete. Because this is so and because at Zaria it was possible to restrict the analysis of governmental change to the changing properties, character, and organization of its officialdoms, which most fully and directly expressed the changing content of the persisting latent forms, "the formal categories of the synchronic system" there described the analytic structure of political and administrative relations which provided the "substantive categories of the diachronic process,"[27] since "all substantive changes which developed in the constitution . . . involved redefinitions and redistributions of power and authority"[28] that proceeded by explicitly functional and transitive relations.

With the record of Daura's affairs before us we can easily appreciate how the much simpler history of postjihadic Zaria encouraged and rewarded this direct leap from the latent structure of underlying forms to the analytic structure of administrative and political relations without explicit examination of the intervening level of concrete units and their relations. To a substantial degree the evident continuity and unity of Zaria's political history dictated this approach; but we should also note that the seven principles which provided the minimum formal description of its successive regimes were almost exclusively abstracted from the study of these official struc-

tures. In short, the latent structure of categorical principles directly subsumed the concrete system of offices as units of formal analysis. Moreover, as it was quite unnecessary to take account of unofficial bodies in the study of change at Zaria, that analysis was exclusively addressed to the continuity or changes of structure and substance in the official system. Thus, because the successive official structures of Zaria were exhaustively defined by their common latent categories, I could examine their changing analytic structures of political and administrative relations directly as evidence of substantive changes without devoting special attention to other concrete structures whose persisting elements were already summarized in the seven basic principles.

This exegesis should explain how I then concluded that "the formal categories of the synchronic system become the substantive categories of the diachronic process and of diachronic analysis"[29] for the study of government. It serves also to show that despite its compression, the leap from latent to analytic structures conceived as the substance of the changing political systems of Zaria was appropriate and sound. Accordingly, in reviewing developments at Daura to test the generalizations derived from Zaria, we could adopt the same procedure. However, to test these generalizations systematically with the challenging materials from the Daura states, I propose to review their development in some detail, paying particular attention to the relationships of continuity and change at the concrete and analytic levels of manifest structure. Having done so, I shall then reanalyze their histories to identify all changes in the properties and articulations of the politically significant corporate units of Daura and Zango in order to determine whether developments at the latent level confirm or disconfirm the preceding analysis.

Before we proceed further, however, it is necessary to refine our conceptions of substance in the light of corporation theory. As indicated above, in the synchronic analyses of governments at Zaria, activities that discharged the primary and secondary functions of government were regarded as "an important part of the content or substance of the governmental system; but it is never the whole of this content, and its distribution is an aspect of the system's form."[30] It is therefore useful to distinguish the totality of these activities and functions as the *scope* of a government from the *resources,* material, social, technical, and ideological, of which the government disposes. We should also distinguish the *capacities* of governmental systems or their components as the actual or potential capabilities of these units to discharge their current functions or to undertake other activities. The area or aggregate subject to a governmental order indicates its *range* or span. The ability of a governmental system or its components to regulate its specific affairs independently illustrates its *autonomy;* and this autonomy may either be delegated from senior to junior officials with varying discretion, or the latter may be obliged to execute commands without exercising their discretion.

Together these differing qualities or dimensions of a governmental system

constitute its *substance* or *content* as these terms were employed in the analysis of Zaria. In like fashion the substance of any regulatory unit, official or other, may be described as the sum or product of its range, autonomy, scope, resources, and capacity. In the normal case we can expect that the unit's substance thus defined will reflect its *basis* and its *articulation* with other units of the same or differing kind in its social environment; and this expectation holds equally for autonomous states and their components. Such external relations represent one sector or dimension of the unit's articulation. The nature and relationship of its constitutent parts represent the other. Thus, articulation, which is an explicitly structural condition of all social units, including individual roles, has two complementary aspects and dimensions, namely, its *internal* and *external* relationships.

Clearly, in differing situations and sequences of change, the autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities of continuing regulatory units may either vary or exhibit certain regularities. Generally these substantive aspects of a regulatory unit either persist unchanged or fluctuate in correspondence with changes of its internal and external articulations; and it is of course possible that these internal and external articulations may be consistently associated. Such possibilities should be borne in mind as we review the record of political change experienced by these Daura states during the nineteenth century and under British rule.

FROM DAURA TO ZANGO, 1806-1903

To see whether the formal changes of these Daura governments always developed in the "fixed and necessary order" of their latent categories while their changes of substance developed in simultaneous transitive relations, it is necessary to review successive segments of their histories in detail, as well as the total span. Thus, although this review dwells exclusively on the structural and substantive changes that were initiated or expressed by historical events, it is unavoidably repetitive. Nonetheless I know no other way in which we may examine the historical record to determine the structure of the processes of change that it reports. A tabular summary of all the sequences of formal change discussed below will be found in the final chapter; but this is scarcely intelligible without narrative exposition.

We shall first examine the experience of the community that finally settled at Zango, from its departure from Daura in 1806 until 1903, when the British assumed control. Beginning with a chronological review of limited successive sequences of change that marked this period, we shall conclude by treating its development from 1806 until 1903 as a single inclusive sequence of structural and substantive change. This done, we shall reexamine the histories of Baure and Fulani Daura as far as we know them before undertaking a similar analysis of developments from 1903 to 1958 under British rule.

To facilitate exposition, the history of the Sarkin Gwari's community

throughout the nineteenth century will be divided into the following major periods: (1) the Sarkin Gwari's reign, (2) the period from Lukudi's accession to that of Nuhu, (3) that from Nuhu's accession until 1877, (4) that from 1877 until 1903. Each of these periods may be subdivided into narrower segments where this seems analytically appropriate, as illustrated below. Proceeding chronologically, I shall first review the Sarkin Gwari's reign from 1806 to 1825.

From Daura to Yekuwa, 1803-1825

The decisive event in the known history of Daura was its conquest by the Fulani under M. Ishi'aka early in the reign of the Sarkin Gwari Abdu. This conquest displayed the superior power, organization, and force of the Shehu's followers. The defeated Sarkin Gwari withdrew from Daura town with his family, kinsmen, officials, and followers, a chief without a capital or chiefdom. After several months at Kworgum and Kance, his former vassals, Sarkin Gwari abandoned the territory and withdrew to Nguru, where he sought the help of the Galadima of Bornu, who had formerly mediated relations between Daura and the Mais who ruled Bornu. However, by then the Fulani had driven the Mai from his capital, Gasrgamo; and the Mai had appealed to a Kanembu sheikh, Alhaji Aminu El Kanemi, for assistance.[31] Empty-handed, the Sarkin Gwari returned from Nguru to Murya (Miria), where he dwelt for nine years before moving to Kalgo and thence to Sallewa ta Kuykuyo, where he passed another ten and a half years before finally settling at Yekuwa, where having "collected his kingdom together, all but the city of Daura"[32] he died shortly after, perhaps in 1825.

It is obvious that the Fulani conquest of Daura drastically changed the status of the Hausa chiefdom—its government; its ruler, the Sarkin Gwari, and his kinsmen and officials—by dispossessing them of their homes, their capital, their territory, and their subjects—that is, by changing the content or substance of these structures. However, defeat could not erase the Sarkin Gwari's status and legitimacy as the chief of Hausa Daura and the senior western vassal of Bornu. By his withdrawal the Sarkin Gwari conceded temporary defeat but avoided subjugation and signified his determination to continue the struggle. Accordingly, he maintained his chieftaincy and government in exile at Murya (Miria), Kalgo, and Sallewa, despite his suzerain's inability to assist. Thus, the immediate effect of defeat and withdrawal was a radical change in the status, form, and substance of the chiefdom, which found expression in physical separation of its chief, dynasty, and officialdom from the territory, the capital, and the population, all of which now fell into the hands of M. Ishi'aka and his army. Thus, the status of the territory and its inhabitants was radically changed as a direct consequence of the defeat that evicted their ruler and threatened to abolish the chiefdom as a unit of status. Thereafter the territory and its people remained a prize contested

by two coordinate governments with sharply contrasted bases and claims, one of which retained possession while the other remained in exile, though active, throughout most of the Sarkin Gwari's reign.

It might seem that these changes, although patently structural, do not replicate the order of logical priority among the categories that defined and constituted the state; but brief reflection will show that this is not so. The decisive and immediate implication of the Fulani victory and the Hausa withdrawal was to change the status of the traditional chiefdom and the content of its traditional status structure. The Fulani, who were previously a subordinate ethnic category within the Hausa chiefdom, were now the conquerors and rulers, organized under the new emir as a corporate group, while the flight of the Hausa government to preserve its independence had transformed its Hausa subjects from a corporate group into a subordinate corporate category by removing their central organization. Because of this withdrawal, the status of the Hausa government was radically changed; and since this government consisted of an ordered structure of offices, its status transformation was manifested directly and simultaneously by changes in the status and substance of all its offices, which now lost their previous resources, perquisites, and much of their scope and autonomy without, however, undergoing any immediate internal changes of relative rank, criteria of allocation, alignment, formal roles, or articulation. In addition, Fulani conquest asserted radical changes in the status requirements for official positions at Daura itself. Thereafter Muslim Fulani monopolized the Daura government to the exclusion of defeated Hausa. However, such changes could neither invalidate nor modify the criteria that regulated traditional distributions of office within the community that withdrew from Daura with the Sarkin Gwari. In like fashion the institution of Fulani emirship in the conquered city did not alter the Sarkin Gwari's status as hereditary ruler of the Hausa state and head of its government. Nonetheless, the Fulani occupation and Hausa withdrawal directly entailed significant changes in the content or substance of the Hausa chiefship and its subordinate offices. Thus, the changes that followed the Fulani conquest proceeded in the order of the categories whose contents were transformed down to the level of the chiefship as the senior office. The traditional orders of rank, official roles, and promotional alignments were not immediately affected.

That these changes in the content or substance of the kingship and other traditional Hausa offices were regulated by structural changes is nicely indicated by the Sarkin Gwari's transfer of the princely titles Samba'a and Sarkin Shanu to the lineage of the Sarkin Pawa before instituting their marriage alliances with the dynasty and the lineages of the Kaura and Galadima. Both measures were unprecedented. According to tradition, both were promulgated successively on a single day. Both signalized the Sarkin Gwari's desire to consolidate his following by reducing the status gulfs that had traditionally separated senior and junior officials. To this end he first transferred these princely titles to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage and then attempted to

enforce their intermarriage with lineages of superior rank. Such measures presupposed and expressed major changes in the status of the Sarkin Gwari, his government, his senior officials, and his community. They also initiated further changes in the relations of the chieftaincy to other offices, especially those of the Sarkin Pawa, Samba'a, Sarkin Shanu, Galadima, and Kaura.

Finally, before he died the Sarkin Gwari established a new capital at Yekuwa, having "collected his kingdom together, all but the city of Daura." Although we know little about the processes by which Abdu achieved this partial recovery of his realm, it is evident that his success initiated or expressed a second major reversal in the relations of his community with the Fulani conquerors. By simultaneously reestablishing his rule over the eastern half of his original chiefdom and creating a new capital at Yekuwa, the Sarkin Gwari further redefined the statuses of the Hausa and Fulani governments as effective coordinates, resumed control of one-half of the territory and its inhabitants, and increased the probability that he might reconquer the rest. This status change had its most obvious and immediate effects on those Hausa commoners who lived in the occupied areas and who were thus transformed from Fulani subjects to citizens and warriors of the resurgent Hausa state, a transformation that induced other Hausa to quit the Fulani emirate. To reassume control of these eastern territories, the Sarkin Gwari had first to evict the Fulani administration and to reassert his jurisdiction, thus altering the content of the Hausa government and its component offices, including the chiefship, by endowing them with territory, a much larger subject population, and the material and strategic resources with which to pursue the recovery of Daura. Thus, before the Sarkin Gwari's death, the Hausa chieftaincy and its traditional offices had recovered much of the status, jurisdiction, and substantive resources they had lost in 1806; and in this context the establishment of a new capital at Yekuwa was not merely symbolic of the reconstituted state but essential to its military and administrative organization.

From Lukudi to Nuhu

It is convenient to divide Lukudi's reign into the following periods: (1) the years at Yekuwa, (2) the years at Yardaji, (3) the years from the fall of Yardaji to the appointment of Nuhu, (4) the years of dual monarchy. We shall discuss these periods in their chronological order.

The Years at Yekuwa.—Selected to succeed the Sarkin Gwari, Lukudi immediately faced the threat of revolt or secession from his predecessor's son, the Yerima Mai Nasara. Having surmounted this difficulty and closed the gates of Yekuwa, despite previous warnings Lukudi allowed his father's brother, Dan Shufini, to quit the town, ostensibly to forage. At Maiyaki Dan Shufini raised the flag of revolt but fled eastward to Dan Mairam when Lukudi's horsemen approached. Lukudi dispatched his army against Dan

Mairam, where Dan Shufini and his brothers Kitari and Zangi and his son Tsoho had assembled their supporters. Though the Kaura Idi, Lukudi's commander, captured Dan Shufini, Kitari, Zangi, and Tsoho escaped eastward to Magaria. For his part in the murder of Dan Shufini, Lukudi fined the Kaura Idi severely, thus initiating an ineradicable and disastrous enmity between the dynasty and the Kaura's lineage.

Mai Nasara's abortive revolt illustrates an unconstitutional attempt to change the procedures and criteria of accession by the use of force, thus challenging the status and autonomy of the electoral council. However, Lukudi succeeded in suppressing this revolt by political means, thereby preserving the regime unchanged.

Dan Shufini's secession had far more radical implications; and since Lukudi failed to suppress this despite Dan Shufini's capture and death, it led to the partition of the Hausa chiefdom into two antagonistic states, centered initially on Magaria and Yekuwa and ultimately on Baure and Zango. Thus, whereas Mai Nasara's revolt failed to modify the Hausa chiefdom structurally or substantively, Dan Shufini's secession revised its status and reduced its substance. Instead of one Hausa chief of the defeated Daurawa duly selected by the traditional electors, there were two and for a time three, each claiming precedence or parity as an independent ruler. The chiefdom reconstituted by the Sarkin Gwari was accordingly divided. The dynasty split initially into two, and for a while three, competing segments of equivalent status and claims, each with its essential complement of traditional offices, lineages, juridical and material resources. The resulting multiplication of chiefdoms entailed corresponding replication of the original unit and its component offices. Qualifications for traditional office were also modified as initiatives were transferred from the appointed chief and council to secessionist princes and enterprising individuals drawn from appropriate lineages and status groups. In the process the status of the legitimate chiefship underwent important changes which directly affected its relations with other offices in the residual chiefdom ruled by Lukudi. Nonetheless, Dan Shufini's secession generated no immediate changes in the differentiation of offices by rank, role, or promotional alignments within the chiefdom that Lukudi ruled. However, by their emergence these secessionist states did modify the external status of the original chiefdom and its component offices, including the chiefship. Moreover, it seems probable that at Magaria and certainly at Baure, where Kitari and Tsoho established new states, the traditional differentiations of Hausa offices by rank, role, and promotional alignments were modified in various ways, as results of the altered relations of these offices to the new chiefships. We need only cite the territorial fiefs and executive and conciliar roles allocated by Tsoho at Baure to princes whose titles were previously honorific; but Tsoho's suspension of the Magajiya's office was equally important.

The effect of these developments on the relations between Lukudi and his officials at Yekuwa is nicely indicated by his high-handed treatment of the

Kaura Idi, his senior official. This act was probably no less illegitimate than ill advised. The traditional constitution of Daura obliged the chief to seek the assent of his senior council before issuing directives of this order; and we may reasonably infer that the council, with Kaura as its senior member after the chief, would certainly have withheld assent to the fine Lukudi imposed. The Kaura might then have appealed to Magajiya to restrain the chief had the latter persisted. The essential point remains that Lukudi's autocratic treatment of his senior official modified his former relations as chief, not only with the Kaura, but with other officials by revealing his autocratic capacities and readiness to set aside or evade the restraints of constitutional forms. In consequence, several members of Lukudi's community withdrew eastward to join Kitari at Magaria or Tsoho at Baure. The Kaura's lineage was impoverished, alienated, and humiliated by the injury it suffered; and we may reasonably date the developing breach between the Kauras and chiefs of the western Daura chiefdom from this event. Moreover, the changes in the relations of chief and other officials that Lukudi's treatment of Idi implied modified the statuses of all together and thus the total structure of their relations. Manifestly by its enforcement Lukudi's *ultra vires* act expressed his political preponderance, his release from oligarchic control, and his ability to override both the constitution and its custodians, his subordinates.

The Years at Yardaji.—Following these events, Lukudi abandoned Yekuwa for Yardaji, thirteen miles due west, probably to move his capital and community away from the territory appropriated by Kitari and Tsoho. From Yardaji Lukudi dispatched the Shentali Bacici with an army against Magaria; but after his army had deserted to Kitari, Bacici also accepted appointment as the first Shentali of Magaria. Such desertions illustrate the radically changed relations among the chief, his officials, and his subjects initiated by Dan Shufini's revolt. Lukudi had already lost several eastern communities to Kitari, so after Bacici's desertion he allied himself with Ibram of Zinder and besieged Magaria until news of an intended Fulani attack brought him hurriedly back to Yardaji. Thereafter Lukudi abandoned his attempts to suppress Magaria; and when the Hausa villagers of Jengini revolted against Kitari, he joined forces with the latter and with Tsoho to suppress them.

Throughout his years at Yardaji Lukudi continued to lose population to Baure and Magaria. Persons eligible by descent for traditional titles moved east to seek them there. Thus the years at Yardaji witnessed a crystallization of the boundaries and regimes of the new chiefdoms; and as these processes developed, the status of Lukudi's chiefdom and office was correspondingly modified. Lukudi's chiefship had lost its hitherto exclusive authority over the Daura Hausa, its status as unchallenged head of the Hausa dynasty, its monopoly of appointments to hereditary and other offices, and its exclusive claims to legitimacy and to the loyalty and control of Daura Hausa. Thus, once again the status of the community was revised together with the statuses

of all its traditional offices as their replicas arose in the eastern states. Inevitably such structural shifts generated corresponding modifications in the substance of Lukudi's chiefship and officialdom.

Tradition relates that Kitari was slain by the Kaura Tamila at the instigation of Tsoho following the successful attack on Jengini. The same tradition asserts that Lukudi promptly fined Tamila 1,000,000 cowries for Kitari's death as he had earlier fined Idi for the murder of Dan Shufini. The punishment indicated Lukudi's desire to institutionalize its unconstitutional precedent, but it merely alienated the Kaura, his lineage, his supporters, and many others who saw in it yet another sign of Lukudi's autocratic inclinations.

Kitari's death was followed by the struggle between his son Masallaci, who succeeded at Magaria, and his rival Tsoho, who recruited followers from Lukudi's people to establish his own state at Baure. The ensuing conflict rapidly brought both chiefdoms under the hegemony of Ibram of Zinder, thus leaving Lukudi as the only independent Hausa chief of the Daura people. Lukudi's community thus became the immediate target of Ibram's aggression; and following several successful defenses, Yardaji was finally sacked shortly after the Kaura Tamila had deserted the town for Kudukudu, where he installed a prince, Muhamman Kyenkyere, as puppet chief. This incident, which ended when Tsoho of Baure attacked Kudukudu and slew Tamila and Kyenkyere, illustrates the alienation of the Kaura from the chief, the collusion of Tamila and Ibram, and the common interests of Lukudi and Tsoho in preventing further secessions by upstart chiefs. In deserting with Kyenkyere to Kudukudu and attempting to set up a chiefdom there, Tamila removed a large section of the Kaura lineage and its dependents. By these actions he repudiated allegiance to Lukudi, rejected the latter's claims to chiefship, attempted to usurp the functions of the electoral council, and thus threatened to modify his relations as Kaura with the chief and with all other offices in the abortive state.

According to the Daura Chronicle, "Tamila seized Kyenkyare [*sic*], a son of Sarkin Gwari Abdu, and took him to Damagaram, and Umaru, Shehu of Bornu, made him king."[33] The Shehu Umaru referred to in this passage was the son of Shehu Alhaji Aminu El Kanemi. He succeeded El Kanemi in 1835 as uncrowned master of Bornu and in 1846 slew the hereditary ruler, Mai Ibram, and his successor, Ali, thus extinguishing the legitimate dynasty.[34] We cannot say whether Lukudi rejected Umaru's usurpation while Ibram of Zinder accepted the latter as his overlord; but it is clear that in deserting Yardaji this time, Tamila sought to injure Lukudi, having secured Ibram's approval of Kyenkyere's accession. These events illustrate Ibram's interest in asserting his dominion over Lukudi's community. The redefinitions implied by these events in the statuses of the chief, the Kaura, the electors, and other senior officials and in the criteria for accession to the throne are too obvious to need recital; but by these acts the Kaura also sought to elevate his office above the Galadima's while expanding its role and power. Although Tamila's secession and treachery ended in failure, his attempt reveals the political instability of Lukudi's regime.

From the Fall of Yardaji to the Appointment of Nuhu.—From Yardaji Lukudi fled to Toka and thence to Kawari and Sandamu in the territory of Fulani Daura. From Sandamu he moved to Acilafiya in the adjacent Fulani emirate of Kazaure before returning to Toka, "where they lived after making peace with Damagaram."[35]

Before resettling at Toka and submitting to Ibram, Lukudi, like the Sarkin Gwari earlier, was a fugitive chief, driven from his capital and chiefdom by his enemies. However, like the Sarkin Gwari before him, Lukudi managed to retain the essential organs of government in his flight; and despite continual harrassment by Ibram, he continued to maintain the government by appointing Sabo as Kaura to replace Tamila and by installing his slaves Danko and Tanko as Sarkin Yara and Turaki while accepting their kinswomen as wives. In this way Lukudi transformed the traditional status conditions of two offices, of which one, that of Sarkin Yara, had been reserved for free men, while neither had been hereditary. Seen beside the decision of the Sarkin Makera Babba to remain at Acilafiya when Lukudi moved on, these appointments illustrate the continuously changing relations between the chiefship and the traditional offices that remained with it following the fall of Yardaji. Nonetheless, by maintaining his government with such appointments, Lukudi preserved the essential fabric of the Hausa state until he was able to return to Toka and made his peace with Ibram.

The Years of Dual Monarchy.—After settling at Toka, Lukudi submitted to further pressure from Ibram and sent his son Nuhu to the latter; Ibram duly appointed Nuhu as chief at Rogogo Cidare. Thereafter for several years Lukudi's community had two chiefs, of whom the junior, Nuhu, was probably regarded by Ibram as its only ruler, although Lukudi continued to direct state affairs. This transitional phase of dual chiefship, with its inevitable duplication of status, powers, and responsibilities, marks yet another major shift in the status and structure of Lukudi's government, in the criteria and procedures for the selection of its chief, in the relations of the chieftaincy to other offices, and in their respective contents. As before, these fundamental changes presupposed and expressed a basic revision in the status of the chiefdom, which had implicitly forfeited its independence by submission to Ibram.

Undoubtedly the terms of Lukudi's vassalage were initially obscure to Lukudi and Nuhu as well as to Ibram. Each was content for his own reasons to leave the definition of this new state of their relations to later events. It is even probable that Ibram interpreted Nuhu's appointment as the termination of Lukudi's reign, although some years later the British explorer Richarddson learned at Zinder that Lukudi was still chief.[36] Nuhu likewise could only discover by experience the nature and meaning of his new status as chief or cochief; and undoubtedly ambiguities of the dual chiefship generated considerable friction at Toka between its principals and their supporters.

When Lukudi had spent five years at Toka, Ibram's suspicions were aroused by reports that Nuhu and his brother Jirro were preparing for revolt against Zinder's dominion. Anticipating an attack, Nuhu abandoned Toka

for Dan Ali, where he initially repulsed Ibram before returning to Toka and being defeated. At this point the Kaura Dan Dawambai, whom Lukudi had appointed to succeed Sabo, persuaded the Hausa commoners of Zango and its environs to transfer allegiance from the Fulani to Lukudi, who promptly settled there with his support and followers.

Shortly afterward Nuhu asserted his supremacy as chief by dismissing the Kaura Dan Dawambai and appointing Mazawaje in his stead to fulfill their secret bargain that each would help the other to obtain his hereditary office, although Dan Dawambai had rescued the community in its moment of peril and had, as far as we know, committed no offense. In this incident Nuhu acted unconstitutionally and arbitrarily, thereby repudiating the conventions that regulated relations among the chief, the Kaura, and his senior councillors, the Magajiya's veto powers being nullified or voided by his status as Ibram's vassal. By the same act, and irreversibly, Nuhu seized decisive control of the Hausa state from his aging father, who survived another four years in retirement. Within traditional conceptions of chiefship, Nuhu probably lacked the constitutional authority to dismiss the Kaura; but as the chief appointed by Ibram, he could do so by acting *ultra vires.* Thus Dan Dawambai's dismissal illustrates further transformations of the status and relations of the chief, the Magajiya, the Kaura, and the senior councillors, all reflecting Nuhu's increasing security and power as Ibram's vassal and his immunity from traditional restraints.

From Nuhu to Sule, 1850-1877

Nuhu's ambiguous status as Ibram's vassal or ally had its dangers as well as its advantages. When Ibram decided to besiege Daura to capture his brother and rival Tanimu, he fortified Nuhu's capital, Zango, as his headquarters. Willing or not, Nuhu had no alternative but to join Ibram in this war. On Ibram's defeat and death Nuhu had to pay the victor, Tanimu, a heavy indemnity to retain his throne; and in this situation Nuhu's friend and protégé, the Kaura Mazawaje, had little difficulty in securing his deposition and death.

As Zinder's vassals, Lukudi and Nuhu had seriously compromised the autonomy and security of their thrones. As vassals, they could not legitimately refuse to aid their suzerain in his wars against his enemies; but they were thus unable to escape involvement in the dynastic struggles that periodically raged at Zinder. Inevitably, then, they were exposed to the political and military risks that attached to participation in such conflicts. Once again, the decisive factor that initiated these and subsequent modifications in the status of the Hausa state and in the positions of its chiefs, Magajiyas, Kauras, and other senior officials and councillors was the superior power of another state which the Kaura Mazawaje, as military leader, senior elector, and senior councillor at Zango, could manipulate for personal ends, aggrandizing his

office and power while discrediting his benefactor, the chief, and bypassing the electoral and senior councils to nominate Mamman Sha, whom Tanimu appointed to succeed Nuhu. On this occasion the series of structural changes proceeded from revision of the chiefdom's status, which defined the status of the chief and his officialdom; to changed conditions for the selection of the chief; to a changed relation of the chiefship to electors and other senior offices, including the Magajiya; to the elevation of the Kaura's office informally to a rank of its own and the partial institutionalization of his new status as maker and breaker of Zango chiefs by virtue of his clandestine relations with the sultan of Zinder. Clearly, insofar as the Kaura Mazawaje promoted these changes by treachery and other unconstitutional means, they expressed the power he wielded in this labile situation.

Developments at Zango under Mamman Sha, Haruna, and Dan Aro illustrate some implications of the structural changes Mazawaje had made in securing Nuhu's dismissal and death. Mamman Sha was obliged to provide an annual tribute to Zinder for which Nuhu's initial indemnity furnished the precedent. He was also required to call out the Zango forces at Tanimu's order for an expedition against Hadeija. When the chief sought to oppose his Kaura in council he found the Galadima Masallaci aligned with Mazawaje against him. It was sufficient for Mazawaje to report Mamman Sha's disparaging remarks about the Zinder army to secure his dismissal and Haruna's accession. During the latter's reign, Tanimu abolished the Magaria chiefdom and incorporated the district of Kurni in Zinder. He also appropriated power to appoint and dismiss the Galadimas of Zango, thus further diminishing the local chiefship; and after replacing Haruna by Dan Aro, another nominee of the Kaura Mazawaje, he exercised this power again at Dan Aro's request to remove the Galadima Tsatso, who owed his appointment to Mazawaje and sided with him against the chief.

Zango's weakness, instability, and divisions are nicely illustrated by these alignments and impositions, which also reflect the Kaura's dominance and the declining autonomy of Zango chiefs. Having progressively lost the rights to mobilize their forces, to fortify their settlements with walls and moats, to execute judicial sentences of mutilation and death as enjoined by the *shari'a,* to negotiate with foreign states, and to appoint or dismiss their Galadimas and Kauras, they were now obliged to render tribute, to pay accession fees *(kudin sarauta),* and to deliver on accession half the estates of their deposed predecessors to their suzerains at Zinder. Nonetheless, these Zango chiefs did succeed in preserving their state in the years when Tanimu incorporated Kworgum and Kance as well as Kurni and Magaria into the territory of Zinder. They also retained autonomous jurisdiction over all official appointments except those already mentioned; the right to stockade their settlements; to create, suspend, or abolish titles; to levy supplies, taxes, and corvée labor on their subjects; and many other prerogatives of the traditional chieftaincy. Nonetheless, during the unhappy reigns of Mamman Sha, Haruna, and Dan Aro, the polity was progressively polarized between the rival

powers of the chief and his Kaura. As this bifurcate structure crystallized, tensions deepened until 1876-1877, when the Kaura and chief celebrated the Idi festival separately, each with his followers.

1877-1903

On learning of this situation, Tanimu decided to reorganize the affairs of Zango in 1877. Dan Aro and Mazawaje were dismissed and replaced by Tafida and Bakula, respectively, each being obliged to render an annual tribute of 2,000,000 cowries as well as substantial *kudin sarauta* on appointment. As this was the first occasion on which a sultan of Zinder had dismissed a Kaura of Zango, it marked Zinder's direct and final appropriation of appointive power to that office. Simultaneously Tanimu transferred responsiblity for collection and remittance of *jangali* taxes throughout Zango to the Fulani headmen at Gurdo and Tsatsumburum and placed all Kanuri residents at Zango under the direct jurisdiction of Zinder officials, thus instituting *tarayya* on an exclusively ethnic basis. By these measures Tanimu doubled his tributes from Zango and divided its territorial and fiscal administration between the Kaura and the chief, while removing local Fulani and Kanuri from their jurisdictions.

Tanimu's intervention transformed the state and expressed his decisive power by modifying the external status and internal structure of Zango in several ways: first, by removing local Fulani and Kanuri from Hausa control; second, by reconstituting the Kaura's office as one ambiguously but operationally coordinate with that of the chief and by dividing the territorial administration between them; third, by doubling the local tribute and holding the Kaura separately responsible for a share equal to that of the chief. Together these measures modified the form and substance of its officialdom, the conditions and attributes of the offices of the Kaura and Fulani chiefs at Gurdo and Tsatsumburum, the scope of the chieftaincy and its relation to these and other offices, the rank and status of the Kauraship and the two Fulani headships, and the roles of these three offices as well as of the chiefship, which now lost further jurisdiction and powers.

These status changes had some novel administrative implications. Thus far, Zinder's progressive domination of Zangò had not required any positive changes in the traditional administrative arrangements of the vassal state. True, the chief had lost his right to call out the local levy; but the Zango forces were still mobilized on occasion at Zinder's command. True, Zango had also lost the right to execute sentences of death or mutilation, but these were still passed to Zinder for review and action. Corvée was still employed to cultivate official farms and to build and repair official compounds, stockades, and other public structures, with the exception of town walls. None of these restrictions involved any positive modifications of traditional practice. Until 1877 the local administration still proceeded through tradi-

tional fiefholders, *lawanai, jekadu,* and *masugari,* all distinguished by traditional principles of rank and *iko* except where *tarayya* provided traditional alternatives. Till then, fiefholders routinely collected the traditional tithes and taxes from their fiefs for transmission to the chief, while craft officials levied the usual *al'adu* and *gaisuwa* on practitioners of their craft for personal benefit or for the treasury.

Tanimu's transformation of the Kaura's role and his creation of two new Fulani chiefships at Gurdo and Tsatsumburum modified this traditional administrative scheme by transferring jurisdiction over the Fulani to these new chiefs, with authority and responsibility for collection of cattle tax, and by removing the Kaura's fiefs and revenues from the jurisdiction of the Zango chief. These innovations positively transformed preceding arrangements at Zango by dividing its territorial administration into two unequally autonomous but parallel structures, each characterized by a distinct taxation policy, by separate administrative patterns, and by separate relations with its Zinder overlords, despite the fact that the territorial units were interspersed *(garawaye).* Further, in transferring Kanuri residents at Zango to the jurisdiction of officials at Zinder, Tanimu instituted a network of political and administrative ties that cut across the Hausa jurisdiction and aligned scattered individuals and families directly to his court. The gross effect of his new arrangements for Fulani administration was not dissimilar. Thus, besides reducing the scope and ethnic range of the Hausa jurisdiction while doubling its tributary load, Tanimu made several major changes in its form and character by acts that expressed his superior power.

The implications of these changes were soon manifest. Increased taxation, generated by the increased tributes, immediately stimulated an exodus of commoners to Fulani territory, which Tanimu ingeniously suppressed by authorizing their enslavement by his friend, Mai Gurdo. Thus restrained, the Hausa and Maguzawa subjects of Zango were obliged to accept the material changes in their status incident to the deteriorating status of their chiefdom. A second effect of the administrative and fiscal reorganization was the expansion by the Kaura of his titled staff through the creation of new *lawani* ranks to assist with his increased duties. As related above, this was followed by the Kaura's assertion of exclusive rights to levy occupational and other special taxes in his fiefs and by his replication of several occupational titles which had formerly been reserved for the throne. Thereafter the traditional craft officials were obliged to restrict their activities to those territories that remained attached to the chief, directly or otherwise.

Nonetheless, despite the segregation of their administrations, the Kaura and chief continued to participate in the weakened but surviving state of Zango. The Kaura still sat as the senior member of Tafida's state council and still commanded the Zango military force. He was still the senior elector of Zango, although his predecessor had behaved as though he were the only one. With the Galadima he could still formally request the Magajiya to restrain or depose the chief, and his assent was required by the chief for several

official appointments. With other members of the senior council, Kaura also retained rights to some of the *yankai* at local appointments; and in consequence of their political situation, the Kaura and chief competed for the support of the Galadima, whose office, formally Kaura's equivalent, had declined in rank and influence relatively over the years. At last, when the Kaura Bakula attached the Galadima Takurce to his cause as a client, Tafida engineered Takurce's flight and had his own client Abba, of another lineage, appointed instead, thereby suspending the traditional criteria of descent for that office in an attempt to counterbalance the Kaura in council. Similarly, when the Kaura Bakula fled to avoid Tanimu's wrath, having unwisely given his daughter in marriage to a Fulani noble of Daura, Tafida secured the appointment of his cross-cousin Kardaji, a loyal member of a minor branch of Kaura's lineage. Kardaji's failure to control Bakula's staff during his brief tenure of office merely indicates the degree to which that staff had been politicized during the preceding years of political feud and increased power, security, and status. Tanimu's reorganization of 1877 thus formalized antecedent divisions within Zango and reconstituted the chiefdom in the form of a curious two-party state, each section of which exercised a limited but independent jurisdiction over particular interspersed areas and maintained its own administration, while both participated in the senior councils that formulated common policy. Despite Tafida's support, Kardaji could neither reverse nor evade this structure in the face of opposition from his subordinate staff, who owed their appointments and allegiance to the absent Bakula. Being thus incapable of fulfilling his tributary obligations and administering his office, Kardaji was dismissed shortly before Tanimu died and Suleiman seized the Zinder throne with Bakula's support in another brief and bloody civil war.

Bakula's restoration after Tafida and the Galadima Abba had fled to avoid the wrath of Suleiman, the new sultan, for assisting his predecessor as their vassalage required, nicely illustrates how political developments at Zinder determined the distribution of senior offices at Zango. However, as these events merely replicated an earlier experience of the struggle between Tanimu and Ibram, they modified neither the relations of Zango and Zinder nor the political structure that Tanimu had established at Zango. On his restoration Bakula secured the appointment of Sule as chief and Jatau as Galadima, thus reasserting his local supremacy. In return for Jatau's appointment, Bakula received four of the few fiefs that remained to the Galadima, promptly incorporated these within his half of the state, and directed his Sarkin Pawa to promote the market at Kanda, the largest of these fiefs. Perceiving that Bakula dominated the senior council with Jatau's support, the new chief, Sule, tried to frustrate this. Bakula accordingly secured his deposition by spreading rumors of an impending Kazaure attack and advising Sule to prepare a defense without awaiting Zinder's permission. On Bakula's suggestion the sultan then appointed Yusufu, thus demonstrating once more the Kaura's preeminence as maker and breaker of the Zango chiefs and the

decisive power in the local state. However, Yusufu's rejection of demands from Zinder for further tribute provoked Sultan Suleiman to levy punitive fines on various pretexts on those officials attached to the chief at Zango. Yusufu's inability to protect his staff against these depredations eroded their loyalties and stimulated some to recoup their losses by increased demands on the people. Once more the structural changes that flowed from his final extension of Zinder's power illustrate how relations of logical priority order the categories on which the government of Zango was based. This demolition of official immunity to fines imposed from without reduced the status and autonomy of the local chiefdom by abrogating its juridical integrity, which itself assumed those traditionally exclusive relations of accountability and control that had formerly identified the officialdom as an exclusive juridical unit. Thus these developments modified the status of the offices at Zango, the status of the local chiefship, and the relationship between the chief and his officials.

This severe decline in the position of the Zango chiefs soon gave rise to further deterioration in the civil order. Unlike the chief's subordinates, the Kaura's retainers and *lawanai* were able to exploit their subjects with impunity. At Bakula's request, the sultan reprieved his client Almajirin Kade of murder. When Shagori, a Hausa commoner, appealed for protection against the Kaura's staff, Suleiman's response demonstrated indifference to the situation of the Hausa commoners of Zango under the Kaura's rule. In this way Suleiman accelerated the deterioration of civil order at Zango by rejecting complaints from the commoners who ultimately bore the full weight of the increased tributes, imposts, and expenses of the dual administration. The result was a progressive deterioration in the jural status of these commoners that Yusufu could not halt.

Following Suleiman's death and another brief succession war at Zinder, the succession of Ahmadu Majerinji as sultan brought Bakula's domination abruptly to an end by the same way in which it had been restored. Yusufu was also dismissed and replaced by Tafida, who on his return proceeded to levy unprecedented confirmation fees, the *kudin wankan sarauta,* on all officials in his jurisdiction, probably for transmission to Zinder as his own appointment fee. Thus Tafida's return further redefined relations between the chief and subordinate offices by this novel levy; and shortly afterward Tafida further modified relations with his slave officials by demanding fees on their appointments, another unprecedented act that expressed his need for additional sources of revenue, his security as the sultan's chosen chief, and his indifference to the traditions and sentiments that regulated relations between the chief and throne slaves. In like fashion Tafida reaped rich revenues by his appointments and dismissals of successive Sarkin Pawas, Sarkin Zangos, and Magaji Bayamadis, perhaps in response to demands for money from Zinder. On various occasions he also assimilated punitive fines to the traditional *kudin sarauta,* thus providing a model which the Kaura Salihu, Bakula's successor, adopted and exploited for his own ends. These develop-

ments all illustrate how the changing relations between the throne and other offices in some ways reversed and in others advanced the deterioration initiated in Yusufu's reign by the sultan's levies on Zango officials. However, these were not the only changes in the conditions of office that followed Tafida's restoration.

Ahmadu Majerinji innovated by instructing the Kaura Salihu to replace his senior subordinate, the Dan Kwaba Ali, by Hamidu, whose father had canvassed his appointment with gifts at Zinder. This was the first occasion on which Zinder had intervened to replace an official on the Kaura's staff; and besides overtly modifying the statuses and relations of the two offices, this action opened two avenues by which other subordinate appointments on the Kaura's staff could be canvassed at Zinder directly without the Kaura's knowledge. It accordingly destroyed the Kaura's hitherto exclusive control of his official staff by exposing him to the prospect of similar preemptions in future, while abrogating the juridical immunity that had enabled Bakula, unlike the chief, to dominate and protect his staff. Finally, on Zinder's orders Tafida was obliged to dismiss his Alkali Yusi; and when Ahmadu Majerinji rejected Tafida's nominee for the vacant post, Zango remained without an Alkali. It is said that having preempted control of the judgeship by dismissing Yusi, Ahmadu refused to fill the post until he had received an appropriate appointment fee; but this was not forthcoming, partly because the request was unprecedented and illegitimate, and partly because the post was not lucrative, despite its religious significance.

Sarkin Gwari's Community, 1804-1903

We have now discussed in order all incidents that generated changes in the governmental structure of those Daura Hausa who finally established the successor state of Zango under the suzerainty of Zinder. Viewing these developments together, the four major events were those successive redefinitions of the status of the community, its government or officialdom, and its chieftaincy that occurred with the initial loss and abandonment of Daura; with the Sarkin Gwari's partial restoration of the chiefdom at Yekuwa; with the secession of Dan Shufini, Kitari, and Tsoho early in Lukudi's reign; and finally with Lukudi's submission to Ibram and the appointment of Nuhu.

Each of these four pivotal events expressed or initiated some major shift in the political situation of the community; and all were mediated by the use of military force. Each event redefined simultaneously the status of the chiefdom or community, the status of its government or officialdom, and the status of its chiefship. Some of them also generated changes in the relations of the chiefship to other offices and units within the polity, while most entailed some significant changes in the criteria that regulated the allocations of office. Such changing conditions of official allocation were most obvious in the secession of princes to Dan Mairam, Magaria, and Baure and in the

withdrawals from Yardaji of men eligible by traditional criteria of descent and status for particular offices in these new states; but altered conditions in the distribution of office are also implicit in the Sarkin Gwari's withdrawal from Daura in 1806 and explicit in transfers of princely titles to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage, an innovation that Lukudi imitated later and in similar straits by conferring the offices of Turaki and Sarkin Yara on two throne slaves. Evidently also when the Sarkin Gwari withdrew from Daura, he left behind some of his central officials and initially most rural ones, including village heads. Conversely, on the partial restoration of his chiefdom at Yekuwa or on the successive relocations of Lukudi's chiefdom, the government almost certainly incorporated many local offices that are missing from our lists, while losing others through desertion or capture at and after the fall of Yardaji. The consolidation and development of Magaria and Baure by Kitari and Tsoho further modified the conditions that governed the distributions of office in Lukudi's community by offering alternative opportunities to individuals with suitable qualifications and initiative. However, these were not the most important changes in the status of the Hausa offices during this century. Such developments as the successive losses of chiefdom and territory at Daura, Yardaji, and Toka, the partial recoveries at Yekuwa and Zango, and the submission of Lukudi and Nuhu to Zinder on indefinite terms, all substantially modified the conditions that governed the traditional distribution of office, as reported above.

Following Lukudi's submission, the two major forces of structural change at Zango were, first, Zinder's progressive encroachments on its vassal's autonomy and, second, the political struggles of the Kaura and chief. Zinder's successive reductions of Zango's autonomy materially altered the status of the Hausa chiefdom and its government, the conditions and structure of its officialdom, the status of its chiefs, and their relations with subordinate officials. Ultimately the effect of these changes was to transform the traditional rank-orders of the Hausa state by reducing the Galadimaship and by elevating the Kauraship to an unconstitutional but locally unchallengeable position of dominance. Thus, while the structural implications of Lukudi's submission to Ibram were initially obscure, Nuhu's alliance with Ibram against Tanimu foreshadowed the involvements of Tafida and Yusufu in 1883 and 1891-1892 in dynastic struggles at Zinder, which revealed the inability of Zango's chiefs to remain aloof from such conflicts.

Apart from its unavoidable participation in the succession struggles at Zinder, however, Zango invited increasing intervention by the suzerain as a result of the bitter and damaging struggle between its Kauras and chiefs, which certainly antedated Lukudi's submission and accounts for the fall of Yardaji following Tamila's desertion with Kyenkyere and their followers on the eve of Ibram's assault. In this way Tamila sought to repay Lukudi for the injuries that he and Kaura Idi had suffered after the deaths of Kitari and Dan Shufini. This antagonism between the chief and the Kaura reflected fundamental shifts in the power and relations of the chief, dynasty, and

senior council that had their root in the withdrawal from Daura and found their first important expression in Dan Shufini's secession and the foundation of two independent rival states. Evidently exile had freed the chief from the control which the senior state council formerly exercised on behalf of the oligarchy. Defeat and exile emphasized the political primacy of individual allegiance to the chief as the basis of the community's cohesion and political capacities. In this context the Sarkin Gwari and Lukudi could assert their leadership despite the opposition and hostility of their senior councils. Inevitably, as the leading elector, military commander, and senior member of the state council after the chief, the Kaura stood to lose most by the chief's increasing autonomy. Accordingly, the struggle for domination of the state and control of its policies directly and recurrently contraposed the Kaura and the chief. Despite the much-vaunted constitutionalism which had probably prevailed at Daura before the jihad, the exigencies of his situation after Dan Shufini's secession encouraged and allowed Lukudi to centralize power in his own hands by overriding the council and by punishing successive Kauras, Idi and Tamila, for killing his rebel kinsmen, Dan Shufini and Kitari, on their own initiatives. Such demonstrations of Lukudi's power antagonized the Kaura's lineage and probably alienated the support of other councillors, particularly those who were informed about Tsoho's autocratic regime at Baure.

Where Tamila had failed and forfeited his life, Mazawaje was successful. By invoking the superior power of the sultan of Zinder, he was able not only to restrain but to depose the chief at will following Tanimu's victory over Ibram at Daura. But this situation enabled sultans of Zinder to extend their direct control over the affairs and senior offices of Zango, thus further reducing the capacity of the chief to dominate or withstand his Kaura or to resist Zinder's demands for tribute, *kudin sarauta,* and other levies. As successive chiefs were deposed and Zinder institutionalized its regulation of Zango affairs, the Kaura's political immunity and local preponderance increased, thereby progressively reducing the authority and autonomy of the chief, Galadima, and senior council until the state was paralyzed by polarization between Dan Aro and Mazawaje.

In 1877 Tanimu intervened to stabilize the situation he had created with Mazawaje's connivance by formally dividing the chieftaincy into to discrete units of territorial and fiscal administration under the two political factions, each having its own set of offices, political lineages, fiefs, and followers. At the same time Tanimu substantially increased his revenues from the vassal state.

However equal in intent, this subdivision materially strengthened the Kaura in his continuing rivalry with the chief by guaranteeing his administrative independence and political immunity against the chief while obliging the latter to retain the Kaura as senior councillor, senior elector, and commander of the local army. Thus this arrangement further weakened the chief's position while entrenching and extending the Kaura's power. In con-

sequence, while the chief rapidly lost further jurisdiction to the sultans of Zinder, the Kaura's subjects had no redress against abuses by his subordinates. This extremely favorable situation tempted the Kaura Bakula to trespass twice against the personal interests of the sultans of Zinder, and on both occasions he had to flee. However, in neither case did the sultans of Zinder allow the chiefs of Zango to recover the political ground they had lost in the struggle against Mazawaje and Bakula. Instead new demands and interventions further reduced its status and autonomy until the intrusion of French and British forces removed Zango from Zinder's control.

This brief sketch of the progressive deterioration of the Zango chiefdom following Lukudi's submission and demise identifies the aggressive policies of Zinder and the subversive policies of the Zango Kauras as the two decisive factors that converged to bring the state first to the brink of partition and then to push it farther along the road to ruin. By themselves, it is probable that neither of these factors would have had such debilitating effects; and of the two, the Kaura's internal subversion was the most decisive. Zinder's initial aggression and subsequent encroachments were largely solicited by the Kaura and directed against the chief, with the result that the Kauras prospered as the chiefship suffered.

The processes by which Zango's autonomy was reduced, its integrity impaired, its jurisdiction divided, and its capacity paralyzed illustrate on a grand scale the constant ordering in which these changes of political structure developed. At each step in the process of declining autonomy, the status of the Hausa chiefdom was revised and its political structure altered as the Kaura institutionalized and elaborated his alliance with Zinder and exploited it to reduce the status and authority of the chief. Such changes generated other changes in the conditions and distributions of local offices and in their relations with the throne and with one another. Simultaneously the traditional organization of offices by rank was transformed into a segmentary contraposition of two official factions, whose relations Tanimu formalized in 1877 by creating coordinate administrations for each while obliging them to compete for the Galadima's allegiance to control the state council. This drastic administrative subdivision redefined the roles of most central offices and modified some of the few promotional ladders the structure contained. Thus the processes of structural change in the Hausa government of Zango followed the order in which its basic elements were aligned by the relations of logical priority and succession that ordered the latent structure of categories that defined these systems. Moreover, each of these moments of structural change, taken separately and together, illustrates the effects of political actions internal to the system. Thus, the experience of Zango confirms the original proposition that "given stability in its context, the structure of a governmental system changes as a function of the political action it generates internally"[37] and extends it to such unstable contexts as the vassalage of Zango to Zinder.

This conclusion leads us to examine briefly the two preceding propositions

from which this *"law of structural drift"* was derived. Of these, the first held that "resistance to changes in the form of a system [of government] varies directly with their significance for the persistence of the system in its current form," a generalization which was restated in two forms as follows: (1) "Specifically administrative changes in a system of government evoke less resistance than do specifically political changes"; and (2) "Changes initiated on the basis of authority and focused on its reallocation evoke less resistance than changes initiated on the basis of power and focused on its redistribution."[38]

If we define resistance as the product of the intensity and duration of effort, including force, required to effect a particular change, there can be no question that the structural changes of this Hausa community before and after its subordination to Zinder reflected direct application of superior power and evoked greater resistance and struggle over much longer periods than did the single specifically administrative change reported above, namely, the Kaura's elaboration of his administrative staff to handle the increased volume of his work following the politically instituted reorganization of 1877. Thus, this conclusion implies that the fundamental categories that inform political order are simultaneously conditions and products of the distributions and use of power within it, since their continuity or modification alike depend on the consequences of the distributions that their particulars imperfectly regulate.

Another early generalization that requires notice held that "resistance to changes in the content of a [governmental] system varies according to their significance for the maintenance of the current structure," a principle that was restated as follows: "Attempts to change the form of a system by changing its content are self-defeating."[39]

As we have seen, a political order may be said to have three levels of form or structure. The first, or *latent structure,* consists in the minimum set of conditions or categories that together define the system's form by describing all its formal features; the second level, or *concrete structure,* consists in the set of corporate units and their interrelations that together directly manifest the structure of latent categories that underlies the system. Finally, all governments exhibit *analytic structures* that consist of relations within and among their specifically political and administrative subsystems.

The content or substance of the system to which the preceding proposition refers denotes the activities and resources deployed in its political and administrative operations. Such activities and resources are thus presupposed as requisite conditions for the viability of the concrete units that manifest the formal categories of the latent structure. Simultaneously they illustrate those distinctions between political and administrative action that furnish the formal categories of the analytic structure.

Our history of the Zango community provides only one instance in which an attempt was made to modify the form of the political system by changing the content or substance of relations within it; this was the secret agreement

of Mazawaje and Nuhu that whoever first secured his hereditary office would engineer the other's appointment, a pact which first implied their willingness to subvert or evade conciliar control of such appointments and then to administer the state jointly by some unspecified division of authority, resources, and responsibilities. This essentially political agreement, despite its explicitly administrative intent, being illegitimate in conception and execution and perhaps inoperable in its administrative implications, merely discredited Nuhu, weakened the throne, and set the state on its disastrous course by aligning the chief and his creature, the Kaura, as peers and partners against his father, the Galadima, and the senior officials, thereby converting the administrative relation initially planned into an explicitly political one which precluded the prospect of any acceptable division of authority and administrative responsibilities between them. Thus, as far as our data go, they also confirm the generalization cited above.

BAURE AND FULANI DAURA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

We know too little about the developments of Baure and Fulani Daura to test the preceding generalizations cogently with these data; however, we may still scrutinize their histories for events or processes that contradict or qualify these propositions. While any exceptions would effectively disconfirm these generalizations, their absence in these conditions confers no additional validity. Restricting this review to the period before the British occupation, I shall discuss events at Baure before moving to Fulani Daura.

Baure

When the British arrived at Baure in 1903, Abdu was its reigning chief. His seven predecessors had together had a total of ten reigns, three having reigned twice each. Not one of these Baure chiefs had ever died in office. From Tsoho onward, all had been dismissed for disobedience or disloyalty by their suzerains at Zinder, most on charges reported by various Baure officials and several specifically for alleged collusion with the Fulani emirate of Kano, which was Zinder's major enemy in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Thus the Kaura Gata removed first Habu and then Jibo from office; then the Sarkin Fada Masabka assumed this role before it passed to the Turaki Inusa in the first reign of Zakari. Nonetheless, these Baure chiefs wielded much greater authority and power than did their cousins at Zango; and this was perhaps primarily because of the mutual independence and competition of their subversive officials. No single officeholder at Baure ever held a monopoly of the means of dethroning its chiefs, such as the Kauras Mazawaje and Bakula enjoyed at Zango. Competitions for this privilege among the senior nonroyal officials show how despite his insecure

tenure of office, the chief's control of the state councils and administration was strengthened by divisions among his officials. Of seven members of the senior council of state, two were fiefholding princes and leading candidates for the succession, while two, the Sarkin Yara and the Shentali, were slave *rukunai;* only two of eight major fiefholders, the Bunturawa, a prince, and the Sarkin Fada, had no seats on that council. Of the largest fiefholders, three were princes and two were slave *rukunai* who also served as electors. These distributions illustrate nicely the patrimonial character of the Baure government.

In developing his chiefdom by recruiting eligible candidates for local office from Magaria and Yardaji, Tsoho deliberately kept the critical office of Magajiya vacant throughout his reign; and although he appointed an Iya, she lacked the Magajiya's status and constitutional role. Tsoho also invested the senior princely titles of Yerima, Murka, and Bunturawa with substantial fiefs, thereby assuring dynastic control of the major part of the chiefdom's territory, population, and resources. Next, by placing these princes on the council of state, together with his senior throne slaves, Tsoho attempted to integrate their dynastic interests with those of the throne and the senior free hereditary officials, namely, the Kaura, the Galadima, and the Fada Babba. By simultaneously reducing the Dan Sanwai's role and suspending the office of Magajiya, Tsoho centralized powers of policy formation and execution in the chiefship and freed it from constitutional controls that prevailed at prejihadic Daura. However, while his context allowed the chief to initiate appointments and dismissals from office without requiring the formal assent of his senior council, Tsoho still needed the council's support before dismissing its members. Thus the chief's executive authority was indirectly restrained by prevailing distributions of power and interest within the central institution of the government.

A second condition that restrained the power of the Baure chiefs and their executive centralism derived from Tsoho's conversion of the traditionally honorific princeships of Daura into fiefholding offices with executive and military roles and, in some cases, with seats on the councils that regulated state policy. However, from the chief's point of view, the military, administrative, and political advantages of these dispositions were partially offset by their unintended defects, since, as major state executives, senior princes were nicely placed to pursue their own interests, including preeminently their quest for the throne. Thus their executive roles introduced new segmentary capacities and alignments within the dynasty and the territorial administration; but this allocation of fiefs and council places to princes also contraposed dynastic and nondynastic interests within the council and throughout the administration. Inevitably, given the subordination of Baure to Zinder which Tsoho's attacks on Magaria induced, competing senior princes canvassed their chiefly claims by cultivating the support of those nonroyal officials who could influence the succession either as electors or through their connections with the Zinder court. Thus, in patrimonializing the state by

entrenching dynastic interests in its councils and territorial administration, Tsoho politicized the dynasty and its senior offices and stimulated princes to pursue their competition by alliances with free and slave *rukunai.* Predictably, these nonroyal officials sought to exploit the situation for their individual political advantage, as did the princes. In consequence the Kaura, the Sarkin Fada, the Turaki, and others competed to supply Zinder with grounds for deposing current chiefs in order to nominate successors who would owe their appointments and tenures directly to them and who would thus be obliged to reward them suitably and advance their interests.

As we have seen, one consequence of such subversive competition for the ear of Zinder was to preserve the political and administrative supremacy of the Baure chiefship against serious local challenge. Thus, despite the unbroken series of depositions, the chiefship at Baure retained its executive predominance and thereby preserved the political integrity of the state, despite the situationally shifting alignments of interest and power of the royal, slave, and free officials. These conditions enabled Baure to preserve its political integrity more successfully than Zango despite similar truncations of its autonomy, as Zinder here also proscribed independent military action, wall building, execution, and mutilation. However, Baure appears to have paid lower tributes than Zango and was never divided administratively as Zango was in 1877. Then and thereafter, the chiefs of Baure retained their rights to administer local Fulani and to levy *jangali* for their own use. As far as we know, the *tarayya* exercised by Zinder officials at Baure was limited to the settlements of Dan Mairam and Burdudu. On balance it seems clear that Baure fared far better under Zinder's rule than did the sister state of Zango; and if we seek the ground for these differences, we should look to the differing political constitutions of the rival states.

The Sarkin Gwari's policies following his initial defeat had committed his community to pursuing restoration by reconquering Daura. Until that was accomplished, the exiled government was incidentally committed to upholding and practicing the constitution of the former state, with due adaptations to their altered situation, even in the absence of requisite material resources. Nonetheless, as we have seen, in developing and pursuing these policies, the Sarkin Gwari modified the prejihadic constitution by freeing the chiefship of oligarchic conciliar controls.

Lukudi inherited this executive power with its twin commitments of restoration and constitutionalism; but in seceding, Dan Shufini, Kitari, and Tsoho tacitly repudiated both, preferring to found new chiefdoms farther east, to abandon the quest for restoration at Daura, and to modify the traditional constitution freely to fit the opportunities and exigencies of their situations. Undoubtedly these ideological reorientations were stimulated to some degree by dynastic interests, ambitions, and opportunities; but they accorded well with the logical implications of secession; and once accepted, they facilitated Tsoho's adoption of a patrimonial model for the Baure state by suspending the Magajiya's office, the primary constitutional means by

which the traditional oligarchy had dominated the Daura chiefs. In thus adopting a patrimonial model for his new chiefdom in place of the oligarchic Daura one, Tsoho created the political forms and conditions that generated the dynastic competition and dispersed subversion mentioned above without, however, thereby destroying the centrality and supremacy of the chiefship and the integrity of the state. Thus Baure's experience supports the formula that "the structure of a governmental system changes as a function of the political action it generates internally";[40] and further, by its contrast with Zango under the common suzerainty of Zinder, it strongly suggests that such endogenous actions and pressures are more critical and significant sources of structural change than the interventions of aggressive suzerains such as the sultans of Zinder. Indeed, the primacy of these internal conditions and processes in promoting structural change in such contexts is nicely illustrated by the contrasting experiences of Baure and Zango under the uniform domination of Zinder.

Given the superior power, aggressive inclinations, and uniform political objectives of their common suzerain, the differing experiences of these two vassal states can only be explained as implications of their differing analytic structures; and as shown above, these differing analytic structures themselves reflect differences in the concrete structures of the two chiefdoms which in turn express their common latent structures in differing ways by articulating similar sets of forms quite distinctly and investing them with diverse contents. It is thus to the implications of these diverse constitutions that we must turn to seek the conditions that generated and facilitated the divergent alignments of political power, relations, and interests which in the common context of vassalage to Zinder produced the radically divergent experiences of Zango and Baure. These contrasts support the statement that "the rate and type of change in a governmental system corresponds to the type and intensity of the pressure its operation focuses on the revision of the formal categories on which its structure is based."[41]

Developments at Baure also suggest that "resistance to changes in the content of a system varies according to their significance for the maintenance of the current structure."[42] At Baure the autonomy and scope of the Hausa government was reduced by successive edicts from Zinder without resort to arms. In consequence, the chiefdom lost its initial capacities for independent military action and independent diplomacy, alliance, and fortification, as well as capital punishment and autonomous control of the senior nonroyal positions. But at Baure such reductions of scope and autonomy aroused less resistance than the continuing struggle among the chiefs, their kinsmen, and their senior nonroyal officials for the direction or domination of the state and thus for the preservation or modification of its political structure.

Finally, in its creation and development Baure illustrates the primacy of political action in the genesis and modification of governmental structures. The chiefdom's creation by Tsoho, its subjugation by Ibram, and the successive depositions of its chiefs were events that modified or preserved its politi-

cal structure and were all explicitly political in source and character, in motive and effect. Ultimately the structure was stabilized as a tense troika of the chief, the dynasty, and the senior nonroyal officials, each segment pursuing its own advantage in alliance with, and opposition to, the others. However, as the dynasty and officials were both internally divided, the chief enjoyed many short-term advantages.

In the genesis of the Baure state we have an excellent chance to see whether the categories that underlay its political structure were instituted in the order of logical priority that aligned them. By successive secessions, from Lukudi at Yardaji and from Kitari and Masallaci at Magaria, Tsoho directly modified the status ascribed to him by the prevailing structures; and although merely a *maina,* the son of an unsuccessful rebel, he asserted and validated his title to chiefship autonomously without being crowned and without external assistance. Next, in constituting his chiefdom he created a new set of offices distinguished from all others by their exclusive identification with Baure; by the attributes, relations, and conditions that differentiated their statuses; by the criteria that governed their allocation; by their grouping in orders of rank; by the definition of their respective roles; and by the presence or absence of promotional alignments among them. In establishing his state Tsoho filled some traditional offices on traditional criteria, others on new criteria, and left others vacant. Thus, the uncrowned chief created his chiefdom by establishing a new system of offices of which the most senior, the chiefship, was distinguished from other Daura chiefships by its territorial difference and by its history and articulation with the Baure offices, which only achieved a permanent form with the appointment of Tsoho's successor. Classifications of the new officialdom by rank and their differentiation by role developed together with the institutionalization of the government as a structure which the chief directed through the senior council of princes, free men, and slaves. Finally, new promotional groupings emerged within the officialdom by the joint allocation of offices to specific kinship groups. Thus the titles of Sarkin Yara, Bai Karama, and Dan Maza were vested in one lineage, while those of the Turaki and Sarkin Yaki, the latter an innovation, were given to another. In sum, it seems that the development of the Baure state replicated in all its particulars the logical order of the latent categories that together determined the limits, forms, and articulations of its concrete structure.

Fulani Daura

Although we have few details of developments at Daura between the death of Malam Ishi'aka and the accession of Altine in 1868, the general outline is reasonably clear. Having expelled the Hausa chief and government, M. Ishi'aka established the Fulani state as a province of the Sokoto caliphate. Several of his initial allocations of titles, fiefs, and council positions are well

known. The dynastic genealogy and local traditions indicate that succession to the throne was collateral until Zubairu's unsuccessful attempt to oust his brother Mamman Bello in 1837. Fraternal conflict recurred between Altine and Mai Gurdo, the sons of Mamman Bello; and at some point in Altine's reign, Mai Gurdo thought it best to flee to Kanda in Zango. Later, as emir, Mai Gurdo himself had to suppress a revolt by his Yerima Loto. Thus dynastic strife among eligible princes descended from M. Ishi'aka was a prominent feature of the Fulani state. As far as we know, neither its suzerain nor his minister in charge of Daura, the Galadima of Sokoto, ever attempted to overrule nominations by the local electors or to depose a local emir.

As Daura's tribute and other imperial obligations were very light throughout the century, we may therefore regard this Fulani emirate as substantially autonomous, protected against its enemies by imperial alliances with Kano, Katsina, and other Fulani states under the supervision of their common lords, the Sokoto caliphs. The contrasting situations of Fulani Daura and Zango illustrate the limits within which the specific conditions or substance of vassalage might vary without change of form. Unlike Zango and Baure, the Fulani of Daura could freely mobilize their military forces and fortify their towns, undertake offensive or defensive campaigns, and execute sentences of mutilation and death. Their suzerains never questioned the rights of these emirs to control local appointments and dismissals, although the emirs of Daura avoided dismissing their imams or chief priests for fear of offending the caliphs. Thus, at least as regards internal arrangements, Fulani Daura was a virtually autonomous state, while its relations of vassalage guaranteed its external security.

We may therefore ask once more whether the historical foundation of this state illustrates the order of logical priority that aligns the seven categories which together underlie and define its structure. To answer, the jihad proclaimed a major transformation in the prevailing system of status differentiation by elevating Muslim Fulani above Hausa, who were considered syncretists or heathen. In Daura the conquest crystallized and imposed this new status structure by subjugating Hausa, Maguzawa, and Buzaye (Bugaje) to the Fulani, whose organization was institutionalized in a new system of offices which M. Ishi'aka created and allocated among the major lineages and status categories of the Fulani community. In this process the emirship emerged from the Shehu Usman's original commission to M. Ishi'aka as the senior executive office. Although M. Ishi'aka was the first Fulani emir of Daura, he, like other flagbearers of the Shehu, was never formally installed in office and continued to exercise the Shehu's commission until his death. The differentiation of offices by rank and role, with members of the various councils, special military, civil, religious, legal, or other functions, developed gradually by successive stages as the emirship crystallized. For example, only on M. Ishi'aka's death could the new office of emir be institutionalized in its final form, and only then could an electoral council meet to decide the succession. Thus, throughout Ishi'aka's reign these electoral roles

were neither instituted nor distributed. Similarly, although M. Ishi'aka allocated certain offices to single lineages, for example those of the Sarkin Bai and the Sarkin Tafarki, their promotional alignments were only instituted by subsequent appointments. The new state developed in the order prescribed by the logical relations of the categories of its latent structure; and its genesis and consolidation alike illustrate an abrupt but lasting redistribution of political power between the Fulani and Hausa.

While allocating traditional nonroyal offices to leading Kwassarawa, Alibawa, and other Fulani lineages, M. Ishi'aka conferred several titles on his "brothers" and sons, thereby maintaining the traditional emphasis on hereditary office while establishing the dynasty. As the Shehu's delegate and governor, M. Ishi'aka assumed executive responsibility for the administration and policy of the state and dispensed with the Magajiya's office. It seems probable that various senior, junior, and war councils were only imperfectly institutionalized during his reign, although it is clear that Ishi'aka observed Islamic forms and governed through councils which included his kinsmen, leading colleagues, and senior slaves. The Fulani emir also abolished *tarayya* throughout his chiefdom and allocated *rumada* and fiefs to his senior officials, most of whom were drawn from the dynasty. By such allocations Ishi'aka constituted the emirate as a patrimonial state whose head, the emir, exercised decisive power in the interests of the dynasty and the leading Fulani lineages, which together administered the territory and dominated its councils.

Like that of Baure, the political organization of the Fulani state was a distinct troika; but the Fulani state had a heavier slave component attached to the throne, through which the chief administered his domains, supervised his fiefholders, levied dues, conducted communications, policed the capital, and waged war. There were therefore three major interest groups in the Fulani government: the throne, represented by the emir and his slave staff; the dynasty, represented by senior executive princes; and the free Fulani officials, heads of noble lineages. The dynasty itself divided into two categories —those eligible to succeed and others who were not. After the death of M. Ishi'aka's brothers, eligibility for the succession was defined by direct descent from a previous emir. All other princes were thus classified as *jikokin sarki,* ineligible for the throne. No sons of M. Ishi'aka's brothers Yusufu and Sani ever succeeded, nor did any princes whose fathers had not ruled the state. Thus the dynasty was segmented and stratified into two categories, one of which provided candidates for the succession while the other was represented on the electoral council by the heads of two collateral lines, the Sa'i and Haska. It was to this ineligible segment that free nobles initially looked for support in restraining the autocratic tendencies of emirs and the dynastic ambitions of eligible princes. Events revealed, however, that these ineligible Kuninkawa lacked the capacities to restrain chiefly absolutism and dynastic strife. For example, to secure the succession of his favorite son, Mamman Bello bypassed the local electors and appealed directly to Sokoto for per-

mission to abdicate in favor of Altine. Mai Gurdo, who had fled the country in Altine's reign, later showed the ineffectiveness of such restraints by expropriating the offices of Kaura, Galadima, Shentali, and Sarkin Yara, which had been hitherto reserved for noble Fulani, and thus aggrandized the throne at the aristocracy's expense. To effect this change, Mai Gurdo simply transferred these offices to throne slaves, thereby destroying the delicate balance of representation, interests, and power that had prevailed in the administration and state councils under his predecessors. Besides displaying his own superior power, such transfers substantially increased it. These developments, which were guided by the distinct and competing interests of the emir, the free nobles, and the dynasty, initiated further structural changes in the Fulani regime through the exercise of political power, thus illustrating the principle that "the structure of a governmental system changes as a function of the political action it generates internally."[43]

Following the Yerima Loto's revolt, Mai Gurdo expropriated the Kwassarawa and other free lineages and suspended the Alkaliship to eliminate alternative sources of power and authority within the realm and thus secure the succession for his sons. However, in transferring these free offices, their fiefs, and their council seats to the throne, Mai Gurdo isolated himself politically and unintentionally placed the future of the state in the hands of the senior throne slaves and particularly their head, the Sarkin Bai. This dangerous situation reflected the fact that the throne slaves, who were easily the largest and most highly organized segment of the officialdom, now exercised direct control over a far greater part of the chiefdom's territory, population, economic, and military resources. Moreover, in converting the patrimonial regime he had inherited into a slave-based sultanism, Mai Gurdo had entrenched the organization of his throne slaves and invested them with a virtual monopoly of the central and rural administration of the state, thus making the throne dependent on their support. Unwittingly, in creating his autocracy he also created the slave power which finally destroyed the state within a year of his death. Secure in his personal absolutism, Mai Gurdo could neither appreciate nor foresee the radical changes in the emirate's external relations that followed when the British replaced Sokoto as the suzerain power; but he also failed to appreciate how severely he had weakened the foundations of the chiefship by eliminating all those institutions and conventions that had restrained and supported it before his reign. Assuming that is new masters, the British, would display the historic tolerance of his former suzerains at Sokoto, and perhaps interpreting his experience of British rule by this inappropriate model, Mai Grudo may never have imagined that his successor would be dethroned, much less the dynasty evicted and the state abolished. Certainly his actions do not suggest that he anticipated the future role of his senior slave, the Sarkin Bai, although his prospective heir, the Bunturawa Sogiji, clearly perceived that this official was the dominant figure at Daura after Mai Gurdo.

Mai Gurdo's conversion of the Daura regime from a patrimonial to a sul-

tanic order proceeded by redefining the content of the Fulani status structure that M. Ishi'aka had established. By these revisions the free strata and lineages lost those offices that were hitherto reserved for them; by their transfer to throne slaves, the status criteria that had governed the distribution of these offices were similarly revised. These events greatly altered the autonomy and relations of these expropriated lineages to the throne and to all other offices and units in the state, including the dynasty, the Fulani and other free strata, titleholding lineages, and the throne slaves. The denunciations and protests of the Limam Jamau indicate his awareness of the significance of these changes. As the traditional rank organization was modified by these official transfers, so were the roles of the offices themselves and finally their promotional alignments. Arising from these shifts, the office of Sarkin Bai was elevated above all others and informally occupied a rank by itself intermediate between the throne and other senior offices, which were now almost entirely occupied by slaves. As though to express this transformation, the Sarkin Bai withdrew from Mai Gurdo's councils but deputized his son and prospective successor, the Salka, to attend in his stead, thereby modifying both their ranks and roles while segregating his own from those of other throne slaves. In sum, the experience of Fulani Daura before colonization, like that of Baure, illustrates, though it may not confirm, those invariant relations observed in the processes of structural change initially at Fulani Zaria and also at Zango and Baure.

DAURA UNDER THE BRITISH, 1903-1958

To complete our analysis of the historical record, we may periodize developments under British rule as follows: (a) Zango and Baure, 1903-1906; (b) Fulani Daura, 1903-1906; (c) the restoration of Musa, 1906-1911; (d) Daura under Indirect Rule, 1911-1951; (e) democracy at Daura, 1951-1958. As before, I shall first review these periods in succession and then discuss them together.

Zango and Baure, 1903-1906

The conquest and incorporation of Zinder by the French in 1899 gave Zango and Baure much-needed and permanent relief even before the first international boundary demarcation of 1901. With the termination of Zinder's suzerainty and the arrival of the British at Daura, Tafida as chief of Zango was given "some 660 towns and villages"[44] in addition to the 33 he already ruled. Thus Zango experienced three major changes of status as against two at Baure, namely, separation from Zinder, subordination to the British, and the status inflation implicit in its territorial expansion of 1903.

The British imposed several prescriptions and proscriptions that offended

many local leaders. Assuming that Tafida, as chief, exercised an unchallenged and undivided authority at Zango, they failed to recognize the "state within a state" of which Kaura Salihu was head; neither did they countenance the jurisdiction and tax-collecting rights of the Fulani headmen at Gurdo and Tsatsumburum. New procedures were promptly devised to gather cattle tax; and it was in this context that the boundary clash occurred in which ex-Sarkin Baure Ali and many other residents of Baure were killed. This incident inflamed the ancient tensions between Baure and Zango to such a degree that his kinsmen and councillors obliged the Sarkin Baure Haliru to adopt obstructive positions in his dealings with the British, who evidently favored the interests of Zango as the senior state. In reply, the British attached Baure to Zango as a dependent or vassal state shortly before Tafida died in 1904. This status change merely exacerbated Baure's opposition to Zango and the British while constraining its chief, Haliru, to display increased defiance. In consequence, in 1906, when Zango lost the extensive territories it had recently acquired, the British abolished the Baure state and incorporated its territory directly under Zango. The Baure dynasty was expelled en bloc to Katsina, and a garrison of Zango bowmen was placed at Baure to maintain peace and order.

The preceding sequence of change began with abrupt and radical revisions in the statuses of Zango and Baure by terminating their vassalage to Zinder and replacing this with a new and unfamiliar subordination, by greatly enlarging the chiefdom of Zango, and by defining its relations with Baure in terms of seniority. These changes simultaneously eliminated the ethnic *tarayya* that Zinder had exercised at Zango, the special status and privileges of the local Fulani, and the autonomous territorial jurisdiction of the Kaura Salihu. Baure lost certain settlements which were transferred to Zango but recovered Burdudu and Dan Mairam with the abolition of Zinder's *tarayya*. In both states these changes greatly strengthened the chiefships and transformed the distribution of power, together with the relations between the chiefs and their officials. Thus Tafida was freed from risk of subversion by the Kaura Salihu and Haliru from his Sarkin Fada and Turaki. It is certain, however, that the scope and implications of these structural changes escaped the immediate perception of those who experienced them in Zango and Baure as well as in Fulani Daura.

Assuming that chiefs could and did control official appointments within their states, the British gave the chiefs of Zango and Baure powers to appoint Galadimas, Kauras, Alkalai, and other senior officials while preventing dismissals from office on grounds unacceptable to them. By replacing Zinder as suzerain, they had also decisively altered the conditions on which these chiefships were allocated. Thus the British presence materially transformed the status and relations of these chiefships to all other offices in their governments by asserting their supreme authority and responsibilities; by proscribing clandestine and subversive communication between their subordinates and suzerain; by terminating the tribute, imposts, and interventions of Zin-

der; by restoring juridical integrity to both chiefships; and by increasing their powers of appointment. Simultaneously the British reduced the autonomy of these chiefs in certain ways, for example by proscribing slave raiding, slave trading, and mutilations; by forbidding unacceptable dismissals from office; and by proscribing several other practices that were established features of Hausa polities.

These actions modified the status conditions and ranking of Zango offices by replacing the Galadima and Kaura as peers below the chief, while at Baure they elevated the order of executive princes above all others. At Zango many official roles were initially redefined as Tafida seized the chance offered by temporary territorial expansion to invest princely titles and trusted throne slaves with fiefs, thus securing control of most of the state resources for the throne and the dynasty. In addition, new procedures for levying *jangali, kudin kasa,* and other taxes at Zango entailed corresponding revisions of prevailing official roles and erased the administrative division instituted in 1877. It seems probable that the Kaura's occupational officials lost their rights to levy *al'adu* and tax at this time. At Baure the more limited administrative reorganization had more restricted effects; but in both states these changes expressed the superior power of the British. In neither were the prevailing promotional arrangements immediately altered.

Fulani Daura, 1903-1906

Meanwhile, as Mai Gurdo's health declined at Daura, the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo, who administered the capital and directed rural affairs through senior throne slaves, acquired the powers and virtual status of a grand vizier. By withdrawing from the state council he asserted his executive preeminence and established the right to deal directly with the chief in private sessions on political and administrative matters. The British accordingly supervised the emirate by communicating with Dan Kanyo on administrative affairs while reserving problems of policy and law for discussion with the emir, since Mai Gurdo refused to appoint an Alkali.

At Daura also the British had terminated the emirate's traditional relations of vassalage to Sokoto by asserting their suzerainty. They thus abruptly revised the status of the chiefdom and reduced its autonomy by suspending its military capacities, by proscribing slave raiding and slave dealing, and by restricting local powers of execution and mutilation. Otherwise the British made no further changes in the status and structure of the emirate during Mai Gurdo's reign, his regime being sufficiently autocratic to fulfill their preconceptions of these Muslim states.

On Mai Gurdo's death, fearing opposition from the Sarkin Bai, the Bunturawa Sogiji promptly installed himself as chief without allowing the electoral council to meet. The Sarkin Bai immediately reported this usurpation to the British at Katsina; and when Sogiji was removed, Dan Kanyo manipu-

lated the new procedures of public election to secure the accession of Magajiya Murnai, the candidate he preferred as a puppet to secure and extend his power. Murnai's subsequent discovery of his humiliating role in these events provoked his confrontation with Dan Kanyo, whose executive responsibilities had by then been formalized through his elevation to the newly created vizierate. To remove Murnai, it was only necessary for Dan Kanyo to convince the British of his incompetence. As vizier, Dan Kanyo was then placed in charge of the emirate while a successor was sought. At this stage his own confidential agent, Na'inkali, subverted the vizier, who was removed from office and lost control of the emirate to another accomplice. In despair at this situation the British accepted the advice of their agent and decided to abolish the Fulani emirate and restore the Hausa dynasty. Malam Musa was accordingly summoned to Bici for a careful briefing on the conditions, procedures, and implications of his restoration.

These developments occupied less than a year after the death of Mai Gurdo. As Sogiji's dismissal illustrated the British desire to uphold traditional institutions such as electoral councils, Murnai's election by the new, peculiar procedure of public consultation effectively modified the antecedent structure by transferring the choice of an emir from the traditional electors to a public assembly, thereby drastically altering the criteria and procedures that had formerly regulated the accession. However, the fall of Sogiji and appointment of Murnai clearly demonstrated Dan Kanyo's power to make or break the emirs of Daura as he pleased. Murnai's removal four months after his appointment amply confirmed this. By then the Sarkin Bai had become vizier; and the creation of this new office illustrates the significant changes in the structure of the officialdom that Mai Gurdo's sultanism had made possible. Yet even earlier, with Mai Gurdo's death, the official structure had significantly changed when Dan Kanyo, formerly the emir's executive, now became effectively his master. Thus this institution of the vizierate at Daura unconsciously acknowledged the emergence of a power from the ranks of the throne slaves sufficiently formidable to overrule the emirs and destroy the emirate.

In creating the vizierate with British approval, Murnai had unwittingly redefined the status criteria that governed the distribution of other offices in the state by transferring initiatives and veto powers for these appointments from the throne to the vizier, who could now quite easily secure the dismissal of unwanted subordinates by manipulating the British. The effect of Dan Kanyo's election to the new vizierate was thus to modify substantially the status and scope of the chiefship and its relation to all other offices in the government, to institute the new rank of vizier within the officialdom, and to modify the roles of most subordinate offices by making them directly accountable to the vizier rather than the chief. Thus, in replacing Sogiji by Murnai, Dan Kanyo had appropriated the political initiative and control of the government that Mai Gurdo had concentrated in the throne. Finally, insofar as his elevation to the vizierate established a precedent, Dan Kanyo's

appointment inaugurated a new promotional ladder from the office of Sarkin Bai, which then remained vacant, to that of vizier. Thus, in detail these changes in the political structure of Daura proceeded in the order of the logical succession of the categories which underlay the regime; and by spanning its entire cycle, it revealed their fundamental significance as a major transformation of the previous order. This transformation was formally publicized for all to see, and being invested with official control of the emirate following Murnai's dismissal, Dan Kanyo promptly appointed Ali to the Alkali's office, which Mai Gurdo had suspended in 1898 and neither Sogiji nor Murnai had filled. With Palmer's discovery of Dan Kanyo's misconduct, the emirate was placed under a *wakil* (deputy) from Katsina, and the vizierate was terminated; and without either a vizier or chief of its own, the emirate was effectively decapitated and incapable of organized autonomous action as a unit. Thus it ceased to exist as a corporate group with the fall of Dan Kanyo even before Malam Musa's appointment. This final development drastically redefined the status of the unit and modified its official structure, calling into question all the traditional and recent criteria of its official allocations, suspending the chiefship and disrupting its rank organization while revising the roles of its offices by subordinating them to the British *wakil* and revoking the incipient promotional ladder that linked the titles of Sarkin Bai and Waziri.

Restoration of Musa, 1906-1911

While Musa's move to Daura fulfilled the hopes that had inspired and sustained the Hausa community ever since the Sarkin Gwari's return from exile to Yekuwa, it also altered the statuses of Zango and Daura in opposite ways. The Fulani emirate was formally extinguished and its territory and population were incorporated in the reconstituted Hausa chiefdom, whose immediate parent at Zango now ceased its separate existence, as Baure had previously done. To facilitate peaceful acceptance of Hausa rule by the Fulani at Daura, the British stipulated that Fulani fiefholders should be allowed to retain their offices unless found guilty of some offense sufficiently serious to require dismissal. New criteria were instituted to regulate the distribution and tenure of office on Musa's transfer to Daura. The ex-emir Murnai was demoted to the village of Sandamu, and the British seized the opportunities provided by amalgamation to introduce certain tax reforms and a new territorial organization of thirteen compact districts. Following this, for several years the Daura government contained two sets of titles, one derived from Zango, the other from the defunct Fulani emirate. A third series of titles flourished at Baure; but this did not compete with the two series at Daura.

Musa's reappointment as Hausa emir of the amalgamated state represented a fundamental revision of the status of the former chiefship and of the criteria that governed its future distribution. The throne was now linked

to the disparate officialdoms under its care by a more complex scheme of relations than either Zango or Daura had previously known. In like fashion, amalgamation altered the rank organization and roles of these two previously independent sets of offices. Many units, both Hausa and Fulani, now lost their traditional positions in the old rank-orders as a new official structure evolved. Many offices also lost their former roles while others received new ones, some of which—for example, the resident district headships—were instituted by the British, while others emerged gradually in the political context and processes of restoration. The status of antecedent promotional ladders in either state thus remained obscure until the duplicating officialdoms had been reduced and integrated in a new set of rank-orders; and as these developments proceeded, the British continued to supervise and to reshape the government by disestablishing certain offices and creating others, by instituting a treasury, by amalgamating districts, and by reorganizing tax collections, the prisons, police, and the law courts.

The British officials who supervised this amalgamation were often ill informed about the political institutions, relations, and processes they sought to guide and to remodel. Their indifferent grasp of local political conditions is nicely indicated by such incidents as the dismissal and exile of the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo; the flights of Galadima Jangwale, the Dan Bawo Baki, the Turaki Madi, the Sarkin Yara Kwanyami, the Sarkin Gabas Lasan, and, perhaps most dramatically, by the rise and fall of the throne slave Na'inkali, who was first appointed as Magajin Gari, then as Fada Babba, then as vizier in charge of the capital and the central administration, and finally, following the flight of Magajiya Murnai, also as district head of Sandamu. These events indicate the extreme uncertainty that disturbed the officials and people, but they also reflect the structural fluidity of the unstable and labile context of restoration.

Na'inkali's elevation to the vizierate by Musa created a situation structurally homologous to that achieved by Dan Kanyo in Murnai's reign. As vizier, Na'inkali exploited his direct relations with the British to discredit and humiliate Musa in ways that recall the subversions of Zango chiefs by Mazawaje and Bakula. The reorientations of official structures, conditions, rank-orders, roles, and relations with the throne which were associated with the rise and fall of the vizier Na'inkali are too transparent to require recital. The accidental exposure of Na'inkali's abuses illustrates the contingency of many historical developments. Before Na'inkali was exposed, the British had found it necessary to reconsider the wisdom of their bold experiment at Daura; and it is quite possible that, had Na'inkali escaped detection for another year or two, the Hausa restoration might have terminated in the abolition of Daura as a state and its territorial incorporation as a district in adjacent Katsina. Only an accident of history forestalled this risk by revealing the vizier's true colors and exculpating the chief, whose prolonged forbearance greatly increased his prestige.

Meanwhile the duplex officialdoms had been simplified to some extent by

the flight of several officials, by the establishment of other posts, by the enforced dismissal of Musa's musicians, and by other measures. In 1910, of the original thirteen districts, only seven remained. Excluding those districts within the defunct Fulani emirate which the British had initially reserved for Fulani officials, all senior offices were now held by Hausa, and several by Musa's kin.

On Na'inkali's dismissal, Malam Musa appointed his eldest son, Abdurrahman, as vizier in charge of the capital, the central administration, and the treasury, thus attaching this strategic office directly to the throne by the strongest ties of kinship and political interest. This appointment accordingly altered the criteria that governed appointments to the vizierate as well as its relation to the throne; and when Musa died in 1910, Abdurrahman duly succeeded as emir.

Daura under Indirect Rule, 1911-1951

Abdurrahman's early years witnessed further changes in the status structure, which included the extrusion of all remaining Fulani officials, thereby simplifying the officialdom and redefining the criteria that governed allocations of local offices. The development of a new official system thus involved a new rank-ordering of offices, together with further revisions of official roles and promotional alignments; but these developments also expressed prior changes in the status and scope of the chiefship and in its relations with subordinate offices, changes to which the British actively contributed. By 1913 all senior territorial and central offices were remunerated by salaries, taxation had been rationalized, and the first district assessments completed. New titles introduced from Katsina and Kano were assimilated to the developing rank organization through placements governed by complex criteria of status. Following Abdurrahman's accession, the vizierate was initially conferred on the Galadima Abubakar and then on the emir's brother Alhassan, who also supervised the treasury, the central administration, and the capital. Titles that had lost their administrative and political roles were abandoned or allowed to lapse on the deaths of their holders. Patrimonial policies initiated by Tafida in 1903 were advanced by the progressive reduction of other appointments and by the allocation of senior territorial and central offices to close kinsmen of the emir. From 1927 until 1939 there were never less than three princes among the emirate's five or six district heads; and throughout this period the vizier was the emir's brother and likely heir.

Meanwhile the British reformed and expanded the local administration. An early attempt to consolidate village groupings under salaried headmen failed, thus preserving the traditional fragmentation of rural administration among *masugari* without discretionary powers. Muslim courts were created at Baure and Mai Aduwa, and the emir's judicial council was separated from other councils. New departments of education, public works, health and

sanitation, agriculture, forestry, police, prisons, and the treasury emerged as the technical functions of the central administration increased and new orientations and standards were introduced. Traditional conventions that had governed the allocation and use of state compounds by senior officials were modified to meet the new conditions and requirements of administration. The capital was removed from the vizier's control and placed under the emir's son. By 1951, when the vizier was dismissed and his office abolished or suspended, village units had been grouped into larger areas under salaried heads, and the emir's family occupied most of the district headships and senior secular offices of the state. Abdurrahman's reign thus completed the transformation of Daura into a patrimonial regime under British supervision.

The stages by which this transformation proceeded were successively as follows. Offices were distinguished by status as Fulani or Hausa and within the latter category as royal and other. Within the royal category, Malam Musa's offspring were distinguished from others by descent, by appointments, and by their prospects. As the new system of offices evolved, the Fulani were excluded and princes were recruited to senior office, a process that transferred this honorific status to the executive ranks and established new criteria for these positions in conditions that reflected the chief's autonomous control of subordinate appointments and his changed relations with officials. Meanwhile a new order of departmental heads emerged to modify the rank organization that had evolved under Musa. As these new offices developed, several older ones also changed their roles, and many traditional positions lapsed entirely as their holders passed away. The old conciliar structure was gradually replaced by one that distinguished the judicial from political councils; and in the process Magajiya lost any vestiges of constitutional authority she may have retained. Abdurrahman dominated and governed the state through his sons and kinsmen, having installed them strategically in the senior territorial offices and senior positions of the central administration. The dynasty now controlled the main executive resources of the chiefdom; and when the Kaura Alhassan died at Baure in 1946, the title was left vacant for several years and the Kaura's compound demolished, as if to demonstrate the final supremacy of the chief and publicly exorcise the tradition of Mazawaje by eradicating his lineage as a political unit from the state.

This progressive patrimonialization encouraged new patterns of dynastic rivalry, initially between the emir's brothers, the Waziri Alhassan and the Madawaki Bukar on the one hand, and on the other his issue, the Bunturawa (later the Magajin Gari) Umaru and his son Bashar, who was successively Abdurrahman's scribe, then Turaki, and finally Wambai, in charge first of Sandamu and then of Baure. It seems probable that the fall of Waziri Alhassan in 1951 was linked with his support of the Madawaki Bukar against Abdurrahman's son and grandson, Umaru and Bashar.

We may therefore summarize these developments as redefinitions of the criteria that governed the allocation of senior office and their relations to the throne. The emergence of dynastic factions which maneuvered for advantage within the officialdom indicates the new political alignments precipitated by these structural changes.

Democracy at Daura, 1951-1958

The final phase of Abdurrahman's reign to which our materials refer extends formally from 1951, when the first public elections were held in Northern Nigeria, until 1958, when my data were collected. In fact the new procedures of election were only applied in Daura to local councils at the levels of the village, district, and emirate in 1953, when the late Sardauna, Sir Ahmadu Bello, visited the emirate as regional minister of local government for this purpose. The Madawaki Bukar then undertook to supervise these and other local programs of community development initiated by the Regional Government and was duly appointed to the inner council of state with responsibility for local elections and rural development. The Madawaki thus forfeited the district headship he had held till then for a place in the emergent rank-order of ministerial councillors; but his contemporaries at Daura interpreted this move in terms of the developing dynastic struggle for the succession. In consequence the new institutions of elected local councils and the new development projects were incorporated at their introduction into the antecedent political structure as new and promising means of dynastic competition for the throne.

During the 1950s local and regional elections were canvassed at Daura by spokesmen of two northern political parties, the NPC, of which the Sardauna was president, and NEPU, a radical party that criticized the Native Administration of northern emirates as corrupt, authoritarian, oppressive, nepotistic, and inefficient. As a leading member of the local dynasty and government and as the Sardauna's local representative, Madawaki Bukar, although obliged to organize impartial elections, clearly sympathized with the NPC rather than NEPU. The results of these elections indicate similar orientations among the people. In rural areas the newly elected councils had capacities to initiate local developments with the approval of their district chiefs. In the situation that prevailed, the populace was incapable of exploiting the new electoral institutions to improve its lot by reducing the power of its rulers. Local NEPU spokesmen risked punishment for speeches that charged the Native Administration with familism and nepotism. The patrimonial chiefdom that Abdurrahman had established was too secure to be upset by such complaints. The introduction of popular elections and a hierarchy of representative councils, which ranged from the level of the village to that of the emirate, was thus neutralized at its beginning by the political con-

ditions that prevailed and redefined these specifically administrative developments initiated by the Regional Government, which was then preparing to replace the British.

The failure of these reforms to effect any significant change in the forms of local government was ensured at their introduction by their submergence in the prevailing dynastic competition, an event that immediately converted them into instruments for the pursuit of that rivalry. Thus, the suspension of local elections and representative councils that followed the assassination of the Sardauna and the overthrow of the federal and Northern Nigerian governments in January 1966 merely removed these elements and duties of the Native Administration without reducing its capacity or modifying its political structure one whit. Thus, the failure of the Sardauna's attempt to democratize the structure of this patrimonial regime by instituting representative councils based on public elections illustrates once more the proposition that "attempts to change the form of a system by changing its content are self-defeating."[45] Despite their ostensibly political origin, character, and purpose, these electoral arrangements and local councils were patently the administrative creations of an external authority and depended on the support of the emirs and their administrations for local operation. Without such support, these innovations could have little, if any, effect on the distribution of power at Daura, not merely because power was by then heavily concentrated within the Native Administration and particularly within Abdurrahman's family, but primarily because commoners, having never been allowed to influence their government under the old regime, were not now given adequate opportunities and resources to do so. Thus, besides introducing the new office of councillor for local elections and development, a status that the Sardauna created and conferred on Bukar with Abdurrahman's approval, the innovations of 1953 made very little change in the status and relations of the throne, populace, and the senior officialdom, although they modified the prevailing rank-order and added the Madawaki to the emir's council of ministers. Certainly these innovations established one new senior office with quite distinctive conditions of appointment and function, together with a new hierarchy of councils aligned by collegial elections from junior to senior through procedures of co-option which enabled high-ranking officials such as the Wambai Bashar to secure election by representatives of the emirate to the Regional House of Assembly. Thus by 1958 the patrimonial regime had incorporated the new machinery of political parties, elections, and local councils and harnessed these structures to dynastic dominance and rivalry for the succession. At the death of the Madawaki Bukar some years later, even that function, which could hardly have been anticipated by the regional authorities that promoted them, was withdrawn from the new institutions, thus leaving the patrimonial order intact and the succession disputed, despite periodic confrontations of NEPU and the NPC at the polls.

Course of Change, 1903-1958

Having already traced in some detail the processes by which the contemporary emirate at Daura was reconstituted during the first decade of this century through the successive amalgamations of three states and displacements of two dynasties, we have only to consider whether and how far or in what ways the common categorical foundations of these three states were modified in the creation and development of the new one. It is obvious that all the changes initiated by the British from the moment of their arrival until the Hausa returned to Daura expressed their superior political power and military force. The various particulars that illustrate this superiority need no recapitulation; neither do the convulsive structural changes that Daura experienced before and after Mai Gurdo's death, the abrupt reversals in the distribution of local power, the creation and suspension of a vizierate, the installation and removal of successive chiefs, and finally the abolition of the emirate. At Baure also the British presence radically changed the delicate balance of power by dislocating its essential mechanisms for the overthrow of local chiefs, thereby precipitating direct confrontations between the chief and his immediate rivals, the senior executive princes. It was those confrontations that obliged Haliru to pursue the defiance which led to the extinction of the chiefdom.

Despite their differing analytic structures, the downfall of Baure and Fulani Daura had common foundations in the formal categories that underlay the concrete structures. Each of these regimes was ordered as a set of differentiated statuses of which the unique perpetual units were offices distinguished by their specific properties, conditions, capacities, and relations with one another and with other status categories in the system. In all three states most offices were hereditary; and each regime and its offices experienced structural changes whenever criteria or conditions that governed the distribution of offices were altered, thus modifying the antecedent participation of status groups within the officialdom, the modified unit's articulation with other offices, its status in the scheme of official ranks, and, frequently, its resources, capacities, and role.

As the apical office of these governments, the chieftaincy was their most sensitive and critical institution. Its status, autonomy, and articulation with other units virtually summarized the analytic structure of the regime. For example, if a chief required his council's assent before appointing or dismissing his senior officials, then the council effectively co-opted its members and governed the state through the chief as an oligarchy guided by the executive, familial, and status interests of its members. Such was the situation at Daura before the jihad identified the chief as the center of an unhinged, displaced regime and thus transformed the structure, thereby enabling the Kauras later to exploit the demand for oligarchic restoration, to subvert the chiefs, and to dominate the state. Alternatively, if a chief could appoint and dismiss offi-

cials freely within limits set by the traditional distributions of office among status groups and lineages, his autocratic capacities could be controlled only by persuading the suzerain to depose him, as was the practice at Baure. In the absence of such external checks, a dominant chief could aggrandize his power by expropriating the traditional offices of lineages and status groups and by transferring these to his slaves, thereby converting the patrimonial regime into an undisguised sultanism, as Mai Gurdo did at Daura. Such absolutism, although superficially the strongest and least divided of these regimes, was fundamentally the most unstable and insecure, since its central organ, the chiefship, was reduced by isolation to utter dependence on the senior slave who administered the state and controlled most of its resources.

Two of these three alternative regimes were equally possible in independent states and in tributary chiefdoms whose suzerains practiced laissez-faire; but vassal status also allowed the suzerain to appropriate control of strategic local offices, whether by making appointments to them himself or by making such appointments and dismissals conditional on his assent, thus modifying the criteria that previously governed the allocations of these positions and reducing the status and autonomy of the local chief. Such external preemptions of appointive power inevitably altered the alignments of these and other offices with the chief and his councillors, the statuses of all parties, and the prevailing distributions of power. The status and integrity of the chiefdom were correspondingly impaired, although this situation allowed subversive officials like Mazawaje and Bakula at Zango, Turaki Inusa at Baure, or the Sarkin Bai Dan Kanyo at Fulani Daura to manipulate the suzerain with more or less success for their own political ends. Thus, the salient differences in political organization and character of these regimes are entailed by structurally prior differences in their distributions of power to allocate office among chiefs, councillors, village lineages or status groups, and their respective suzerains.

Transfers of office between rank-orders and status groups which illustrate the stability of these rank-orders alike reflect the distributions and the exercise of power to make these appointments. In similar fashion the capacity to modify prevailing roles and promotional alignments of office by suspending, creating, or transposing them reflect the fluctuating distributions, conditions, and objectives of decisive power within or over the officialdom as a unit or its hierarchic segments. The freedom with which the British guided the creation by Musa and Abdurrahman of new rank-orders for district chiefs and departmental heads while allowing several traditional offices to lapse, introducing new titles, and transferring titles and roles at their administrative convenience indicates nicely the inner significance of such changes for the political structure, since such changes clearly express pivotal realignments of decisive power that altered the status, articulation, and autonomy of the state. Indeed, at Daura these developments describe the mutual accommodation of the British and the Hausa chiefs, for while Musa and Abdurrahman allowed the British to reform and rationalize the central and

local administrations, the British in turn allowed the emirs to staff both these structures with men of their own choice.

The gradual but inexorable conversion of the Hausa government at Daura into a stable patrimonial regime proceeded under British supervision and presumably with the support of British officials as particularly appropriate to consolidate the restoration. However, even at Zango, as soon as opportunity allowed, Tafida and Musa had initiated this policy by placing new territories under their kinsmen and slaves to strengthen the throne and reduce its dependence on hereditary officials such as the Kauras Mazawaje and Bakula or the Galadimas Masallaci and Jatau. Moreover, events at Baure and at Fulani Daura under the British demonstrate that vassal chiefs had equal reason to fear those slave or free *shigege* officials whom they could not readily dismiss. When the British sought to introduce popular elections and participation in local government during the final decade of their rule, the result was a substantial failure despite its formal success, because among other things the prerequisite redefinitions of the jural and political status of the commoners and their rulers had not been effected. Thus the attempt to change the form of the system by changing its content through administrative means effected little; the patrimonial regime that Abdurrahman directed assimilated these innovations without strain.

9
Corporations and Change

THE FORMS AND CONDITIONS OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION

Corporations and Concrete Structure

I have now examined the data to see whether within these three Daura chiefdoms the changing distributions of power and authority, that is, their changing analytic structures, always replicated the order that aligned the seven latent categories on which these regimes were based. But despite frequent allusions to their concrete structures, I have attempted neither to delineate these nor to investigate their continuity or change. I shall now undertake this inquiry in an attempt to fill this gap in the preceding analysis with two particular ends in view: first, I shall try to see whether continuities and changes at this concrete level of structure exhibit any invariant features; second, I shall seek to determine the congruence of changes at this structural level with those reviewed above at the analytic and latent levels. For brevity, and because of its superior data, I shall restrict this analysis to the history of the Hausa community that was eventually restored from Zango to Daura.

It is important to examine changes and continuities in the concrete structure of this regime for several reasons. First, this inquiry obliges us to go beyond the governmental system defined as an official order to consider the structural form and continuity of the total society. Accordingly, it should enable us to integrate the preceding analysis of political continuity and change with some discussion of other features of the social order of which the government is part. Second, as noted above, my failure to seek developmental variations or uniformities at the concrete level of political structure would leave the analysis incomplete, since this concrete structure manifests the latent structure of basic categories directly and sets the conditions in which the analytic structure of relations defined by power and authority crystallize and develop. Thus, as the intervening level of structure, these concrete units and their relations merit further study.

As we have seen, at a macrosociological level the concrete structure of a political order consists of its corporate forms and their interrelations. As a concrete body, the polity is simply the most inclusive unit of corporate organization. As a form it denotes the particular way in which this specific ensemble is articulated and organized. If centralized, the polity is thereby constituted as a corporate group; if uncentralized, it represents a corporate category. As indicated earlier, besides corporate categories and groups, in treating corporate forms we have also to deal with colleges, offices, and commissions.[1] Of these five varieties, four possess the essential attributes of corporations, namely, uniqueness, presumptive perpetuity, closure, and membership, while the fifth, commissions, are quasi-corporations of diverse form and base. Further, of these five varieties three are corporations aggregate, namely, the corporate group, category, and the college, while two are corporations sole. Likewise, three varieties are *perfect* in the technical sense that they possess capacities for continuous positive action, while two are *imperfect,* one of these, the category, being a species of corporation aggregate while the other, the commission, a quasi-corporation, is normally a variety of corporation sole. Though closed, unique, presumptively perpetual, and having determinate memberships, corporate categories are imperfect since they lack the conditions necessary to undertake positive functions as inclusive collectivities. By contrast, while all commissions are imperfect since they lack the presumption of perpetuity, they are otherwise highly variable. Some commissions are unique while others are organized in ranked series of indefinite extent. Some unique commissions are assumed or created by individuals independently, while others are established by other bodies. Finally, some unique but discontinuous commissions, such as presidents or parliament may appoint for specific purposes, often consist of several persons who are either endowed with distinct commissions or obliged to function as though they are one. Thus the commission, a quasi-corporation, also exhibits the greatest diversity of form.

As perduring regulatory units, corporations endow their members with distinctive status. They are accordingly concrete units of status differentiation. While the precise rights, privileges, obligations, and liabilities of the members of any corporation will vary with its type and basis, they also vary as the unit's articulation with other corporations in its social environment undergo change. Such external articulations may either enhance or restrict the autonomy and scope of the corporate body, with the direct consequence that the collective resources and interests of its members will expand or contract in security and/or scope, thereby extending or restricting their rights and obligations vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis nonmembers, thus modifying the substantive aspect of their membership status. However, while some corporations enroll all their members on identical conditions and thus confer an identical status on each, others differentiate their members in strata distinguished by differing duties and rights or in mutually exclusive segments of coordinate or unequal status.

As units endowed by their organization with capacities for continuous positive action, colleges and offices are explicitly regulatory structures, more so than the corporate groups in which they are always embedded. However, there are many corporate groups that lack such agencies of collective regulation and rely instead on ad hoc commissions to guide the affairs of their members. Thus, while those corporate groups that lack regulatory colleges and offices disperse their self-regulating powers among their members, others that have these agencies are thereby differentiated internally into regulating and regulated sections.

Though discontinuous in their incidence, operation, and institutionalization, commissions of either sort are agencies of public regulation, though this is often implicit. By contrast, since corporate categories lack the organizational requisites for common action, they cannot regulate their affairs as an inclusive collectivity and are therefore regulated either by other superordinate units or by inviolate collective prescriptions, such as rules of exogamy, endogamy, or both together. When subject to positive regulation by other bodies, the members of a corporate category are *differentially incorporated* by that condition in some wider unit. When regulated merely by binding general rules such as those that enjoin exogamy or endogamy, such categories are normally incorporated on uniform conditions in some wider unit by their identical or complementary disabilities. Frequently this wider unit has the form of an uncentralized *consociation.*

Societies must either recruit their members in three distinctive modes or in some specific and operable combination of them. An aggregate may incorporate some of its members under conditions that impose upon them jural and political disabilities of varying severity and scope, thereby establishing their *differential incorporation.* However, for reasons of logic no society can ever enroll *all* its members in this way. Alternatively, societies may incorporate their members universalistically on uniform and identical conditions that distribute equal rights and obligations and attach each individual directly to the whole. Such conditions illustrate the mode of *universalistic incorporation.* Or a society may incorporate its members indirectly, although equally or equivalently, by prescribing their prior membership in one or other of various collectivities that constitute it. Such *consociational incorporation* may unite lineages, clans, guilds, communes, cantons, or federated states to form societies. Finally, many societies employ two or more of these alternative *modes of incorporation* to order relations among differing collectivities within them.

Before the jihad Daura differentially incorporated such non-Hausa residents as the pastoral and settled Fulani, the Maguzawa, and the Bugaje. By contrast, local Beriberi (Kanuri) probably held privileged positions at Daura at that time. In addition, at this period the Hausa society differentially incorporated three other categories of persons, namely, eunuchs, women, and slaves. The privileged section that dominated the society by monopolizing its

central institutions was organized consociationally as an oligarchy. Its traditional norms prescribed allocations of hereditary office to privileged lineages drawn from various strata, thereby establishing a secure distribution of power for the oligarchic consociation; but a sufficient number of *shigege* offices reserved for differing status categories was incorporated in the staffs of *rukunai* and the chief to motivate ambitious Hausa by providing opportunities for social mobility. In consequence the regime elicited support as well as apathy from the people, for with these exceptions Hausa commoners lacked prospects of power and could not influence the government, although individuals were often consulted on issues affecting them and, as Hausa, were free to initiate *tarayya* relations with lords of their choice to secure redress or relief from others. Thus the status of these Hausa subjects illustrates stratification rather than the differential incorporation that was reserved for the Fulani, Maguzawa, and Bugaje. In establishing such *tarayya* relations, as in contracting clientage, the inferior invested his patron with a standardized type of *commission* in return for customary services on his part. Thus this structured combination of differential and consociational incorporation defined society in the prejihadic Hausa state as a corporate group in which various collectivities were differentiated as closed and presumptively perpetual categories by criteria of ethnic and/or political status that effectively disenfranchised them.

At Daura the jihad began with the conversion of one of these disenfranchised ethnic categories, the Fulani, themselves subdivided by modes of life into pastoral and sedentary communities, into a corporate group mobilized as a unit for military action against the Hausa rulers. This transformation of local Fulani from a corporate category into a corporate group was achieved on the return of M. Ishi'aka to Daura with the Shehu's commission, symbolized by a flag, and with contingents of allies to lead the local Fulani and Muslims against syncretistic Hausa chiefs and officials. Unprepared, the Hausa failed to withstand this challenge and were defeated. Their rulers then withdrew, leaving the territory and its inhabitants to the Fulani conquerors. As we have seen, these Fulani conquerors merely reversed the prevailing structure of differential incorporation by constituting themselves as the dominant corporate group and the Hausa, Maguzawa, and Bugaje inhabitants as so many corporate categories subject to Fulani rule.

The flight of the Sarkin Gwari and his central officials effectively converted their Hausa subjects within the abandoned territory into a corporate category by removing the central institutions and personnel that had hitherto provided the essential organization for their collective action in routine situations and in emergencies. Thus the jihad effected a major reversal of the preexisting corporate organization at Daura by converting the Fulani from a corporate category into a corporate group with central leadership while transforming the Hausa inhabitants from a corporate group into a corporate category by expelling the indispensable central agencies of their collective

organization. The structure of the new political order was thus the mirror image of the old even to many details of its governmental organization, as related above.

By evacuating Daura and removing its government, the Sarkin Gwari decapitated the Hausa society. The government itself consisted entirely of corporations sole organized as a corporate group under the chieftaincy and the senior council; but this unit had several corporate groups of differing kind attached to it, namely, the dynasty, lineages with hereditary titles, palace eunuchs, throne slaves, craft groups, and Hausa malams. Following the exodus, the Fulani promptly filled certain vacant ranks with their own leaders, councils, officials, noble lineages, and a new palace staff of eunuchs and slaves. Gradually but inevitably the commission with which the Shehu Usman dan Fodio had invested M. Ishi'aka was converted into the office of emir; and as the Shehu's delegate, Ishi'aka created or revived and distributed offices among his kinsmen, associates, and subordinates; established the dynasty; created councils; and recruited a palace staff. In this way he developed a new institutional structure which was modeled on the old and furnished the basis for a government monopolized by the Fulani as an essential condition of their continued rule.

Formal Conditions of Corporate Organization

To investigate the conditions and processes of continuity and change in the concrete structure of the Hausa government after its flight from Daura, certain features of corporate organization should be noticed. First, any organization of corporate units consists of these units and their institutional relations. As corporations are presumptively perpetual, closed, and mutually distinct, in order for them to endure, their relations must normally be standardized and consistent with their mutual requirements. Such relations, which together define the articulation of the system, accordingly distinguish the properties and capacities of the corporations they integrate.

As observed earlier, corporations of any type are based on principles that regulate the recruitment of their members and exclude nonmembers. In practice all corporate groups require two or more principles to regulate this recruitment, whereas categories need only one. For example, lineages may recruit their members by agnatic or by uterine descent and by coresidence, thereby defining them all as part and parcel of a common indivisible estate. By contrast, a categorical clan only needs a rule of unilineal descent to recruit its members, who are often dispersed.

The set of principles by which a corporation recruits and differentiates its members and excludes nonmembers forms the *basis* on which the unit is incorporated, while the nature of the unit and the status of its membership indicate its *type* or *form*. Thus the five varieties of corporations and quasi-corporations distinguished above illustrate alternative forms. Differences in

the forms of corporation correlate directly with certain differences in their internal and external articulations, since these articulations consist of standardized relations which are either required or entailed by particular conditions or elements of these units.

Many conditions that are necessary for the appropriate *internal* and *external articulation* of corporations attach directly to the *principles* on which they are based, while others attach to their form. Principles that furnish the basis of a corporation by recruiting and differentiating its members have *logical requisites* and *implications* or *entailments* without which they can be neither conceived nor institutionalized. For example, any rule of descent presupposes prior distinctions of sex, generation, filiation, and parenthood without which the relation of descent, and hence the rule, is inconceivable. Moreover, to be institutionalized as a principle of social organization and differentiation, such rules imply or entail mechanisms or criteria by which individuals and collectivities can determine their identical or differing descents within whatever contexts, limits, or modes their social system requires or permits. Thus, in a society of two intermarrying exogamous moieties, a unilineal rule and the prescription of exogamy are sufficient to distinguish individuals of common or opposite categories without excluding segmental differences of descent in either. In other systems a genealogy may be necessary; and in yet others, a pedigree. Moreover, in the moiety organization just mentioned, the exogamous rule itself presumes some arrangements to secure its observance by all, since the validity of the categorical units that provide the concrete structures of such societies depends upon this. Thus, while logical requisites are conceptual preconditions of the bases or forms of corporations, entailments are intrinsic implications that specify the operational necessities of adequate institutionalization.

The corporate group requires recruitment criteria or principles; the implications and requisites of these principles must therefore be logically compatible and coherently integrated in order that the unit may be viable and have mutually consistent internal and external articulations. The specific character and range of the unit's external articulations will accordingly reflect its recruitment criteria, which directly prescribe its explicit primary concerns within the limits set by its form and societal context. Thus the articulations of corporations with others of similar or differing base and form reflect the primary interests entailed by the principles on which such units recruit and organize their members. It is obviously requisite that such recruitment criteria should be mutually consistent in order that they may be institutionalized together as the basis for corporations of any particular form. It follows that a perfect corporation, that is, one capable of continuous positive action as a unit, should routinely uphold and administer the exclusive common affairs of its members by acceptable procedures and that the central core of these common affairs are directly entailed by those principles on which the unit is based and by the form of its organization. The minimal set of affairs that such corporations must regulate to assure their persistence

without changes of form is thus entailed by the specific set of principles that regulate the recruitment and differentiation of their members. For example, units that enroll their membership by criteria of kinship or descent must regulate those kinship relations and interests which are either requisite for, or entailed by, their recruitment criteria, for example, marriage, residence, inheritance, parenthood, succession, or descent. Other corporations that enroll members on local, occupational, economic, political, or religious criteria, or on some specific combinations of these, have correspondingly divergent conditions, interests, affairs, and activities to regulate; but the extent to which such units are in fact able to administer their essential affairs autonomously depends upon and reflects their individual articulations with other units of similar and differing type and base in their social environment.

While the requisites and entailments of their particular recruitment criteria specify and differentiate the appropriate conditions for the articulations of corporations of differing base, other requisites and implications attach uniformly to all corporations of identical form. Of these, the requisites of perpetuity and closure directly entail criteria and procedures of recruitment and differentiation of members. Thus the four formal features that together constitute corporate status specify the most general requisites and entailments of all such units. However, as already noted, these conditions are not essential for commissions, which as quasi-corporations are neither presumptively perpetual nor prescriptively unique. Moreover, while all corporations must recruit and differentiate their members to assure their uniqueness and perpetuity, some—the corporations aggregate—require a plurality, while others—the corporations sole—preclude this and prescribe a strictly individual succession. Thus, corporations aggregate must assure their continuing plurality, while corporations sole must secure stable conditions of individual succession. Lacking the latter, individual commissions forfeit perpetuity and thus rise and disappear situationally. However, by virtue of these imperfections, individual commissions are readily converted into corporate offices by the institution of hereditary or other modes of transmission. For example, following the jihad at Daura, M. Ishi'aka's commission was institutionalized as a perpetual office with certain inalienable rights and properties, the *universitas juris* of emirship that provided the substance of its inextinguishable status. By institutionalizing criteria and procedures for succession, precisely the same conversion occurred at Baure when Ibram replaced Tsoho, its uncrowned creator, with Habu as his vassal chief. Failing such transformation, the commissions of Tsoho and M. Ishi'aka would simply have lapsed on their death, thereby necessitating the creation of some substitutes of equivalent status and efficacy if the states they had established were to persist in any form.

The universal requisites of corporate groups are thus plural memberships recruited by rules that differentiate them collectively as presumptively perpetual and externally indivisible units in conditions that establish the collective procedures, organization, and autonomy they require to regulate their common affairs. Since the requisites and entailments specific to corporate

groups of differing base vary as direct conditions of the differing principles on which they are based, units of identical basis and form within a common system will accordingly share identical requisites and entailments which distinguish the conditions appropriate for their articulation uniformly from all other corporations of differing base and form within the system. In consequence, corporations of identical constitution should exhibit identical properties and articulations unless differentiated by some specific conditions or incidents of structural change, while units of differing base should differ correspondingly in their attributes and articulations.

Being always located within corporate groups, colleges share those properties that derive from the general and specific requisites and entailments of the corporate groups to which they belong. However, every college is differentiated by further requisites and entailments from the corporate group it represents and regulates. These additional differentiae include those principles that govern the recruitment of members to the college and the requisites and entailments that attach to them; but they also include the status differentiations that establish the college as a distinct structure within the wider unit and regulate its autonomy, procedures, and scope. Thus, colleges differ from the corporate groups in which they are set in their composition, bases, and capacities, given that the affairs subject to collegial regulation vary in their kind and range as a function of the form and principles of the corporate unit they regulate. Such differences in the bases, composition, autonomy, procedures, and scope of colleges generally reflect differences in their articulations with the corporate groups whose affairs they regulate and with other corporate units in their social environments.

In like fashion the requisites of offices include the specific conditions that constitute and distinguish them as perpetual statuses from one another and from all other types of social unit, corporate or noncorporate, in the systems of which they are part. As already mentioned, prescriptions of individual incumbency and specific criteria and procedures of succession are critical requisites. The first of these defines the unit's form; the second, its base. Thus, despite their identical form, offices which were prescriptively reserved for specific lineages differed in their base from those which were reserved for a status group without lineage restrictions and from others which the chief could allocate as he pleased. Appropriately, such "differentiation of office by status conditions of eligibility" follows immediately after the principle that distinguishes offices as "perpetual statuses" in my original list of logically ordered categories that provided the foundations of Hausa government.[2] In addition, as regulatory units, offices require autonomy and scope, that is, the capacity to regulate certain affairs of specific social units or categories. As with colleges, the autonomy and scope of various offices of similar or differing bases generally reflect the conditions of their articulation with other regulatory units, with the systems of which they are part, or with some wider societal environment. For example, many offices owe their creation, conditions, autonomy, and resources to the initiative of some superior

body, while others, such as the chiefships of Zango and Baure, may lose autonomy, scope, and resources to more powerful units. In either case, the conditions of its articulation regulate the scope and autonomy of office.

Like colleges and offices, commissions are found in corporate categories as well as in corporate groups. They may also be temporarily attached to offices and may then consist of single individuals or groups. They may be created and abolished by those who hold them or by others in the society. They may be organized as individually unique but formally homologous units in ranked strata of indefinite extent, as in bureaucracies or armies, for example. Thus commissions owe their remarkable diversity to that fusion of basis and form which is the source of all their imperfections as corporate units. In consequence, the scope and autonomy of differing types of commission vary widely, but their limits are always set by the conditions that articulate these units to the social field in which they occur.

The formal requisites of corporate categories are simply those that distinguish corporations as a class from other social units with one special feature, namely, that as corporations aggregate, categories require plural memberships. However, since such collectivities lack any inclusive organization, they cannot as units possess exclusive common affairs, procedures, resources, or collective autonomy to administer them. Thus, corporate categories are inert collectivities incapable of inclusive common action unless converted into a corporate group by some organizing agency such as M. Ishi'aka's commission represented among the Fulani of Daura in 1804-1805.

The form of a corporation prescribes specific conditions for its articulation with other units of similar or different type to ensure its persistence. For example, without adequate arrangements for the collective organization of their common interests and activities, corporate groups would lose their capacities for inclusive positive action and thus the collective affairs, autonomy, and procedures that distinguish them from corporate categories. To prevent this and to regulate their interests effectively, corporate groups accordingly maintain offices, colleges, moots, or discontinuous commissions which they may change or replace as experience suggests without dissolving their requisite organization. For their perpetuity and also for their internal and external articulation, these units also require uniform criteria, procedures, and rules to recruit and differentiate their members internally and externally. In contrast, the rules that regulate the transmission of office summarize the criteria and procedures of succession but distinguish them from one another; thus some offices may be hereditary in particular lineages, others reserved for particular local or status groups, and yet others may be formally unrestricted by such criteria. Further, succession may be regulated by various procedures. Councils may coopt; patrons may sponsor; staff or lineages may elect or select; autocrats may appoint freely; candidates may compete by examinations, by bribes, or by such alliances as the pact between Mazawaje and Nuhu. In like fashion the tenure of office may be terminated by death; by set time intervals; by flight or resignation of incumbents; by

promotion, demotion, transfer; or by dismissal on various structural contingencies. Together these rules, procedures, and conditions of succession and tenure differentiate offices of differing bases within a common system by specifying their distinctive articulations with other units that influence or control their allocation and activities, including their scope, subjects, and staffs. Together such diverse and specific relations differentiate offices within each rank-order of a common government and define the formal and operational conditions that are necessary to their continuity without change. Accordingly, when these requisites are set aside, or when the conditions that regulate its allocation or tenure change, the status, relations, and capacities of any office are correspondingly modified, giving rise to adaptive adjustments with other units of the common system which typically revise the antecedent distribution of resources, autonomy, and scope among them, thus altering the former distributions of power and authority. More grossly, the conversions of corporations into forms of differing types generate and express broader changes in the structure and alignment of such units within a society. For example, when the Fulani of Daura constituted themselves as a corporate group instead of a corporate category, they rejected the prevailing pattern of differential incorporation that subjugated them. When the Sarkin Gwari withdrew with his court and officials following his defeat, he thereby converted the Hausa who remained at Daura into a corporate category subjugated to Fulani rule by a new structure of differential incorporation. Thus alternative modes and conditions of incorporation express differing distributions of autonomy and status between collectivities as well as offices.

Substantive Aspects of Corporations

As obliquely indicated above, besides their formal requisites and entailments, with the exception of corporate categories, corporations of all types have substantive requisites and entailments. To discharge their regulatory functions with routine efficiency, offices, colleges, commissions, and corporate groups need the autonomy and resources appropriate for their scope. This scope consists simply of all affairs which are subject to their positive corporate regulation. Without adequate autonomy, no unit can positively regulate its affairs. Thus its actual autonomy sets limits to the scope of any unit. However, the autonomy a unit requires must always exceed the authority that its scope routinely assumes by that discretionary margin which enables the unit to adjust appropriately to the needs and opportunities of its changing internal and external situation. Since all corporations, excluding corporate categories, share these general requirements as conditions of viability, either all must normally possess autonomies appropriate to their differing scopes, or, alternatively, their scope must reduce as their autonomy reduces. If its autonomy is not effectively restrained by other units, whether of superordinate or equivalent status, a corporation might extend its scope,

resources, or range—that is, the size or extent of the aggregate it regulates—often by pursuing ascendancy in its social field. Normally the ascendancy of a unit also increases together with its resources, autonomy, and scope. Increases of scope or range without corresponding increases of resource generally reduce the capacity of a unit by augmenting its functional load without compensatory resources. Likewise, if the autonomy of a unit decreases while its resources and range remain constant, its capacity and scope are both reduced, since the unit's capacity consists in its actual (manifest) and potential (latent) capabilities to perform various tasks. Normally, then, reduction in a unit's autonomy reduces its scope, whether or not its resources and range remain unchanged. Such changes in the autonomies that corporations exercise should also invariably correlate with changes in their articulations with other units of identical or different bases and forms in their social environment. Thus, changes in the articulations of corporate units should express corresponding shifts in the distributions of autonomy that determine their respective scopes and capacities.

As indicated above, corporate categories subject to positive regulation by other units are differentially incorporated within societies and accordingly lack autonomy, organization, collective resources (an "estate"), exclusive common affairs (scope), and procedures for collective action. In consequence, such categories are objects rather than agents of administration, and the policy of other groups is often designed to ensure their subjugation by anticipating and frustrating the conditions necessary for their organization.

By contrast, when a society contains corporate categories or groups which are not differentially incorporated, their coordinate status is expressed in symmetrical relations, identical scope, and equivalent autonomies. Thus the articulations of corporate categories vary directly with the mode of their incorporation in the societies of which they are part, and this provides the constitution of these societies. However, in neither case do such categories possess common and exclusive resources, affairs, organization, or capacities for common action. Instead they are distinguished as units by their incapacities for inclusive positive action and by the peculiar disabilities their members uniformly share.

The resources that other corporations with powers of positive regulation require vary with their form, basis, and scope or spheres of corporate action; but such resources are neither solely nor primarily material. Besides such material assets as equipment, land, buildings, and wealth, regulatory corporations require social resources such as staff, members or subjects, skills, including technical skills, organization, allegiance, legitimacy, and compliance. For self-regulating corporate groups these moral factors are commonly critical wherever the exercise of collective authority assumes popular support; but in heterocephalous structures the subordinate's allegiance to, or fear of, his superior and the latter's capacity to fulfill the former's expectation are no less important.

The autonomy that corporate groups, commissions, offices, and colleges

require and manifest combines the power and authority that together and in varying measures and mixtures constitute them as units of public regulation. As such they are simultaneously subject to those collective rules, traditions, and norms that confer the authority they exercise and uphold; and as a condition of satisfactory adaptation to various exigencies and changing situations, they generate new traditions, procedures, rules, and norms, whether by reinterpreting and modifying antecedent rules and practice, by revoking them, or by innovation. Further, as structures and units of public authority, corporations provide the immediate contexts and focuses of political action for their staffs, for the publics they regulate, and for individuals and groups, including nonmembers, who seek to influence their activities, relations, and orientations. Thus, regulatory corporations organize and integrate fields of power and authority within their milieus, and they accordingly articulate with one another by relations that manifest these differential capacities.

The political structure of a society accordingly consists of the distributions of authority and power that prevail within and among the corporations that provide its principal enduring units and delimit its boundaries by their interrelations. This political structure includes corporate categories, whether regulated by such institutional norms as exogamy and endogamy or positively by other types of corporations. Indeed, as corporations, societies are themselves merely the most extensive frameworks of corporate organization.

The states discussed above, Daura before and after the jihad, Zinder, Zango, and Baure, all shared a common constitutional basis in the categories that furnished their latent structure. Thus, despite many differences in the concrete particulars of their corporate organization, as corporations of identical status and type, they shared identical requisites, capacities, and properties and pursued identical goals of maintaining or enhancing their autonomy and territorial integrity by similar means in their differing situations. Nonetheless, as we have seen, both before the jihad and under the suzerainty of Sokoto, Daura enjoyed relations of vassalage that differed significantly from those imposed on Baure and Zango. The histories of Zango and Baure also show that as their subordination increased, their autonomy and integrity deteriorated, largely in consequence of internal political cleavages that positively encouraged interventions by Zinder. In consequence, Zango was subdivided administratively, and the chiefs of both states were routinely deposed, whereas before and after the jihad, under Kanuri and Fulani rule, the Daura chiefdoms enjoyed high degrees of security and internal autonomy. These differences in the conditions and substance of the vassal relation common to all four states illustrate those covariations of corporate autonomy and scope mentioned above and show that such variations depend on changes in the external articulation of corporate units which themselves were often promoted by changes in the internal articulations of these units. Thus, differences in the articulations of corporations of identical type and base indicate differing courses of structural change and imply corresponding differences of autonomy and scope.

Corporations and Latent Structure

We can now see clearly the utility of these conceptions of corporations as concrete units whose articulations constitute and delimit the political structure of societies and allow us to analyze their interaction, structures, and development. Since corporations constitute the perduring units of public regulation, they simultaneously embody and organize the resources and distributions of power and authority within the societies they organize and delimit. Accordingly, insofar as its corporate organization represents the concrete macrostructure of a society, it also constitutes the contexts and conditions of the distribution of authority and power that prevails within it. Thus, as a concrete structure, the corporate level of organization subsumes those analytic structures of politics and administration whose evolution has already been reviewed as direct evidence of structural change in the Daura states. For this reason, changes in the concrete structures and relations of corporate units should mediate between changes in the form of the analytic structure and changes in the content of the latent categories that underlie the social order.

The close connections between corporate organization as the concrete level of macrostructure and the latent structure of formal categories, whose changing contents in the Daura states have already been analyzed in relation to the form of the analytic structure, will immediately become evident by comparing these latent categories with the conditions of corporate organization. For example, the three alternative modes of incorporation—the differential, the equivalent, and the uniform—all designate alternative conditions of status differentiation, as do all varieties of corporation, since each constitutes a specific continuing unit and structure of status to which individuals are recruited by criteria that differentiate them individually and collectively from others in the wider society.

The second category in the latent series which distinguishes offices as "perpetual statuses" merely identifies one of the five varieties of corporation and one which, although central to Hausa government, assumes corporate groups as its social matrix and field of official action. Moreover, offices share with colleges, corporate groups, and corporate categories the properties of status uniqueness and perpetuity. Thus, it is merely necessary to reformulate the second principle and distinguish "corporations differentiated as perpetual status units"[3] to extend the scheme to include all varieties of corporations, from societies to offices.

The third principle that specifies the conditions on which offices of a common system are distributed among the status categories of its population emphasizes the critical place of recruitment principles in corporations of all types; but it also allusively distinguishes the differing bases that underlie the distinctive requisites and entailments, articulations, and properties of the various offices in a system.

The fourth principle distinguishes "kingship as the most senior of such offices," thus differentiating those societies constituted as corporate groups by the possession of central regulative corporations from others, such as the Nuer, Kwakiutl, and Tikopia, which lack such hierarchic coordination, although they possess offices. Societies of the latter sort are accordingly constituted as polycephalous categories rather than corporate groups. However, besides monarchical institutions, collectivities may be coordinated collegially; and it is therefore necessary to reformulate this principle to accommodate republics and other collegially centralized regimes as well as chiefdoms and monarchies.

The fifth principle isolates the "rank organization of offices" as a feature of monarchical states. However, this condition applies equally to collegially regulated societies, being a requisite of any hierarchic organization. It also prescribes differing resources, articulations, and autonomies for offices of differing status and rank. Likewise, to enhance its integration and operating capacities, an official hierarchy may differentiate its component units by role or scope as well as by range, whether these take the form of judicial, religious, military, civil, administrative, or industrial offices. Such developments indicate the variable complexity and capacities of official regimes. As one feature of such developments, offices of similar or differing scope and rank may be aligned promotionally and assigned on criteria of status or competence. Thus, the three final principles of latent structure apply equally to monarchic and to collegially regulated regimes. However, since the series excludes all varieties of corporation other than offices, it refers solely to official hierarchies directed by chiefs. Such systems are accordingly constituted as corporate groups of offices, themselves embedded in wider collectivities that have the form of corporate groups by virtue of these central institutions. Normally such governments contain colleges and commissions as well as offices; but even if they do not, the wider society is generally organized as an integrated order of corporate categories and groups. The particular constitution and combination of these various types of corporation will decide the distribution and articulations of offices within systems incorporated on different modes by specifying the bases, conditions, and limits of their regulations.

Corporations and Change

Intentionally, the seven principles that furnished the frame of reference for analysis of the structural changes in successive governments of Zaria were conceived as strictly formal; the only relations postulated among them were those of logical presupposition and dependence. Substantive changes consistent with the persistence of this serial organization of abstract forms were initially traced to changes in the analytic structures of these governments, and particularly to redistributions of power within them.

> In our analysis we must therefore distinguish the formal and substantive aspects of governmental change; and since the redistribution of functions or powers can only be effected by the exercise of political power, we must recognise that the basis of governmental organisation or change is a system of power relations. Thus changes in the form of the system will be mediated through political action, but will normally follow changes in the modes or distribution of power within it.[4]

The analytic structure of political and administrative relations was taken to delineate the form of a government viewed synchronically, since its official order had been abstracted from the concrete level of corporate organization and virtually subsumed in the set of latent categories just reviewed. Thus, for an exhaustive analysis of the whole range of corporate organizations, besides restoring the official order to its concrete structural matrix, we will have to specify how changes at the concrete level of corporate organization are related to changes in the composition and articulation of the political and administrative systems that represent the analytic structure of government.

In broad outline the nature of these relations is implicit in those distinctions between the formal and substantive conditions of the various types of corporate unit discussed above. To recapitulate: those conditions that attach directly as requisites or entailments to the form and bases of corporations of any type together specify their essential formal properties. All other conditions, attributes, or aspects of corporations are substantive in nature and relate to their regulatory and other activities. As essential formal conditions of corporate organization, uniqueness, presumptive perpetuity, recruitment criteria, and specific personnel were distinguished; as essential substantive conditions of positive regulatory corporations we distinguished autonomy, scope, range, resources, and capacity, all of which are involved in positive corporate action. Finally, in exploring relations between these two levels or aspects of corporate units, the formal and the substantive, we drew attention to the evident primacy of the external and internal articulations in determining the limits within which the substance of a corporation may vary as essential conditions of their form and continuity. The internal and external articulations of corporations are manifestly structural, their minima being prescribed by the logical requisites and entailments that attach to the forms and bases of these units.

It is evident that the resources, autonomy, scope, range, and articulation which are requisite for, or entailed by, corporations will vary on the one hand with their form and on the other with the principles on which these units are based. If the autonomy that a unit enjoys is transitively related to its articulations on the one hand and to its operational scope and capacity on the other, then changes in either of these conditions will modify the other simultaneously and reversibly. However, autonomy, capacity, and scope, being substantive conditions, stand in explicitly functional relations to one another, such that changes in either dimension should involve simultaneous changes in the other. If so, such changes would illustrate the simultaneity and transitivity that were cited as indices of substantive change in the study

of Zaria.[5] By contrast, a unit's external articulation, seen as the sum of its relations with other units, and its internal articulation, seen as the sum of the relations among its concrete components, are specifically structural features, whereas its scope, autonomy, and capacity are substantive conditions. It seems then that while changes in the external articulation of a corporate unit entail changes in its autonomy, scope, or range, changes in its internal articulation may or may not have similar effects.

In parallel fashion the resources and range of a unit would seem to be related transitively to one another and to its capacity and scope. If its range and scope remain constant while its resources are altered, the unit's capacity changes correspondingly; conversely, if its resources and scope remain constant while the unit's capacity changes, it will either reflect some change in its range or in the autonomy that reflects its external articulation. Finally, if the range of a unit alters while its scope does not, to maintain its former capacity, its resources would alter correspondingly.

These hypotheses illustrate some advantages of the preceding scheme. By discriminating various dimensions of corporate substance and conceptualizing them as variables, we may formulate several hypotheses about their relations with one another and with changes at the structural level of articulation. For example, we may write various formulas as follows:

(a) Scope : range : : resources : articulation, *or*

(b) $$\text{Capacity} = \text{scope} \times \frac{\text{range}}{\text{autonomy}} \times \text{resources}$$
$$= \text{autonomy} \times \text{resources}, \quad \textit{or}$$

(c) $$\text{Autonomy} = \text{scope} \times \text{range} \times \text{resources} = \frac{\text{capacity}}{\text{articulation}}$$

To indicate the relations between changes of form and substance in corporate units or organization, it is sufficient to hold that changes in the external articulation of political units involve changes in their relative autonomies; and that such changes of autonomy modify the capacities and scope or range of the units affected. Beyond a certain threshold such modifications may radically affect the viability or form of the corporation either by frustrating those conditions which are necessary for its maintenance or by adding new requisites and entailments to them.

Before proceeding to reexamine the history of Zango in the light of these conceptions, one feature of this analytic framework should be mentioned. We have stressed that as units based on various specific principles, corporations have certain general requisites and entailments which attach directly to their form and others which are specific to their bases. Together these conceptual preconditions and intrinsic implications of corporate structures in their specific milieus provide the equivalent for corporation analysis of those relations of logical priority that regulated the order of change in both the

latent and analytic structure of the Daura states as presented above. With the aid of these corporate concepts, we may therefore ask, what were the preconditions and immediate entailments of each modification in the concrete structure of the Hausa polity? In this way we should perhaps be able to determine whether changes in the substance and articulations of concrete structure proceed in any sequence that parallels the order of change in the analytic levels of the political system. We may also examine the substantive conditions of corporate change to determine whether such variables as autonomy, scope, range, resources, or capacity change simultaneously or serially, following changes in the internal or external articulations of these units.

CHANGES IN THE CORPORATE ORGANIZATION OF DAURA HAUSA, 1804-1958

To pursue these questions, as before, I shall periodize the history of the Sarkin Gwari's community from the jihad to 1958 and review these sections chronologically, restricting attention to formal and substantive changes in the concrete structure of the Hausa polity. The findings of this descriptive analysis are summarized in the final table.

From the Jihad to Yekuwa, 1804-1825

The jihad at Daura began when M. Ishi'aka returned bearing the Shehu's flag and commission to overthrow the Hausa state. Exercising his commission, Ishi'aka won the local Fulani to his side, thus converting them from a corporate category to a corporate group under his leadership by transforming their antecedent external and internal articulations and asserting an unprecedented and indeterminate autonomy for the new corporate group to regulate its own affairs with all the resources at its command while extending its range to the limits of its capacity. Throughout the following campaign, Daura was contested by two corporate groups of coordinate status, though of differing bases and mutually irreconcilable claims. With the Fulani victory and the Sarkin Gwari's withdrawal, the structure of the local society was simplified. Besides the dominant Fulani organized as a corporate group under Ishi'aka's leadership and government, it contained differentially incorporated categories of Maguzawa, Bugaje, and Hausa, the latter having lost their status as a corporate group with the departure of their government, which took with it their collective autonomy, exclusive common affairs, organizational resources, range, and capacities. Thus the two developments that transferred Daura from Hausa to Fulani rule are mirror images of one another. The first consisted in the reconstitution of the Fulani category as a corporate group by the emergence of an effective centralized leadership under the Shehu's commission; the second consisted of the reverse process,

as the local Hausa, deprived of their central government, lost their former status, organization, and capacities as a corporate group and became a corporate category under Fulani rule. However, in both cases the order by which these transformations proceeded was the same. Changes in the external articulations of both units presupposed and followed changes in their internal articulation. The final table indicates the order in which these formal and substantive features changed.

On withdrawing from Daura in 1805-1806, the defeated Hausa government lost its capital, its territory, and most of the social and material resources on which its traditional scope, capacities, and recent defense had depended, together with its traditional autonomy to administer the chiefdom. Nonetheless, by withdrawing as a unit, it retained sufficient cohesion and resources to maintain its integrity in exile as the legitimate Hausa government and its capacity to continue the conflict as it saw fit. In withdrawing, the Hausa chief removed his insignia of office, his treasury, dynasty, officialdom, and a sufficiently large complement of loyal supporters and servants to preserve the essential form of the prejihadic government of the state. It is evident that this community in exile attracted many Hausa emigrants from the conquered chiefdom.

Despite its severe reversal of fortune, the loss of territory, subjects, capital, and most of the material resources it had formerly controlled, the defeated Hausa government maintained its status and capacities as a corporate group, though all its components experienced proportionate losses of resource, range, scope, capacity, and autonomy. Nonetheless, despite these material reverses, the government maintained its capacity for continuing autonomous action by preserving and adapting the traditional articulation of its official components as a hierarchically ordered corporate group under its hereditary chief, the Sarkin Gwari. In exile the government owed its capacities for positive action to its satisfactory preservation and adaptation of those concrete structures and internal articulations on which its prejihadic capacities had depended. However, despite this substantial preservation of its concrete structure and internal articulations, in quitting Daura the government abruptly modified the status and integration of the state by deserting the chiefdom.

As we have seen, the defeated government continued to represent the suspended state throughout its exile by claiming that status and by demonstrating the ability to assert its claim. Nonetheless, its withdrawal radically unhinged the antecedent internal articulation of the state as the integration of the government and the chiefdom. While the internal articulations of its offices, colleges, and rank-orders distinguished the government from the chiefdom as the regulative corporate group, its relations with the chiefdom were also essential to the internal articulation of the state. In effect, within the state the government's position and role distinguished it from all other units as the center of two discrete but related orders of internal relations, the first of which coordinated and segregated its official structure, while the

second integrated this with the population and territory to constitute the state. The government was also engaged in external relations, particularly with its suzerain, its vassals, and adjacent Hausa states, all of which together defined its external articulation. We may therefore describe the relations that integrated the government and the chiefdom as internal articulations seen from the perspectives of the chiefdom and the state and at the same time classify them as medial from the government's perspective in order to distinguish them from those relations that articulated its offices with one another to form a discrete corporate group with unique status, organization, properties, and regulative powers. In evacuating Daura, the government accordingly dislocated those medial relations by which it was hitherto integrated with the chiefdom to form a territorial state. In maintaining its internal cohesion, autonomy, and capacities in exile, the government preserved the image, tradition, and future of the suspended state; but its desertion of the chiefdom translated the state from substantial reality into suspension by disrupting the integration of its two essential parts, the government and the chiefdom. Viewed from the perspectives of the chiefdom and the state, though not from that of the government, the fundamental feature of the Sarkin Gwari's withdrawal was the abrupt suspension of those internal articulations that constituted the territory and its population as a corporate group having the status, form, and properties of a unitary state. It was this abrupt dislocation of its essential internal articulations that generated those substantive changes in the condition of the deserted chiefdom reported above.

In disassociating the government from the chiefdom, the Sarkin Gwari also destabilized the prevailing external articulations of the state. After six months at Kworgum and Kance, he withdrew eastward to Nguru, forfeiting effective control of these vassal states. At Nguru he appealed in vain for assistance to his suzerain, the Mai of Bornu, himself already the victim of Fulani attacks. In form and substance alike the historic relations between the traditional governments of Daura and Bornu were thus transformed from the specific ties of vassalage to an alliance of unequals which was doubly indeterminate, given the political ambiguities and uncertainties of the usurpation and conflict under way in Bornu on the one hand and the status and capacities of the Sarkin Gwari's disembodied and migratory government on the other. Nonetheless, on this occasion the external articulations of the evicted government changed even before disassociation from its homeland had radically reduced its substantive properties and capacities. Moreover, while the suspension of his vassal relations formally increased the Sarkin Gwari's autonomy and relieved him of various obligations, it also removed his chief remaining hope of substantial material aid.

Despite its diminished capacities, the Hausa government in exile retained internal autonomy and pursued the recovery of Daura by political and military means. Moving as a unit under its chief, it sought allies, formulated and pursued its policies, contracted or called in debts, and adapted to the exigencies of its situation by reallocating what resources it retained, including the

offices that furnished the central units of its organization. Asserting its legitimacy and intention to recover Daura, the government in exile sought to defend and advance the interests and security of its community and asserted its authority over the people and territory of Daura by political and military means as best it could. As far as we know, despite major changes in its status, resources, range, scope, and capacities, the government in exile preserved its original form and articulations until the Sarkin Gwari, seeking to enhance the solidarity of the community gathered around him, asserted his autonomy to modify prejihadic relations between the dynasty and the families of the two senior *rukunai,* on the one hand, and that of the Sarkin Pawa, the head of the order of craft officials, on the other. To institute these changes, the Sarkin Gwari transferred two princely titles to the sons of the Sarkin Pawa and instituted prescriptive marriages between the higher nobility and the kin of the chief butcher. Though the princeships thus transferred to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage were initially honorific and remained so and their translation from one rank-order to another involved no modifications of substance, these are the only modifications of the prejihadic regime that tradition attributes to the Sarkin Gwari. By implication, it would seem that however its analytic aspects may have changed, the Hausa government in exile preserved the concrete form of its traditional organization with little change.

The known history of the Sarkin Gwari's movements and activities following his visit to Nguru indicates that he succeeded in keeping his followers united under his leadership, that he resumed the war with some success after prolonged residence at Miria (Murya) and Kalgo, and that he finally recovered the eastern half of his territory, which was incorporated in the resurgent state by restoring those relations his withdrawal had suspended. In this way the absentee government recovered a substantial portion of the autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities it had forfeited by flight, having first favorably modified its external articulations with the Fulani emirate. This partial success demonstrates the solidarity and political capacities which the exiled community derived from the maintenance of its traditional internal articulations under the Sarkin Gwari.

In committing his community to recovering the lost chiefdom, the Sarkin Gwari simultaneously committed his government to upholding the traditional constitution of Daura as best the unusual situation allowed. Accordingly the government maintained its senior, junior, and war councils; the constitutional supremacy of the Magajiya; its traditional distributions of office among lineages and status groups; and its traditional rank-orders, definitions of official roles, and promotional alignments. To compensate for the material and moral resources it had lost on withdrawal, the government in exile intensified its ideological commitments to preserving and restoring the status quo. Thus, although stripped of their former substance as organs of public administration, the traditional offices preserved their antecedent status, relations, and capacities as essentials of the prejihadic order the government sought to conserve and restore. When the government relocated at

Yekuwa following the partial reconquest of Daura, it reincorporated the eastern territories to constitute a new domain and revived such traditional administrative forms as fiefs, benefices, and *tarayya,* thus renewing the substance and vitality of its component offices by endowing their autonomies with new scope, resources, range, and capacities as immediate substantive expressions of their new articulation.

From Lukudi to Nuhu

Lukudi's accession at Yekuwa initiated other structural changes in the Hausa government. To forestall defections, Lukudi initially ordered the gates of the town to be closed but later agreed to allow his uncle Dan Shufini and a small party to leave the town. The ensuing rebellion initiated secession and civil war. The dynasty and the chiefdom were split; and our data suggest that the officials and their kin were also divided. Some, such as the Shentali Bacici, deserted to the rebels after Dan Shufini's death at Dan Mairam; Lukudi replaced these deserters by officials recruited on criteria of loyalty from other status groups and lineages, thereby modifying the conditions and distributions of office and thus the internal articulation of his government. Several eastern settlements were also incorporated by the new chiefdom at Magaria. Lukudi's efforts to suppress this upstart chiefdom cost him dear. Many officials and subjects deserted to Kitari's side; and despite the assistance of Ibram of Zinder, Lukudi was obliged to recognize the independence of Kitari's state, to which an increasing number of his people had emigrated, some to seek appropriate appointments, others for different reasons. The community and chiefdom split into two, the dynasty divided, and the internal and external articulations of Lukudi's government and state were abruptly transformed. The autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities of the truncated unit were thus reduced. Although Lukudi did preserve the concrete structure of his government with little formal change in its constituents, its analytic structure was profoundly altered, as described above, and the resources and range of the system were virtually halved. In consequence of the emergence of these duplicate rival states, the articulation of offices with the strata and lineages for which they were traditionally reserved changed substantially. Eligible individuals were now free to assume hereditary offices in rival states, while the monopoly of appointments that the Sarkin Gwari and Lukudi had formerly exercised now disappeared. In parallel fashion, communities located on or near the borders of the rival states could now transfer their allegiance and thus display autonomy.

These changing conditions of internal articulation weakened Lukudi's authority as chief by breaking his exclusive control of appointments to office and questioning his status as the sole legitimate chief of the Daura Hausa. By their successful rebellion, Dan Shufini, Kitari, and Tsoho repudiated Lukudi's claims to legitimacy and paramountcy, truncated his realm,

reduced his authority, destablizied his relations with his officials and followers, and defied his power. In response to the capture and death of Dan Shufini, Lukudi reasserted his autonomy as chief at Yekuwa by levying an unconstitutional and impolitic fine on the Kaura Idi for an act he had either ordered or condoned. This autocratic gesture further disturbed relations with his senior council, increasing their disaffection and distrust by exhibiting Lukudi's capacity to overrule his council and dominate his senior officials. This event also modified the internal articulations of the government at Yekuwa by increasing the autonomy, scope, resources, and capacity of the chief in relation to his state council and senior executives. No alterations in the external articulations or range of either of these units was involved.

To reduce the risk of attack and his continuing losses by desertion, Lukudi advanced his capital from Yekuwa to Yardaji, thirteen miles nearer Daura, where he dwelt for twenty years and consolidated his chiefdom, attacking the Fulani state and repelling assaults from Zinder. Shortly before Kitari's death, Lukudi collaborated with Kitari and Tsoho, who had already established a chiefdom at Baure, to attack the Hausa village of Jengini which had revolted and refused to acknowledge any chief. This incident illustrates the substantial decline in the material and moral resources, capacities, range, scope, and autonomy that followed fragmentation of the Sarkin Gwari's chiefdom into three warring successor states and the transformation of internal articulations into external ones. In suspending their mutual hostilities to collaborate in suppressing the antiroyalist revolt at Jengini, Lukudi, Tsoho, and Kitari demonstrated recognition of the serious threat to their status and regimes that this incident represented, together with their determination to reassert control even at the cost of cooperation. Thus an explicit attempt by one community to restructure its relations with the local government was defeated by the combined might of those chiefs whose rivalry and strife had finally destroyed the integrity and military capacity of the Hausa state reestablished by the Sarkin Gwari.

Kitari's death and Masallaci's succession at Magaria stimulated further attacks on that chiefdom by Tsoho of Baure and duly brought both under the suzerainty of Zinder, thus leaving Yardaji as the last of these three states to maintain its independence. This situation enabled Ibram to concentrate the superior forces of Zinder against Lukudi; and the muddled distribution of authority that then prevailed in Bornu probably provided sufficient formal grounds to excuse his assault on Lukudi as an attempt to restore the latter's vassalage to the new rulers of Bornu. Yardaji was taken and sacked; and the chiefdom Lukudi had ruled disintegrated as he fled from the Zinder cavalry.

An ominous feature of these events was the withdrawal of Kaura Tamila from Yardaji to Kudukudu on the eve of the successful Zinder attack, taking with him Mamman Kyenkyere, a son of the Sarkin Gwari, for Ibram to appoint as his vassal in charge of Lukudi's state. Though Lukudi had alienated Tamila by fining the latter after Kitari's death at Jengini, it remains

uncertain whether the subversion was initiated by Tamila from motives of personal or political opposition to Lukudi, by Kyenkyere from motives of dynastic rivalry, or by Ibram in pursuit of his aggressive objectives. Possibly all three alternatives converged, and it is certain that Lukudi had alienated several officials by repeatedly fining his Kauras Tamila and Idi for eliminating his rivals. In any event the desertion of Tamila and Kyenkyere to Kudukudu with many supporters illustrated significant changes in the articulations of the Kaura and chief, the Kaura and the electoral council, the dynastic segments founded by the Sarkin Gwari and by Lukudi, and in the relations of the state and its senior officials with Ibram of Zinder.

Lacking the resources and capacity to suppress the secession of Tamila and Kyenkyere, Lukudi owed their defeat to the intervention of his kinsman Tsoho, who captured Kudukudu and destroyed the traitors on his own initiative and with his own resources, thereby seeking to preserve the status and autonomy of the three established Hausa chiefs against further subversions by their officials and kin and forfeiting his throne in the process, since Ibram promptly deposed him for this action. Thus Tamila's attempt to install Kyenkyere as Ibram's vassal chief of Lukudi's community first modified the internal and external articulations of that unit and then its status, autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities, in that order; but it also threatened the chieftaincy, the constitutional role of the Magajiya, the unity of the dynasty, and the status and autonomy of the electoral and senior councils. At the same time it reduced the range of the chiefdom by temporarily subdividing its territory and population between Kyenkyere at Kudukudu and Lukudi at Yardaji. In consequence Lukudi lost the capacity to withstand the Zinder assault and suffered heavily. As Yardaji fell, Lukudi escaped with his family and many officials to the west, while others, including the palace eunuchs, were either captured or slain at Yardaji or by Tsoho at Kudukudu. Lukudi's government was thus stripped of its territory, capital, and subjects and depleted of personnel. Its status and situation were now formally identical with that of the Sarkin Gwari's regime during the exile that followed his flight before resettlement at Yekuwa. The government's internal articulations with the Yardaji chiefdom having been thus destroyed, its autonomy, resources, range, scope, and capacity were severely reduced; its external articulations were abruptly transformed; and the leaderless people of the conquered chiefdom were constituted as a corporate category by the flight of their chief and government.

Despite this reverse, following the Sarkin Gwari's example, Lukudi preserved the government as an ideal structure of concrete units by filling its vacant positions and reasserting the validity of their traditional relations. To this end he punished Tamila's defection by fining his agnates even though those who remained with him were loyal and not implicated in the intrigue. Likewise, in filling vacant offices from his retinue, Lukudi made several unprecedented appointments which modified preceding articulations of these offices with one another and with the status divisions of the loyal commu-

nity. Imitating the Sarkin Gwari, Lukudi also strove to consolidate his following by prescribing marriage alliances between high- and low-ranking lineages. By these initiatives, he reasserted the superior autonomy and scope of the chiefship despite its constitutional subordination to the senior council, thus modifying its articulation with the offices, strata, and lineages of its community, augmenting its resources and restoring some of its lost capacities by political means. Having thus reasserted the integrity and autonomy of his government, Lukudi continued the struggle for independence by successive flights to Toka, Sandamu, Acilafiya, and elsewhere, demonstrating that he could survive Zinder's attacks although unable to reestablish a capital and chiefdom.

Despite the massive loss of resources, range, and scope he had sustained at Yardaji, by these appointments, measures, and successive withdrawals Lukudi preserved the integrity of his government as an autonomous corporate group with the capacity to evade and resist Ibram's attacks and demands; and thus he also held his legitimate status as independent chief of the Daura Hausa. Thus, by reconstituting the regime, Lukudi preserved the future of his state, chiefship, dynasty, and government despite his military weakness. Though without a chiefdom, as the sole legitimate Hausa chief on the borders of Fulani Daura, Lukudi was able to negotiate peace with Zinder from a position of political strength. By then, Kyenkyere's death at Tsoho's hands had discouraged other princes from attempting secession and deprived Ibram of his only complaisant candidate for the throne. Lukudi's geographical remoteness from Zinder, his proximity to Fulani Daura, and the hostility that Zinder's assault had provoked among the defeated Hausa together obliged Ibram to court Lukudi's submission by offering to restore his territory and subjects and to cease the attack in return for acknowledgment of his supremacy. Lukudi accordingly sent his eldest son, Nuhu, for Ibram to appoint as chief of the reconstituted Hausa state; but having done so, Lukudi then relocated his government at Toka, which he rapidly walled, and continued for several years to administer the state despite Ibram's appointment of Nuhu.

Lukudi's submission to Ibram modified the status and external articulation of his government and chiefship by placing it in vassalage to Zinder after a generation of independence. This external change further modified the internal structure of the regime by instituting a dual chieftaincy with Nuhu's appointment; but the pact also enabled Lukudi's government to rearticulate with the chiefdom and restore the state by reincorporating the territory and subjects it had recently lost, thereby recovering its former range, resources, scope, and an uncertain measure of its initial autonomy and capacity.

In submitting to Zinder, the subject state had now lost the capacity to select and install its chiefs autonomously by its traditional procedure. Nuhu's installation signified Zinder's assumption of control over future appointments to Lukudi's throne. Awareness of this may well have stimu-

lated Nuhu's desire to revolt against Ibram. Probably neither Lukudi, Nuhu, nor their contemporaries anticipated that Zinder would employ its new power to depose the Hausa chiefs. In this regard their prejihadic experience of Bornu vassalage probably generated misplaced confidence. However, such extensions of Zinder's authority were latent and implicit in the new relations symbolized by Nuhu's installation. Likewise, when he submitted and sent Nuhu for Ibram to appoint, Lukudi could hardly have foreseen how Zinder would later select his successors; but again such developments were latent in the new articulation of the two states. Equally, Lukudi and Nuhu could not anticipate that by their formal submission they had endowed Zinder with power to prohibit their independent military mobilization and action; the fortification of their towns with walls; the local executions prescribed by Muslim law; independent foreign relations; or the autonomous regulation of local appointments, taxes, and administrative arrangements. In submitting to Zinder, neither Lukudi nor Nuhu had contracted any tributary or military obligations beyond those compatible with an unequal alliance of a stronger and a weaker state. Their changed relations with Zinder did not initially restrict the local jurisdiction; their powers of appointment or dismissal; or their freedom to fortify settlements, wage war, or engage in foreign relations. Thus they probably perceived the act of submission as an alliance or treaty of peace which restored the integrity, autonomy, and scope of their chiefdom without reduction and which replaced their ancient suzerain, Bornu, by a new protector, Zinder, which was already the most powerful Kanuri state in this region. Subsequent developments revealed the irreparable losses of autonomy that Lukudi's community and successors had suffered by this formal acknowledgment of Zinder's authority. However, there is no indication that Lukudi's government, harrassed in the extreme at this juncture, could have secured restoration of its territory and state on any other terms. Submission to Zinder was thus the sine qua non of the chiefdom's reintegration. The alternative that Lukudi and his followers faced was progressive attrition by desertions, as their members, wearied of a fugitive and apparently futile existence, followed the example of the Sarkin Makera Babba, who chose to remain at Acilafiya when the community moved on to escape subjugation by Dambo, the Fulani emir of Kazaure, Lukudi's affine.

From Nuhu to Tafida

Besides permitting the Hausa government to renew articulations with its former territory and people and thus restore the state, Nuhu's appointment by Ibram initiated several important changes in its concrete structure. First, and perhaps unwittingly, it duplicated the chiefship, thus adding a second apical office to the Hausa hierarchy and modifying its articulation. Probably Ibram interpreted his appointment of Nuhu as a replacement of Lukudi; but the latter had neither abdicated nor been deposed and continued to rule as

head of state at Toka, thereby preserving the unity of his government in substance, despite its ambiguous form. For several years the chiefdom was ruled by two chiefs in concert, its own and Ibram's, father and son. Whatever the intentions of Ibram, Lukudi, or Nuhu, the latter's appointment had created a dual chiefship, thus modifying the articulation, autonomy, scope, and capacity of the original chiefship and other offices; their rank organization and roles; the traditional procedures for promotion to the throne; and its range and resources. Thereafter Nuhu represented the state in transactions with Zinder, while Lukudi controlled its internal affairs. This unprecedented situation was structurally anomalous and laden with occasions for friction among Lukudi, Nuhu, and their senior officials, notably the Kaura and Galadima, who could now hold the balance by supporting one against the other. These realignments of central offices were inevitably expressed by corresponding changes in their antecedent articulations with local communities, whether administered by *tarayya* or as fiefs.

During these years at Toka, Ibram evidently exercised increasing pressure on Lukudi and Nuhu for objectives which remain obscure. Recalling his experience at and after Yardaji, Lukudi probably adopted a more evasive and accommodating attitude to these demands than did Nuhu, whose status and autonomy they inevitably compromised. Anticipating conflict, Nuhu and the Yerima Jirro made appropriate preparations for revolt, either with or without Lukudi's connivance. Nonetheless, Zinder's attack on Dan Ali, to which the community withdrew on Nuhu's advice, caught them by surprise; and Lukudi was barely able to escape to Zugai. The ensuing campaign redefined the community's relations with Zinder and hastened the end of the dual monarchy. For the third time in a generation, the Hausa government was forcibly separated from its territory and subjects, thereby losing its resources, range, scope, and capacity, together with its autonomous jurisdiction. However, as the situation was not entirely unfamiliar, Lukudi was able to maintain the government as an internally autonomous entity by evading Ibram's attacks.

On this occasion the Kaura Dan Dawambai rescued the state by persuading those Hausa communities around Zango to throw off Fulani rule and receive Lukudi. The government then withdrew from Toka to Zango, where it was permitted to settle in peace after a second submission to Zinder that formally redefined its status and autonomy as Zinder's vassal. By this relocation Lukudi and Nuhu redefined the boundaries and range of the reconstituted chiefdom, acquired new resources to replace their losses, and modified once more the preceding articulations of the officialdom and local communities; but the autonomy and scope of the chiefdom were severely reduced by this second submission to Zinder, which redefined its status and external articulation.

Following their relocation at Zango, Nuhu overruled Lukudi and terminated the dual chiefship with its divided authority as an ineffective structure by dismissing the Kaura Dan Dawambai, to whom the state owed its reinte-

gration, and by appointing Mazawaje, with whom Nuhu had earlier made a secret agreement. These changes were almost certainly enforced by Nuhu despite Lukudi's opposition and in defiance of the constitutional rights of the Kaura and the senior council. Thus, as an illegitimate but successful assertion of his ability to overrule his father, the constitution, the council, and the Kauras, Nuhu dissolved the dual chiefship and radically altered the internal articulations of the government. Presumably the assurance that as Ibram's vassal in charge of Zango he was subject neither to Lukudi nor to dismissal by local officials enabled Nuhu to take these steps. In dismissing Dan Dawambai, Nuhu accordingly demonstrated the constitutional incapacities of the Magajiya in the context of vassalage. By the same act he also modified his relations with the Kaura's office and lineage and changed the status and relations of the Kaura to the Galadima and the senior council. Presumably by removing Dan Dawambai and appointing Mazawaje, Nuhu sought to increase his political resources and capacities while aggrandizing his autonomy and scope. Events proved otherwise.

Shortly after Lukudi's death Nuhu allied himself with Ibram and the Hausa chiefs of Maradi and Gobir to attack the Fulani capital of Daura, where Ibram's brother Tanimu was preparing to march on Zinder and seize the throne. Thus Nuhu's attempt to recapture Daura took place in the context of a civil war between Tanimu and Ibram for the Zinder succession. Ibram's death following Tanimu's victory in the conflict placed Nuhu and Zango at the mercy of Tanimu as the new sultan of Zinder. Nuhu was obliged to pay an indemnity of 1,000,000 cowries, an act which established precedents for further tribute and modified his status and relations with Zinder. It was probably at this time that the chief of Zango lost the power to mobilize his army without Zinder's permission, thus reducing the scope, capacity, and resources of the chiefdom and its chief. Distrusted by Tanimu, Nuhu was easily subverted by his friend the Kaura Mazawaje, whose nominee, Mamman Sha, Tanimu appointed even before Nuhu was formally deposed. Nuhu's flight, surrender, and death at the hands of Tanimu and Mazawaje merely dramatized the radically changed position of the Zango state and its chiefs vis-à-vis their suzerain at Zinder.

Nuhu's fall and Mamman Sha's accession were effected by the Kaura Mazawaje, whose reports undermined Tanimu's patience while his stratagems rendered Nuhu defenseless. Mazawaje's intrigues and their effectiveness presupposed and expressed significant changes in the status, relations and autonomies of the Kaura, the chief, and the senior council. In establishing direct secret relations with Tanimu, the Kaura had transformed his position by vastly increasing the autonomy, resources, scope, and range of his office at the expense of the chiefship, the senior council, and ultimately the Zango state. The political structure and capacities of the chiefdom were accordingly transformed; and for the rest of Mazawaje's tenure of the Kaura office, this situation prevailed. Having forfeited its external autonomy to

Zinder, Zango progressively lost its internal autonomy and thus its integrity. Its chief could neither call out the military levy, undertake independent campaigns, order execution, nor dismiss the Kaura without Zinder's approval.

Tanimu pressed Mamman Sha for regular tribute and deposed him at Mazawaje's instigation after their joint campaign against Hadeija, replacing him by Haruna in the absence of Mazawaje's nominee, Dan Aro. Not long after, when Tanimu abolished the chiefdom founded at Magaria by Kitari and incorporated the territories of Kworgum, Kance, and Kurni in Zinder, Zango's predicament became clear. Rather than its current autonomy, which was further reduced when Tanimu dismissed the Galadima Masallaci and appointed Tsatso in his place, its continued existence as a discrete unit was now the issue at stake. Haruna's deposition on Mazawaje's allegations in 1871 was followed by the appointment of Dan Aro, in whose reign Tanimu dismissed the Galadima Tsatso and tried unsuccessfully to double the annual tribute. Meanwhile Zango was progressively polarized between its chief and the Kaura until the mutual distrust and antagonism of Dan Aro and Mazawaje, which was expressed in their separate celebration of the Idi rites, formally divided the chiefdom between the two factions and threatened strife, thus providing Tanimu with a favorable situation for new interventions. In 1877 Tanimu removed Mazawaje and Dan Aro, divided the chiefdom into two separate administrations, and obliged each to render an annual tribute equivalent to that previously paid by both together.

By establishing clandestine political relations with the sultans of Zinder, Mazawaje had subverted the chiefdom's autonomy and capacity to resist Zinder's demands. He had reduced the autonomy, scope, and capacity of the chieftaincy and aggrandized his own office by dramatically increasing its range, resources, and scope. In the process he had altered the status interrelations and autonomies of the senior offices and the senior council. The Magajiya's constitutional capacities disappeared; and by establishing private political relations with Zinder, the Kaura drastically reduced the moral and political resources of the throne, thus creating a situation which enabled him to reduce its material and social resources correspondingly. By thus creating and monopolizing the capacity to subvert the chief, Mazawaje also destroyed the corporate integrity of the Zango government, altered the antecedent articulation of its senior components—the chiefship, the electoral and state councils, and the senior offices—and divided the officialdom into two hostile factions, thereby modifying its traditional articulations with the dynasty and other titled lineages and status groups and redefining the scope and autonomy of his office as the maker and breaker of local chiefs. Thus the Kaura's power increased in scope and intensity as the chief's declined. However illegitimate his power, Mazawaje dominated the Zango polity from the fall of Nuhu to that of Dan Aro; but to stabilize and increase his predominance, he destabilized the structure of the state and decreased its autonomy and capacity to withstand the successive interventions of Zinder.

1877 to 1903

Tanimu's solution of the virtual paralysis his policies had generated at Zango was to divide the territory of the chiefdom into two coordinate jurisdictions under the Kaura and the chief. By imposing approximately equal burdens on either, Tanimu quietly doubled his revenues from Zango while preserving the chiefdom as a political unit for his own purposes by leaving the Kaura as senior member of the state council, commander of the Zango forces, and senior elector. However, in 1877 Tanimu also removed the Fulani from the jurisdiction of the Zango chief by placing them under headmen from Gurdo and Tsatsumburum who were themselves subject to Zinder officials. Simultaneously he withdrew all resident Kanuri from the jurisdiction of the Zango officials and placed them under Zinder by *tarayya* administration. Thus, besides those resources and capacities which the chief now lost to his Kaura, both offices lost their jurisdictions over the corporate categories of Fulani and Beriberi, which were thus excised from the Zango polity by Tanimu's restriction of its jurisdiction to local Hausa and Maguzawa.

In this way Tanimu segregated the administrative resources, autonomy, and scope of the competing factions while perpetuating their contraposition in the political councils of the state. The autonomy, capacity, scope, and range of the chiefship were thus reduced, while the autonomy, resources, scope, capacity, and range of the Kaura's office were correspondingly augmented. The Kaura accordingly extended the scope, resources, and capacity of his office by assuming the exclusive rights, which had formerly lain with the chief, to levy occupational taxes throughout his domain. He then expanded his staff proportionately by creating new offices. In council he easily won over the Galadima Takurce and with his assistance thwarted the chief.

The territorial subdivision and ethnic excisions of 1877 severely modified the external and internal articulations of the Zango state by altering the status of the unit and its two senior offices and reducing its autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacity while materially weakening the chief and strengthening the Kaura. Preceding articulations of offices, factions, and lineages within the state were now transformed by the administrative segregation and elaboration of the Kaura's staff. The resources, autonomy, and capacity of the chief and his chiefdom were fundamentally impaired; and the range and scope of the chiefship were truncated by these ethnic transfers, subdivisions, and politically imposed redistributions of administrative authority. Probably the first popular reponse to the new situation was the exodus of Hausa subjects westward to Fulani territory. In thus attempting to leave the tormented chiefdom, these Hausa subjects exercised their residual autonomy to transfer allegiance at their own risk in contexts of crisis or oppression. Like Lukudi and Kitari before him, Dan Aro's successor, Tafida, opposed but could not prevent these transfers. Tanimu had little difficulty in doing so; he directed Mai Gurdo, the emir of Daura, to enslave the refugees.

The reigns of Tafida, Sule, and Yusufu merely illustrate the increased insecurity that these changes induced in the chiefship and the Kaura's position. To preserve and enhance his autonomy within its administratively reduced sphere, Tafida, whom Tanimu had installed as chief in 1877 when Bakula became Kaura, strove to remove those Galadimas who supported the Kaura; and when Bakula misjudged the scope of his autonomy by contracting a marriage alliance with the Daura Fulani and was forced to flee, Tafida secured the appointment of his cross-cousin Kardaji as Kaura in an effort to recoup his recent administrative losses by political means and perhaps to reunite the realm in substance, despite its formal division. However, this temporary realignment of the Kaura and chief foundered when Kardaji failed to implement the orientations it entailed among his staff, who remained loyal to the absent Bakula. In consequence the Kaura's establishment was paralyzed and unable to fulfill its administrative and tributary roles. Kardaji was duly removed and replaced by Bakula when Tanimu's son, Suleiman, seized the Zinder throne in the succession war of 1883, and Tafida fled with his Galadima Abba to avoid a fate like that of his father Nuhu.

Having already established alliance with Suleiman, Bakula was able to secure the appointments of his nominees, Sule and Jatau, as chief and Galadima, respectively, meanwhile increasing his resources by attaching fiefs that had formerly belonged to the Galadima. Thus Bakula's restoration and domination of Jatau and Sule modified the preceding articulations of these three senior offices to the Kaura's advantage. Bakula accordingly reestablished the political predominance that Mazawaje had exercised within the chief's administration and councils; and when the new chief, Sule, contested this predominance, Bakula ingeniously removed him by a variation of the ruse Mazawaje had used against Nuhu. As Sule's successor, Yusufu owed his nomination and appointment to Bakula and was obliged to accept the Kaura's preeminence, especially since Bakula had securely attached several of the chief's officials to his side.

The deterioration in the civil conditions of Zango that this divided administration promoted is nicely illustrated by two later developments. Exploited with impunity by the Kaura's officials, some of his Hausa subjects appealed directly to Zinder for relief under the *tarayya* institution. Such appeals were discouraged by harsh punishment of the complainants. Thus this final attempt by the *talakawa* to ameliorate their lot by relations of clientage had no more success than their earlier efforts. Officials continued to abuse their authority with impunity and with the connivance and protection of their superiors, who translated the fines levied for such offenses into *kudin sarauta* for titles and promotion, thus institutionalizing a new and explicitly oppressive articulation of their *lawanai* and subjects.

At this period Suleiman of Zinder began to levy fines directly on members of Yusufu's staff at Zango. Unable to protect his staff, the chief saw his limited authority and autonomy disintegrate as his traditionally exclusive jurisdiction over his subordinates deteriorated, thus enabling the Kaura to

recruit further clients from the chief's supporters and to appropriate further towns from the Galadima. The integrity of the chiefship and chiefdom was thus on the final edge of dissolution when yet another political upheaval, a civil war at Zinder, obliged Bakula to flee and restored Tafida as chief of Zango.

After the death of Bakula's successor, Malam, the new sultan of Zinder, Ahmadu Majerinji, appointed Salihu as Kaura. By then Tafida had levied new fees, the *kudin wankan sarauta,* on Zango officials to finance the payments to Zinder for his restoration. He had also made unprecedented demands for *kudin sarauta* from slaves on their appointment and had extorted other revenues by appointing and dismissing wealthy men to particular offices for lucrative fees. By these means Tafida increased the autonomy and resources of the chiefship on his return and manifestly redefined its relations with the offices, status groups, and lineages that had remained under its jurisdiction by violating traditional norms while maintaining favorable relations with his suzerain. Nonetheless, Zinder continued to extend its interference in Zango affairs, thereby reducing the residual autonomies of the chief and Kaura. In response to a private appeal, Ahmadu Majerinji replaced the Kaura's senior lieutenant, the Dan Kwaba, by another of his own choice. He also ordered Tafida to dismiss his Alkali and forbade further appointments to that office until an appropriate fee had been paid. When Zango was threatened by attack from Kano in 1900, Tafida was forbidden to restore the walls that Ibram had erected nearly fifty years before; Zinder then left Tafida to repel the assault unaided. When the Kaura of Kurni, a Zinder official, pursued the Fulani Yerima Loto of Daura at Zango on behalf of the Fulani emir Mai Gurdo, Tafida was unable to intervene or to secure reparation. The substantive integrity of the chiefdom as a corporate group had been virtually destroyed by subdivision into contraposed segments and by successive interventions of Zinder against its subjects, officials, and chiefs. Nonetheless, the state retained its formal unity, its range, residual autonomy, scope, and concrete structure.

The First Years of European Rule, 1903-1904

This was the situation of Zango when a French expeditionary force defeated Ahmadu Majerinji and occupied Zinder in 1899, thereby dramatically transforming the political map of this region and redefining its preceding alignments. Although the French immediately installed Ahmadu Dan Bassa as the new sultan at Zinder, he was not allowed to initiate further changes at Zango before his deposition in 1906 on the eve of the final boundary demarcation that permanently freed Zango from Zinder. When the British arrived, Zango experienced a second and equally dramatic reversal of fortune, as several hundred villages were transferred to it from the former territory of Damagaram (Zinder), thus greatly inflating the resources, range, scope, autonomy and capacity of the local chiefship.[6] In assuming that the local polity was

united under its chief and conducting their relations accordingly, the British restored the integrity of the chiefdom by making the Kaura formally subordinate and responsible to the chief for his territorial administration. Resident Fulani and Kanuri were likewise replaced under the jurisdiction of Zango, and the British claimed a far lighter tribute than Zinder had drawn. Tafida exploited these opportunities to place his kinsmen and slaves in charge of most of the newly acquired territory, thereby revising the traditional articulations of the dynasty, the throne slaves, and the executive officialdom while replenishing the throne's depleted resources, rewarding his loyal supporters, and enhancing his power. By these means Tafida further changed the articulation of the chiefship with the officialdom and rural communities and increased its range, resources, scope, autonomy, and capacity. Notably, all these changes presupposed the historically prior change in the status and external articulations of the state and its chief which accompanied the termination of vassalage to Zinder and the assertion of British control.

New arrangements were made to levy and transport local taxes. The vacant judgeship was filled. The Kaura now lost some of the fiefs his predecessors had acquired from the Galadimas, together with his powers to levy occupational taxes and to administer law. Though forbidden to fortify his settlements or initiate military action, the chief could now order executions and dismiss his officials, subject to British approval; and in making appointments or delegating authority, he had a free hand. His people were relieved of tribute to Zinder; his officials, of arbitrary fines; the chief, of serious risks of subversion and deposition. Thus the new suzerains redefined the polity as a self-regulating corporate group whose hereditary chief controlled its political and administrative systems. Since this model was consistent with traditional ideas and with his interests as chief, Tafida accepted and upheld it.

Following a border clash at Dan Mairam and threatening gestures from Baure, that chiefdom was attached to Zango in a relation sufficiently close to traditional patterns of vassalage to be perceived as such by both parties. Thus the external relations, range, scope, and resources of the Zango chiefdom were further enhanced. When Tafida died in 1904, the Zango electors resisted the attempts of Kaura Salihu to decide the succession and chose Musa, whom the British confirmed. Thus, from 1902-1904 the electors regained autonomous control of the succession; and the chief, of official appointments and internal administration. The integrity and capacities of the chiefdom were thus restored; its resources and range increased; the articulation of its officials, dynasty, and subjects were greatly modified; and the scope of the government expanded. Baure's attachment to Zango as a subordinate state clearly illustrates the enhanced capacity of the senior chiefdom.

The Reign of Musa, 1904-1911

Following Musa's accession, the continuing hostility of Baure precipitated an impasse that led to the abolition of that chiefdom by the eviction and exile

of its dynasty en bloc to Katsina. Baure was then incorporated in Zango and garrisoned by Zango troops, although administered by its own senior non-royal officials. Again, the autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacity of the Zango chiefship were substantially increased following these changes in its external articulations with Baure and with the British supervisors.

In 1906, when the territories that Zango had recently acquired from Zinder were restored to French administration in Niger, Musa was elevated to Daura, the first and only Hausa emir to be thus restored to the capital from which the Fulani had expelled his ancestors during the jihad. The Fulani emirate was abolished and incorporated in the reconstituted Hausa chiefdom of Daura, together with the territories of Zango and Baure. Thus the chiefdom of Zango was subsumed and incorporated in a wider unit of higher status by the restoration of its chief and dynasty to their ancestral home. The ancient Hausa state, so long and wretchedly fragmented, was now reborn as a single integrated body under a single hereditary chief.

On British instructions, Musa left the Fulani officials of the former emirate in office until they committed offenses that merited their removal. This condition initially obliged Musa to leave many of his Hausa staff outside the formal limits of the Fulani emirate; but almost immediately after Musa had moved to Daura, the British reorganized the territorial administration of the chiefdom by replacing the small, dispersed fiefs of precolonial times with a simpler grouping in larger, coadunate districts. There was thus a sharp decrease in the number of senior territorial offices available for high-ranking members of the Hausa elite. Musa astutely allocated several of these district headships to his close kinsmen, thereby consolidating the patrimonial distributions and policies that Tafida had initiated on the first boundary demarcation of 1903 and entrenching dynastic control of the executive.

It is evident that despite various restrictions on his conduct as emir of the reconstituted state, Musa increased his autonomy, range, resources, capacity, and scope by moving to Daura. The restoration also transformed the relation of the chiefship to the preexisting state and offices at Zango by requiring its relocation at Daura, where the local Fulani resumed the status of a corporate category, fragmented under several leaders and subject to the Hausa state. However, while his restoration glorified the chieftaincy and conferred a new charisma on Musa in the eyes of his Hausa followers, this reunion scrambled antecedent relations of offices, lineages, and ethnic and social divisions within the amalgamated chiefdoms; and consequently the situation remained ambiguous, unstable, and fraught with difficulties.

Musa's problems began with his move to Daura. Some Hausa officials refused to leave Zango. Others who accompanied Musa later abandoned their posts and fled across the border, disillusioned and alienated by the disjunctions and incompatibilities of their traditional and their new status. In addition, Musa had to assert his executive authority over such powerful Fulani officials as the Sarkin Bai and to govern through a new communication structure which enabled his vizier, Na'inkali, to destroy his credit with the

people of Daura and with the British administration. At one point in this sequence, Musa seriously risked deposition and the loss of all that he had inherited and gained since his accession; but with the exposure and conviction of Na'inkali, the flight of the Turaki Madi, and the fall of the Kaura Salihu, who still sought to achieve Bakula's position by Bakula's means, the restoration was consolidated before Musa's death in 1911. Several posts initially reserved for Fulani officials, having by then passed to Hausa hands, lapsed as districts; tax collection and other administrative processes were reformed and simplified. Thus the dramatic upheavals that followed Musa's return to Daura reflected the confused and inconsistent articulations of his hybrid officialdom, prevailing uncertainties about the status of the regime and its components, and the defective organization which allowed opportunistic officials to exploit the situation for their own advantage. Fortunately the British discovered the major culprits in due course, and their confidence in Musa was restored; but by then many traditional offices had been disestablished, while others had changed their ranks and roles. Several Fulani offices had been incorporated in the emergent system, and some new titles had been introduced from Katsina and Kano. A new official structure was evolving, as new official rank orders, roles, powers, and relations crystallized, together with new modes of remuneration and new distributions of senior offices among the dynasty and lineages of differing status and ethnic stocks.

Abdurrahman, 1911-1966

Abdurrahman's position as Musa's eldest son and official vizier gave him an outstanding claim to succeed in 1911; and his long, uneventful reign, which allowed the regime to develop a new stable official structure, also facilitated his progressive transfer of its senior positions to members of the dynasty. As new technical departments emerged in the Native Administration, these were patrimonialized by placement under princes with suitable education. By 1927 most district headships were also held by princes. Following Tafida and Musa, Abdurrahman established the government as a patrimonial regime. Some members of the traditional senior council were dispersed to the districts; a new council of clearly patrimonial cast emerged, together with a new judicial council.

These developments increasingly transformed the nature of the regime by concentrating the power and authority of the throne in the emir's closest kinsmen and particularly among his sons, grandsons, and brothers. Thus the traditional relations of the chief, the dynasty, the senior executive offices, councils, noble lineages, and status groups were progressively altered. The resources of state increased with the growth of population and prosperity that followed pacification; so did its capacity and scope. In consequence, as the autonomy of the central chiefship expanded vis-à-vis other elements in the government despite or through the supervision of the British, these addi-

tional powers were used to promote the dynasty. Thus, besides the Native Administration, which was organized as a corporate group with several departments and territorial segments, the dynasty developed as an overlapping group that occupied the most strategic positions of the state and furnished the emir's personal structure of patrimonial control. Other office-holding lineages such as that of the Kaura were either eliminated or reduced to dependence on Abdurrahman's goodwill for preservation. The chances that commoners might be appointed to senior positions declined as *shigege* offices decreased in significance and number through patrimonialization. Thus, by 1958 the political elite consisted of an entrenched and expanding dynastic core, a few traditional noble lineages, and a scatter of new men. Its lesser officialdom of craft heads, palace attendants, and technical staff was still recruited on traditional criteria of descent and clientage; but by 1958 the traditional rank-order of slaves had substantially disappeared with the passing of most of the last generation born into slavery before the British occupation. Beyond the officialdom, the population was divided, as before the jihad, into Hausa, Maguzawa, Fulani, and Bugaje, the last three being ordered as corporate categories by descent, custom, and their lack of inclusive organization.

As patrimonialization proceeded, dynastic rivalries for the succession emerged as the decisive political cleavages in the state. The emir's brothers allied themselves against his son and grandson. Both factions maneuvered for position, but the brothers' prospects suffered with the dismissal of their senior from the office of Waziri. When electoral institutions, representative councils, and political parties were introduced to Daura in 1953, few commoners dared or appeared to support radical criticism of the regime as familistic and unrepresentative. The emir's patrimonial clients and kin were accordingly elected to represent the state in the regional and federal legislatures at Kaduna and Lagos. New village, district, and outer councils of the state remained firmly under dynastic control; and the forms of representative electoral participation in government lacked substance and autonomy, since Abdurrahman had exhaustively appropriated these for the dynasty. The controlling power, which was once contested and later divided between the Kaura and the chief, had now been fused by the emir in the undifferentiated *iko* that he exercised as hereditary chief of the Native Administration on the one hand and as head of the dominant political organization of the state, the dynasty, on the other. In effect, having stabilized their external articulations by suitable accommodations with the British, Musa and Abdurrahman fundamentally transformed the internal articulations of the officialdom by appropriating some old and several new offices for the dynasty, thus progressively increasing the autonomy, scope, resources, and capacity of the chiefship as the new concrete structure of the state crystallized within the forms of the old; and its latent categories were filled, like old wineskins, with a new official order.

10
Conclusion

The Problem

With the aid of two distinct conceptual schemes, and from two differing points of view, I have now reported and analyzed the political history of the Hausa state of Zango from its antecedents until its absorption in the reconstituted Hausa state of Daura under British rule. First I employed the set of latent categories that furnished the frame of reference for my earlier analysis of the processes of political change in the Hausa-Fulani emirate of Zaria. I then reviewed the histories of Zango, Baure, and Fulani Daura in outline to see whether the order of their development and change replicated the relations of logical priority which aligned the categories of their latent structure. The history of the senior successor state from the Sarkin Gwari's withdrawal in 1805 until my visit in 1958 was then reanalyzed with the aid of a second conceptual scheme designed to distinguish the various conditions and modes of substantive change in the corporate units that provided its concrete structures. In concluding, I now wish to explore some of the ways in which these complementary but differing analyses may be related and to learn what we may from their combination. To this end I have devised techniques for concise, if cryptic, summaries of the results obtained when identical events are analyzed in each of these frameworks, thus allowing us to tabulate them together for further study. For in order to determine as objectively and systematically as we can whether the changes reported above reveal any regularities of processual form or of substantive change and to specify the patterns that they exhibit as concisely and accurately as possible, it is essential to recast the preceding qualitative analyses in a form which allows us to tabulate the specific coefficients and sequences of change induced by identical events in the content of the latent categories that underlie the regime and in the substance of its concrete structure of corporate units. Without some appropriate means of distilling and compressing the results of these analyses uniformly and consistently, we can hardly advance our understanding of the

processes of political change beyond the preceding level of qualitative chronological description, which has many severe limitations, including its unavoidable subjectivity. However, in attempting to summarize the types of change induced in the content of latent categories and in the substance of corporate forms in ways that allow us to compare and study them systematically, I have inevitably had to develop a set of conventions and procedures which must first be described in order that the data tabulated below might be intelligible.

Lacking adequate details on the political ethnographies and histories of Baure and Fulani Daura, I have restricted the analysis that follows to the experience of that Hausa community which accompanied the Sarkin Gwari in his exile and successively settled at Yekuwa, Yardaji, Toka, and Zango before its final reinstatement at Daura under Musa in 1906. As the history of this community is relatively well known and extraordinarily diverse in its details, it provides many situations which can be analyzed as a continuous chronological series in the complementary schemes discussed above; and the sheer diversity of its historical experience assures equally challenging tests for our conceptual frames and techniques of notation and analysis.

Despite many imperfections, some likely errors, and its tentative, preliminary character, table 17 summarizes all the changes of a formal or substantive character that were sustained by this Hausa regime during each of sixty chronologically successive events or processes. In summarizing these levels and moments of change, the table attempts to detail their particular sequence and scope in a manner that invites verification by readers interested in reanalyzing these events themselves and facilitates further comparison and analyses. To this end I have juxtaposed two independent analyses of the effects of the sixty chronological events in the two halves of table 17, thus facilitating direct comparisons of the differential effects of these events on the prevailing contents of those latent categories that constituted and underlay the regime and on the substantive properties of the three most significant levels of its corporate organization, namely, the chieftaincy, the government, and the state. References to preceding accounts and discussions of each of the sixty listed events are included to enable readers to refresh their memories of the particular contexts and developments under review; and since each event or process exercises a determinate set of influences on its milieu, divergences among the differing formulas that describe its impacts on these differing structural forms indicate corresponding differences in the properties of the units to which they refer. For although the seven categories of latent structure provide a common frame of reference for all sequences itemized in the first half of the table, the second half, which concentrates on the sequence, structure, and mode of particular substantive changes induced by these events in concrete structures, distinguishes three reference units or levels for comparative analysis, namely, the government, the chiefship, and the state. In all respects the simpler of the two halves of the table is the first, which indicates the range and sequence of changes in the content of the

TABLE 17

Sixty Moments of Change

Changes in the content of latent categories (Part I) and in the substantive properties and articulations of government, the state, and the chiefship (Part II) induced or expressed by sixty chronological incidents in the history of the Hausa of Daura from 1804-1958.

No.	Events	Preceding accounts, see pages:	Part I — Changes in content of latent categories	Part II — Effects on:		
				Government	State	Chiefship
1.	Ishi'aka mobilizes Fulani	145-46, 389	a	b c/f/d/e g	a c/f/d e g	b c/f/d e g
2.	Fulani victory	145-46, 389-90	a	b e/d f/c g	ab e/d/c/f g	b e/d/f/c g
3.	Sarkin Gwari flees Daura	146, 389-90	abcd	ba e/d f/c g	ba d/e/f c g	ba e/d/f/c g
4.	Sarkin Gwari's mission to Nguru	147-49, 389	abcd	ba c/d?e/f g	ba e/d?c/f g	ba c/f d/e g
5.	S. Gwari ennobles Sarkin Pawa's kin	153-54, 390-91	abcdefg	a?d?c	———	a c/f/d g
6.	S. Gwari moves to Yekuwa	149-50, 391	abcd	ba d/e/f c g	ba d/e c/f g	ba e/d/c/f g
7.	The secession at Yekuwa	154-57, 391-92	abcdefg	a d/e b f/c g	a d/e c/f b g	ab e/d/c f g
8.	Lukudi fines Kaura Idi	157, 392-93	abcd	a	———	a c/d/f g
9.	Lukudi moves to Yardaji	158-59, 393	abcd	ba d/e g?f	ba e/d g	ba d/e/f?g
10.	The suppression of Jengini	159-60, 393	———	b ?f	b	b
11.	Lukudi fines Tamila	160, 394	abcd	a	———	a c/f g d
12.	The sack of Yardaji	163-66, 394	abcd	ba c/f d/e g	ba d/f g/e	ba d/e c/f g
13.	Defection of Tamila & Kyenkyere	166-67, 394	abcdefg	ab d/e f/c g	ab c/e f/d g	ab d/e/f c g
14.	Lukudi fines the Kaura lineage	166	abcd	a?c	———	a?c/g/d
15.	Lukudi's flight	168, 395	abcd	ba c/e/f/d g	ba c/f d/e g	ba d/e c/f g
16.	Lukudi appoints slave Sarkin Yara & Turaki	169-71	abcdefg	a c/f?d/g	———	a c?f d g

TABLE 17 (Continued)

No.	Events	Preceding accounts, see pages:	Part I — Changes in content of latent categories	Part II — Effects on:		
				Government	State	Chiefship
17.	Lukudi submits; Ibram appoints Nuhu	168-69, 395	abcd	ba c f e/d g	ba c f e/d g	ba c f e/d g
18.	The dual monarchy	169-71, 395-96	abcdefg	ba c/f d/e g	ba c/f e/d g	ba c/f d/e g*
19.	Nuhu's revolt & defeat	171, 395-96	abcd	ba c d/e f g	ba c e/d f g	a c/f/d/e g*
20.	Location at Zango	171-72, 396	abcd	ba c/d/e/f g	ba c/f/d/e g	ba c/f/d/e g*
21.	Submission to Ibram at Zango	171-72, 396	abcd	b c/f g?d	b c/f g?d/e	ba c/f?g/d/e*
22.	Nuhu seizes power	172-74, 396	abcdef	a g	———	a c/f/g d*
23.	Nuhu replaces Kaura Dan Dawambai by Mazawaje	172-74, 396	abcdefg	a ? g	———	a c/f d/?e g*
24.	Tanimu defeats Ibram & Nuhu	174-76, 396-97	a	b c/f/d/g	b c/f/g d	b c/d/f g
25.	Tanimu deposes Nuhu	176-77, 396, 397	abcd	ba c/f g?d	ba c/f g	ba c/f g
26.	Mazawaje & the fall of Nuhu	176-77, 396-97	abcdefg	ba c/f ?d g	ba c/f g	ba c/f?d g
27.	Mazawaje, Mamman Sha, & Haruna	177, 185-89, 397	abcdefg	ba c/f d/g	ba c/f d/g	ba c/f?d/g
28.	Tanimu appoints Tsatso Galadima	189, 397	abcdefg	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g
29.	Tanimu deposes Haruna		abcd	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g
30.	Tanimu deposes Dan Aro & Mazawaje together	192-93, 398	abcd	ba c/f g	ba c/f ?d g	ba c/f g
31.	Mazawaje & the Kauraship	172-74, 176-77, 185-93, 396-98	abcdefg	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g
32.	Mazawaje, Dan Aro, & the double Idi	192-93, 398	abcdef	a c?e/f/d g	a c?e/?f/?d g	a c/f e/d g
33.	Tanimu's reorganization of 1877	192-99, 398-400	abcdefg	ba c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g
34.	The Kaura's new staff & taxes	200-03, 399	abcdefg	a c/d/f? g	a d g	a c/f e/d g

TABLE 17 (Continued)

No.	Events	Preceding accounts, see pages:	Part I — Changes in content of latent categories	Part II — Effects on:		
				Government	State	Chiefship
35.	The exodus from Zango to Daura	199,200, 399	a	b c/d/e g	a c/d/e g	b c/d/e g
36.	The Kaura & the Galadima Takurce	205-07, 399-400	abcd	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g
37.	Bakula secures simultaneous appts. of Sule & Galadima Jatau	210-11, 400	abcdef	ba ?g	ba	ba ?d/e ?f/c g
38.	Dismissals of Sule & Yusufu	212, 219, 400-01	———	———	———	———
39.	Commoners protest oppression	214-16, 401	a	b c/d/e/f g	ae/f/c gd	b f/c g
40.	Kaura Salihu treats fines as *kudin sarauta*	226, 401-02	abc	a f g	a f g	a c/f d g
41.	Zinder fines Yusufu's staff	213-14, 401	abcd	ba c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g
42.	Tafida levies *kudin sarauta* & *k. wankan sarauta* on slaves	220-22, 401-02	abcd	a ?c/f g	a ?g	a c/f/d g
43.	Ahmadu Majerinji & the Alkali's & Dan Kwaba's offices	223-24, 402	abcd	ba e/d/c/f g	ba e/d/c/f g	ba c/f/e/d g
44.	French conquest of Zinder	225, 415	abcd	ba e/d/f/c g	ba c/f/e/d g	ba e/c/f/d g
45.	Land transfer to Zango	228-30, 232-35*	abcd	ba e/d c/f g	b e/d/f/c a g	ba e/d/c/f g
46.	British assert suzerainty at Zango	230-31, 415	abcd	ba e/d/?c/f g	ba c/f/d/e g	b e/d/f/c a g
47.	Baure attached to Zango as vassal	293-96, 416	abcd	b c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g	ba c/f/e/d g
48.	Baure incorporated in Zango	296-99, 416	abcdefg	ba e/d/f/c g	ba e/d/f/c g	ba e/d/f/c g
49.	Zango loses its recent territories to Niger	295-308, 416	abcd	ab e/d?f/ g	ba e/d/?f g	ab e/d/f g
50.	Zango electors select Musa to succeed	296-97	abcdefg	ba c/f d g	ba c/f d g	ba

*additional accounts page 415

TABLE 17 (Continued)

No.	Events	Preceding accounts, see pages:	Part I — Changes in content of latent categories	Part II — Effects on:		
				Government	State	Chiefship
51.	British confirm & appoint Musa	297	abcd	ba c/f d g	ba c/f/d g	ba ?g
52.	Musa's transfer to Daura	306-9, 419-20	abcdef	ba e/d/c/f g	ba e/d/c/f g	ba e/d/f/c g
53.	Musa's mixed officialdom at Daura	314-18, 419-21	abcdefg	ba e/d/c/f g	ba e/d/c/f g	ba c/e/f/d g
54.	The rise of Na'inkali	314, 324-25, 420	abcdefg	ab?g	a?g	a c/f/d ?e g
55.	Na'inkali's fall; Musa's recovery	326-29, 420-21	abcdefg	ba	ba	ab c/f/d/e g
56.	The patrimonialization of the Native administration	336, 344-346, 422	abcd	a	a	a c/f/d g
57.	Developments of new departments	342-44, 422	abcdefg	a d/f?/e c g	a d/f/c?e g	a d/f/c?e g
58.	Development of dynastic rivalry	344-50, 422-23	abcd	a ?e g	a?g	a f/c g
59.	Institution of local elections	350, 423-24	a	a f/c/d	a d/f/c/e g	ab c d g
60.	Institution of local councils	350-55, 423-24	a	a f/c/d?e g	a c/f/d?e g	a f/c d g

*These formulas refer to Lukudi's chiefship only.

latent categories and seeks to test the thesis advanced in my study of Zaria that such changes always proceed in the order of logical priority that aligns the categories themselves; it is thus the appropriate one to begin with. But as we wish, however briefly, to explore the relations between the two analyses and the conceptual frameworks that inform them, it is necessary to discuss each in turn before attempting to combine them. The ultimate objective of this juxtaposition is to determine how observable changes in the substantive properties of the three different forms of corporate organization isolated in part 2 of table 17 relate to changes in the content of the latent categories which underlie the regime reported in part 1 for any particular event and all events together. It is therefore necessary to indicate the conceptual issues clearly before proceeding to discuss the preparation and interpretation of the tabulated formulas.

In attempting to test and develop the analysis of political change advanced in the study of Zaria, I have employed the seven logically ordered categories that described the "principal features of the Habe constitution which persisted throughout the government of Fulani Zaria, [noting that] these categories and their interrelations are purely formal."[1] Here I describe these forms as latent categories because together they define the persistent latent structure of the Daura regime. However, as at Zaria, "the persistence of these formal categories does not exclude changes of their content within the systems under study,"[2] since "the seven formal categories constitute the irreducible minimum definition of the general type of government to which the[se] systems . . . all belong."[3] On logical grounds it was then argued there that "the order of logical priority among the formal categories of a given system will be the structure by which the change of that system proceeds,"[4] since "revision of any single category in such a system presupposes certain changes in the content of the categories which precede it."[5]

As mentioned above, the changing political and administrative systems of government were identified as the immediate and labile content of the latent categories in the diachronic analysis of government at Zaria, with the result that changes in the content of particular latent categories were directly deduced from changes in the antecedent structures of politics and administration. "In our analysis of government as a synchronic system, the primary formal categories are the political and administrative systems, while the substantive categories consist of governmental activities and tasks. But in the analysis of governmental change at Zaria, these political and administrative structures form the content of the system which undergoes change, and the structure of the diachronic process is the fixed order of logically necessary relations which regulates the change of constitutive forms."[6] It is evident that the political and administrative subsystems which were treated as the content of the latent categories in the Zaria analysis constitute the analytic structure of the political order, since they are abstracted and articulated by analytic distinctions of authority and power. However, these analytic struc-

tures of authority and power are themselves anchored in concrete structures of a corporate kind whose individual contents or substance consisted of their scope, autonomy, resources, range, and capacity. Thus, in listing the specific and differing effects of identical events on the analytic structures that form the content of the latent categories of the system and on substantive aspects of the corporate units that furnish its concrete structures, I now seek to determine how these two sets of substantive changes are systematically related to one another, since they both appear instantaneously at different levels of a common system. In brief, the immediate problem is to indicate precisely how changes that proceed at the analytic level of the system are related to those that modify the substantive properties of the corporate units that provide its concrete structure; and as changes in analytic structure express changes in the distributions of power and authority within and among these corporations, the issue can be restated thus: how do changes in the political and administrative roles and relations of corporations relate to changes in the scope, autonomy, resources, range, and capacity which together form their concrete substances?

Preliminaries

To present the results of our analyses of the modes, sequence, and structure of the numerous changes under review in a form sufficiently terse and determinate to allow direct inspection and objective comparison of the results of individual events, and to invite replication and independent verification without resort to discursive argument, some kind of algebraic notation is probably indispensable, and in any event exceedingly helpful, despite the primitive state of my present usage. To translate the formal categories of latent structure into algebraic forms, I have therefore written them as follows:

1. Status differentiation	= a
2. Offices differentiated as perpetual statuses	= b
3. Differentiation of office by status conditions of eligibility	= c
4. Kingship as the most senior of such offices	= d
5. Rank organization of offices	= e
6. Role differentiation of offices	= f
7. Organization of offices with similar status qualifications in exclusive promotional series	= g^7

Since these seven categories persist formally throughout the history under review, and since they are ordered as set out above by relations of logical priority, such changes as they experienced at Daura or Zango can only refer to their content or particular expression in successive contexts. For example, changes in the content of the first category include any modification in the prevailing structure of status differentiation. Likewise changes in the fourth category include any modification in the content of the chiefship, including its relations with other governmental units.

In the notation adopted here, changes in the content or expression of the first category are represented by the letter *a,* while changes in the fourth category are represented by the letter *d.* However, since it was argued in the earlier study that "by virtue of its logical structure, the revision and redefinition of a system of categories arranged in an order of logical priority can only proceed in a sequence which repeats the order of logical relations holding among the categories themselves,"[8] any formulas written to describe processes of categorical change that differed from this strict alphabetical order in any way would invalidate the preceding thesis. Thus events that modify the content of chiefship should have the form *a b c d,* while all events that modify the antecedent promotional alignment of offices should have the formula *a b c d e f g.* Thus the sequence of these symbols represents the order in which the categories they symbolize were modified by, and in, the incident under review; and this order constitutes "the structure of the diachronic process,"[9] at least with reference to any revision of the contents or actual expressions of these logically ordered latent categories. Accordingly our primary object in analyzing the impact of the sixty listed events or processes on the contents of the latent categories that prevailed at these precise moments is to determine whether they illustrate the prescriptive serialization indicated above. A second immediate interest is to determine the extent to which successive incidents of similar or different type modified the prevailing content of particular latent categories immediately and in identical fashion. Excluding errors in analysis, any formula that described a process of categorical change by omitting or misplacing alphabetically prior symbols could only mean one of two things: either that the latent categories thus displaced or omitted were not ordered by relations of logical priority or that changes in the content that actualizes these categories do not always proceed in the logically prescribed sequence. Either of these findings would seriously disturb the logical base on which the analysis of governmental change in Zaria rests. Thus, whereas the differing lengths of the formulas in part 1 of table 17 indicate the differing impacts of the incidents to which they refer on the content of the latent categories that then prevailed, their sequence, which reflects the order of logical priority among these categories, indicates the necessary and invariant order that underlies this series of changes.

To prepare formulas that describe accurately the mode and processes of change induced in the content of latent categories by particular events, the first requisites are precise definitions of the event or process and the moments of time to which the analysis refers, since these together determine the span of the sequence. Thus, if an "event" develops as a process over several weeks, months, or years—as, for example, M. Ishi'aka's mobilization of the local Fulani to campaign for Islam and the Shehu, or Mazawaje's prolonged subversion of the Zango chiefship—it is necessary to isolate and conceptualize some particular strategic moment or aspect of the process in order to determine its impact precisely. Often, as in the example of M. Ishi'aka's mobilization, the instant of initial action provides the appropriate reference

point; but in dealing with more protracted processes, such as Mazawaje's successive subversions, we should isolate clearly the dimension we wish to examine. Conversely, even a single incident might be profitably bisected to discriminate the immediate effects of its various moments or dimensions. Thus, in the following table items 22 and 23 distinguish two features of what, historically, was a single incident, namely, Nuhu's assertion of supremacy by dismissing the Kaura Dan Dawambai and appointing Mazawaje. The successive formulas show that while Mazawaje's appointment presupposed Nuhu's supremacy, that fact did not modify antecedent promotional arrangements, whereas Mazawaje's appointment did.

It is evident that any longitudinal analysis of changes in the forms that furnish the substantive expression of latent categories in a political system presupposes adequate information on the state and relations of these structures immediately before the critical event. Thus the incidents whose effects are the objects of analysis must be arranged in their chronological order, and the student should have sufficient information on the state of the system before and immediately after these events to determine their structural effects as precisely as possible. We need not apologize profusely because our information on the political ethnography and history of the Zango state is sometimes obscure and sometimes insufficient to satisfy this condition. By comparison with our information on Baure and Fulani Daura, these Zango data are quite sufficient for our present purpose. Their bluntness and uncertainties create more difficulties in assessing the effects of particular events on substantive features of corporate organization than on the political and administrative structures that illustrate the latent categories and provide their empirical contents.

It is also requisite that we should restrict our assessment of the effects of a given event or process to the particular moment selected for scrutiny, thus excluding its probable indirect or long-term contributions to further changes, in order to concentrate strictly on the changes presupposed, directly expressed, or immediately entailed by the event at the moment selected for analysis. To attempt such assessment, we clearly require an adequate grasp of the context and structures affected by the event or process. Equally, as in the bisected incident listed as items 22 and 23 in table 17, once we have determined the precise connotations of one event or moment of an event, we may then attempt a similar assessment by relating its later stages to other features of the situation or to those modifications already achieved in the specific structure it affects. In either case, our procedure requires that the changes attributed to a particular event should be restricted as far as possible to the precise moment of the incident, thus excluding secondary and remoter effects. Likewise processes, defined as continuing series of events, can only be treated as units for this analysis when they are homogeneous in all their elements, contexts, requisites, and implications. In such cases, we may represent a given process by any moment, phase, or incident that embodies all its components and can then write formulas to describe its effects on various structures in its immediate context. Certainly these conditions restrict the

range and scope of our analytic approach; but this limitation may be less serious than it seems, and it is balanced by compensatory advantages.

A rather different problem arises when a later event reproduces the form and character of an earlier one, so that identical or very similar effects might be attributed to both, insofar as the structures current at these moments had identical states. In some cases, such as the successive relocations of the Hausa community at Yekuwa, Yardaji, Toka, and Zango, such replication presents no analytic difficulty, since the range and resources of the regime were materially altered at each relocation. Thus the virtually identical processes of reconstituting the chiefdom on each of these four occasions are distinguished by their differing sociohistorical contexts. In such cases the formally identical processes of territorial incorporation within the state present no analytic problem. However, in other cases a regime may experience a succession of events that have identical form, character, and structural implications only if its state is constant for all. It is then necessary to determine whether the changes associated with these events were not effectively institutionalized by the first of the series as permanent and accepted features of the regime; for if this institutionalization had occurred, subsequent events that replicated the form of the first would merely reaffirm its effects without generating further change. On the other hand, if the changes generated by the initial event were not fully institutionalized, their replication by later incidents does involve progressive but identical patterns of change. Thus formulas written to describe such replicative events reflect judgments of the degree to which the changes generated by the initial or earlier events of the series have been institutionalized.

This issue is further complicated by the fact that successive incidents of identical form and scope may generate identical formulas even though the changes that each initiates are firmly institutionalized, provided that the series as such is progressive and cumulative. For example, by successive appropriations of free hereditary offices for throne slaves, Mai Gurdo progressively expanded his power and converted the Fulani regime from its traditional mixture of patrimonial and oligarchic rule into a slave-based absolutism. Each successive appropriation advanced this process by institutionalizing the transfers of further official resources of power to the throne, thus replicating the structure and scope of the changes effected by earlier appropriations. Accordingly, while some replicative events merely reinforce or reaffirm changes already institutionalized as features of a regime without promoting further changes, others may contribute increments to a cumulative process of structural change, and yet other replicative events may generate identical effects in their immediate contexts without securing institutionalization. Thus, to determine the scope of changes effected by later events in a replicative series, we have to judge whether their structural implications were already institutionalized by earlier incidents which may have modified the regime to incorporate effects that might otherwise have been validly attributed to later replications.

Thus the problems are, first, to determine whether a set of changes induced

by an earlier event of identical form has already been institutionalized as an accepted feature of the regime so that replication of the event has no other effect than to reaffirm these changes and, second, to determine whether changes of identical type already institutionalized represent phases in a progressive and continuous series or merely replicate one another without any further effects.

Some illustrations may help to clarify the issues. Sultan Suleiman's successive dismissals of the Zango chiefs Sule and Yusufu are grouped together as item 38 in table 17; but according to my analysis they neither altered the political and administrative relations that provided the content of the latent categories of the Zango regime nor modified the articulations or substance of the Zango chiefship, government, or state. Such neutral effects indicate that by then the authority of the Zinder sultans to depose their Zango vassals was accepted as an institutional condition or feature of the subordinate regime. Accordingly the dismissals of Sule and Yusufu merely reaffirmed but did not modify antecedent patterns. By contrast, both the Sarkin Gwari and Lukudi at different times made unusual reallocations of office and prescribed marriage alliances between high- and low-ranking families of the loyalist community that shared their exile. The Sarkin Gwari thus ennobled the lineage of is chief butcher, the Sarkin Pawa, by transferring two princely titles to it, while Lukudi conferred the titles of Sarkin Yara and Turaki on two brothers and throne slaves. In both cases these chiefs also conferred high-ranking brides on the men they ennobled. Insofar as both events modified the status attributes and requirements of the offices transferred, their position in the rank organization, and their official roles and promotional alignments, they are clearly distinct in the objects they modified, although formally identical. Moreover, insofar as these marriage prescriptions and official reallocations lacked traditional precedents and thus depended entirely on chiefly initiative, they illustrate successive extensions of the chief's regulatory autonomy and scope. Thus these formally similar modifications of the official order indicate cumulative extensions of chiefly power in the straitened circumstances of flight.

It is notoriously difficult to determine whether and to what degree or in what respects a given innovation has been institutionalized, since institutionalization is at once a process and a state of affairs. Certainly, while some innovations might be institutionalized by a single event, others remain uninstitutionalized despite frequent repetitions, which may indeed be perceived as increasingly illegitimate, however effective they are in modifying the operational conditions of a regime or society. Thus, to determine whether a modification has or has not been institutionalized, we should consider its nature, its form and source, the source and form of the sanctions that enforce it, its consistency with the normative and structural conditions of the regime, the public approval or disapproval that it elicits, and such evidence as we may have of its reception by senior members of the unit it affects. Further, in the absence of contemporary opinions on the acceptability of differ-

ing modifications, we may draw useful inferences about this from the historical struggles that centered on their acceptance or rejection. For example, the success of Mazawaje and Bakula in securing the depositions and appointments of several Zango chiefs by manipulating the sultans of Zinder failed to receive institutional sanctions at Zango, although the sultan's ability and right to remove the Zango chiefs was progressively recognized. In like fashion the successive appointments of Tsatso and Takurce as Galadimas of Zango by the sultans of Zinder were disapproved and contested by the Zango chiefs, despite their patent ineffectiveness. By contrast, the ennoblements of the Sarkin Pawa's lineage and the slave Turaki and Sarkin Yara mentioned above were enacted and accepted simultaneously. Again, one obvious sign that a community rejects the arrangements that it had formerly been obliged to tolerate is its cancellation or reversal of these arrangements when changing circumstances provide an appropriate chance. Thus, once they were removed from Zinder's control, the chiefs and officials of Zango repudiated many practices that they had formerly had to tolerate for fear of Zinder and attempted to reconstruct the old institutional order as best they could. Efficacy and compliance are thus uncertain signs of institutionalization; and in attempting to determine the nature and status of the modifications generated by subsequent events in a replicative series, it is clearly essential to distinguish those changes which have been institutionalized from others which have not, since reenactment of the latter represents further changes of identical form, scope, direction, and probable effect, while replications of the former do not.

Given the ambiguous criteria, conditions, and character of institutionalization and our inadequate knowledge of contemporary responses at Zango to particular incidents, it is obvious that any judgments of the degree to which changes induced in the Zango regime by particular events have been institutionalized are likely to include several errors. However, such judgments are prerequisites for determination of the effects of subsequent events; and such errors as they contain are equally unavoidable, given our imperfect knowledge of the contemporary situations at Zango and the complex and ambiguous character of institutionalization. We have to accept the probability, then, that our subjective perceptions of the changing situations of Zango diverge variably from the objective realities. The likelihood that we have misjudged the institutionalization of particular changes experienced at Zango illustrates this dilemma. However, for the present analysis it is surely sufficient to assess the degree to which changes induced by chronologically antecedent events had achieved institutional acceptance in order to determine the effects of subsequent events of similar or different kind on the analytic and concrete structures of the Hausa regime. Thus, even if these errors of judgment accumulate along a chronological series to increase the initial gap between our perceptions and the objective realities of events at Zango, provided only that they are consistently applied, such judgments of the differential institutionalization of particular changes should allow us to inter-

pret the effects of subsequent events consistently and systematically by providing common premises for each formula.

Techniques of Notation

Besides the problems already discussed in the attempt to determine and summarize changes in the substantive properties of the corporate units that provided the concrete structures of these polities, we encounter several others. Perhaps the best way to review these difficulties is to describe briefly the process by which table 17 was constructed. Having initially attempted to tabulate the sequence and scope induced in the content of the latent categories by fifty-two chronologically ordered events and having found that these changes had a common serial form, I tried to summarize the effects of these and some other events on the content or substantive properties of corporate units with the aid of a similar algebraic notation. For this purpose the seven variables identified above as significant for the analysis of substantive changes in corporate units were transcribed as follows:

1. Internal articulations of the corporation or other concrete unit = a
2. External articulations of the corporation or other concrete unit = b
3. Autonomy of the corporation or other concrete unit = c
4. Resources of the corporation or other concrete unit = d
5. Range of the corporation or other concrete unit = e
6. Scope of the corporation or other concrete unit = f
7. Capacity of the corporation or other concrete unit = g

These terms are defined above in chapter 9, in the first section, in a preliminary discussion of their probable relations. Although it was then suggested that substantive changes were characteristically simultaneous and transitive, in my initial attempt to tabulate these changes, I tried to arrange them serially as progressive sequences. This procedure was partly influenced by my earlier success in reducing changes in the analytic structures that expressed the latent categories to a set of serial formulas and partly by my confusion of the two quite different notions of substance to which these two analyses were addressed. In addition, and in contradiction, I also wished to see whether the substantive properties of corporate units changed simultaneously rather than sequentially by attempting to summarize them in a set of serial formulas. These orientations were undoubtedly influenced by my lack of any technique for representing diverse combinations of simultaneous and successive changes in algebraic form. In consequence, the first set of formulas describing changes of corporate substance induced or expressed by successive events were written uniformly as progressive series.

To assess the validity of these results, I repeated the exercise after a fortnight without consulting the earlier list, but for a longer and somewhat different catalog of events. In consequence, each of these lists contained some

events that were absent from the other. The next step was to collate the two sets of formulas by simple tabulation of all events that were common to both. This showed that of forty-seven pairs of formulas ostensibly written for the same events, there were forty-two cases of disagreement in the order of change and/or the inclusion of particular variables. For example, the formulas written to describe Bakula's success in securing the simultaneous appointments of Sule and Jatau as chief and Galadima were, respectively, *b a c f d g* and *a c d f g,* a relatively simple type of disagreement. Yet besides simple differences in the absolute order of the listed variables, the formulas differed in the variables they included and in the relative order or sequence of variables in sets of similar and differing constitution. Noting this, I reanalyzed the two sets of formulas to quantify the part played by these alternatives in the total disagreements; and it was at this stage that the fundamental sources of these disagreements became clear.

These were as follows: (1) differences in the precise moment or aspect of the event to which the formulas were addressed; (2) differences in the concrete structures to which the various pairs of formulas referred; (3) some inconsistency in my discrimination of the substantive variables during and between these successive analyses; (4) the basic inappropriateness of serialization for the description of substantive changes in corporate units, as demonstrated by the many differences in the absolute and relative orders of paired formulas; and (5) inconsistent and rather casual conceptions of the institutionalization of antecedent changes induced by replicating events in the successive tabulations. Thus my two initial attempts to formulate these changes sometimes referred to different events or different aspects, dimensions, or moments of the same event; sometimes to different corporations affected by the same event; and sometimes to different conceptions of the state of the regime when the particular events occurred. When the disagreements derived from these sources were compounded by inappropriate serialization and inconsistent discriminations of the substantive variables cited in the formulas, it is not surprising that only five of the forty-seven pairs of formulas were absolutely identical.

Having identified the major sources of error in discriminating the substantive changes of these concrete structures, I sought to reduce or eliminate them at my next attempt by the following procedure. First, the precise moment or aspect of each event selected for study was defined in writing as clearly as possible before a formula was written to summarize it. Second, I decided to distinguish clearly the various units affected by these events and to write separate formulas for each on all occasions. Recalling the preceding discussion of the differences in relations of government, chiefship, and the state, I thought it appropriate to explore systematically the effects of each event on these three structures by writing separate formulas for them in each instance and for any other concrete unit affected by these events. Thus I attempted to determine the effects of each event on the government, the chiefship, and the state as they were at each of these points in time. In addi-

tion, I attempted to determine the effect of each event on such other corporations as they affected. For example, the first and second incidents in table 17 have as their primary focuses the Fulani and Hausa populations of Daura whose corporate statuses were abruptly transformed first by the conversion of Fulani into a corporate group through Malam Ishi'aka's mobilization and then by the conversion of the defeated Hausa inhabitants into a corporate category by the withdrawal of the Sarkin Gwari and his government. Formulas summarizing these events were accordingly written for both ethnic units, given their corporate status; but both developments were also assessed for their impacts on the substantive properties of the chiefship, the government, and the state. Likewise item 31 in the following table requires us to assess the effect of Mazawaje's conduct on the Kaura's office; however, Mazawaje's conduct can also be assessed for its impact on the chiefship, the government, and the state. Similarly the appointments of Tsatso and Takurce have been examined for their effects on the Galadima's office; but these formulas are also excluded from the following table in favor of others that describe the effects of these events on the government, the chiefship, and the state.

In selecting these three concrete structures as significant referents for systematic analysis of the substantive changes induced by these events, I was guided by various considerations. First, the chiefship, government, and state are three central but distinct features of all these regimes, but while the state includes the government, the latter includes the chiefship. Thus they differ in complexity and span. While chiefship is a single office, government is organized as a corporate group of offices aligned in colleges and categories or orders of rank; and the state is an even wider corporation which integrates the government with the territory and population—that is, the chiefdom—that it governs. Thus, while the relations of chiefship to other offices are external from the perspective of the chief, they are internal from the perspectives of the government and the state; and while relations between the government and its subject communities may be conceived as external from the government's perspective, they are equally internal elements of the state. Thus, despite their many close connections, these three concrete structures are units of differing level, complexity, and span, differentiated by their articulations and by such substantive properties as their resources, scope, autonomy, range, and capacity. For example, whereas the government consists of offices ordered in ranks, colleges, and hierarchies to form a corporate group, it excludes those ethnic categories and local groups which are incorporated within the state. Thus the state is the only one of these three units that embraces the entire corporate organization of the political society.

In selecting these three structures for systematic study, I also hoped that one of them would correspond closely in its parameters to the unit constituted by the seven latent categories whose changing contents I ultimately wished to relate to the changing properties of these concrete structures. However, although this conception of government as an orderly group of

corporate offices differentiated by rank, role, criteria of eligibility, and promotional alignments gives explicit form to the last six of these latent categories, the first and most general principle of status differentiation transcends governmental structures and obliges us to recognize states and societies as global status units, differentiated internally in various ways and externally by reference to one another. In like fashion this first category subsumes status differentiations between government and other elements in the state. Thus, while the last six categories of the latent series neatly outline the basic forms and frameworks of Hausa government, the series as a whole refers equally to the state. It also includes chiefship, the third concrete structure isolated for study, as an institutional form that directly expresses the fourth latent category. In consequence, my hope that one of these three concrete structures would correspond with the unit defined by these seven latent categories proved mistaken. Nonetheless, this consideration did guide the selection of these three forms for detailed study.

These two steps, the precise specification of the event, moment, or aspect under analysis and the separation of alternative structures as reference points for assessment of the changes immediately induced or expressed by particular events, enabled me to reconsider critically the preceding definitions and criteria of the five specifically substantive variables, namely, *autonomy, scope, resources, range,* and *capacity,* in order to discriminate consistently among them in the varied situations of change listed for study. In practice it was necessary to continue this reconsideration and clarification of the criteria and relations of these substantive variables into the analysis of the incidents themselves until a sufficiently varied range of situations had crystallized their differences and relationships in my mind. These exercises also assisted the search for criteria to determine the differential institutionalization of changes effected by earlier events of differing or similar form and type in the Hausa regime and emphasized the value of restricting the analysis of change to the immediate moments and contexts of each event, thus excluding their indirect or direct long-term effects and implications in favor of their immediate impact.

Having thus clarified the criteria and scope of each analysis in a way which dispensed with the preceding qualitative accounts, I then considered how to write formulas that might include and discriminate simultaneous and successive modifications and indicate the varying types of uncertainty that reflect our limited knowledge of the actual situations affected by these events. To indicate succession in the changes of substantive variables, it is convenient to place their symbols serially, though this may not necessarily replicate the alphabetic order that describes changes in the content of the latent categories. Thus, the order in which symbols are written represents my assessment of the order in which the variables represented by these symbols were changed by the event. To indicate simultaneity in the changes of two or more variables, we may associate these by oblique signs—for example, *a/b* or *c/d/e.* It is then indifferent whether we write these simultaneous changes in

differing orders, such as *a/b* or *b/a, c/d/e, e/d/c, d/e/c,* or *c/e/d,* since either alternative indicates their simultaneity. However, such simultaneity need not denote transitivity or symmetry in the associated changes, nor should it be interpreted to mean that the variables thus linked changed in equal values or even in the same general direction. It is quite conceivable that while an event or process may have increased the values of *c* and *e,* it may have reduced those of *d* in a simultaneous set of shifts represented as *c/d/e.* Furthermore, some variables such as *c* and *f* sometimes suffer simultaneous changes in opposite directions from a given incident. For example, the autonomy and/or scope of a particular unit may be reduced in some respects and increased in others by a single event. Recognizing this, I nonetheless decided to omit positive and negative signs which might indicate the directions or modes of change in the values of the variables concerned, partly in the interests of simplicity and legibility but also because the direction of change in specific variables is normally clear from the narrative account of the incidents or processes concerned.

To indicate uncertainties, whether these derived from our fragmentary information on the contexts of the events and structures under review, from obscurities and ambiguities in my conceptualization of the criteria that distinguish these variables, or from the procedures for determining their change, I have placed question marks before the problematic symbols. Thus *a/?b* means that although it is uncertain whether the variable represented by *b* was modified in this event, it seems certain that if it was modified, it changed simultaneously with *a.* Conversely the formula *a?/d* indicates that it is uncertain whether *a* and *d* changed simultaneously in that context. To minimize ambiguities in the interpretation of these question marks, wherever the sequence allowed, I have placed the problematic variables at the end of their simultaneous sets. Thus, instead of writing *a?/d/c,* if it is evident that *a* and *c* altered simultaneously, it is preferable to place the problematic factor *d* last and to write *a/c?/d.* Moreover, to express uncertainties that attach to different items in a single sequence of change, I have not hesitated to place as many question marks as seem necessary. Thus the formula *ba?d/e?f/cg* means, first, that changes in *b* were followed by changes in *a;* second, that although it is uncertain whether *d* and *e* changed, it seems clear that if they did, both changed simultaneously; and finally, that it is also uncertain whether *f, c,* and *g* changed, although if either *f* or *c* changed in this context, the other changed simultaneously, and *g* sequentially.

Having yet found no reliable procedures for resolving these uncertainties that surround the sequence or scope of substantive changes, since these uncertainties sometimes arise as effects of the grossness of our operational criteria and procedures and sometimes as results of the uneven information at our disposal, in order to keep the formulas simple, I designate these and other types of uncertainty by a single sign, the question mark.

With these conventions, I then made two new attempts to formulate the effects of a common roster of events on the substantive properties and artic-

ulations of government, the chiefship, the state, and any other corporations immediately affected by each of these incidents, taking care to define the events and their moments precisely, the corporations affected uniformly, and to write out the various steps of these analyses as fully as necessary. The second of these transcriptions was made without consulting the first after an interval of several days; and each required two or three days to complete, given the large number of formulas involved. The two sets of formulas were then juxtaposed as before to determine their similarities and differences and the sources of the latter. My inability in this context to resolve reasonable alternative transcriptions of certain events accounts for many of the question marks inserted in the formulas below. These problematic interpretations illustrated the difficulties that arise from uncertainty about the institutionalization of anterior changes in particular structures and represent a substantial proportion of the divergences between the two transcriptions. However, even at this stage some differences reflected insufficiently precise denotations of the moments or aspects of events that generated change, while others reflected inconsistent applications of the criteria that distinguished the variables under study. Further consideration eliminated differences in most of these problematic cases, but not in all, thus yielding the results set out below. Undoubtedly the following table contains many errors that had escaped attention in these repeated analyses. It may also contain a greater number of debatable interpretations. Nonetheless, despite its primitive formulas and preliminary status, I believe that the table is basically sound and merits publication, since it illustrates a technique for the serial analysis of successive incidents in a sequence of change that pursues precision and objectivity and invites independent verification by interested students. Thus, whatever the particular failings of table 17, one hopes that the conceptions and procedures that inform it may stimulate some readers to develop and refine this analytic approach, whether by application to the data presented above or to other historical materials.

Changes in the Content of Latent Categories

The most fundamental feature of the formulas that summarize changes in the content of the latent categories that underlay the Hausa regime is their uniformly serial character and their uniform progression in the order of logical priority that aligns the categories themselves. These findings support the statement that "the internal order of the process by which the form of the system changed historically is the same as the order of logical priority among its categorical forms."[10] As indicated above, however, the content of these latent categories consists in the "political and administrative structures" that express the distributions of power and authority among the units of the governmental system.[11] Thus, to specify the changes generated by these events in the content of the categories that underlay the Hausa regime,

we must obliquely denote consecutive shifts in the distributions of authority and power that distinguished its administrative and political structures and processes. At least negatively, the first half of table 17 illustrates the general thesis that the content of categories ordered by relations of logical priority change in identical order and that "the revision of any single category in such a system presupposes certain changes in the content of the categories which precede it."[12]

The second important feature of the formulas that describe these categorical changes is their variable length and problematic meaning. Of the sixty incidents reviewed in table 17, only two, numbers 10, "the suppression of Jengini," and 38, "the depositions of Sule and Yusufu," did not modify the content of any latent categories and thus by implication did not change the immediately antecedent distributions of authority and power. Of these sixty incidents, seven—1, 2, 24, 35, 39, 59, and 60—modified only the first and most general of these latent categories, the prevailing structures of status differentiation; twenty-eight incidents—items 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 29, 30, 36, 41 to 47, 49, 51, 56, and 58—modified the content of the first four categories together, whereas only one event, item 40, generated changes in the first three categories without affecting the fourth. Thus, in the normal case changes in the contents of the categories that underlie a monarchical regime will either be restricted to the first category or proceed serially to the fourth, the chiefship, which as the senior office is at once the most sensitive and critical index of the state of the regime. Item 40, which refers to the Kaura Salihu's conversion of official fines levied on his agents into *kudin sarauta* for their appointments to office on his staff, is doubly anomalous, for not only did this innovation discredit prevailing conceptions of office and their prerequisite qualifications, but it was initiated by the Kaura Salihu rather than the chief, whose position was thus not compromised by the Kaura's conduct.

Of those fifty-eight incidents that modified the contents of some of these latent categories, none generated changes that extended only to include the fifth category that regulated the rank organization of offices; four items, 22, 32, 37, and 52, extended to the sixth, which prescribed their role differentiation; and eighteen—5, 7, 13, 16, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, and 57—extended to all seven categories of the set. Thus, in the history of this community, incidents whose effects ceased with modification of the content of the chiefship were much more frequent than those that modified all seven categories of the latent structure and exactly four times as frequent as those that modified the structure of status differentiation only.

The number of latent categories whose contents were modified by a particular event provides no index of its significance, since the most fundamental categories are also the most general and accordingly occur at the start of the series. Moreover, as we have seen, of these early categories, items 2 and 3 can rarely be modified except by events that also generate changes in the content and status of the chiefship. Probably the two most decisive events in the

history of Daura before Lukudi's submission to Ibram were M. Ishi'aka's mobilization of the local Fulani and his defeat of the Hausa armies. Neither of these events directly modified the official structure of the Hausa government. They merely reversed the antecedent status differentiations of local Fulani and Hausa and are accordingly represented in the table by entries restricted to category *a*. Even the Sarkin Gwari's withdrawal from Daura city in 1805 did not formally signify any changes in the rank organization and role differentiation of the offices of the Hausa government that withdrew with him, though all of these offices lost substantial resources and scope by their withdrawal. In contrast, the relatively trivial transfer of princely titles to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage involved progressive revisions of the content of all seven categories of the Hausa regime. Thus the mere number of the categories whose contents are modified by a particular event rarely indicates its substantive significance for the continuity of those prevailing distributions of authority and power that delineate the analytic structure that furnishes the content of these seven categories. This is so partly because the fundamental category whose modifications probably have the widest and most varied political implications for the regime is first in the series; but it also reflects the fact that these seven categories are purely formal and aligned in an order of increasing specificity which endows the first and most general of the series with the greatest range of variable contents, while restricting the last to a single recurrent feature, namely, the promotional alignments of particular sets of offices. By virtue of its sheer generality, the category of status differentiation subsumes equally the conversion of Fulani from a subjugated corporate category into a militant and ultimately victorious corporate group and the transfer of honorific princely titles from the dynasty to the Sarkin Pawa's lineage, together with all incidents that modify the status attributes and relations of the chiefship or any other units within the system. As these latent categories are purely formal and aligned in order of decreasing generality by their relations of logical priority, the empirical significance of events that revise the contents of an identical or differing number of these categories must remain problematic. To assess the differing substantive significance of these events, we should therefore examine the second half of table 17, which attempts to specify the modifications generated by each in the articulations and substantive properties of the state, the government, and the chiefship. Following this, we may then attempt to explore the relations between these two sets of changes, the formal and substantive.

Changes in the Substance of Concrete Structures

Although the second half of table 17 is addressed to changes in the substantive properties of three concrete corporate structures, namely, the government, the state, and the chieftaincy, two of the seven variables whose modifications the table charts are specifically structural rather than substantive

features of all three units. These are the internal and the external articulations of the three structures. As indicated above, these three units form a series of progressively wider scope, since government includes the chiefship and the state, the government. In consequence, their internal and external relations should differ correspondingly. In the strictest sense, the internal articulations of chiefship consist in the network of relations within the chief's immediate official staff, while its relations with all other governmental units, with the population, and with foreign princes, collectivities, or states are all external. On this criterion none of the fifty-nine events listed in table 17 that modified the chieftaincy would alter its internal articulation, while they all modified its external ones. To correct this imbalance and to discriminate the differential effects of these events on the articulations of the chiefship more precisely, I have therefore consistently treated all intragovernmental or intraofficial relations of the chiefship as internal articulations *(a),* while treating its relations with various categories or divisions of the subject population and with external bodies as external articulations *(b).* Similarly, whereas relations between the subjects and the government are internal articulations of the state, I have treated these as external articulations of the government defined as a corporate group of offices having distinctive status, powers, scope, autonomy, resources, range, and capacity. By defining the internal articulations of the chieftaincy as its relations with other units in the government, I have assimilated the relations of both these units very closely for most of the events reported in the table; but by segregating government and chiefship from the subject population, I have treated some relations which are internal to the state as external to both of these units. Items 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 22, 23, 35, 39, 45, 46, and 49 of the table illustrate the implications of these conventions, while items 7, 19, 21, 46, 47, 54, and 55 illustrate divergences in the articulations of the chiefship and the government that arise from intrinsic differences in the constitution of these two units. It is necessary then to bear in mind the exact denotations and specifically structural character of these corporate articulations throughout the discussion that follows.

Part 2 of table 17 lists formulas that describe the changes initiated by the sixty events or processes in the substantive properties and articulations of the three concrete institutional structures isolated as referents. Thus, altogether this part of the table could include 180 different formulas. However, one event, item 38, "the depositions of Sule and Yusufu," generated no changes in any of these three referents, since the authority of the sultans of Zinder to depose the Zango chiefs had probably been accepted at Zango by this time. With this exception all other incidents listed in the table modified the articulations and/or substance of the chiefship and government; but seven of these events had no effect on the substance or structure of the state. As the most inclusive of these units, the state is also the least sensitive to events that generate changes in the articulations and/or substance of government and chiefship.

The 170 formulas that summarize the changes effected by these sixty events in the relations and properties of government, the state, and the chiefship begin with some changes in the internal or external articulations of each of these units. Of fifty-nine events that somehow modified the government and chiefship, 34 and 35, respectively, modified the external and internal articulations of each unit together. Likewise, of fifty-two events that changed the situation and substance of the state, thirty-four modified its external and internal articulations. Thus, most changes induced by these events in the three corporate units begin with shifts in the two sets of relations that together define the status and structure of these units. In a few instances—items 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 23, 37, 42, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, and 58—it is possible that the effects of these events on one or other of the three reference units were limited to changes in their articulations; but in no case was any of the five substantive properties of these concrete units changed without prior changes of their internal and/or external articulations, and in no case have these two sets of articulations changed simultaneously with reference to one another or to any of the substantive variables. As structural features, it thus seems, first, that *these sets of articulations always change serially and never simultaneously;* and, second, *that some changes in either or both sets of articulations are prerequisite for change in the substantive properties of the corporations concerned.* These findings support two hypotheses advanced in the discussion of political change at Zaria, namely, that "formal change is... always sequential"[13] and that "the form of a system limits the range of development of its content";[14] but these data neither confirm nor contradict the statement that "the order of such [formal] change is fixed and irreversible, being logically necessary."[15] Since the two sets of articulations under discussion are not ordered by relations of logical priority, changes in either set of articulations occur independently in 70 of the 170 formulas in part 2 of table 17; and in 12 of the 103 formulas that list changes in both sets of articulations, internal relations were modified before external ones. Nonetheless, the order in which these sets of relations change is neither fixed nor irreversible, since these sets of articulations are not aligned by relations of logical priority and dependence. Their relative freedom to change in various sequences or contexts independently of one another probably reflects their role as mediators between the formal and substantive levels of the concrete structures whose separate internal and external relations they represent.

Three sets of formulas, items 7, 45, and 46, indicate that changes in one set of articulations were followed by changes in some substantive features of the units concerned before the other set of articulations was altered. It is possible that these formulas, the most complex in the table, need correction; it is also possible that each of these formulas compresses two successive but separate moments in the sequential change of these units; but there is no a priori reason why the interval that separates sequential changes of the unit's internal and external articulations should always exclude changes in its substantive attributes. Even when these problematic formulas are included, how-

ever, all substantive changes in these corporations are preceded by some change or changes in their articulations.

Of the fifty-nine events that modified some features or properties of Daura government, chiefship, or state, sixteen modified all seven variables for all three units simultaneously, while another six modified the same set of variables for all of these units. Thus twenty-two of these fifty-nine events generated changes of identical scope in the three reference units, sixteen of these modifying all types of relations and properties in each unit, while the remaining six modified the same set of factors for each of these units.

Of these twenty-one events, fourteen generated changes of identical sequence as well as scope in all three corporations; of these fourteen events, eight generated changes summarized in the formula *ba c/d/e/f g*—namely, items 20, 33, 41, 43, 44, 48, 52, and 53—while another four, items 28, 29, 31, and 36, generated changes with the formula *ba c/f d g*. Seven events, items 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15, and 45, modified all seven features of the three corporations by different sequences; and another two events, items 12 and 24, also modified identical but limited sets of variables in all three corporations in differing order. In only twelve of the twenty-one events that generated changes of identical scope in all three corporations was the structure of the process of change formally the same for each unit, even though the degrees of change induced in either probably differed. Thus, while 35 percent of these events had effects of similar kind on the chiefship, government, and state, in only 20 percent of the incidents listed were these effects identical in their form as well as their scope, a finding which vividly demonstrates the significant substantive and formal differences of the three corporations whose differential reactions to these events are tabulated above.

Probably the most significant single feature of part 2 of table 17 is its vivid demonstration of the remarkable variability in the sequential form of substantive changes and, above all, its demonstration of the many variable combinations of simultaneous changes in the four primary dimensions of corporate substance—autonomy, resources, range, and scope—the capacity of a corporation being largely the product of these variables. Of the 170 formulas listed in part 2 of table 17, only 4 formulas that report changes in two or more of these five variables without reservation have a strictly serial order that excludes simultaneous change. Two of these formulas refer to item 40; and the others, to items 16 and 34. Another three incidents, 5, 58, and 59, generated changes whose sequences and extent, although uncertain, probably involved serial modifications of two or more substantive variables. Altogether, if queries and differences of components and sequence indicate variation, these 170 formulas illustrate sixty-six alternative patterns, only four of which—*a, b, ab,* and *ba*—exclude specifically substantive variables. Thus the remaining sixty-two patterns illustrate the extraordinary variability with which these five substantive variables, *c* to *g*, may be combined with the two structural variables, *a* and *b*, in instances of change. Accordingly, although these formulas provide abundant evidence that changes in the sub-

stantive features of corporate units do not *always* proceed by their simultaneous modification, they also show that in the overwhelming majority of events that generate such changes, at least two, often more, and sometimes all substantive variables affected do undergo simultaneous changes of value. Thus the formulas in part 2 of table 17 confirm one and qualify the other of two principal hypotheses advanced initially in the analysis of political change at Zaria and discussed extensively above, namely, that structural changes proceed *seriatim,* while substantive changes proceed as a rule by simultaneous and transitive relations of an explicitly functional kind. However, the numerous exceptions to this second generalization illustrated by the serial order of substantive changes in the formulas above must mean either that my techniques and criteria of discrimination and notation are presently too imprecise to specify the exact form of these processes or that my early conceptions of the transitivity and symmetrical relations of these specifically substantive variables are too gross to encompass and discriminate their many differing interconnections. Probably these discordant findings reflect both deficiencies together.

Conclusion

By relating the two halves of table 17, we can now explore the connections between the changes their formulas report in both the substantive features of the three concrete structures and in the content of the latent categories for those fifty-nine of the sixty incidents whose effects the formulas describe. As we have seen, relations between these two sets of modifications are variable and problematic; some events that modify the content of all seven latent categories may merely modify the internal articulations of the government and fail to modify the state, while significantly altering the substance of the chiefship. Conversely, some events that dramatically transform the articulations of all three concrete structures may not affect the content of the last six of these latent categories. Such differing responses of concrete structures and latent categories to identical events oblige us to reexamine and restate the distinctions between these two sets of concepts in order to explore their relations with the data before us.

As concrete structures, the chiefship, government, and state are easily distinguished and defined. Their differing scope, properties, and articulations have been amply described above. Our present difficulty resides in identifying precisely the unit to which the seven latent categories refer. In the context of their original formulation, they summarized the perduring formal features of the constitution of government in Zaria.[16] These seven categories were in fact devised to list "those features of the Habe constitution which persisted from 1804 to 1950, despite other changes"[17] at Zaria, thus providing a common frame of reference for the comparative and diachronic analysis of the development and form of the different regimes that succeeded one

another there. These seven categories together indicate the abstract constitutional forms shared by the successive regimes at Zaria; and the relations of logical priority that align them governed the order in which the empirical expression of these categories underwent change. This invariant order was distinguished as the structure of the process of change from its substantive contents, which involved the historical forms of government at Zaria and the conditions of their transformation. Thus, as the seven latent categories specify in logical order the persisting forms of the constitution, they refer directly or exclusively neither to the government nor to the state, although they do directly predicate the chiefship as the senior office. In consequence, these latent categories describe the conceptual foundations of the total society as a constitutional order rather than any of its specific institutional manifestations. Nonetheless, since the constitutions of successive regimes at Zaria reserved governmental functions for their officialdoms, six of the seven latent categories specify the axioms that underlie these official orders. In consequence, changes in the constitutions of these Zaria governments consisted of changes in the scope, composition, and articulation of their officialdoms. By differentiating their specifically political and specifically administrative components, the development of these structures could be traced to changes in the distributions of power and authority which provided the analytic structures of these regimes. Thus the substance or content of the seven latent categories which furnished the framework of government in Zaria consisted in the political and administrative subsystems of these successive regimes, conceived primarily as orders of offices. Constitutional changes that modified the contents of these categories were accordingly manifested by changes in the relations, positions, and scope of official structures, which themselves reflected shifting alignments of power and authority. Accordingly, developments in the political and administrative systems of government that modified the expression of constitutional forms simultaneously altered the current content or expression of some or all the latent categories.

For our present inquiry this exegesis has various implications. First, although the latent categories were primarily designed to facilitate the simultaneous analysis of three successive officialdoms at Zaria, and although six of their seven components refer exclusively to offices, since this set of categories identifies persistent constitutional forms, it refers equally, though less discriminately, to the state as the inclusive unit and to the government as an official hierarchy. One consequence of their inclusiveness is that while the categories distinguish various changes that modify the officialdom, they lump together all events that modify the status of these or any other types of unit, including the government and state, under the first and most general category, as "changes in the content of the system of status differentiation."[18] Moreover, since the order of logical priorities that aligns the categories regulates the order in which their contents may change and defines successive categories as progressively more specific in content, changes in the

promotional alignments of particular offices necessarily assume prior changes in all antecedent categories, whereas such fundamental changes in the order of status differentiation as the Fulani mobilization and subsequent victory need not immediately and of themselves generate changes in the political and administrative alignments of the defeated officialdom and consequently may not affect the prevailing contents of any category beyond the first.

To illustrate the implications of this discussion, we need only consult table 17, which shows that changes in the substantive properties and articulations of the government correlate as poorly with changes in the content of the latent categories as do changes in the substance of the chiefship and the state. For example, of fifteen events that modified all seven substantive features of these three concrete structures, we find that items 3, 6, 15, 17, 20, 41, 43, 44, and 45 modified the content of the first four latent categories, while two events, 33 and 52, modified the first six; and four others—13, 18, 48, and 53—modified the contents of all seven latent categories together. Thus we should not seek immediate transparent connections between those changes of analytic structure that modify the contents of the latent categories as constitutional forms and changes in the operational properties or substance of the government, the chiefship, and the state as concrete structures. Rather we should look for some factor that mediates between these two sets of concurrent changes.

Of eighteen events that modified the contents of all seven latent categories, two, items 55 and 56, altered only the articulations of the government and the state, while another, item 50, affected the internal and external articulations of the chiefship. Three events, items 23, 34, and 54, modified at most three of seven substantive features of the government and the state. Such examples illustrate the relative independence of changes in the content of the latent categories and in the substantive particulars of these corporate structures, thus confirming the distinctions made above between the analytic and concrete levels of the regime whose changes these various formulas report. However, the diverse reactions of these two dimensions to common events indicates their differences are relative but not absolute. All fifty-eight incidents that modified the content of the latent categories of the Hausa regime also modified the articulations and substance of the government and the chiefship. Of these fifty-eight incidents, fifty-one also modified the state in some way; and only seven events, items 8, 10, 11, 37, 50, 55, and 56, changed the articulations of these corporations without generating further changes in their substantive properties. Thus the external and internal relations that articulate these corporate structures as units and with one another mediate those changes in the distributions of authority and power that modify the substance of the formal categories of latent structure and precede all changes in the substantive properties of the three corporations that concretely express these latent constitutional forms. As structural features of these corporations, changes in their internal and/or external articulations always precede

changes in their autonomy, resources, range, capacity, or scope. It is evident that such changes in the internal and/or external articulations of these corporations directly express and promote redistributions of authority and power among and within them, thus modifying the preceding content of the latent categories and regulating the substantive properties of these concrete structures. For example, since the government formed an inclusive official hierarchy, the fines that Lukudi successively imposed on the Kauras Idi and Tamila and, after Tamila's defection to Kudukudu, on the Kaura lineage collectively illustrate progressive modifications in the internal relations of the chiefship, the Kaura's office and lineage, the senior state council, and several other governmental units; but these changes did not alter the scope, autonomy, resources, range, or capacity of the government as a unit, although by increasing the scope, autonomy, and capacity of the chiefship at the expense of the Kaura's office, his lineage, and the senior council, they altered the antecedent distributions of power and authority within it, and thus its constitutional expressions of the latent categories as well as the substantive properties of the corporations listed above.

In short, changes in the internal and external articulations of the government, chiefship, and the state mediate the shifting distributions of authority and power that simultaneously define and transform their constitution on the one hand and their autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities on the other. Thus changes in the structural articulations of these corporations mediate changes in the analytic structures that provide the labile content of the latent categories, of which they are complementary concrete manifestations. In consequence these changing articulations normally modify the substantive properties of all units affected by the redistributions of authority and power that find their expression in historic events. For this reason the capacities and properties of a state are sometimes unchanged by events that modify its internal or external articulations, even though the forms and conditions of the government and chiefship are thereby changed. Similarly, various developments that alter the autonomy, scope, or resources of chiefship may simply realign its relations with other governmental units without materially changing the substantive properties of the government or the state. However, any changes in the autonomy, scope, resources, range, and capacities of chiefship or other official units of a government presuppose and express corresponding changes in their respective authority and power; but while such changes in the articulations of these units manifestly express and promote the distributions of authority and power among them, being internal to the more inclusive corporation, they may proceed without modifying the substantial attributes or capacities of this wider unit in any way. Thus the articulations that regulate the substantive properties of corporations reflect the prevailing distribution of authority and power among and within them and mediate those changes in the constitution of the wider unit which manifest and transform the content of the latent categories on which these concrete and analytic structures are equally based.

Appendix A
List of the Queens and Kings of Daura

	Ruler	Length of reign (where given) Years	Months	Days
1.	Kufuru			
	Gino			
	Yakumo			
	Yakunya	at		
	Walzamu	Tsohon		
	Yanbamu	Birni		
	Gizirgizir			
8.	Innagari			
	Daura (Daura)	150	—	—
	Gamata (Hamata)			
	Shata			
	Batatume (Batatuma)			
	Sandamata (Saidamata)			
	Jamata			
	Hamata			
	Zama			
17.	Shawata			
1.	Abayajidda (Sarki)	150	—	—
	Bawo	90	3	7
	Gazaura	110	—	—
	Gakuma	71	—	2
	Jaaku (Jaku)	80	1	—
	Jaketake	50	—	10
	Yakama (Yakuma)	201	—	—
	Jaka	30	—	—
	Ada Hamta (Ada Hamata)	60	—	4
10.	Ada Jabu (Ada Jabau)	20	—	—
	Dagamu (Daguma)	8	5	—
	Ada Yaki	106	—	—
	Hamdogu (Hamdau)	210	4	1
	Yabau	—	—	10

	Ruler	Length of reign (where given) Years	Months	Days	
	Naji	7	—	—	
	Gani	33	—	—	
	Wake	15	—	—	
	Kamutu	40	—	—	
	Rigo	1	—	—	
20.	Gaga	50	—	—	
	Jabu (Jabau)	1	8	—	
	Zamnau	4	—	1	
	Shashimi (Shashima)	9	—	—	
	Ada Inda			½	
	Doguma (Daguma)	109	—	—	
	Ada Gamu (Ada Gumau)	30	—	—	
	Ada Sunguma		7	—	
	Shafau (Shakau)	5	—	—	
	Ada Sabau	8	—	—	
30.	Ada Doki	99	—	—	
	Nagama	6	—	—	
	Ada Kube	60	—	—	
	Hamama (Hammau)	6	—	—	
	Dagajirau (Dagajarau)	30	6	—	
	Kamu			3	
	Ada Guguwa	40	—	—	
	Hamida			10	
	Abdu Kawo	9	—	—	
	Nagama	6	—	—	
40.	Hamatari	Not known			
	Rifau (Rufa'i)	80			
	Hazo (Hazo Allah Sarki)	—	—	—	
	Dango	—	—	—	
	Bawan Allah	—	—	—	
	Kalifa	—	—	—	
	Tsofo	—	—	—	
	Jiro	—	—	—	
48.	Sarkin Gwari Abdu	—	—	—	
49.	Lukudi (brother of 48)	30	—	—	
50.	Nuhu (son of 48)	15	—	—	
	Mahamman (son of 48)	3	3	—	
	Haruna (son of 49)	6	6	—	
53.	Dan Aro (son of 48)	6	7	—	
	Sulemanu (son of 53)	2	—	—	
	Yusufu (son of 49)	5	—	—	(6 yrs)
	Tafida (son of 50)	20	8	—	
57.	Mallam Musa (son of 50)	7	—	—	(7 yrs., 5 mths.)
58.	Abdurrahman (son of 57)	Appointed in 1912.			

SOURCE: H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1928), 3:142-143.

Alternative spellings and reign lengths listed beside Palmer's text refer to two lists of Daura rulers which the Limamin Daura Malam Ishaka and Alhaji Ahmadu kindly dictated to me on separate occasions. Neither list included any of the first eight queens cited by Palmer.

In a version of the tale of Bayajidda and the serpent recorded by F. Edgar, Daura is said to be the ninth queen (Magajiya) of the town. Her predecessors are listed there in the following order: Kufunu, Gufunu, Yukunu, Yakunya, Waizam, Waiwaina, Gidirgidir, and Anagari. Daura, the ninth queen, married Bayajidda. See F. Edgar, *Litafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa* (Belfast: W. Erskine Mayne, 1913), 1:223. Another text dictated by the Limam of Daura M. Ishaka lists Daura's predecessors as her sisters, Bakwainiya, Gambo, Bakwainiya the Lesser, Kafe, and Goizamu.

Appendix B
Kudin Sarautu at Zango in the Late Nineteenth Century

Office	Appointed by	Kudin Sarauta
Sarkin Zango*	Sarkin Damagaram	2,000,000 cowries
Magajiya	Sarkin Zango	—
Iya	Sarkin Zango	—
Saraki	Sarkin Zango	—
Gabsai	Sarkin Zango	—
Maidaki	Magajiya	—
Yar Kuntu	Magajiya	—
Dan Gawa	Magajiya	—
Yerima	Sarkin Zango	—
Murka	Sarkin Zango	—
Bunturawa	Sarkin Zango	—
Magaji	Sarkin Zango	—
Maiwa	Sarkin Zango	—
Gara	Sarkin Zango	—
Limam	Sarkin Zango	—
Na'ibi	Sarkin Zango	—
Alkali	Sarkin Zango	—
Dan Sanwai	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Samba'a	Sarkin Zango	200,000
Magajin Malam	Sarkin Zango	100,000-150,000
Kaura	S/Zango S/Damagaram	1,000,000
S. Dawaki	S/Zango S/Damagaram	500,000
Madaba	S/Zango S/Damagaram	500,000
Dan Kwaba	S/Zango S/Damagaram	500,000
Sarka	S/Zango S/Damagaram	200,000-500,000
S. Diya	S/Zango S/Damagaram	500,000
Kusheyi	S/Zango S/Damagaram	100,000
Gilu	Kaura	500,000
Dan Takora	Kaura	200,000
S. Fada	Kaura	400,000
Galadima	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Dan Kumalo	Sarkin Zango	500,000

Office	Appointed by	Kudin Sarauta
Dan Bawo	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Matsai (Barde)	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Magayaki	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Yekuwa	Galadima	150,000-200,000
Binoni	Galadima	150,000-200,000
S. Fada	Galadima	200,000
Tarno	Sarkin Zango	?
S. Tafarki	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Ubandawakin S. Tafarki	Sarkin Zango	Nil
Dan Bajida	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Dan Barau	Sarkin Zango	500,000
S. Zagi	Sarkin Zango	?
Barde	Sarkin Zango	500,000
S. Fada	Sarkin Zango	?
S. Karma	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Magaji Dankakulema	Sarkin Zango	200,000
Barage	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Zango	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Lafiya	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Magaji Bayamadi	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Pawa	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Shanu	N/K	N/K
Samba'a	N/K	N/K
Korama	S. Pawa	200,000
Magajin Aska	Sarkin Zango	?
S. Marina	Sarkin Zango	400,000
S. Gini	Sarkin Zango	?
S. Makera	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Bulkacima	Sarkin Zango	N/K
Madugu	Sarkin Zango	N/K
S. Dillalai	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Dan Tomo	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Dakama	Sarkin Zango	100,000
Magajin Tambari	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Magajin Turu	Sarkin Zango	100,000
S. Busa	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Makada	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Sankira	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Bai**	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Bai Karama**	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
S. Ruwa**	Sarkin Zango	300,000
S. Fada (S. B.)**	S. Bai	100,000
S. Yara**	Sarkin Daura	1,000,000
Ubandawaki**	Sarkin Daura	500,000
Shentalin S. Y.**	Sarkin Yara	150,000-200,000
S. Fada S. Y.**	Sarkin Yara	150,000-200,000
Guyama**	Sarkin Zango	150,000-200,000
Fada Babba	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Hauni**	Sarkin Zango	200,000

Office	Appointed by	Kudin Sarauta
S. Dogarai**	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Turaki**	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Shentali**	Sarkin Zango	N/K
S. Fadan Shentali**	Shentali	100,000
S. Garka**	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Makama**	Sarkin Zango	400,000
Dan Maza**	Sarkin Zango	500,000
Ajiya**	Sarkin Zango	500,000
S. Jarmai**	Sarkin Zango	400,000
Lifidi**	Sarkin Zango	1,000,000
Shamaki**	Sarkin Zango	N/K
Jekafada**	Sarkin Zango	400,000

*First levied by Tanimu of Zinder in 1861 or 1864. See text.

**These offices first became liable to these *kudin sarauta* payments as related in the text. Since the status of some who held such "slave offices" as Sarkin Bai or Bai Karama remains obscure, we cannot be absolutely certain that the officials had not paid *kudin sarauta* before.

Appendix C
Installation of the Sarkin Daura, Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar, O.B.E., O.F.R., at Daura, January 3, 1969

(a) *Biography.*

Born 1925. Daura Elementary School 1936-1942. Katsina Middle School, 1942-1945. Kaduna College, 1945-1948. School for Arabic Studies, Kano, 1948-1950. Clerical Training College, Zaria, 1950-1951. Local Government courses in the U.K., 1954 and 1958-1959.

Scribe, Central Office, 1950-1951; Local Authority Chief Scribe, 1951-1953; District Head Sandamu, 1953-1954; District Head Baure, 1954-1957. Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry for Local Government, 1957-1959. Parliamentary Secretary of Animal Health and Forest Resources, 1959-1960. Minister for Local Government, Northern Region of Nigeria, 1960-1961. Awarded O.B.E. in 1960, O.F.R. in 1964. Minister for Economic Planning, Government of Northern Nigeria, 1961-1965.

Appointed Emir of Daura, 1966.

(b) *Programme for the Installation—Friday 3rd January 1969.*

0900 a.m.	All guests to be seated.
0905	H.E. Military Governor, North Central State leaves Daberam.
0910	V.I.P. guests to be seated.
0915	Emir of Daura arrives and proceeds to his pavilion.
0920	Provincial Secretary arrives.
0925	All visiting Military Governors arrive.
0930	H.E. the Military Governor, North Central State, arrives at the ground and inspects the guard of honour. All stand and give a loyal salute.
0935	H.E. the Military Governor of the North Central State mounts the dais.
0936	Traditional Installation.
0950	The Emir mounts the dais, accompanied by Kaura, greets the Military Governor, and takes his seat.
0952	The Chief Imam of Daura mounts the dais and administers the Oath of Allegiance.
0955	H.E. the Military Governor of the North Central State, assisted by Kaura, invests the Emir with an *alkyabba.*

0957	H.E. the Military Governor of the North Central State delivers his address to the Emir and presents (i) the Letter of Appointment, (ii) the Staff of Office, etc.
1010	The Emir makes his speech.
1020	The Chief Imam mounts the dais and says prayers.
1025	Councillors, led by the Senior Councillor, come to the front of the dais and pay traditional homage to the Emir.
1030	H.E. the Military Governor of the North Central State introduces Military Governors and other Senior Officials to the Emir.
1040 a.m.	Durbar begins (in the following order) 1. GALADIMA 2. MURKA 3. BUNTURAWA 4. MAGAJIN GARI 5. KAURA 6. EMIR
1110	Durbar ends.
1115	H.E. the Military Governor of North Central State departs.
1116	Visiting Military Governors depart.
1120	V.I.P. guests come to the dais and meet the Emir and leave.
1125	Provincial Secretary leaves.
1130 a.m.	The Emir leaves for the Palace on horseback.

SOURCE: From the official *Programme of the Installation of Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar as Emir of Daura, Friday 3rd January 1969,* pp. 6, 12-13.

Notes

PREFACE

1. M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960).
2. Hassan (Sarkin Ruwa, Abuja) and Shu'aibu (Mukaddamin Makaranta, Bida) *Makau, Sarkin Zazzau na Habe* and *Tarihi da Al'adun Habe na Abuja,* 2 vols. (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1952). Translated by Frank Heath as *A Chronicle of Abuja* (Ibadan: The University Press, 1952).
3. M. G. Smith, "Field Histories among the Hausa," *Journal of African History* 2, 1 (1961):87-101.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960).
2. Ibid., pp. vi-vii; M. G. Smith, "Field Histories among the Hausa," *Journal of African History* 2, 1 (1961): 87-101.
3. Hassan (Sarkin Ruwa, Abuja) and Shu'aibu (Mukaddamin Makaranta, Bida), *Makau, Sarkin Zazzau na Habe* and *Tarihi da Al'adun Habe na Abuja,* 2 vols. (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1952). Translated by Frank Heath as *A Chronicle of Abuja* (Ibadan: The University Press, 1952).
4. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* pp. 313-314.
5. Ibid., pp. 319-320.
6. Ibid., p. 321.
7. M. G. Smith, *Corporations and Society* (London: Duckworth, 1974) p. 104.
8. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); and see Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1974) pp. 14-17.
9. For further exposition of these concepts, see Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* pp. 15-33; and M. G. Smith, "Political Organization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968) 12: 193-202.
10. For fuller discussion of corporations, see M. G. Smith, "A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics" in *Varieties of Political Theory,* ed. David Easton (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 123-128; Smith, *Corporations and Society,* passim; and D. E. Brown, "Corporations and Social Classification," *Current Anthropology* 15, 1 (March 1974): 29-52.

11. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* p. 298.
12. Ibid., p. 300.
13. Ibid., p. 314.
14. Smith, *Corporations and Society,* pp. 165-204; and idem, "Two Lectures on Social Change" (MS, 1971).
15. H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1928), 3:132-134. For another version authenticated by the emir of Daura, Alhaji Abdurrahman, C.B.E., see Alhaji Abubakar Imam, *Hausa Bakwai: Kunne ya Girmi Kaka* (Zaria: Northern Region Literature Agency, 1954).
16. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* pp. 142-143.
17. Ibid., pp. 139-141.
18. M. Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3 (1960): 558-579.
19. E. J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani: Being a Paraphrase and in Some Parts a Translation of the Infaku'l Maisuri of Sultan Mohammed Bello* (Kano: n.p., 1922), pp. 77-79.
20. 'Abdallah Ibn Muhammad, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt,* trans. and ed. M. Hiskett (Ibadan: The University Press, 1963), pp. 86-87. The town referred to by 'Abdallah was Kagara Dauran, eight miles southwest of Zurmi in the territory of Zamfara, where the two brothers were then preaching Islam.
21. E. W. Bovill, ed., *Missions to the Niger* (Cambridge: The University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1964), 1:115-117, 121.
22. James Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed in the Years 1850-51* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1853), 2:190-191, 205, 221, 228, 231, 238-239, 252-253, 259, 269-271, 273-274.
23. Henry Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1890), 2:137-143.
24. J. F. Schön, *Maganar Hausa* (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1885), pp. 18-29.
25. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* pp. 132-163.
26. Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:425-481, 510-537.
27. Frank Edgar, *Litafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa* (Belfast: W. Erskine Mayne, 1913), 1: 222-226, 229-230, 274-277.
28. P. G. Harris, "Gazetteer of Sokoto Province," Sokoto Divisional Office, comp. 1938-1939.
29. William Wallace, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1906-1907,* Colonial Reports, no. 551 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1907); E. P. C. Girouard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1907-1908,* Colonial Reports, no. 594 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909).
30. W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1921), pp. 29-30.
31. Palmer, *Sudanese memoirs,* p. 141.
32. Smith, "Field Histories among the Hausa," pp. 87-101.

CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIETY AND ITS CONTEXT

1. A. T. Grove, *Land and Population in Katsina Province* (Kaduna: The Government Printer, n.d. [1953?]), p. 29.
2. H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1928), 3:144-145.
3. Grove, *Land and Population in Katsina Province,* p. 23.
4. Department of Statistics, *North Nigerian Census, July 1952,* Bulletin no. 3 (Lagos: Federal Government Statistician), Table B, p. 10.
5. W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1921), p. 7.
6. D. J. Sheridan, "Daura Emirate, 1927," Katsina Provincial Office, File HIS/5.

7. For an account of Maguzawa in Kano, see Joseph Greenberg, *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion,* American Ethnological Society, Memoir no. 15 (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1946).

8. Sheridan, "Daura Emirate, 1927"; and *North Nigerian Census, July 1952,* Bulletin no. 3, Table B, p. 10.

9. D. J. Stenning, *Savannah Nomads: A Study of the Wodaabe Pastoral Fulani of Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

10. M. Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3 (1960).

11. Sheridan, "Daura Emirate, 1927."

12. Grove, *Land and Population in Katsina Province,* p. 20.

13. For further discussion, see M. G. Smith, "The Hausa System of Social Status," *Africa* 29 (1959): 239-252; idem, "Kebbi and Hausa Stratification," *British Journal of Sociology* 12 (1961): 52-64; idem, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960), pp. 250-259; and E. R. Yeld, "Islam and Social Stratification in Northern Nigeria," *British Journal of Sociology* 11 (1960): 112-128.

14. Max Rheinstein, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 105-106; on clientage in Zaria, see Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* pp. 243-246, 259-261.

15. For fuller accounts of women's bond-friendships, clientage, and kin relationships, see Mary F. Smith, *Baba of Karo: A Woman of the Moslem Hausa* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), pp. 32-33, 191-206.

16. F. H. Ruxton, *Maliki Law* (London: Luzac & Co., 1916), p. 100.

17. Ibid., pp. 100-101, 155-156.

18. On Hausa kinship in Zaria, see Mary F. Smith, *Baba of Karo;* M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria Province* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955); M. G. Smith, "Hausa Inheritance and Succession," in *Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria,* ed. J. Duncan M. Derrett (London: Oxford University Press for the Nigerian Institute of Social & Economic Research, 1965), pp. 230-281; Ibrahim Madauci, Yahaya Isa, and Bello Daura, *Hausa Customs* (Zaria: North Nigerian Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 25-28.

CHAPTER 3: DAURA BEFORE THE JIHAD

1. H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1928), 3:132-134.

2. Alhaji Abubakar Imam, *Hausa Bakwai: Kunne ya Girmi Kaka* (Zaria: Northern Region Literature Agency, 1954). For other versions see also *Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d.; reprint ed., Zaria: The Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, Ltd., 1970), 1:1-15; and Frank Edgar, *Litafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa* (Belfast: W. Erskine Mayne, 1913), 1:222-225, 229-230; for a recent discussion, see W. K. R. Hallam, "The Bayajida Legend in Hausa Folklore," *Journal of African History* 7 (1966): 42-60.

3. According to a letter written in 1945 by the Emir Alhaji Abdurrahman, C.B.E., to the Divisional Officer, Katsina. See Katsina Provincial Office, File 8, Daura 31.

4. See Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 143.

5. Ibid., pp. 146-154; and idem, *The Bornu, Sahara, and Sudan* (London: John Murray, 1936), pp. 16, 94, 226-228.

6. H. A. R. Gibb, trans. and ed., *Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1356* (London: Routledge and Sons, 1929), pp. 336, 382; Leo Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa,* trans. by John Pory, 1600, 3 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1896); see book 7. Palmer's argument that these events are postdated in the Masbarma text by some 500 years lacks external corroboration.

7. M. G. Smith, "The Beginnings of Hausa Society, 1000-1500 A.D.," in *The Historian in Tropical Africa,* ed. J. Vasina, R. Mauny, and L. V. Thomas (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1964), pp. 339-357.

8. P. G. Harris, "Gazetteer of Sokoto Province," Sokoto Divisional Office, comp. 1938-1939; see pp. 20-21. See also E. W. Bovill, ed., *Missions to the Niger* (Cambridge: The Uni-

versity Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1964), 1:115-117 and 121 for Frederick Hornemann's preliminary notes on Hausaland derived from conversations with a Marabout at Murzuk in 1798-1799.

9. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* pp. 142-143.

10. H. R. Palmer, "The Kano Chronicle," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 38 (1908): 75; Translation Bureau, Zaria, *Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu* (Lagos: C. M. S. Bookshop, 1933), 2:35.

11. Henry Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1890), 2:126.

12. E. J. Arnett, *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1920), p. 12.

13. Y. Urvoy, *Histoire de l'Empire du Bornou,* Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, no. 7 (Paris: Libraire Larose, 1949), pp. 89-92. But see Hornemann's report in Bovill, ed., *Missions to the Niger,* pp. 115-117, 121.

14. Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:442, fn. 1.

15. Ibid., p. 461, fn. 1.

16. J. F. Schön, *Maganar Hausa* (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1885), pp. 18-30.

17. For fuller discussions of this distinction, see M. G. Smith, "A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics," in *Varieties of Political Theory,* ed. David Easton (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), and various papers in M. G. Smith, *Corporations and Society* (London: Duckworth, 1974).

18. For further discussion, see M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 6 (January 1964): 164-194.

19. See Hassan (Sarkin Ruwa, Abuja) and Shu'aibu (Mukaddamin Makaranta, Bida) *Tarihi da Al'adun Habe na Abuja,* 2 vols. (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1952), p. 19; and M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960), pp. 36-72, 333-343.

20. Ibid.

21. See T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

22. For further accounts of Hausa weaponry and military organization current in the Sokoto caliphate during the nineteenth century, see D. J. M. Muffett, "Nigeria—Sokoto Caliphate," in *West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation,* ed. Michael Crowder (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1971), pp. 276-280; and Joseph P. Smalldone, "Historical and Sociological Aspects of Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1971), especially chaps. 2-4.

23. On benefices, fiefs, and prebends, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* trans. A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: William Hodge & Co., 1947), pp. 322-323, 343-354.

24. Palmer, "The Kano Chronicle," p. 90.

25. See M. Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3 (1960): 567-569. For Hiskett's comments, see pp. 573-577.

26. Weber, *Social and Economic Organization,* p. 322.

27. Kenneth Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951), p. 29.

28. See Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq," p. 568.

CHAPTER 4: DEFEAT AND FRAGMENTATION

1. On the Shehu's early movements and preaching, see E. J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani: Being a Paraphrase and in Some Parts a Translation of the Infaku'l Maisuri of Sultan Mohammed Bello* (Kano: n.p., 1922), pp. 20-46; 'Abdallah Ibn Muhammad, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt,* trans. and ed. M. Hiskett (Ibadan: The University Press, 1963), pp. 84-105; Wazirin Sakkwato, Alhaji Junaidu, *Tarihin Fulani* (Zaria: Northern Region Literature Agency, 1957),

pp. 8-13; F. H. El-Masri, "The Life of Shehu Usuman dan Fodio before the Jihād," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2, 4 (December 1963): 435-448.

2. Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* pp. 46-48; 'Abdallah Ibn Muhammad, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt,* pp. 86-88, 98, 104-105; Wazirin Sakkwato, Alhaji Junaidu, *Tarihin Fulani,* pp. 10-13.

3. M. Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3 (1960): 558-579; M. G. Smith and Alhaji Muntaka Kumasi, "An Account of the Obligations of Withdrawal: Being a Translation of the *Bayan wujūb al-hijra 'alā 'l-ibād* of Shehu Usumanu dan Fodio," (MS, 1959).

4. Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* p. 48; Wazirin Sakkwato, Alhaji Junaidu, *Tarihin Fulani,* pp. 14-15.

5. Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* pp. 48-58, 105. For a summary account and discussion of these events and their context, see M. G. Smith, "The Jihād of Shehu dan Fodio: Some Problems," in *Islam in Tropical Africa,* ed. I. M. Lewis (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1966), pp. 408-424; and Marilyn R. Waldman, "The Fulani Jihād: A Reassessment," *Journal of African History* 6, 3 (1965): 333-355.

6. Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* p. 77.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 79. Since Bello completed this book in A.H. 1227 (A.D. 1812), his remark that the Sarkin Daura Abdu had fled to Bornu and remained there "to this day" contradicts the view of W. F. Gowers and of S. J. Hogben and Kirk-Greene that Abdu died in 1809. See W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1921), p. 29; S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 155. Indeed so do these authors themselves, since they note that later, "on reaching the village of Duku-duku, Abdu learned of the death of Mallam Ishi'aku," the Fulani conqueror of Daura (ibid., p. 151). Since M. Ishi'aku is said to have reigned for twenty-four to twenty-five years at Daura, this story suggests that Abdu was alive in 1829-1830.

9. Alhaji Abubakar Imam, *Hausa Bakwai: Kunne ya Girmi Kaka* (Zaria: Northern Region Literature Agency, 1954), pp. 11-13.

10. E. J. Arnett, *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1920), p. 25; and idem, "History of Sokoto," in *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* p. 22. See also Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* pp. 151, 155.

11. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 29; but see H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1928), 3:143.

12. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 29. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* gives no clue as to the date of Abdu's accession in his list of Daura chiefs.

13. Tsirkau was then the capital of Abdu's vassal, the Tintima who administered Kance. It was probably destroyed not long after Abdu's visit. See Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:461 (hereafter referred to as *Mission Tilho*). British accounts give Dankama in northeastern Katsina as the site of Magaji Halidu's death; see Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 82, and Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* p. 169.

14. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

15. Ibid.; P. A. Benton, *The Sultanate of Bornu: Translated from the German of Dr. A. Schultze with Additions and Appendices* (1913; reprt ed., London: Frank Cass & Co., 1968), pp. 19-20, 251-253. For the dates cited above for the fall and recapture of Gasrgamo, see H. R. Palmer, *Gazetteer of Bornu Province* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1929), pp. 18-19.

16. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

17. Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* pp. 99-100. For Bello's correspondence with Shehu Aminu El Kanemi, see ibid., pp. 102-120.

18. Ibid., p. 100.

19. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

20. Ibid.; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* p. 151.

21. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano province,* p. 29; S. J. Hogben, *The Muhammadan Emirates*

of Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 80. See also Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* pp. 151, 155, and n. 8 above.

22. *Mission Tilho,* pp. 440-441. For further information, see the unpublished work of Roberta Ann Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanese Kingdom" (Ph.D. diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 17-24.

23. See Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* pp. 142-143, for the king list and pp. 139-140 for the chronicle of these events. For some indication of the problems that arise when the chronology adopted from Gowers by Hogben and Kirk-Greene is related to developments at Zinder, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 22, 44, and fnn. 20, p. 37, and 1, p. 60. Mamman Bello's observation that in 1812 the defeated Sarkin Daura Abdu was still in "Bornu" (see Arnett, *Rise of the Sokoto Fulani,* p. 79) indicates that the account of Abdu's death, 1809, related to the British by Fulani at Daura early in this century was little more than a confession of their ignorance and indifference concerning his fate (see Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 29). On the other hand, despite careful inquiries among the descendants of Abdu at Daura in 1958-1959, I never heard the story related by Hogben and Kirk-Greene (*The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* p. 151) that Abdu outlived Malam Ishi'aku or learned of the conqueror's death at Dukuduku while marching to attack Daura town. My tentative date for Abdu's death agrees closely with that proposed by Y. Urvoy, *Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central (Colonie du Niger)* (Paris: Libraire Larose, 1936), p. 309.

24. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

25. Henry Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1890), 2:137-138, 140, 503-505. For other chronologies and accounts, see *Mission Tilho,* pp. 442-443, and Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 32-35 and fnn. 61-68, pp. 40-41.

26. James Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed in the Years 1850-51* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1853), 2:221.

27. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

28. The preceding account should be compared with the bald summary of these events given in the Chronicle, which mentions neither Dan Shufini's death at Kaura Idi's hands nor the fine that Lukudi levied on Idi for this incident. According to the Chronicle, "Sarki Abdu (Sarkin Gwari) died at Yekuwa and Lukudi his brother reigned in his stead.

"When Lukudi became king he collected all his forces and destroyed Magariya. For Kitari his cousin had left Lukudi and had settled at Magariya so that he too might be a king. And another cousin Dan Shafunni also left Lukudi and settled at Dan Mairam so that he also might become a king. So Lukudi collected all his forces and destroyed the town and killed Dan Shafunni. For Lukudi said, 'We wish to collect in one place and be strong so that one day we may regain the home of our fathers, and you are causing dissension among us.'

"Then Lukudi left Yekuwa and went to Yardaje." See also Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

29. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 25.

30. These events also find no place in the Daura Chronicle. See Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* pp. 139-140.

31. This follows the account of Landeroin. See *Mission Tilho,* pp. 434-435; but see also ibid., pp. 440-441. For another version, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 19-20.

32. Ronald Cohen, "Incorporation in Bornu," in *From Tribe to Nation in Africa,* ed. Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970), p. 156.

33. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa,* pp. 238-239; but for the sultan's share of war booty at Zinder, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 170-171.

34. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa,* pp. 238-239.

35. For these developments in Bornu, see Benton, *The Sultanate of Bornu,* pp. 265-267. Benton adds that two years after suppressing the Magumi dynasty, Umar marched against Zinder "whose Sultan, Ibrahim, had disregarded his orders. Ibrahim took to flight" and was replaced by his brother Tanimu (ibid., pp. 267-268). For another version of this affair, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 23-24.

36. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid. For developments at Zinder dated by Landeroin in 1841-1843, see *Mission Tilho,* pp. 441-443.

40. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

41. Ibid.

42. For Landeroin's account and dating, see *Mission Tilho,* pp. 441-443; for other accounts, see Benton, *The Sultanate of Bornu,* pp. 267-268, which yields dates of 1848-1849, instead of 1841-1843, as Landeroin reckons. Dunbar prefers the years 1846-1847 for Tamimu's first reign; see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 23-25.

43. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140. See also *Mission Tilho,* pp. 443-463; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 32-34.

44. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140; *Mission Tilho,* pp. 443, 463.

45. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

46. Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 32-34, 43. Landeroin, *Mission Tilho,* p. 443, prefers the years 1850-1857; but on this date Barth's contemporary observations are decisive; see *Travels and Discoveries,* pp. 137-138.

47. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

48. Ibid., p. 141.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. *Mission Tilho,* pp. 454-455.

53. Ibid., p. 453.

54. Ibid., p. 441; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 20.

55. Ibid., p. 442. However, following Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa,* pp. 200-202, Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," reckons the siege lasted three months; see p. 25.

56. *Mission Tilho,* p. 444.

57. Ibid., p. 446. Nonetheless Dunbar observes that despite this interest in ordinance, muskets or rifles were never manufactured at Zinder, and the cannons were rarely used in battle. See Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1806-1912," pp. 171-175 and fnn. 54, 55, 58, 59, and 63, pp. 181-182.

58. *Mission Tilho,* p. 444, fn. 2.

59. Ibid., p. 444.

60. Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 52-54, relates how Tanimu constructed the wall in between forty days and five months, despite initial prohibition by his suzerain, the Shehu Umar of Bornu. Her thesis also illuminates relations between economic and political development of Zinder during the reigns of Ibram and Tanimu. See especially chaps. 6-9 and Appendix IX.

61. *Mission Tilho,* pp. 443-446; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 45-51, 54.

62. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 23; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* p. 489.

63. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 141. Unfortunately, after relating Nuhu's death, both versions of the Chronicle, the Limam's and Palmer's, merely record the succession of Zango chiefs as follows: "And Mahomman Sha was deposed by Damagaram and Haruna succeeded him, and he was followed by Dan Aro and Sule and Yusufu, all of whom were deposed in turn by Damagaram. Then Tafida was appointed Sarkin Zango, as compensation for the murder of his father, and he controlled some thirty-three towns until the arrival of the British" (ibid., p. 141). Thus, beyond this point we are almost entirely dependent on oral traditions up to and, for important issues, well beyond the arrival of the British and French. My sources and field procedures having been reported above, I shall not attempt to list the individuals who supplied particular items of information in footnotes. Nor, given my general reliance on group interviews, could I presently identify with any confidence those sources individually, even from my notes. We must therefore forego the ceremonial trappings of scholarship and follow the excellent example of Herodotus.

64. The only exceptions to such allocations that I have yet come across in Hausa-Fulani emirates are at Baure and at Kaura Namoda in the Sokoto State during a brief visit in August

1972. On Baure see p. 237. On Kaura see my unpublished report, "Development and Organization of the Fulani Chiefdom of Kaura Namoda, 1809-1903," Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, 1972.

65. *Mission Tilho,* pp. 453-455; for a more likely and unpleasant version, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 57-59 and fnn. 60-62, p. 64.

66. *Mission Tilho,* pp. 449-452, does not mention this rebellion, the oral account of which from Daura is confirmed by Dunbar's recent research at Zinder; see "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 72.

67. *Mission Tilho,* p. 449, fn. 1; but see also Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 72, where she relates that Roumji (Rinji) was the birthplace of Ahmadu's mother, and hence this final retreat. For her account of Ahmadu's end, see ibid., pp. 85-87; for a semiofficial version, see Ct. Chailley, *Les Grandes Missions Françaises en Afrique Occidentale* (Dakar: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1953), pp. 78-79.

68. This report was neither confirmed nor controverted by written accounts or oral traditions collected at Kano, probably because Kano was then preoccupied with the possibilities of invasion by Rabeh from the east or by the British from their base at Jebba on the Niger. However, Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 107, mentions a "massive invasion by Damagaram forces in 1903," under Ahmadu Dan Bassa, who succeeded Ahmadu Majerinji, to withstand which "a large trench had been constructed some ten miles north of the town." It thus seems possible that Zango was attacked by Kano and Zinder in rapid succession following the disruption of traditional political alignments that followed initial demarcation of the Anglo-French border; see chap. 4, "Zango, Zinder, and Kano."

69. For confirmation and some details, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 98-107.

70. J. N. D. Anderson, *The Maliki Law of Homicide* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1959), pp. 3-7.

71. This may have been the raid initiated by Ahmadu Dan Bassa after Majerinji's death as reported by Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 101.

72. See ibid., p. 107.

73. Sir Alan Burns, *History of Nigeria* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 156-158.

74. Chailley, *Les Grandes Missions,* pp. 78-79; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 85-88, 276; *Mission Tilho,* p. 452.

75. F. D. Lugard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1900-1901,* Colonial Reports, no. 346 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), p. 25.

76. For fuller accounts see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 104-110; and J. C. Anene, *The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960* (London: Longman, 1970).

77. Burns, *History of Nigeria,* p. 151.

78. Lugard, *Northern Nigeria, 1900-1901,* p. 25.

79. Ibid.; see also Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 104-107.

80. Lugard, *Northern Nigeria, 1900-1901;* see map opposite p. 27; for further information on the successive boundary delimitations and negotiations, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 104-110 and Lugard's annual reports on Northern Nigeria to the Colonial Office in London for the years 1900-1906; also Anene, *International Boundaries of Nigeria.*

81. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 141.

CHAPTER 5: BAURE IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1. For allusive indications of Zinder's hostility to Gumel throughout the last century, see Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:442-451; Roberta Ann Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanese Kingdom" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 25, 75-77, 101, 152; W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1921), pp. 25-26; S. T. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 355, 357.

2. For my tentative dating of these events, see chap. 4.

3. For local accounts of Zinder's tribute from its vassals, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 127-128. However, her list of these vassals, ibid., p. 152, fn. 13, omits Baure.

4. For the form and rates of taxation levied in the territory of Zinder during the closing decades of the last century, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 156-162.

CHAPTER 6: FULANI DAURA

1. See J. E. King, "History of Hausaland (Daura), with Comments by J. D. Craig," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/42, n.d.
2. M. G. Smith, "Development and Organization of the Fulani Chiefdom of Kaura Namoda, 1809-1903," Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, 1972.
3. Shehu Usman dan Fodio, *Bayan wujūb al-hijra 'ala'l-ibād,* trans. M. G. Smith and Alhaji Muntaka Kumasi as "An Account of the Obligations of Withdrawal" (MS, 1959).
4. M. Hiskett, "Kitāb al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3 (1960): 558-579.
5. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958), p. 53.
6. Hugh Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa from the Bight of Benin to Soccatoo* (London: John Murray, 1829), p. 215.
7. M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 6, 2 (January 1964): 164-194.
8. E. J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani: Being a Paraphrase and in Some Parts a Translation of the Infaku'l Maisuri of Sultan Mohammed Bello* (Kano: n.p., 1922), pp. 95-97, 120-121; see also idem, "History of Sokoto," in the same volume, pp. 26-28.
9. Personal communication from the late Malam Abubakar Mai-Katuru at Sokoto, July 1959. As the son and assistant of the Galadiman Sokoto Shehu, who held office at the turn of this century, Malam Abubakar, who was about eight-five years old in 1959, was well qualified by experience to estimate the volume of Daura's tribute to Sokoto.
10. Henry Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1890), 2:140.
11. Concerning Fulani movements at this time from Daura into the territory of Zango, see chap. 4. For the subsequent Fulani immigration into Zinder, see Roberta Ann Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanese Kingdom" (Ph.D. diss. in History, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 51-52.
12. Similar arrangements prevailed in the Alibawa chiefdom of Kiyawa (Kaura Namoda), which formed part of the Sokoto state. See Smith, "The Fulani Chiefdom of Kaura Namoda," pp. 49-50.
13. See King, "History of Hausaland."
14. For a reference to these incidents, see S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 409-410. For Lugard's account, see F. D. Lugard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1902,* Colonial Reports, no. 409 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1903), pp. 95-98, especially the long fn. on pp. 97-98.
15. For Zinder reports of Tanimu's amicable relations with Mamman Bello and Fulani Daura, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 33 and fn. 65, pp. 40-41.
16. Ministère des Colonies, *Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1911), 2:447; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 57; and above, chap. 4.
17. For a brief account of Ahmadu Dan Bassa's raid on Fulani Daura in 1903, see Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," p. 101. There is no record of an attack on Daura by Ahmadu Majerinji, 1893-1899.
18. For a suggestive account of the circumstances of Abdurrahman's accession as caliph, see Smith, "The Fulani Chiefdom of Kaura Namoda," pp. 31-34.

CHAPTER 7: RESTORATION AND REUNION

1. F. D. Lugard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1904,* Colonial Reports, no. 476 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 214, para. 8.

2. F. D. Lugard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1900-1901,* Colonial Reports, no. 346 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), p. 15.

3. For the only official account of Baure's end I have yet found in print, see W. F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1921), p. 29, were we are simply told: "The Anglo-French boundary cut up the territory (of Daura) considerably. Most of the Baure villages went to the French and the 'Sarikin Baure' went after them." This elegant and laconic misrepresentation of Baure's end nicely illustrates some pitfalls that await students who base their histories of African societies solely on published or unpublished documents from official sources, colonial or native.

4. See H. J. Miller-Sterling, "Assessment Reports of Yerima and Galadima Districts, Daura, 1911," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/3; also idem, "Assessment Report of Yanduna District, Daura," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/3.

5. E. P. C. Girouard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1907-1908,* Colonial Reports, no. 594 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909), pp. 611-612.

6. Ibid., p. 613.

7. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 29, implicitly dates Musa's transfer to Daura in or after 1907, when he says Mai Gurdo (Maigerda) died. However, an anonymous "History of Daura Districts from 1906" in the Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/42, lists thirteen districts with their headmen by name and title extant in 1906, which suggests that Palmer had discussed these changes with Musa at Bici. J. E. King's "History of Hausaland (Daura), with Comments by J. D. Craig," in File HIS/42 at Katsina gives a clear account and date for Musa's installation. "When the British arrived on the scene he (Musa) was residing at Zango, and in 1906 there was a conference at Dutsi. Those attending included the Emir of Katsina, the Emir of Kazaure, the Fulani Emir of Daura and the Kado Emir of Daura, Malam Musa, and Mr. Palmer. The Emirs of Katsina and Kazaure were confirmed in their appointment, and Malam Musa was installed as the rightful Emir of Daura in place of the Fulani Emir, Magajiya Murnai, who went to Sandamu as District Head with the title of Sarkin Fulani."

8. On the abolition of the sultanate at Zinder, see Roberta Ann Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanese Kingdom" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 111-116; on developments at Katsina, see Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province,* p. 19; S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 174-175; and Muhammadu Bello Kagara, *Sarkin Katsina, Alhaji Muhammadu Dikko, C.B.E., 1865-1944* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1951), especially Palmer's preface and pp. 18-20; for an account of the Satiru uprising, see F. D. Lugard, *Annual Report—Northern Nigeria, 1905-1906,* Colonial Reports, no. 516 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1907), pp. 364-472. Dunbar discusses the implications of this incident for Zinder in the pages cited above.

9. Girouard, *Northern Nigeria, 1907-1908,* p. 613; Dunbar, "Damagaram, 1812-1906," pp. 104-110.

10. Ibid., pp. 615-616.

11. King, "History of Hausaland," says: "When Malam Musa was at Zango, the French tried to persuade him to become Emir of the former Daura territory which had then been annexed by the French. He preferred however to remain under British rule as Daura town was in British territory. The French then asked for his eldest son, Abdurrahmani, in his stead, but this was also refused." King's text suggests that this second request was made after Musa's installation at Daura.

12. Girouard, *Northern Nigeria, 1907-1908,* p. 605.

13. On Maroka, see M. G. Smith, "The Social Functions and Meaning of Hausa Praise-singing," *Africa,* vol. 27 (January 1957).

14. Miller-Sterling, "Yerima and Galadima Districts"; idem, "Yanduna and Sandamu Districts"; Liddard, "Assessment Report, Zango District, Daura," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/3.

15. In 1958 it was widely believed that the Emir Abdurrahman had decreed there should be no more Kauras at Daura, and the destruction of the Kaura's state compound and the introduction of the Madawaki title from Kano, as an alternative to Kaura, lent some support for this belief. However, following the Madawaki Bukari's death, the title of Kaura was reinstated by a new appointment before the formal installation of Abdurrahman's grandson and successor, Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar, as emir on January 3, 1969.

This illustrates nicely how unwise it is to assume that an office has finally lapsed merely because it has remained vacant for several years under one or two rulers. The structural grounds for such unexpected reactivations are substantial and various but cannot be discussed here.

16. H. J. Miller-Sterling, "Assessment Report on Sandamu District, Daura, 1911," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/3.

17. D. J. Sheridan, "Daura," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/1, 1923.

18. D. J. Sheridan, "Daura Emirate, 1927," Katsina Divisional Office, File HIS/5.

19. Nigerian Government, *Annual Report on the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 1931* (Kaduna: The Government Printer, 1931), pp. 24, 57.

20. Nigerian Government, *Annual Report on the Northern Provinces, 1934* (Kaduna: The Government Printer, 1934), p. 34; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria,* pp. 175, 178.

21. Nigeria, Northern Provinces, *Native Administration Estimates, 1953-54; Katsina Province* (Kaduna: The Government Printer, 1954), pp. 2-4.

22. Government of Nigeria, *Ordinance to Prescribe the Powers and Duties of Native Authorities,* no. 40, 1933 (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1933).

23. For further accounts of these political parties and their orientations, see C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 3, 1 (1965): 1-19; Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); K. W. J. Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 38-43, 71-77.

24. For a brief general account of the administrative position of technical officers in the district organization, see M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960), pp. 264-265.

CHAPTER 8: Analysis

1. M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960), pp. 313-314, 319-321.

2. Ibid., p. 298.

3. See the discussion of corporations in chap. 1, "Corporations."

4. See Lloyd Faller's review of *Government in Zazzau* in *American Anthropologist* 65, 2, (1963): 168-170.

5. For the Shehu's aims and objectives, see M. Hiskett, "Kitab al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to Othmān dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23, part 3, (1960): 558-579, and the Shehu's treatise, *Bayan wujub al-hijra 'alā 'l-ibād.*

6. H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating to the Central and Western Sudan* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1928), 3:142.

7. On the differences between a patrimonial regime and sultanism, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* trans. A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: William Hodge & Co., 1947), p. 318.

8. Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., *Essays in Sociology: From Max Weber* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.

9. See Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* p. 143.

10. For Weber's proposals on this topic, see ibid., pp. 119-121 and 297-300.

11. Emile Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals,* trans. Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 43.

12. See chap. 1, "Political Systems."

13. Ibid.

14. See M. G. Smith, "Political Organization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), 12: 197-198.

15. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber,* pp. 77-78; see also Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* pp. 141-142.

16. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

17. Lacking this status, Charles de Gaulle's assumption of political leadership of France after its defeat in 1940 divided the nation and failed to win support from the governors of French colonies in Africa and elsewhere. Nonetheless, de Gaulle's claim that his Free French Government was the authentic representative of the French people compromised the legitimacy of the Vichy regime.

18. On the administration of the estates of officials at Baure, see chap. 5. Whether local custom implied a general rejection of the chief's right to some portions of these official estates, we cannot say on the data available.

19. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* p. 297.

20. Ibid., pp. 298-301.

21. Ibid., pp. 298-299.

22. Ibid., p. 300.

23. For example, compare the conceptions of substance in ibid., pp. 297-299, with those on pp. 308-309 and that implicit in pp. 317-319.

24. Ibid., p. 308.

25. Ibid., p. 309.

26. I am indebted for the present clarification of these conceptions of analytic and latent structures and their relations to the writings of Marion T. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), and Claude Lévi-Strauss, especially his fundamental essay on "Social Structure," first published in *Anthropology Today,* ed. A. L. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 524-553. Nonetheless, readers familiar with the work of these scholars will readily appreciate how my notion of analytic structure differs from that of Marion Levy and my idea of latent structure from that of Lévi-Strauss and his followers.

27. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* p. 308.

28. Ibid., p. 309.

29. Ibid., p. 308.

30. Ibid., p. 297.

31. P. A. Benton, *The Sultanate of Bornu: Translated from the German of Dr. A. Schultze with Additions and Appendices* (1913; reprint ed., London: Frank Cass & Co., 1968), pp. 252-253; H. R. Palmer, *Gazetteer of Bornu Province* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1929), pp. 18-19.

32. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 139.

33. Ibid.

34. Benton, *The Sultanate of Bornu,* pp. 265-268; Palmer, *Gazetteer of Bornu Province,* p. 21.

35. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 140.

36. James Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed in the Years 1850-51* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1853), 2:221.

37. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* p. 321.

38. Ibid., pp. 313-314.

39. Ibid., p. 320.

40. Ibid., p. 321.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 319.

43. Ibid., p. 321.

44. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs,* p. 141. It is worth mention that in 1851 Richardson learned at Zinder that Lukudi still ruled some six hundred villages formerly part of the old Hausa state of Daura. See Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa,* p. 221. Presumably these were the great majority of the settlements transferred to Tafida in 1903-1904.

45. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* p. 321.

CHAPTER 9: CORPORATIONS AND CHANGE

1. See chap. 1, last three sections. For more extensive discussion and illustration of these concepts, see M. G. Smith, *Corporations and Society* (London: Duckworth, 1974).

2. M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1960), p. 298.
3. Ibid., p. 298.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 303-304, 308.

Roberta Ann Dunbar, "Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanese Kingdom" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), p. 107, reports "a massive invasion by Damagaram forces in 1903" against Zango and Baure, presumably after the first Anglo-French boundary commission had removed these states and a large slice of territory from Zinder's control. Presumably the British officer (Maitumbi) and garrison at Zango took appropriate measures to deal with this attack, as I heard nothing of this incident in my inquiry, though Dunbar says that by 1906, "a large trench had been constructed some ten miles north of the town" (ibid., p. 107) as defense against a second assault. She adds that "the population kept moving south of this trench" although "British attempts to collect taxes there in 1906 were rebuffed with skirmishes." This may refer to the skirmish at Dan Mairam between forces of Baure and Zango, when the Turaki Madi was collecting taxes.

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION

1. M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press for the Internatinal African Institute, 1960), p. 298.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 299.
4. Ibid., pp. 300-301.
5. Ibid., p. 300.
6. Ibid., p. 308.
7. Ibid., p. 298.
8. Ibid., p. 300.
9. Ibid., p. 308.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 297-298, 308-309.
12. ibid., p. 300.
13. Ibid., p. 303.
14. Ibid., p. 320.
15. Ibid., p. 303.
16. Ibid., pp. 298-299.
17. Ibid., p. 298.
18. Ibid., p. 299.

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The following abbreviations have been used: FD — Fulani Daura 1806-1906; HD — traditional Daura before 1806; Zango — S. Gwari Abdu's community, 1806-1906; S. — Sarkin (chief of), e.g., S. Kano — Sarkin Kano; SDZ — Sarkin Daura at Zango.

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